Southern Union Co. v. United States

Jury: Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, which holds that the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial guarantee requires that any fact (other than the fact of a prior conviction) that increases the maxi­mum punishment authorized for a particular crime be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; Held: The rule of Apprendi applies to the imposition of criminal fines; Apprendi’s rule is “rooted in longstanding common-law prac­tice,” Cunningham v. California, 549 U. S. 270, 281, and preserves the “historic jury function” of “determining whether the prosecution has proved each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt,” Oregon v. Ice, 555 U. S. 160, 163. This Court has repeatedly affirmed Apprendi’s rule by applying it to a variety of sentencing schemes that allow judges to find facts that increase a defendant’s maximum au­thorized sentence. See Cunningham, 549 U. S., at 274−275; United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220, 226–227; Blakely v. Washington, 542 U. S. 296, 299–300; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584, 588–589; Ap­prendi, 530 U. S., at 468–469. While the punishments at stake in these cases were imprisonment or a death sentence, there is no principled basis under Apprendi to treat criminal fines differently. Apprendi’s “core concern”—to reserve to the jury “the determination of facts that warrant punishment for a specific statutory offense,” Ice, 555 U. S., at 170—applies whether the sentence is a criminal fine or imprison­ment or death. Criminal fines, like these other forms of punishment, are penalties inflicted by the sovereign for the commission of offenses. Fines were by far the most common form of noncapital punishment in colonial America and they continue to be frequently imposed today. And, the amount of a fine, like the maximum term of imprisonment or eligibility for the death penalty, is often determined by reference to particular facts. The Government argues that fines are less onerous than incarceration and the death sentence and therefore should be exempt from Apprendi. But where a fine is substantial enough to trigger the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial guarantee, Apprendi applies in full; the “historical role of the jury at common law,” which informs the “scope of the constitutional jury right,” Ice, 555 U. S., at 170, sup­ports applying Apprendi to criminal fines. To be sure, judges in the colonies and during the founding era had much discretion in deter­mining whether to impose a fine and in what amount. But the exer­cise of such discretion is fully consistent with Apprendi, which per­mits courts to impose “judgment within the range prescribed by statute.” 530 U. S., at 481 (emphasis in original). The more salient question is what role the jury played in prosecutions for offenses that pegged the amount of a fine to the determination of specified facts. A review of both state and federal decisions discloses that the predomi­nant practice was for such facts to be alleged in the indictment and proved to the jury. The rule that juries must determine facts that set a fine’s maximum amount is an application of the “two longstanding tenets of common-law criminal jurisprudence” on which Apprendi is based: first, “the ‘truth of every accusation’ against a defendant‘ should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours.’ ” Blakely, 542 U. S., at 301. And se­cond, “ ‘an accusation which lacks any particular fact which the law makes essential to the punishment is . . . no accusation within the requirements of the common law, and is no accusation in reason.’ ” Ibid (U.S.S.Ct., 21.06.12, Southern Union Co. v. United States, J. Sotomayor).

Rôle du jury : la jurisprudence Apprendi requiert, en application des garanties d’un procès avec jury déduites du Sixième Amendement, que tous les faits augmentant la peine maximum autorisée pour un crime particulier soient prouvés par le jury au-delà d’un doute raisonnable (sauf le fait d’une conviction antérieure). Apprendi s’applique également en cas d’imposition d’une amende pénale. La jurisprudence Apprendi est enracinée dans la longue pratique de la Common law et préserve la fonction historique du jury consistant à déterminer si l’accusation a prouvé chaque élément au-delà d’un doute raisonnable. Les amendes étaient de loin la forme la plus commune de peine non capitale dans l’Amérique coloniale et elles continuent d’être fréquemment imposées aujourd’hui. Ainsi, lorsqu’une amende est suffisamment substantielle pour enclencher le droit à un jury déduit du Sixième Amendement, Apprendi s’applique sans réserve. La jurisprudence Apprendi est basée sur deux principes découlant de longue date de la jurisprudence pénale sous l’empire de la Common law : le premier de ces principes est que la vérité de chaque accusation contre un accusé doit ensuite être confirmée par la décision unanime de douze de ses pairs et voisins. Le second de ces principes est qu’une prévention qui manque un fait particulier que la loi déclare essentiel à la punition ne constitue nullement une accusation selon les exigences de la Common law.