Common law v. statute:
(…) The general rule that we do not presume the Legislature intends to abrogate the common law unless it clearly and unequivocally says so. (Reynolds v. Bement (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1075 (Reynolds)). Reynolds, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1086.) The Reynolds rule therefore applies when the common law test of employment would have been appropriate in the same context at common law. But as we explained in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, the common law test of employment is not always appropriate beyond the tort context in which it was originally developed. (Id. at pp. 350–351.) Outside of tort, rather than rigidly applying the common law test, we look to the history and fundamental purposes of the statute at issue to determine whether the Legislature intended the test to apply. (Ibid. [declining to apply the common law test in light of the history and purposes of the workers‘ compensation statute at issue]; Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35, 64 [declining to apply the common law test in light of the full historical and statutory context of the statute at issue].) In Reynolds itself, we observed that the plaintiff in that case had not persuaded us that one may infer from the history and purposes of the statute at issue a clear legislative intent to depart . . . from the common law as to the question at issue. (Reynolds, at p. 1087, fn. 8.)
The rule of the common law, that penal statutes are to be strictly construed, has no application to this Code. All its provisions are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice.
(Cal. S.C., June 26, 2017, P. v. Super. Ct., S232639).
En règle générale, les Tribunaux de l'état de Californie présument que le législatif entend maintenir la Common law quand il légifère, sauf s'il indique clairement et sans équivoque vouloir l'abroger. Les travaux législatifs, l'analyse systématique et l'analyse téléologique sont d'importance.