Eighth Amendment: California’s prison population: the
court-mandated population limit is necessary to remedy the violation of
prisoners’ constitutional rights and is authorized by the PLRA; if a prison
deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including adequate medical care, the
courts have a responsibility to remedy the resulting Eighth Amendment
violation. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687, n. 9. They must consider a
range of options, including the appointment of special masters or receivers,
the possibility of consent decrees, and orders limiting a prison’s population.
Under the PLRA, only a three-judge court may limit a prison population. 18
U.S.C. §3626(a)(3). Before convening such a court, a district court must have
entered an order for less intrusive relief that failed to remedy the
constitutional violation and must have given the defendant a reasonable time to
comply with its prior orders. §3626(a)(3)(A). Once convened, the three-judge
court must find by clear and convincing evidence that “crowding is the primary
cause of the violation” and “no other relief will remedy the violation,”
§3626(a)(3)(E); and that the relief is “narrowly drawn, extends no further than
necessary. . . , and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the
violation,” §3626(a)(1)(A). The court must give “substantial weight to any
adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system
caused by the relief.” Ibid. Its legal determinations are reviewed de novo, but
its factual findings are reviewed for clear error; the trial record documents
the severe impact of burgeoning demand on the provision of care. The evidence
showed that there were high vacancy rates for medical and mental health staff,
e.g., 20% for surgeons and 54.1% for psychiatrists; that these numbers
understated the severity of the crisis because the State has not budgeted
sufficient staff to meet demand; and that even if vacant positions could be
filled, there would be insufficient space for the additional staff. Such a
shortfall contributes to significant delays in treating mentally ill prisoners,
who are housed in administrative segregation for extended periods while
awaiting transfer to scarce mental health treatment beds. There are also
backlogs of up to 700 prisoners waiting to see a doctor for physical care; numerous
experts testified that crowding is the primary cause of the constitutional
violations; it was permissible for the three-judge court to conclude that
overcrowding was the “primary,” but not the only, cause of the violations, and
that reducing crowding would not entirely cure the violations. This
understanding of the primary cause requirement is consistent with the PLRA. Had
Congress intended to require that crowding be the only cause, the PLRA would
have said so; the prospective relief ordered here was narrowly drawn, extended
no further than necessary to correct the violation, and was the least intrusive
means necessary to correct the violation; assuming no constitutional violation
results, some facilities may retain populations in excess of the 137.5% limit
provided others fall sufficiently below it so the system as a whole remains in
compliance with the order; the court found that various available methods of
reducing overcrowding—good time credits and diverting low-risk offenders to
community programs—would have little or no impact on public safety, and its
order took account of such concerns by giving the State substantial flexibility
to select among the means of reducing overcrowding; developments during the
pendency of this appeal, when the State has begun to reduce the prison
population, support the conclusion that a reduction can be accomplished without
an undue negative effect on public safety; the three-judge court did not err in
providing a 2-year deadline for relief, especially in light of the State’s
failure to contest the issue at trial; the court may, e.g., grant a motion to
extend the deadline if the State meets appropriate preconditions designed to
ensure that the plan will be implemented without undue delay. Such observations
reflect the fact that the existing order, like all ongoing equitable relief,
must remain open to appropriate modification, and are not intended to cast
doubt on the validity of the order’s basic premise (U.S.S.Ct., 23.05.11, Brown
v. Plata, J. Kennedy).
Monday, May 23, 2011
Brown v. Plata
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