Double
Jeopardy: the principles of double jeopardy are of federal and state
constitutional origin. The Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “no person shall
. . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb . . . .” (U.S.
Const., 5th Amend.) Similarly, the
California Constitution provides that “persons may not twice be put in jeopardy
for the same offense . . . .” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) Unless sound reason exists, California courts
will not interpret the California double jeopardy clause more broadly than its
federal counterpart. (Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d
336, 353.)
At
its core, the double jeopardy clause “protects an individual from being
subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an
alleged offense.” (Green v. United States (1957) 355 U.S. 184, 187.) The policy underlying the double jeopardy
protection “is that the State with all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual . . .
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him
to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity.” (Id. at
pp. 187-188.)
“The
constitutional protection against double jeopardy unequivocally prohibits a
second trial following an acquittal,” because the “public interest in the
finality of criminal judgments is so strong that an acquitted defendant may not
be retried even though ‘the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous
foundation.’ ” (Arizona v. Washington (1978) 434 U.S.
497, 503.) Consequently, the People
cannot appeal from a jury’s verdict acquitting a defendant, seeking a reversal
in order to retry the defendant. “This
is justified on the ground that, however mistaken the acquittal may have been,
there would be an unacceptably high risk that the Government, with its superior
resources, would wear down a defendant, thereby ‘enhancing the possibility that
even though innocent he may be found guilty.’ ” (United
States v. DiFrancesco (1980) 449 U.S. 117, 130.)
Similarly,
a trial court’s action amounting to the legal equivalent of an acquittal prior to the jury’s verdict cannot be
appealed by the People because a successful appeal would result in a second trial,
which would violate the protection against double jeopardy. (Evans
v. Michigan (2013) 568 U.S. ___ [133 S.Ct. 1069, 1074] (Evans).)
The trial court’s action is the legal equivalent of an acquittal if it
constitutes a ruling that the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to
support a conviction, regardless of whether that ruling is legally
correct. (Ibid. [although trial court erred in directing verdict of acquittal
at close of prosecution’s case, defendant was acquitted for double jeopardy
purposes and could not be retried]; see, e.g., Smalis v. Pennsylvania (1986) 476 U.S. 140 [trial court’s order
granting defendant’s demurrer after close of the prosecution’s case on grounds
that the evidence was insufficient constituted an acquittal for double jeopardy
purposes and barred appeal and retrial]; Sanabria
v. United States (1978) 437 U.S. 54, 64 [trial court’s order striking
certain evidence and granting judgment of acquittal could not be appealed even
if based on erroneous legal conclusions]; United
States v. Martin Linen Supply Co. (1977) 430 U.S. 564 [double jeopardy
clause barred appeal of trial court’s judgment of acquittal, entered after jury
was discharged because it had been unable to agree on a verdict]; Fong Foo v. United States (1962) 369
U.S. 141, 143 [trial court’s order directing jury to return verdicts of
acquittal, resulting in judgments of acquittal, barred retrial even if trial
court was without power to direct acquittals under the circumstances of the
case].) Sometimes when a trial court grants a motion for new trial, it is
unclear whether it found the evidence to be legally insufficient or whether it
concluded, reviewing the evidence independently as the “13th juror,” that the
jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence. (See § 1181; People v. Lagunas, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1038,
fn. 6.) In such situations, the
reviewing court “must determine whether the ruling . . . ,
whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some
or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” (United
States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., supra, 430 U.S. at p. 571.) In the present case, however, the record
leaves no doubt that the trial court found the evidence to be legally
insufficient. On the other hand, if a trial court rules that evidence was
insufficient to support a conviction after
the jury has returned a verdict the People may appeal that ruling “because
reversal would result in reinstatement of the jury verdict of guilt, not a new
trial.” (Evans, supra, 568 U.S. at
p. ___ [133 S.Ct. at p. 1081, fn. 9]; accord, United States v. Wilson (1975) 420 U.S. 332, 353 [prosecution may
appeal from trial court’s dismissal of indictment after a jury had returned its
verdict].) “Where a Government appeal
presents no threat of successive prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause is
not offended.” (United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., supra, 430 U.S. at pp. 569-570.)
Under
these decisions, in the present case, double jeopardy principles did not
preclude the People from appealing the trial court’s judgment dismissing the
charges on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient. A successful appeal by the People under such
circumstances would merely require reinstatement of the jury’s verdict and
would not result in a new trial. (See Evans, supra, 568 U.S. at p. ___, fn. 9 [133 S.Ct. at
p. 1081, fn. 9].) The Court of
Appeal found the evidence to be sufficient and reversed the trial court’s
ruling, thereby reinstating the jury’s verdict of conviction; because the
People’s appeal and the appellate court’s reversal did not require a new trial,
neither implicated double jeopardy principles.
