Chaidez v. U.S.

Immigration: the Sixth Amendment requires defense attorneys to inform non-citizen clients of the depor­tation risks of guilty pleas: this Court held in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. ___, that the Sixth Amendment requires defense attorneys to inform non-citizen clients of the depor­tation risks of guilty pleas. The District Court vacated Chaidez’s conviction, determining that Padilla did not announce a “new rule” under Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, and thus applied to Chaidez’s case. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Padilla had de­clared a new rule and should not apply in a challenge to a final con­viction.

Held: Padilla does not apply retroactively to cases already final on di­rect review; under Teague, a person whose conviction is already final may not benefit from a new rule of criminal procedure on collateral re­view. A “case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became fi­nal.” Teague, 489 U. S., at 301. And a holding is not so dictated un­less it would have been “apparent to all reasonable jurists.” Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U. S. 518, 527−528. At the same time, a case does not “announce a new rule, when it is merely an application of the principle that governed” a prior decision to a different set of facts. Teague, 489 U. S., at 307. Thus, garden-variety applications of the test in Strickland  v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, for assessing ineffective assistance claims do not produce new rules, id., at 687−688; Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52, had explicitly left open whether the Sixth Amendment right extends to collateral consequences. That left the issue to the state and lower federal courts, and they almost unani­mously concluded that the Sixth Amendment does not require attor­neys to inform their clients of a conviction’s collateral consequences, including deportation. Padilla’s contrary ruling thus answered an open question about the Sixth Amendment’s reach, in a way that al­tered the law of most jurisdictions. In so doing, Padilla broke new ground and imposed a new obligation; neither does INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, have any relevance here. In saying that a rea­sonably competent lawyer would tell a non-citizen client about a guilty plea’s deportation consequences, St. Cyr did not determine that the Sixth Amendment requires a lawyer to provide such information. It took Padilla to decide that question (U.S.S.Ct., 20.02.13, Chaidez v. U.S., J. Kagan).

Immigration : le Sixième Amendement de la Constitution fédérale impose à l'avocat de la défense d'informer ses clients non-citoyens du risque de renvoi du territoire U.S. s'ils venaient à plaider coupables dans un procès pénal (que cette obligation d'information découle du Sixième Amendement a été fixé pour la première fois dans l'arrêt Padilla v. Kentucky). Si l'avocat omet de donner cette information, le client peut tenter d'obtenir une révision de son procès pénal en invoquant l'ineffective assistance de son avocat au sens du Sixième Amendement, mais dite omission ne permettra pas d'obtenir la révision d'un jugement qui était déjà final lorsque l'arrêt Padilla a été rendu. En effet, comme la décision Padilla s'est prononcée pour la première fois sur la question de savoir si dite obligation d'information découlait du Sixième Amendement, elle ne saurait avoir de portée rétroactive. Une personne dont la condamnation pénale est déjà finale ne peut pas bénéficier d'une nouvelle règle de procédure pénale dans le cadre d'une remise en cause du jugement final par une procédure collatérale.