Antitrust: determining whether there is concerted action under §1; the
Court has repeatedly found instances in which members of a legally single
entity violated §1 when the entity was controlled by a group of competitors and
served, in essence, as a vehicle for ongoing concerted activity. See, e.g.,
United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U. S. 350, 352–356. Conversely,
the Court has found that although the entities may be “separate” for purposes
of incorporation or formal title, if they are controlled by a single center of
decisionmaking and they control a single aggregation of economic power, an
agreement between them does not constitute a “contract, combination . . . or,
conspiracy.” Copperweld, 467 U. S., at 769; (…) concerted action covered
by §1, and the court must decide whether the restraint of trade is unreasonable
and therefore illegal; although decisions made by NFLP are not as easily
classified as concerted activity, the NFLP’s decisions about licensing the
teams’ separately owned intellectual property are concerted activity and thus
covered by §1 for the same reason that decisions made directly by the 32 teams
are covered by §1; the alleged conduct related to licensing of intellectual
property constitutes concerted action that is not categorically beyond §1’s coverage
(U.S. S. Ct., 24.05.10, American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, J.
Stevens, unanimous).
Monday, May 24, 2010
American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League
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