Statute of limitations: when does the clock begin to
tick? Use of the “discovery rule”? In this case: investment: Investment
Advisers Act: the Investment Advisers Act makes it illegal for investment
advisers to defraud their clients, 15 U. S. C. §§80b–6(1), (2), and authorizes
the Securities and Exchange Commission to bring enforcement actions against
investment advisers who violate the Act, or against individuals who aid and
abet such violations, §80b–9(d). If the SEC seeks civil penalties as part of
those actions, it must file suit “within five years from the date when the
claim first accrued,” pursuant to a general statute of limitations that governs
many penalty provisions throughout the U. S. Code, 28 U. S. C. §2462; the
“discovery rule” (…) meaning that the statute of limitations did not begin to
run until the SEC discovered or reasonably could have discovered the fraud; held:
the five-year clock in §2462 begins to tick when the fraud occurs, not when it
is discovered; this is the most natural reading of the statute. “In common
parlance a right accrues when it comes into existence.” United States v.
Lindsay, 346 U. S. 568, 569. The “standard rule” is that a claim accrues
“when the plaintiff has ‘ “a complete and present cause of action.” ’ ” Wallace
v. Kato, 549 U. S. 384, 388; discovery rule: that doctrine is an
“exception” to the standard rule, and delays accrual “until a plaintiff has
‘discovered’ ” his cause of action. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds,
559 U. S. ___, ___. It arose from the recognition that “something different was
needed in the case of fraud, where a defendant’s deceptive conduct may prevent
a plaintiff from even knowing that he or she has been defrauded.” Ibid.
Thus “where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and ‘remains in ignorance
of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of
the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered.’ ” Holmberg
v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 397. This Court, however, has never
applied the discovery rule in this context, where the plaintiff is not a
defrauded victim seeking recompense, but is instead the Government bringing an
enforcement action for civil penalties; emphasizing the importance of time
limits on penalty actions, Chief Justice Marshall admonished that it “would be
utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws” if actions for penalties could “be
brought at any distance of time.” Adams v. Woods, 2 Cranch 336,
342 (U.S. S. Ct., 27.02.13, Gabelli v. SEC, C. J. Roberts, unanimous).
Wednesday, February 27, 2013
Gabelli v. SEC
Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds
Securities: damages in a private securities-fraud
action under §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and
Exchange Commission Rule 10b–5: to recover damages in a private
securities-fraud action under §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b–5, a plaintiff must prove, among
other things, reliance on a material misrepresentation or omission made by the
defendant. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U. S.
___, ___. Requiring proof of direct reliance “would place an unnecessarily unrealistic
evidentiary burden on a plaintiff who has traded on an impersonal market.” Basic
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U. S. 224, 245. Thus, this Court has endorsed
a “fraud-on-the-market” theory, which permits securities-fraud plaintiffs to
invoke a rebuttable presumption of reliance on public, material
misrepresentations regarding securities traded in an efficient market. Id.,
at 241–249. The fraud-on-the market theory facilitates the certification of
securities-fraud class actions by permitting reliance to be proved on a
classwide basis. Invoking the fraud-on-the-market theory, respondent
Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds (Connecticut Retirement) sought
certification of a securities-fraud class action under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3) against biotechnology company Amgen Inc. and several of its
officers (collectively, Amgen). The District Court certified the class, and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Ninth Circuit rejected Amgen’s argument that
Connecticut Retirement was required to prove the materiality of Amgen’s
alleged misrepresentations and omissions before class certification in order
to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement that “questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members.” The Ninth Circuit also held that the District Court did not err in
refusing to consider rebuttal evidence that Amgen had presented on the issue of
materiality at the class-certification stage. Held: proof of materiality
is not a prerequisite to certification of a securities-fraud class action
seeking money damages for alleged violations of §10(b) and Rule 10b–5
(U.S.S.Ct., 27.02.13, Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust
Funds, J. Ginsburg).
