Torture: Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), which authorizes a cause of action against “an individual” for acts of torture and extrajudicial killing committed under authority or color of law of any foreign nation. 106 Stat. 73, note following 28 U. S. C. §1350; as used in the TVPA, the term “individual” encompasses only natural persons. Consequently, the Act does not impose liability against organizations; before a word will be assumed to have a meaning broader than or different from its ordinary meaning, Congress must give some indication that it intended such a result. There are no such indications in the TVPA; the Act’s liability provision uses the word “individual” five times in the same sentence: once to refer to the perpetrator and four times to refer to the victim. See TVPA §2(a). Since only a natural person can be a victim of torture or extrajudicial killing, it is difficult to conclude that Congress used “individual” four times in the same sentence to refer to a natural person and once to refer to a natural person and any nonsovereign organization; finally, although petitioners rightly note that the TVPA contemplates liability against officers who do not personally execute the torture or extrajudicial killing, it does not follow that the Act embraces liability against nonsovereign organizations; petitioners also contend that legislative history supports their broad reading of “individual,” but “reliance on legislative history is unnecessary in light of the statute’s unambiguous language.” Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P. A. v. United States, 559 U. S. ___, ___. In any event, the history supports this Court’s interpretation (U.S.S.Ct., 18.04.12, Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, J. Sotomayor).