Missouri v. Frye

Attorney: ineffective assistance of counsel: the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel ex­tends to the consideration of plea offers that lapse or are rejected. That right applies to “all ‘critical’ stages of the criminal proceedings.” Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U. S. 778, 786. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52, established that Strickland’s two-part test governs ineffective assistance claims in the plea bargain context. There, the defendant had alleged that his counsel had given him inadequate advice about his plea, but he failed to show that he would have proceeded to trial had he received the proper advice. 474 U. S., at 60. In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. ___, where a plea offer was set aside because counsel had misinformed the defendant of its immigration conse­quences, this Court made clear that “the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical” stage for ineffective-assistance purposes, id., at ___, and rejected the argument made by the State in this case that a knowing and voluntary plea supersedes defense counsel’s errors; Respondent Frye was charged with driving with a revoked license. Be­cause he had been convicted of the same offense three times before, he was charged, under Missouri law, with a felony carrying a maxi­mum 4-year prison term. The prosecutor sent Frye’s counsel a letter, offering two possible plea bargains, including an offer to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor and to recommend, with a guilty plea, a 90 ­day sentence. Counsel did not convey the offers to Frye, and they ex­pired. Less than a week before Frye’s preliminary hearing, he was again arrested for driving with a revoked license. He subsequently pleaded guilty with no underlying plea agreement and was sentenced to three years in prison. Seeking postconviction relief in state court, he alleged his counsel’s failure to inform him of the earlier plea offers denied him the effective assistance of counsel, and he testified that he would have pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor had he known of the offer; 97 percent of federal con­victions and 94 percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas; here, as the result of counsel’s deficient performance, the offers lapsed. Under Strickland, the question then becomes what, if any, prejudice resulted from the breach of duty; to show prejudice where a plea offer has lapsed or been rejected because of counsel’s deficient performance, defendants must demon­strate a reasonable probability both that they would have accepted the more favorable plea offer had they been afforded effective assis­tance of counsel and that the plea would have been entered without the prosecution’s canceling it or the trial court’s refusing to accept it, if they had the authority to exercise that discretion under state law. This application of Strickland to uncommunicated, lapsed pleas does not alter Hill’s standard, which requires a defendant complaining that ineffective assistance led him to accept a plea offer instead of go­ing to trial to show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” 474 U. S., at 59. Hill correctly applies in the context in which it arose, but it does not provide the sole means for demon­strating prejudice arising from counsel’s deficient performance dur­ing plea negotiations. Because Frye argues that with effective assis­tance he would have accepted an earlier plea offer as opposed to entering an open plea, Strickland’s inquiry into whether “the result of the proceeding would have been different,” 466 U. S., at 694, re­quires looking not at whether the defendant would have proceeded to trial but at whether he would have accepted the earlier plea offer. He must also show that, if the prosecution had the discretion to can­cel the plea agreement or the trial court had the discretion to refuse to accept it, there is a reasonable probability neither the prosecution nor the trial court would have prevented the offer from being accept­ed or implemented. This further showing is particularly important because a defendant has no right to be offered a plea, see Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U. S. 545, 561, nor a federal right that the judge accept it, Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257, 262. Missouri, among other States, appears to give the prosecution some discretion to cancel a plea agreement; and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, some state rules, including Missouri’s, and this Court’s precedents give tri­al courts some leeway to accept or reject plea agreements.

Applying these standards here, the Missouri court correctly con­cluded that counsel’s failure to inform Frye of the written plea offer before it expired fell below an objective reasonableness standard, but it failed to require Frye to show that the plea offer would have been adhered to by the prosecution and accepted by the trial court. These matters should be addressed by the Missouri appellate court in the first instance. Given that Frye’s new offense for driving without a li­cense occurred a week before his preliminary hearing, there is reason to doubt that the prosecution would have adhered to the agreement or that the trial court would have accepted it unless they were re­quired by state law to do so. 311 S. W. 3d 350, vacated and remanded (U.S. S. Ct., 21.03.12, Missouri v. Frye, J. Kennedy).

Avocat : violation de son devoir de diligence dû à son client : le Sixième amendement de la Constitution fédérale prévoit que le droit à une assistance effective de son avocat s'étend à toutes les étapes critiques de la procédure pénale, y compris la procédure dans laquelle la culpabilité et la peine sont négociées avec l'accusation. La jurisprudence Strickland prévoit un test en deux parties s'agissant d'apprécier si le travail de l'avocat était ou non suffisant dans le contexte de ces peines négociées. La question, en dernière analyse, est celle de savoir si un préjudice résulte de l'assistance déficiente de l'avocat. Pour établir l'existence d'un dommage dans le cas d'une offre d'accord avec l'accusation, offre qui a expiré, le client de l'avocat doit démontrer, selon le critère de la probabilité raisonnable, qu'il aurait accepté l'accord, que l'accusation n'aurait pas retiré l'offre, et que le Tribunal aurait accepté l'accord (bien entendu si le droit étatique accorde ces possibilités de retrait et d'acceptation). De même, si un client se plaint d'avoir été mal conseillé et d'avoir ainsi accepté un accord avec l'accusation, il appartient à ce client d'établir selon le critère de la probabilité raisonnable que sans le conseil de son avocat, il aurait choisi le procès plutôt que l'accord. En outre, si le client soutient que s'il avait été conseillé correctement il aurait accepté un accord avant procès plutôt qu'un accord ultérieur (open plea), la jurisprudence Strickland implique d'établir que le client aurait accepté l'accord avant procès. Un prévenu n'a pas un droit de se voir offrir un accord, ni un droit (fédéral, découlant des Règles fédérales de procédure pénale) qui imposerait au Tribunal d'accepter l'accord.