Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, Docket 15-7

Misrepresentation: Common law: Tort: Securities: In tort law, for exam­ple, “if the defendant does speak, he must disclose enough to prevent his words from being misleading.” W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts §106, p. 738 (5th ed. 1984). Contract law also embraces this principle. See, e.g., Restate­ment (Second) of Contracts §161, Comment a, p. 432 (1979). And we have used this definition in other statutory contexts. See, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U. S. 27, 44 (2011) (securities law).

A classic example of an actionable half-truth in contract law is the seller who reveals that there may be two new roads near a property he is selling, but fails to disclose that a third potential road might bisect the property. See Junius Constr. Co. v. Cohen, 257 N. Y. 393, 400, 178 N. E. 672, 674 (1931) (Cardozo, J.). “The enumeration of two streets, described as unopened but projected, was a tacit represen­tation that the land to be conveyed was subject to no others, and certainly subject to no others materially affect­ing the value of the purchase.” Ibid. Likewise, an appli­cant for an adjunct position at a local college makes an actionable misrepresentation when his resume lists prior jobs and then retirement, but fails to disclose that his “retirement” was a prison stint for perpetrating a $12 million bank fraud. See D. Dobbs, P. Hayden, & H. Bublick, Law of Torts §682, pp. 702–703, and n. 14 (2d ed.2011) (citing Sarvis v. Vermont State Colleges, 172 Vt. 76, 78, 80–82, 772 A. 2d 494, 496, 497–499 (2001)).

(…) Materiality “looks to the effect on the likely or actual behavior of the recipient of the alleged misrepre­sentation.” R. Lord, Williston on Contracts §69:12, p. 549 (4th ed. 2003) (Williston). In tort law, for instance, a “matter is material” in only two circumstances: (1) “if a reasonable man would attach importance to it in deter­mining his choice of action in the transaction”; or (2) if the defendant knew or had reason to know that the recipient of the representation attaches importance to the specific matter “in determining his choice of action,” even though a reasonable person would not. Restatement (Second) of Torts §538, at 80. Materiality in contract law is substan­tially similar. See Restatement (Second) of contracts §162(2), and Comment c, pp. 439, 441 (1979) (“A misrep­resentation is material” only if it would “likely . . . induce a reasonable person to manifest his assent,” or the defend­ant “knows that for some special reason the representa­tion is likely to induce the particular recipient to manifest his assent” to the transaction). Accord, Williston §69:12, pp. 549–550 (“most popular” understand­ing is “that a misrepresentation is material if it concerns a matter to which a reasonable person would attach importance in determining his or her choice of action with respect to the transaction involved: which will induce action by a complaining party, knowledge of which would have induced the recipient to act differently”); id., at 550 (noting rule that “a misrepresentation is material if, had it not been made, the party complaining of fraud would not have taken the action alleged to have been induced by the misrepresentation”); Junius Constr. Co. v. Cohen, 257 N. Y. 393, 400, 178 N. E. 672, 674 (1931) (a misrepresentation is material if it “went to the very essence of the bargain”); cf. Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 16, 22, n. 5 (1999) (relying on “ ‘natural tendency to influence’ ” standard and citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §538 definition of materiality).

Materiality, in addition, cannot be found where noncompliance is minor or insubstantial. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537, 543 (1943) (contractors’ misrepresentation that they satisfied a non-collusive bidding requirement for federal program contracts violated the False Claims Act because “the government’s money would never have been placed in the joint fund for payment to respondents had its agents known the bids were collusive”); see also Junius Constr., 257 N. Y., at 400, 178 N. E., at 674 (an undisclosed fact was material because “no one can say with reason that the plaintiff would have signed this contract if informed of the likelihood” of the undisclosed fact).

Secondary sources: W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts §106, p. 738 (5th ed. 1984); Restate­ment (Second) of Contracts §161, Comment a, p. 432 (1979); D. Dobbs, P. Hayden, & H. Bublick, Law of Torts §682, pp. 702–703, and n. 14 (2d ed.2011); R. Lord, Williston on Contracts §69:12, p. 549 (4th ed. 2003).

(U.S.S.C., June 16, 2016, Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, Docket 15-7, J. Thomas, unanimous).

Induire en erreur, en responsabilité extracontractuelle ou contractuelle : en droit de la responsabilité civile, si l’adverse partie s’est exprimée, elle doit en avoir dit suffisamment pour éviter d’induire en erreur. Le droit des contrats connaît le même principe (Restate­ment (Second) of Contracts §161, Comment a, p. 432 (1979)), que la Cour a repris dans d’autres contextes statutaires (p. ex. en droit des Securities).

Un exemple classique d’une demi-vérité actionnable en droit des contrats est la déclaration du vendeur qui informe son acheteur que deux routes pourraient bien dans le futur être construites à proximité de l’immeuble en vente, mais qui omet d’informer qu’une troisième route pourrait être construite, cette dernière partageant la propriété en deux. En effet, la mention des deux routes constitue une représentation tacite qu’aucune autre route n’est projetée, et certainement qu’aucune autre route affectant la valeur de la propriété n’est projetée (cf. Junius Constr. Co. v. Cohen, 257 N. Y. 393, 400, 178 N. E. 672, 674 (1931) (Cardozo, J.)). De même, celui qui postule à une offre d’emploi comme professeur assistant induit en erreur, et peut être actionné à ce titre, si son CV donne la liste de ses emplois antérieurs, la liste comprenant par ailleurs une période de retraite, sans mentionner que cette retraite correspond à une période d’incarcération pour avoir commis une fraude bancaire portant sur 12 millions de dollars.

(…) La condition de matérialité s’intéresse au comportement soit effectif soit vraisemblable de celui qui est – est-il allégué – induit en erreur (R. Lord, Williston on Contracts §69:12, p. 549). En droit des « Torts », une matière est « matérielle » dans seulement deux circonstances : (1) si un homme raisonnable attache de l’importance à dite matière pour déterminer son action dans le cadre de la transaction, ou (2) si le défendeur savait ou avait des raisons de savoir que celui recevant les informations attachait de l’importance à dite matière dans la détermination de son action, même si une personne raisonnable n’y attacherait pas d’importance (cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts §538, at 80). La notion de matérialité est substantiellement similaire en droit des contrats : selon le Restatement (Second) of contracts §162(2), and Comment c, pp. 439, 441 (1979), le fait d’induire en erreur est matériel seulement s’il est de nature à vraisemblablement induire en erreur une personne raisonnable, l’incitant ainsi à manifester sa volonté, ou seulement si le défendeur savait que pour certaines raisons, la représentation induirait vraisemblablement celui qui l’a reçue à conclure la transaction. Un fait qui induit en erreur est matériel s’il porte sur l’essence même de la transaction.