Monday, June 12, 2017

Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., Docket 16-349

Interpretation (statute):

(…) Our usual presumption that “identical words used in different parts of the same statute” carry “the same mean­ing.” IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U. S. 21, 34 (2005).

(…) See Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U. S. 320, 334 (2010) (“We cannot replace the actual text with speculation as to Congress’ intent”).

(…) Legislation is, after all, the art of compromise, the limitations expressed in statutory terms often the price of passage, and no statute yet known “pur­sues its stated purpose at all costs.” Rodri­guez v. United States, 480 U. S. 522, 525-526 (1987) (per curiam).

(…) The legis­lature says . . . what it means and means . . . what it says. Dodd v. United States, 545 U. S. 353, 357 (2005).

Secondary sources: P. Peters, The Cambridge Guide to English Usage 409 (2004); B. Garner, Modern English Usage 666 (4th ed. 2016); Oxford English Dictionary 669 (2d ed. 1989).

(U.S.S.C., June 12, 2017, Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., Docket 16-349, J Gorsuch, unanimous).

Interprétation littérale d'une loi au sens formel. Considération des termes voisins dans la même loi.

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