Misrepresentation: Common law: Tort: Securities: In
tort law, for example, “if the defendant does speak, he must disclose enough
to prevent his words from being misleading.” W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton,
& D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts
§106, p. 738 (5th ed. 1984). Contract law also embraces this principle. See, e.g.,
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §161, Comment a, p. 432 (1979).
And we have used this definition in other statutory contexts. See, e.g.,
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U. S. 27, 44 (2011)
(securities law).
A classic example of an actionable
half-truth in contract law is the seller who reveals that there may be two new
roads near a property he is selling, but fails to disclose that a third
potential road might bisect the property. See Junius Constr. Co. v. Cohen,
257 N. Y. 393, 400, 178 N. E. 672, 674 (1931) (Cardozo, J.). “The enumeration
of two streets, described as unopened but projected, was a tacit representation
that the land to be conveyed was subject to no others, and certainly subject to
no others materially affecting the value of the purchase.” Ibid. Likewise,
an applicant for an adjunct position at a local college makes an actionable
misrepresentation when his resume lists prior jobs and then retirement, but
fails to disclose that his “retirement” was a prison stint for perpetrating a
$12 million bank fraud. See D. Dobbs, P. Hayden, & H. Bublick, Law of Torts
§682, pp. 702–703, and n. 14 (2d ed.2011) (citing Sarvis v. Vermont
State Colleges, 172 Vt. 76, 78, 80–82, 772 A. 2d 494, 496, 497–499 (2001)).
(…) Materiality “looks to the effect on the likely or
actual behavior of the recipient of the alleged misrepresentation.” R. Lord,
Williston on Contracts §69:12, p. 549 (4th ed. 2003)
(Williston). In tort law, for instance, a “matter is material” in only two
circumstances: (1) “if a reasonable man would attach importance to it in determining
his choice of action in the transaction”; or (2) if the defendant knew or had
reason to know that the recipient of the representation attaches importance to
the specific matter “in determining his choice of action,” even though a reasonable
person would not. Restatement (Second) of Torts §538, at 80. Materiality in
contract law is substantially similar. See Restatement (Second) of contracts §162(2),
and Comment c, pp. 439, 441 (1979) (“A misrepresentation is material”
only if it would “likely . . . induce a reasonable person to manifest his
assent,” or the defendant “knows that for some special reason the representation
is likely to induce the particular recipient to manifest his assent” to the
transaction). Accord, Williston §69:12, pp. 549–550 (“most popular”
understanding is “that a misrepresentation is material if it concerns a matter
to which a reasonable person would attach importance in determining his or her
choice of action with respect to the transaction involved: which will induce
action by a complaining party, knowledge of which would have induced the
recipient to act differently”); id., at 550 (noting rule that “a
misrepresentation is material if, had it not been made, the party complaining
of fraud would not have taken the action alleged to have been induced by the
misrepresentation”); Junius Constr. Co. v. Cohen, 257 N. Y. 393,
400, 178 N. E. 672, 674 (1931) (a misrepresentation is material if it “went to
the very essence of the bargain”); cf. Neder v. United States,
527 U. S. 1, 16, 22, n. 5 (1999) (relying on “ ‘natural tendency to influence’
” standard and citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §538 definition of
materiality).
Materiality, in addition, cannot be found
where noncompliance is minor or insubstantial. See United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537, 543 (1943) (contractors’
misrepresentation that they satisfied a non-collusive bidding requirement for
federal program contracts violated the False Claims Act because “the
government’s money would never have been placed in the joint fund for payment
to respondents had its agents known the bids were collusive”); see also Junius
Constr., 257 N. Y., at 400, 178 N. E., at 674 (an undisclosed fact was
material because “no one can say with reason that the plaintiff would have
signed this contract if informed of the likelihood” of the undisclosed fact).
Secondary sources: W.
Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser
and Keeton on Law of Torts §106, p. 738 (5th ed. 1984); Restatement (Second)
of Contracts §161, Comment a, p. 432 (1979); D. Dobbs, P. Hayden, &
H. Bublick, Law of Torts §682, pp. 702–703, and n. 14 (2d ed.2011); R.
Lord, Williston on Contracts §69:12, p. 549 (4th ed.
2003).
(U.S.S.C., June 16, 2016, Universal Health
Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, Docket 15-7, J. Thomas,
unanimous).
Induire
en erreur, en responsabilité extracontractuelle ou contractuelle : en
droit de la responsabilité civile, si l’adverse partie s’est exprimée, elle
doit en avoir dit suffisamment pour éviter d’induire en erreur. Le droit des
contrats connaît le même principe (Restatement
(Second) of Contracts §161, Comment a,
p. 432 (1979)), que la Cour a repris dans d’autres contextes statutaires (p.
ex. en droit des Securities).
Un exemple classique d’une demi-vérité actionnable en droit des contrats
est la déclaration du vendeur qui informe son acheteur que deux routes
pourraient bien dans le futur être construites à proximité de l’immeuble en
vente, mais qui omet d’informer qu’une troisième route pourrait être
construite, cette dernière partageant la propriété en deux. En effet, la mention
des deux routes constitue une représentation tacite qu’aucune autre route n’est
projetée, et certainement qu’aucune autre route affectant la valeur de la
propriété n’est projetée (cf. Junius
Constr. Co. v. Cohen,
257 N. Y. 393, 400, 178 N. E. 672, 674 (1931) (Cardozo, J.)). De même, celui
qui postule à une offre d’emploi comme professeur assistant induit en erreur,
et peut être actionné à ce titre, si son CV donne la liste de ses emplois
antérieurs, la liste comprenant par ailleurs une période de retraite, sans
mentionner que cette retraite correspond à une période d’incarcération pour
avoir commis une fraude bancaire portant sur 12 millions de dollars.
(…) La condition de matérialité s’intéresse au comportement soit
effectif soit vraisemblable de celui qui est – est-il allégué – induit en
erreur (R.
Lord, Williston on Contracts §69:12, p. 549). En
droit des « Torts », une matière est « matérielle » dans
seulement deux circonstances : (1) si un homme raisonnable attache de
l’importance à dite matière pour déterminer son action dans le cadre de la
transaction, ou (2) si le défendeur savait ou avait des raisons de savoir que
celui recevant les informations attachait de l’importance à dite matière dans
la détermination de son action, même si une personne raisonnable n’y
attacherait pas d’importance (cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts §538, at 80).
La notion de matérialité est substantiellement similaire en droit des
contrats : selon le Restatement (Second) of contracts §162(2), and Comment
c, pp. 439, 441 (1979), le fait
d’induire en erreur est matériel seulement s’il est de nature à
vraisemblablement induire en erreur une personne raisonnable, l’incitant ainsi
à manifester sa volonté, ou seulement si le défendeur savait que pour certaines
raisons, la représentation induirait vraisemblablement celui qui l’a reçue à
conclure la transaction. Un fait qui induit en erreur est matériel s’il porte
sur l’essence même de la transaction.
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