Animal Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co., Docket No. 16-1220

Conflict of laws: Foreign law: Antitrust: Export: Act of state doctrine: Foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine: Comity (international): Common law:

When foreign law is relevant to a case instituted in a federal court, and the foreign government whose law is in contention submits an official statement on the meaning and interpretation of its domestic law, may the federal court look beyond that official statement? The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit answered generally “no,” ruling that federal courts are “bound to defer” to a foreign government’s construction of its own law, whenever that construction is “reasonable.” In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, 837 F. 3d 175, 189 (2016).

We hold otherwise. A federal court should accord respectful consideration to a foreign government’s submission, but is not bound to accord conclusive effect to the foreign government’s statements. Instead, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 instructs that, in determining foreign law, “the court may consider any relevant material or source . . . whether or not submitted by a party.” As “the court’s determination must be treated as a ruling on a question of law,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 44.1, the court “may engage in its own research and consider any relevant material thus found,” Advisory Committee’s 1966 Note on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 44.1, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 892. Because the Second Circuit ordered dismissal of this case on the ground that the foreign government’s statements could not be gainsaid, we vacate that court’s judgment and remand the case for further consideration.

Petitioners, U. S.-based purchasers of vitamin C, filed a class-action suit against four Chinese corporations that manufacture and export the nutrient. The U. S. purchasers alleged that the Chinese sellers, two of whom are respondents here, had agreed to fix the price and quantity of vitamin C exported to the United States from China, in violation of §1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. §1. More particularly, the U. S. purchasers stated that the Chinese sellers had formed a cartel “facilitated by the efforts of their trade association,” the Chamber of Commerce of Medicines and Health Products Importers and Exporters. Complaint in No. 1:05–CV–453, Docket No. 1, ¶43. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the instant case and related suits for pretrial proceedings in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.

The Chinese sellers moved to dismiss the U. S. purchasers’ complaint on the ground that Chinese law required them to fix the price and quantity of vitamin C exports. Therefore, the Chinese sellers urged, they are shielded from liability under U. S. antitrust law by the act of state doctrine, the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine, and principles of international comity.

At common law, the content of foreign law relevant to a dispute was treated “as a question of fact.” Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the “Fact” Approach to Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 613, 617–619 (1967). In 1801, this Court endorsed the common-law rule, instructing that “the laws of a foreign nation” must be “proved as facts.” Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch 1, 38 (1801); see, e.g., Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch 187, 236 (1804).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1, adopted in 1966, fundamentally changed the mode of determining foreign law in federal courts. The Rule specifies that a court’s determination of foreign law “must be treated as a ruling on a question of law,” rather than as a finding of fact. (…) (Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1 establishes “substantially the same” rule for criminal cases. Advisory Committee’s 1966 Note on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 26.1, 18 U. S. C. App., p. 709).

(…) In the spirit of “international comity,” Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for Southern Dist. of Iowa, 482 U. S. 522, 543, and n. 27 (1987), a federal court should carefully consider a foreign state’s views about the meaning of its own laws. (…) But the appropriate weight in each case will depend upon the circumstances; a federal court is neither bound to adopt the foreign government’s characterization nor required to ignore other relevant materials. When a foreign government makes conflicting statements, or, as here, offers an account in the context of litigation, there may be cause for caution in evaluating the foreign government’s submission. Given the world’s many and diverse legal systems, and the range of circumstances in which a foreign government’s views may be presented, no single formula or rule will fit all cases in which a foreign government describes its own law. Relevant considerations include the statement’s clarity, thoroughness, and support; its context and purpose; the transparency of the foreign legal system; the role and authority of the entity or official offering the statement; and the statement’s consistency with the foreign government’s past positions.

(…) The Court of Appeals additionally mischaracterized the Ministry’s brief as a “sworn evidentiary proffer.” 837 F. 3d, at 189. In so describing the Ministry’s submission, the Court of Appeals overlooked that a court’s resolution of an issue of foreign law “must be treated as a ruling on a question of law.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 44.1. The Ministry’s brief, while a probative source for resolving the legal question at hand, was not an attestation to facts.