The question remains whether, as the Court of Appeal concluded, double
jeopardy principles would preclude a retrial if, on remand, the trial court
were to grant defendant’s motion for a new trial or dismissal on defendant’s
remaining grounds other than
insufficiency of the evidence. The
double jeopardy rules are well known.
The protection against double jeopardy generally precludes retrial for
the same offense after a conviction or an acquittal. (People
v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 563.)
An exception to this rule applies if the judgment of conviction is
reversed as a result of defendant’s appeal, motion for new trial, or other challenge
by a defendant to his or her conviction.
(People v. Hernandez (2003) 30
Cal.4th 1, 6-7.) Like other
constitutional guarantees, double jeopardy protections are not absolute, and
may be waived by a defendant. A
defendant who files a motion for a new trial, like a defendant who moves for a
mistrial, waives state and federal double jeopardy protections. (Porter
v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 125, 136; see Oregon v. Kennedy (1982) 456 U.S. 667, 672-673.) By seeking reversal of a judgment of conviction
on appeal, “ ‘in effect, a defendant assents to all the consequences
legitimately following such reversal, and consents to be tried
anew.’ ” (People v. Sachau (1926) 78 Cal.App. 702, 706; see People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 7
[double jeopardy does not bar retrial when conviction is reversed because of a
trial court’s erroneous replacement of a juror]; Tibbs v. Florida (1982) 457 U.S. 31, 42 [state appellate court’s
reversal because of the weight of the evidence, rather than the insufficiency
of the evidence, does not bar retrial].)
Additionally, two policy considerations support allowing retrial in this
situation. First, “society would pay too
high a price ‘were every accused granted immunity from punishment because of
any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading
to conviction.’ ” (Tibbs,
supra, at p. 40.) “Second, the
Court has concluded that retrial after reversal of a conviction is not the type
of governmental oppression targeted by the Double Jeopardy Clause.” (Ibid.)
There
is an exception to the rule permitting retrial after the defendant’s successful
challenge to his conviction: the
defendant may not be retried if the judgment is reversed because, as a matter
of law, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. “When a reversal rests upon the ground that
the prosecution has failed to produce sufficient evidence
. . . , the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the prosecutor from
making a second attempt at conviction.”
(Tibbs v. Florida, supra, 457 U.S. at p. 42.) When the evidence is legally insufficient, it
means that “ ‘the government’s case was so lacking that it should not have
even been submitted to the
jury.’ ” (Id. at p. 41, citing Burks v.
United States (1978) 437 U.S. 1, 16.)
Furthermore, when the defendant seeks a reversal on appeal based on
insufficient evidence, or moves for acquittal in the trial court, the defendant
does not consent to a disposition that contemplates retrial and therefore does
not waive double jeopardy protections. (Evans, supra, 568 U.S. at p. ___ [133 S.Ct. at p. 1079].) Even if the defendant moves for a new trial,
retrial will nevertheless be barred if the defendant’s motion was granted on
grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. (See Burks,
supra, at p. 17 [“in our view it
makes no difference that a defendant has sought a new trial as one of his
remedies, or even as the sole remedy”].) In the present case, the Court of
Appeal contemplated that, on remand, the trial court could consider the
defendant’s remaining grounds for his motion for a new trial and could consider
dismissal under section 1385 on grounds other than the insufficiency of the
evidence. As the above discussion makes
clear, double jeopardy principles would not preclude a retrial if defendant
were successful in obtaining a new trial or a dismissal of charges, because in
seeking to overturn his conviction on grounds other than insufficiency of the
evidence he would impliedly waive double jeopardy protections and consent to be
retried. (See Porter v. Superior Court, supra,
47 Cal.4th at p. 136.) (…) All of the cases cited in the quotation from Hatch, upon which the Court of Appeal
relied, involved rulings by the trial court before
the jury returned a verdict. In such
cases, the prosecution cannot appeal the trial court’s ruling even if it is
erroneous because a successful appeal would require a retrial, which is barred
by double jeopardy. (See Sanabria v. United States, supra, 437 U.S. at pp. 59-60 [trial
court granted defendant’s motion for acquittal after presentation of the
defense case but before the case went to the jury]; People v. Valenti, supra,
49 Cal.2d at pp. 203, 209 [trial court dismissed the information in the
middle of trial]; Fong Foo v. United
States, supra, 369 U.S. at p. 143
[trial court directed jury to return verdicts of acquittal]; see also Evans, supra, 568 U.S. at p. ___ [133 S.Ct. at p. 1073 [trial
court directed verdict of acquittal at close of prosecution’s case]; Mannes v. Gillespie, supra, 967 F.2d at pp. 1313-1316 [after
jury was dismissed because it deadlocked on murder charge, trial court
dismissed the charges on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient].) Arizona
v. Rumsey (1984) 467 U.S. 203, upon which defendant relies, is distinguishable
for the same reason. In Rumsey, the high court held that the
trial court’s judgment imposing a life sentence rather than the death penalty
was the equivalent of an acquittal on the merits and precluded defendant from
being resentenced to death after the state supreme court reversed the trial
court’s decision for legal error. In Rumsey, there was no jury; the trial
court in that case was the “sole decisionmaker” in the proceeding. (Id.
