Coleman v. Johnson

Evidence: criminal law: substantive law and procedural law: federal law versus state law: at the outset, we note that it was error for the Court of Appeals to look to Pennsylvania law in determining what distinguishes a reasoned inference from “mere specula­tion.” Under Jackson, federal courts must look to state law for “the substantive elements of the criminal offense,” 443 U. S., at 324, n. 16, but the minimum amount of evi­dence that the Due Process Clause requires to prove the offense is purely a matter of federal law.

Under the deferential federal standard, the approach taken by the Court of Appeals was flawed because it unduly impinged on the jury’s role as factfinder. Jackson leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what inferences to draw from the evidence presented at trial, requiring only that jurors “draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id., at 319. This deferential standard does not permit the type of fine-grained factual parsing in which the Court of Appeals engaged. For ex­ample, in addressing Brown and Ramsey’s testimony that Williams was “walked” and “forced” into the alleyway, the court objected that the witnesses did not describe any “physical action” supporting the conclusion that force was used. 446 Fed. Appx., at 541. Absent some specific testi­mony that “Johnson actively pushed, shoved, ordered or otherwise forced the victim into the alley, or prevented him from leaving it,” ibid., the court could see no reasonable basis for the jury’s conclusion that Johnson had a specific intent to help kill Williams.

That analysis is flawed for two reasons. First, the coer­cive nature of Johnson and Walker’s behavior could be inferred from other circumstances not involving the direct use of force: Walker was noticeably concealing a weapon, and he had been heatedly threatening to kill Williams after a violent confrontation earlier in the day. Johnson and Walker kept Williams between them in a single-file line on the way to the alley, where Johnson stood at the entrance while the other two entered, suggesting that Johnson may have been prepared to prevent Williams from fleeing. And second, even if Williams was not co­erced into the alley, the jury still could have concluded that Johnson helped lead or lure him there to facilitate the murder.

Taken in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the trial testimony revealed that Johnson and Walker “ran the streets together,” and had attempted to collect a debt from Williams earlier on the day of the murder. Williams resisted the collection, managing to humiliate Walker in the process by giving him a public thrashing with a broomstick. This enraged Walker to the point that he repeatedly declared over the course of the day in Johnson’s presence that he intended to kill Williams. Then, while Walker was noticeably concealing a bulky object under his trenchcoat, Johnson helped escort Williams into an alley, where Johnson stood at the entryway while Walker pulled out a shotgun and shot Williams in the chest.

On the basis of these facts, a rational jury could infer that Johnson knew that Walker was armed with a shot­gun; knew that he intended to kill Williams; and helped usher Williams into the alleyway to meet his fate. The jury in this case was convinced, and the only question under Jackson is whether that finding was so insupporta­ble as to fall below the threshold of bare rationality. The state court of last review did not think so, and that deter­mination in turn is entitled to considerable deference under AEDPA, 28 U. S. C. §2254(d).

Affording due respect to the role of the jury and the state courts, we conclude that the evidence at Johnson’s trial was not nearly sparse enough to sustain a due pro­cess challenge under Jackson. The evidence was sufficient to convict Johnson as an accomplice and a co-conspirator in the murder of Taraja Williams. The Commonwealth’s petition for certiorari and the motion to proceed in forma pauperis are granted, the judgment of the Court of Ap­peals for the Third Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion (U.S.S.Ct., 29.05.12, Coleman v. Johnson, Per Curiam).

Seul le droit fédéral, à l’exclusion du droit des états, détermine les exigences minimales en matière de preuves requises par la clause du procès équitable.

Le rôle du jury dans le procès pénal consiste à établir les faits. Les constatations du jury sont revues par les autorités de recours sous l’angle d’un standard déférentiel. La jurisprudence de la Cour Suprême fédérale laisse au jury une large discrétion en ce qui concerne les inférences à tirer des preuves présentées au procès pénal de première instance. La Cour exige uniquement que le jury retienne des inférences raisonnables des faits de base pour aboutir aux faits juridiquement déterminants. En l’espèce, la cour d’appel a retenu à tort l’absence de témoignages spécifiques établissant que le prévenu avait exercé une contrainte physique sur le prévenu, en vue de permettre son meurtre. En effet, la nature contraignante du comportement du prévenu pouvait être déduite d’autres circonstances n’impliquant pas l’usage direct de la force. Il est établi qu’un comparse du prévenu dissimulait une arme, et qu’il avait menacé la victime de la tuer après une violente altercation le jour de l’homicide. Des comparses avaient au moment du crime aidé le prévenu à maintenir la victime le long d’une allée conduisant à une entrée, devant laquelle se dressait l’auteur de l’homicide, suggérant qu’il se trouvait là pour prévenir la fuite de la victime. Par ailleurs, même si la victime n’avait pas été contrainte de parcourir l’allée, le jury aurait été fondé à conclure que le prévenu avait fourni son aide pour attirer la victime en vue de faciliter son exécution.

Sur la base des faits de la cause, un jury rationnel pouvait inférer que le prévenu savait que l’un de ses comparses portait une arme à feu, et qu’il savait que le comparse avait l’intention de tuer la victime, considérant la violente altercation le jour même entre le comparse et la victime, et considérant les déclarations répétées du comparse pendant la journée selon lesquelles il entendait tuer la victime.  Le critère de la rationalité est ainsi satisfait. Dès lors, pas de violation du droit à un procès équitable en l’espèce. Les preuves sont suffisantes pour permettre à la cour pénale étatique de condamner le prévenu de complice et de co-conspirateur du meurtre de la victime.