Military: Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA); Staub sued Proctor under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), which forbids an employer to deny “employment, reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment” based on a person’s “membership” in or “obligation to perform service in a uniformed service,” 38 U. S. C. §4311(a), and provides that liability is established “if the person’s membership . . . is a motivating factor in the employer’s action,” §4311(c); if a supervisor performs an act motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable under USERRA. In construing the phrase “motivating factor in the employer’s action,” this Court starts from the premise that when Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the background of general tort law. See, e.g., Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. United States, 556 U. S. ___, ___. Intentional torts such as the one here “generally require that the actor intend ‘the consequences’ of an act,’ not simply ‘the act itself.’ ” Kawaauhau Geiger, 523 U. S. 57, 61–62. However, Proctor errs in contending that an employer is not liable unless the de facto decisionmaker is motivated by discriminatory animus. So long as the earlier agent intended, for discriminatory reasons, that the adverse action occur, he has the scienter required for USERRA liability. Moreover, it is axiomatic under tort law that the decisionmaker’s exercise of judgment does not prevent the earlier agent’s action from being the proximate cause of the harm. See Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 559 S. 1, ___. Nor can the ultimate decisionmaker’s judgment be deemed a superseding cause of the harm. See Exxon Co., U. S. A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U. S. 830, 837. Proctor’s approach would have an improbable consequence: if an employer isolates a personnel official from its supervisors, vests the decision to take adverse employment actions in that official, and asks that official to review the employee’s personnel file before taking the adverse action, then the employer will be effectively shielded from discriminatory acts and recommendations of supervisors that were designed and intended to produce the adverse action. Proctor also errs in arguing that a decisionmaker’s independent investigation, and rejection, of an employee’s discriminatory animus allegations should negate the effect of the prior discrimination (U.S.S.Ct., 01.03.11, Staub v. Proctor Hospital, J. Scalia).