at p. 211.) Thus, “there was no
verdict of ‘guilty’ for the appellate court to reinstate.” (Id.
at p. 212.) Consequently, the
appellate reversal in Rumsey would
have subjected the defendant to a second sentencing trial, in violation of
double jeopardy principles. In contrast,
in the present case reversal of the trial court’s judgment of “acquittal” will
allow reinstatement of the jury’s guilty verdict.
Under
these authorities, the trial court’s order in the present case would have
precluded a retrial had the People chosen not to appeal it or had it been affirmed
on appeal. But the People did appeal and
the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s ruling and reinstated the jury
verdict. “It is well settled that the
reversal of a judgment or order ordinarily leaves the proceeding in the same
situation in which it stood before the judgment or order was made.” (Odlum
v. Duffy (1950) 35 Cal.2d 562, 564; see 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed.
2008) § 869, p. 928 [reversal of an order granting a new trial “leaves the
judgment as if no such order had been made, i.e., as if the motion had been
denied”].) “When an order has been
reversed the effect is that ‘it no longer has any vitality or
force . . . .’ ”
(Estate of Pusey (1918) 177
Cal. 367, 371, quoting Estate of Mitchell
(1899) 126 Cal. 250.) The effect of the
Court of Appeal’s order barring a retrial upon remand was to improperly give
legal force and effect to a ruling of the trial court that it had
reversed. (C.J. Cantil-Sakauye, with six
Justices concurring, no dissent, case Anna Nicole Smith (also known as Vicki
Lynn Marshall), Cal. S. Ct., 03.11.2014, P. v. Eroshevich,
S210545).
Ne bis in idem : ce principe trouve son origine dans les Constitutions
fédérale et californienne. Au plan fédéral, le Cinquième Amendement prévoit que
nul ne saurait être prévenu deux fois pour la même infraction. L’art. I, § 15
de la Constitution de Californie est de même contenu. A moins de raisons
fondées, les Tribunaux californiens n’interprètent pas la disposition de
manière plus large que ce que prévoit la disposition sœur fédérale. Le but de
ce principe est d’empêcher le Gouvernement de procéder à des tentatives
répétées de condamner un individu, le soumettant ainsi à des pressions, y
compris financières, et le contraignant de vivre dans un état continu d’anxiété
et d’insécurité. La protection constitutionnelle contre une double mise en
accusation interdit la tenue d’un second procès pénal après un acquittement,
même si l’acquittement est fondé sur des considérations erronées. Par
conséquent, l’accusation ne peut appeler d’une décision d’acquittement rendue
par un jury, cela dans le but de juger à nouveau le prévenu acquitté. De même,
une quelconque action émanant cette fois-ci non pas du jury mais du Tribunal de
première instance, action constituant un équivalent juridique d’un acquittement
et rendue avant la décision du jury, ne peut pas non plus être appelée par
l’accusation, parce qu’un appel qui viendrait à être jugé bien-fondé
entraînerait la tenue d’une seconde procédure, violant ainsi le principe ne bis
in idem. L’action du Tribunal pénal de première instance constitue l’équivalent
juridique d’un acquittement si elle décide que les preuves apportées par
l’accusation sont insuffisantes pour entraîner une condamnation. Peu importe
que la décision du Tribunal soit juridiquement exacte ou non. Par exemple, la
clause ne bis in idem ne permet pas à l’accusation d’appeler d’un jugement
d’acquittement prononcé après la libération du jury au motif que dit jury ne
parvenait pas à s’accorder sur la question de la culpabilité. Parfois
lorsqu’une cour de première instance accorde une requête sollicitant un nouveau
procès, il n’est pas clair de déterminer si la cour a estimé les preuves
juridiquement insuffisantes ou si elle a conclu, après avoir revu les preuves de
manière indépendante, en tant que « treizième juré », que la décision
du jury ne correspondait pas à l’état des preuves. Dans de telles situations,
la cour supérieure doit déterminer si la décision de première instance, quel
que soit son intitulé, représente véritablement une résolution, correcte ou
non, de certains éléments de fait, ou de tous les éléments de fait, de
l’infraction reprochée. Dans la présente affaire, le dossier ne laisse planer
aucun doute : la cour de première instance a jugé que les preuves étaient
légalement insuffisantes. Par ailleurs, si la cour de première instance juge
que les preuves sont insuffisantes pour permettre une condamnation après
