Antitrust: determining whether there is concerted action under §1; the Court has repeatedly found instances in which members of a legally single entity violated §1 when the entity was controlled by a group of competitors and served, in essence, as a vehicle for ongoing concerted activity. See, e.g., United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U. S. 350, 352–356. Conversely, the Court has found that although the entities may be “separate” for purposes of incorporation or formal title, if they are controlled by a single center of decisionmaking and they control a single aggregation of economic power, an agreement between them does not constitute a “contract, combination . . . or, conspiracy.” Copperweld, 467 U. S., at 769; (…) concerted action covered by §1, and the court must decide whether the restraint of trade is unreasonable and therefore illegal; although decisions made by NFLP are not as easily classified as concerted activity, the NFLP’s decisions about licensing the teams’ separately owned intellectual property are concerted activity and thus covered by §1 for the same reason that decisions made directly by the 32 teams are covered by §1; the alleged conduct related to licensing of intellectual property constitutes concerted action that is not categorically beyond §1’s coverage (U.S. S. Ct., 24.05.10, American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, J. Stevens, unanimous).