Messerschmidt v. Millender

Immunity of police officers: the officers are entitled to qualified immunity; qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly es­tablished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 231. Where the alleged Fourth Amendment violation involves a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner, or in “objective good faith.” United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 922–923. Nonetheless, that fact does not end the inquiry into objective reasonableness. The Court has rec­ognized an exception allowing suit when “it is obvious that no rea­sonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 341. The “shield of immunity” otherwise conferred by the warrant, id., at 345, will be lost, for example, where the warrant was “based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Leon, 468 U. S., at 923. The threshold for establishing this exception is high. “In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate’s prob­able-cause determination” because “it is the magistrate’s responsibility to determine whether the officer’s allegations establish proba­ble cause and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.” Leon, supra, at 921; California law allows a magistrate to issue a search warrant for items “in the possession of any person with the intent to use them as a means of committing a public offense,” Cal. Penal Code Ann. §1524(a)(3), and the warrant application submitted by the officers specifically referenced this pro­vision as a basis for the search (U.S.S.Ct., 22.02.12, Messerschmidt v. Millender, C.J. Roberts).

Immunité des officiers de police : de manière générale, l’immunité protège les employés publics d’une responsabilité civile aussi longtemps que leur conduite ne porte pas atteinte à des droits clairement établis par une loi fédérale au sens formel ou par la Constitution, droits qu’une personne raisonnable est censée connaître. Lorsqu’une violation alléguée du Quatrième Amendement implique une fouille ou une saisie conformément à un warrant, le fait qu’un magistrat neutre ait délivré un warrant constitue l’indication la plus claire que l’officier de police a agi d’une manière objectivement raisonnable, ou de bonne foi objective. Cependant, cette détermination est insuffisante à satisfaire en elle-même le critère de la manière objectivement raisonnable. La Cour a reconnu une exception en admettant une action lorsqu’il est évident qu’aucun officier de police raisonnablement compétent n’aurait pu concevoir qu’un warrant pouvait être émis. L’immunité conférée par un warrant sera par exemple perdue si le warrant est basé sur un affidavit tellement dépourvu de cause probable que croire à la validité de dit warrant est complètement déraisonnable. Cette exception n’est admise qu’avec beaucoup de retenue.