J.M. v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., S230510

Tolling: Equitable tolling: Equity: Equitable remedies: Deadline: Statute of limitations:

The doctrine of equitable tolling may also apply to the limitation periods imposed by the claims statutes.  Addison v. State of California (1978) 21 Cal.3d 313 (Addison) recognized “a general policy which favors relieving plaintiff from the bar of a limitations statute when, possessing several legal remedies he, reasonably and in good faith, pursues one designed to lessen the extent of his injuries or damage.”  (Id. at p. 317; see McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 100.)  In Addison, the plaintiffs presented a timely claim.  When it was rejected they filed a federal lawsuit, which was eventually dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  In these circumstances, the period for suing in state court was equitably tolled during the pendency of the federal action.  The elements of timely notice, lack of prejudice to the defendant, and reasonable good faith conduct by the plaintiff were satisfied.  (Addison, at p. 319.)

Here, the Court of Appeal rejected J.M.’s equitable tolling argument because he did not pursue an alternate remedy.  J.M. contends he did, by filing a complaint simultaneously with his petition for relief under section 946.6.  The complaint does not appear in the record, though a trial court register refers to one.  In any event, it is not “reasonable” to pursue a court action when the claims filing requirements have not been satisfied, nor did J.M. ever provide the District with “timely notice.”  (Addison, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 319; see Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363, 371 (Lantzy) [“equitable tolling should not apply if it is ‘inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute’ ”].)  More fundamentally, there was no limitation period that might have been tolled by the filing of a complaint.  The period for seeking relief from the District’s deemed denial had already expired by the time counsel acted.

We note that pursuit of an alternate remedy is not always required for equitable tolling.  The doctrine is applied flexibly to “ensure fundamental practicality and fairness.”  (Lantzy, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 370; see Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Actions, § 694 et seq., p. 914 et seq.)  But J.M. advances no sufficient basis for equitable tolling here.  “As with other general equitable principles, application of the equitable tolling doctrine requires a balancing of the injustice to the plaintiff occasioned by the bar of his claim against the effect upon the important public interest or policy expressed by the Government Claims Act limitations statute.”  (Addison, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 321.)  J.M. fails to establish an injustice.  He simply failed to comply with the claims statutes, missing an easily ascertainable deadline that has been in place for over 50 years.  (See Stats. 1965, ch. 653, § 22, p. 2016.)  If oversight of such plain rules justified equitable relief, the structure of the Government Claims Act would be substantially undermined, and its provisions for timely notice to public entities subverted.

Secondary sources: Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Actions, § 694 et seq., p. 914 et seq.

(Cal. S. C., March 6, 2017, J.M. v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., S230510).

Suspension d'un délai :

"Equitable tolling", une doctrine qui permet d'obtenir la suspension d'un délai, s'applique également dans le domaine des actions en réparation d'un préjudice, singulièrement, comme ici, quand le défendeur est une administration.

La jurisprudence reconnaît le principe général de ne pas opposer l'échéance d'un délai à une partie qui a dans un premier temps choisi de bonne foi une procédure en réparation qui s'est par la suite révélée ne pas être le bon choix. De la sorte, cette partie doit pouvoir choisir de présenter ses prétentions selon d'autres modalités sans que le délai échu ne puisse lui être opposé. A cette fin, le délai sera suspendu pendant la première procédure. Cas d'un demandeur qui saisit la cour de district fédérale, demande rejetée pour défaut de compétence matérielle. Le délai pour saisir la cour de l'état est suspendu pendant la durée de la procédure fédérale antérieure.

La suspension d'un délai ne peut pas être accordée si elle est inconsistante avec les dispositions légales applicables à l'affaire.

La conduite d'une procédure alternative n'est pas systématiquement exigée pour permettre la suspension équitable d'un délai. Dite doctrine de suspension est appliquée de manière flexible, pour assurer une solution pragmatique et équitable. Comme pour les autres théories juridiques relevant de l'équité s'agit-il de mettre en balance : ici l'injustice causée au demandeur par l'échéance d'un délai avec l'intérêt public important au respect des délais fixés par le droit des dommages-intérêts.