Papiers- valeurs (securities) : action
en dommages-intérêts basée sur une fraude en matière de transactions portant
sur des papiers-valeurs. Pour se faire adjuger ses conclusions en
dommages-intérêts, le demandeur doit notamment prouver s'être fié à une fausse
représentation ou à une fausse omission de nature matérielle faite par le
défendeur. N'est pas requise la preuve d'un lien de causalité direct entre la
tromperie et l'acte ou l'omission du demandeur sur le marché. Ainsi, la Cour
retient la théorie de la "fraude sur le marché", selon laquelle le
demandeur peut invoquer la présomption réfragable qu'il s'est fié à de fausses
déclarations matérielles et publiques relatives à des papiers-valeurs échangés
sur un marché effectif. Cette théorie facilite la certification d'actions de
classe en matière de papiers-valeurs, en permettant d'apporter la preuve de
"s'être fié à" au niveau de la classe elle-même et non au niveau d'un
demandeur individuel. Est rejeté l'argument consistant à soutenir que les
demandeurs sont tenus de prouver la matérialité de la représentation
frauduleuse pour obtenir la certification de la classe.
Tuesday, February 26, 2013
Marx v. General Revenue Corp.
Costs: civil procedure: Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (FRCP) 54(d)(1), which gives district courts discretion to award
costs to prevailing defendants “unless a federal statute . . . provides
otherwise.”; Rule 54(d)(1) gives courts discretion to award costs to prevailing
parties, but this discretion can be displaced by a federal statute or FRCP that
“provides otherwise,” i.e., is “contrary” to Rule 54(d)(1). Contrary to
the argument of Marx and the United States, as amicus, language of the
original 1937 version of the Rule does not suggest that any “express provision”
for costs should displace Rule 54(d)(1), regardless of whether it is contrary
to the Rule (15 U. S. C. §1692k(a)(3)); Section 1692k(a)(3)’s language and
context demonstrate that the provision is not contrary to Rule 54(d)(1); here,
context indicates that Congress did not intend §1692k(a)(3) to foreclose
courts from awarding costs under the Rule. First, under the American Rule, each
litigant generally pays his own attorney’s fees, but the Court has long
recognized that federal courts have inherent power to award attorney’s fees in
a narrow set of circumstances, e.g., when a party brings an action in
bad faith. The statute is thus best read as codifying a court’s pre-existing
authority to award both attorney’s fees and costs (U.S. S. Ct., 26.02.13, Marx
v. General Revenue Corp., J. Thomas).
Frais de justice et d'avocats en procédure civile
fédérale : selon l'American Rule, chaque partie conserve ses frais. La Règle
54(d)(1) des Règles fédérales de procédure civile prévoit que la cour fédérale
peut à sa discrétion mettre les frais et honoraires à charge de la partie
perdante, à moins qu'une loi fédérale n'en dispose autrement. Il ne suffit pas
qu'une loi fédérale prévoie une répartition des frais et dépens pour annuler la
discrétion de la cour fédérale selon la Règle 54(d)(1) précitée. Il faut encore que la
réglementation prévue par la loi fédérale soit contraire à dite Règle 54(d)(1).
Tel n'est pas
le cas en l'espèce.
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA
Standing: to establish Article III standing, an injury
must be “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to
the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.” Monsanto Co.
v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U. S. ___, ___. “Threatened injury must
be ‘ “certainly impending” ’ to constitute injury in fact,” and “allegations of
possible future injury” are not sufficient. Whitmore v. Arkansas,
495 U. S. 149, 158 (U.S. S. Ct., 26.02.13, Clapper v. Amnesty International
USA, J. Alito).
Thursday, February 21, 2013
Greb v. Diamond Internat. Corp., S183365
Jurisdiction: plaintiffs
highlight defendant’s history of transacting business in California from the
1930s through the 1980s, when it surrendered its certificate of
qualification. They assert that
defendant, having been dormant for nearly two decades, strategically filed for
dissolution in Delaware in 2005 in order to cut off its continuing liability
(and recovery of damages through applicable “undistributed . . .
insurance assets” ) to asbestos victims.
Plaintiffs argue that this course of conduct directly contravenes
California policy. When foreign
corporations seek and accept the benefits of transacting business here,
California law should not allow them
to use their home state’s corporate-friendly laws to deprive California
citizens of their remedies. (Cal. S. Ct., S183365, 21.02.2013, Greb v. Diamond
Internat. Corp.).
Lorsque des
entreprises incorporées hors de l’état de Californie recherchent et acceptent
le bénéfice de commercer en Californie, le droit californien ne saurait
permettre à ces entreprises de recourir au droit – qui leur est favorable, de
leur état d’incorporation, dans le but de priver les résidents de Californie
des remèdes que cet état met à leur disposition.
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