The understanding that a government’s expressed view of its own law is ordinarily entitled to substantial but not conclusive weight is also consistent with two international treaties that establish formal mechanisms by which one government may obtain from another an official statement characterizing its laws. Those treaties specify that “the information given in the reply shall not bind the judicial authority from which the request emanated.” European Convention on Information on Foreign Law, Art. 8, June 7, 1968, 720 U. N. T. S. 154; see Inter-American Convention on Proof of and Information on Foreign Law, Art. 6, May 8, 1979, O. A. S. T. S. 1439 U. N. T. S. 111 (similar). Although the United States is not a party to those treaties, they reflect an international practice inconsistent with the Court of Appeals’ “binding, if reasonable” resolution.

Secondary sources: Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the “Fact” Approach to Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 613, 617–619 (1967); C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §2441, p. 324 (3d ed. 2008).

(U.S.S.C., June 14, 2018, Animal Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co., Docket No. 16-1220, J. Ginsburg, unanimous)

En l’espèce, des acheteurs U.S. de vitamine C ont déposé une « class action » contre quatre entreprises chinoises qui la fabrique et l’exporte.

Quand une cour fédérale doit considérer un droit étranger et que le gouvernement étranger émet une déclaration officielle exposant le sens et l’interprétation de ce droit, la cour fédérale se doit de prendre en compte dite déclaration, mais n’est pas tenue de la suivre, en application de la Règle 44.1 de procédure civile fédérale. En pratique, pour déterminer le contenu du droit étranger, la cour peut entreprendre sa propre recherche et s’inspirer de toutes sources utiles.

Les importateurs, demandeurs à l’action de classe, allèguent que les entreprises chinoises venderesses se sont entendues pour fixer les prix de vente et les quantités, en violation de la §1 du Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §1). Les entreprises défenderesses soutiennent que le droit chinois leur impose de fixer le prix de la vitamine C et les quantités exportées. De la sorte, invoquent-elles, elles seraient protégées par le droit U.S. de l’antitrust, par l’« act of state doctrine », par la « foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine » et par les principes de l’ « international comity ».

Sous le régime de la Common law, la détermination du contenu du droit étranger était traitée comme une question de fait, et non de droit. La Cour a repris sur ce point la Common law par une décision de 1801.

Ce régime a été fondamentalement modifié par la Règle 44.1 de procédure civile fédérale (et par la Règle 26.1 de procédure pénale fédérale) : la détermination du droit étranger se traite désormais comme une question de droit.

L’essence de l’ « international comity » impose à une cour fédérale de considérer avec soin les vues d’un état étranger au sujet de son propre droit. Mais le poids à donner à ces vues dépend des circonstances du cas d’espèce. Une cour fédérale n’est pas tenue de se conformer à ces vues, et n’est pas tenue non plus d’ignorer d’autres sources permettant d’appréhender le contenu du droit étranger. Ainsi, quand un gouvernement étranger émet des opinions contradictoires ou, comme ici, s’exprime dans le contexte d’une procédure judiciaire, il se peut que l’avis du gouvernement étranger doive être apprécié avec retenue. En pratique, l’avis du gouvernement étranger doit être analysé sous l’angle de sa clarté, de sa rigueur, de sa motivation, de son contexte, de son but, de la transparence du système juridique étranger, du rôle et de l’autorité de l’entité gouvernementale qui s’est exprimée, et de sa consistance avec les prises de position passées dudit gouvernement étranger.

(L’autorité inférieure, à tort, a caractérisé la déclaration du gouvernement étranger comme une attestation officielle donnée sous serment).

Les Etats-Unis ne sont pas parties aux deux traités suivants : European Convention on Information on Foreign Law, Inter-American Convention on Proof of and Information on Foreign Law. Cependant, la Cour observe que la Règle 44.1 est conforme à ces deux traités.