Criminal procedure: ne bis in idem: the trial of
Esteban Martinez was set to begin on May 17, 2010. His counsel was ready; the
State was not. When the court swore in the jury and invited the State to
present its first witness, the State declined to present any evidence. So
Martinez moved for a directed not-guilty verdict, and the court granted it. The
State appealed, arguing that the trial court should have granted its motion for
a continuance. The question is whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the
State’s attempt to appeal in the hope of subjecting Martinez to a new trial.
The Illinois Supreme Court manifestly erred in
allowing the State’s appeal, on the theory that jeopardy never attached because
Martinez “was never at risk of conviction.” 2013 IL 113475, ¶39, 990 N. E. 2d
215, 224. Our cases have repeatedly stated the bright-line rule that “jeopardy
attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn.” Crist v. Bretz,
437 U. S. 28, 35 (1978); there is simply no doubt that Martinez was subjected
to jeopardy. And because the trial court found the State’s evidence
insufficient to sustain a conviction, there is equally no doubt that Martinez
may not be retried.
“‘The conclusion that jeopardy has attached,’”
however, “‘begins, rather than ends, the inquiry as to whether the Double
Jeopardy Clause bars retrial.’” Id., at 390. The remaining question is
whether the jeopardy ended in such a manner that the defendant may not be
retried. See 6 LaFave §25.1(g) (surveying circumstances in which retrial is and
is not allowed). Here, there is no doubt that Martinez’s jeopardy ended in a
manner that bars his retrial: the trial court acquitted him of the charged
offenses. “Perhaps the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy
jurisprudence has been that ‘a verdict of acquittal . . . could not be reviewed
. . . without putting a defendant twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the
Constitution.’” Martin Linen, supra, at 571; “our cases have
defined an acquittal to encompass any ruling that the prosecution’s proof is
insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense.” Evans v. Michigan,
568 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 4–5). And the trial court clearly made
such a ruling here. After the State declined to present evidence against
Martinez, his counsel moved for “directed findings of not guilty to both
counts,” and the court “granted the motion for a directed finding.” Tr. 21.
That is a textbook acquittal: a finding that the State’s evidence cannot
support a conviction; “we have emphasized that what constitutes an ‘acquittal’ is
not to be controlled by the form of the judge’s action”; it turns on “whether
the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution .
. . of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” Martin
Linen, 430 U. S., at 571; see also Evans, supra, at ___ (slip
op., at 11) (“Our decision turns not on the form of the trial court’s action,
but rather whether it ‘serves’ substantive ‘purposes’ or procedural ones”); United
States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82, 96 (1978) (“We have previously noted
that ‘the trial judge’s characterization of his own action cannot control the
classification of the action’”); (…) And, critically, the court told the State
on the day of trial that it could “move to dismiss its case” before the jury
was sworn. Tr. 3. Had the State accepted that invitation, the Double Jeopardy
Clause would not have barred it from recharging Martinez. Instead, the State
participated in the selection of jurors and did not ask for dismissal before
the jury was sworn. When the State declined to dismiss its case, it “‘took a
chance, . . . entering upon the trial of the case without sufficient evidence
to convict.’” Downum v. United States, 372 U. S. 734, 737 (1963).
Here, the State knew, or should have known, that an acquittal forever bars the
retrial of the defendant when it occurs after jeopardy has attached (U.S.S.Ct.,
27.05.2014, Martinez v. Illinois, Docket 13-5967, Per Curiam).
Un prévenu qui
a été acquitté ne peut pas être poursuivi une seconde fois. Pour savoir si une personne
a acquis la qualité de prévenu, autrement dit pour savoir si une procédure
contre elle a débuté, il s’agit de déterminer à partir de quelle date cette
personne a été « mise en examen ». Le terme technique est
« jeopardy ». La Constitution fédérale interdit donc d’être en
« jeopardy » une seconde fois si la première procédure s’est terminée
par un acquittement. Une personne est en « jeopardy » dès que le jury
a été constitué et assermenté. Pour déterminer si la première procédure s’est
terminée par un acquittement, les termes utilisés dans la décision de justice
n’importent pas : c’est le contenu de la décision qu’il s’agit d’analyser
pour déterminer si elle équivaut à un acquittement. La jurisprudence de la Cour
définit un acquittement comme toute décision établissant que les moyens de
preuves de l’accusation sont insuffisants pour condamner. Dans cette affaire,
la cour de première instance avait expressément indiqué à l’accusation, qui
n’était manifestement pas prête (ses témoins faisant défaut et étant
introuvables) qu’elle pouvait demander l’abandon des poursuites avant que le
jury ne soit assermenté. Si l’accusation avait accepté cette invitation, un
« second » procès aurait pu être mené. Mais comme le jury a été
assermenté et que l’accusation a simplement choisi de ne pas participer, un
second procès n’était pas constitutionnellement admissible.
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