condamnation rendue par le jury, l’accusation peut appeler de la décision de la
cour car une annulation de dite décision résultera en la remise en vigueur de
la décision de culpabilité rendue par le jury, sans impliquer la tenue d’un
nouveau procès. Quand un appel de l’accusation ne présente aucune menace de
poursuites successives, la clause ne bis in idem est respectée. Cependant
demeure la question de savoir si la clause ne bis in idem serait susceptible
d’empêcher la tenue d’un nouveau procès si, la cause étant renvoyée à la cour
de première instance, dite cour venait à accorder la requête d’un prévenu
sollicitant la tenue d’un nouveau procès, ou sollicitant l’annulation de la
procédure basée sur d’autres moyens que l’insuffisance des preuves. La clause
ne bis in idem est bien connue. De manière générale, la protection contre une
double mise en accusation empêche un nouveau procès pour la même infraction
après condamnation ou acquittement. Une exception à cette règle s’applique si
le jugement condamnatoire est renversé suite à un appel déposé par le condamné,
comme conséquence d’une requête sollicitant
un nouveau procès, ou suite à de nouvelles allégations du condamné contre sa
condamnation. Comme d’autres garanties constitutionnelles, la protection
découlant de la clause ne bis in idem n’est pas absolue et le condamné peut y
renoncer. Ainsi, un condamné qui dépose une requête sollicitant la tenue d’un
nouveau procès, ou sollicitant l’annulation de la procédure, renonce à la
protection conférée par la clause ne bis in idem, que cette clause découle du
droit étatique ou du droit fédéral. En outre, la clause ne bis in idem
n’empêche pas la tenue d’un nouveau procès lorsque la condamnation est
renversée du fait que la cour de première instance a remplacé un juré de
manière erronée. Et une annulation par la cour d’appel d’un jugement de
première instance en raison de la trop faible valeur convaincante des preuves
n’empêche pas la tenue d’un nouveau procès. Une annulation pour insuffisance
des preuves, quand à elle, empêche la tenue d’un nouveau procès. Il est encore
ici rappelé qu’il existe une exception à la règle qui permet un nouveau procès
après que le condamné ait mis en cause avec succès sa condamnation : un
nouveau procès ne peut pas avoir lieu si le jugement a été annulé pour
insuffisance de preuves à charge apportées par l’accusation, la Clause ne bis
in idem ne laissant pas à l’accusation une seconde tentative de condamner. En
effet, lorsque les preuves apportées sont juridiquement insuffisantes à obtenir
une condamnation, il s’ensuit que le dossier de l’accusation était à ce point
déficient qu’il n’aurait même pas dû être soumis au jury. Par ailleurs, lorsque
le condamné conclut à l’annulation du jugement condamnatoire en procédure
d’appel basée sur l’insuffisance des preuves à charge, ou lorsque le prévenu
conclut à son acquittement devant la cour de première instance, le prévenu ou
le condamné ne consent pas à un nouveau procès et par conséquent ne renonce pas
à la protection conférée par la Clause ne bis in idem. En l’espèce, la cour
d’appel remarque que, après renvoi à l’autorité inférieure, dite cour est en
droit de considérer les autres motifs à la base de la requête du prévenu
sollicitant un nouveau procès (sauf les motifs abandonnés pour insuffisance de
preuves), et est en droit d’annuler toutes préventions pour d’autres motifs que
l’insuffisance des preuves apportées par l’accusation. Dans les cas où la cour
se prononce avant le jury, l’accusation ne peut pas appeler de la décision de
la cour, même si elle est juridiquement erronée, parce qu’un appel victorieux
impliquerait la tenue d’un nouveau procès, ce que ne permet pas la Clause ne
bis in idem. Par exemple, dans sa décision Arizona v. Rumsey (1984), la Cour
Suprême fédérale jugea que la décision de la cour de première instance
prononçant une peine privative de liberté à vie au lieu de la peine de mort
constituait à ce niveau un acquittement au fond et interdisait le prononcé
d’une condamnation à mort dans un procès ultérieur, procès ultérieur tenu après
que la cour suprême de l’état ait renversé le jugement de première instance
pour une erreur de droit. La cour Rumsey n’était pas une cour avec jury. En
l’espèce, l’accusation a appelé du jugement de première instance et la cour
d’appel a renversé ce jugement, avec pour effet de laisser intacte la décision
du jury. Par conséquent, une nouvelle décision doit être rendue par la cour de
première instance, sur la base de la décision du jury.
