Filarsky v. Delia

Immunity: of a private individual temporarily retained by the government to carry out its work: a private individual temporarily retained by the government to carry out its work is entitled to seek qualified immunity from suit under §1983; respondent Delia, a firefighter employed by the City of Rialto, Califor­nia, missed work after becoming ill on the job. Suspicious of Delia’s extended absence, the City hired a private investigation firm to con­duct surveillance on him. When Delia was seen buying fiberglass in­sulation and other building supplies, the City initiated an internal af­fairs investigation. It hired petitioner Filarsky, a private attorney, to interview Delia; Delia brought an action under 42 U. S. C. §1983 against the City, the Fire Department, Filarsky, and other individuals, alleging that the order to produce the building materials violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; in determining whether the Court of Appeals made a valid dis­tinction between City employees and Filarsky for qualified immunity purposes, this Court looks to the general principles of tort immunities and defenses applicable at common law, and the reasons the Court has afforded protection from suit under §1983. See Imbler v. Pacht­man, 424 U. S. 409, 418. The common law as it existed in 1871, when Congress enacted §1983, did not draw a distinction between full-time public servants and private individuals engaged in public service in according protection to those carrying out government responsibili­ties. Government at that time was smaller in both size and reach, had fewer responsibilities, and operated primarily at the local level. Government work was carried out to a significant extent by individuals who did not devote all their time to public duties, but instead pur­sued private callings as well. In according protection from suit to in­dividuals doing the government’s work, the common law did not draw distinctions based on the nature of a worker’s engagement with the government. Indeed, examples of individuals receiving immunity for actions taken while engaged in public service on a temporary or occa­sional basis are as varied as the reach of government itself. Common law principles of immunity were incorporated into §1983 and should not be abrogated absent clear legislative intent. See Pulliam v. Al­len, 466 U. S. 522, 529. Immunity under §1983 therefore should not vary depending on whether an individual working for the government does so as a permanent or full-time employee, or on some other basis (U.S.S.Ct., 17.04.12, Filarsky v. Delia, C.J. Roberts, unanimous).

Immunité d’une personne physique employée temporairement ou à temps partiel par le Gouvernement pour accomplir des tâches de nature gouvernementale (en l’espèce cas d’un avocat engagé par une ville de Californie pour investiguer la situation d’un pompier dont l’absence pour maladie paraissait douteuse) : même employé de manière temporaire, un tel employé bénéficie de l’immunité accordée aux employés par la loi fédérale (42 U.S.C. §1983, qui fait l’objet d’une abondante jurisprudence de la Cour et qui concerne l’immunité d’un employé d’état s’il est recherché directement en responsabilité par un tiers pour une faute alléguée dans l’exercice de ses fonctions). Historiquement, quand le Gouvernement était de taille beaucoup plus restreinte qu’aujourd’hui, beaucoup d’employés d’état travaillaient à temps partiel et accomplissaient à-côté de leurs tâches publiques une activité dans le secteur privé. Dès lors, en application de la Common law, ces employés publics à temps partiel bénéficient de l’immunité. Le Congrès fédéral doit abroger ce principe de la Common law pour qu’il cesse de s’appliquer. Le Congrès ne l’a pas fait à ce jour, de sorte que l’immunité continue de s’appliquer s’agissant des employés publics temporaires.