Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund of Operating Engineers and Participating Employers

Statute of limitations: separate decision on costs is not on the merit, thus statute of limitations has already begin to run with the preceding decision on the merits: this case has instructive similarities to Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U. S. 196. There, this Court held a district court judgment to be a “final decision” for §1291 purposes despite an unresolved motion for statutory-based attorney’s fees, noting that fee awards do not remedy the injury giving rise to the action, are often available to the defending party, and were, at common law, an ele­ment of “costs” awarded to a prevailing party, not a part of the merits judgment. Id., at 200. Even if laws authorizing fees might some­times treat them as part of the merits, considerations of “operational consistency and predictability in the overall application of §1291” fa­vored a “uniform rule.” Id., at 202; the operational consistency stressed in Budinich is not pro­moted by providing for different jurisdictional effect based solely on whether an asserted right to fees is based on contract or statute (U.S.S.Ct., 15.01.2014, Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund of Operating Engineers and Participating Employers,  J. Kennedy, unanimous).

Dans une procédure devant les cours fédérales, la décision sur les frais et dépens peut être distincte et subséquente à la décision au fond, antérieure. Le délai de recours devant le Circuit fédéral compétent commence à courir dès la notification de la décision au fond, et non pas dès la notification d’une décision ultérieure sur les frais et dépens (ce délai est de 30 jours). La décision sur les frais et dépens n’apporte en effet aucun dédommagement s’agissant du préjudice objet de la procédure. Il est irrelevant à cet égard que la disposition attribuant les frais et dépens soit légale ou contractuelle.