U.S. Supreme Court, CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., 605 U.S. 223

Foreign Sovereign Immunity

 

Personal Jurisdiction over a Foreign Sovereign

 

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

 

Immunity Exception Applies and Service of Process

 

Minimum Contacts?

 

 

 

 

Held: Personal jurisdiction exists under the FSIA when an immunity exception applies and service is proper. The FSIA does not require proof of “minimum contacts” over and above the contacts already required by the Act's enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.

 

 

Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U. S. C. §§ 1330, 1602 et seq., foreign states are generally immune from suit in United States courts, but the Act creates several exceptions. See §§ 1604, 1605–1607. And when an exception applies, § 1330(a) of the FSIA vests federal courts with “original jurisdiction” over such claims.

 

 

This suit concerns the FSIA's neighboring personal-jurisdiction provision. It provides that “personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist” whenever (1) an exception to foreign sovereign immunity applies, and (2) the foreign defendant has been properly served. § 1330(b). In the decision below, however, the Ninth Circuit imposed a third requirement: a plaintiff must also prove that the foreign state has made “minimum contacts” with the United States sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional test set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316 (1945), and its progeny. Because the Ninth Circuit's additional requirement goes beyond the text of the FSIA, we reverse.

 

 

For much of American history, foreign states and their instrumentalities enjoyed near total immunity from suit in our courts. See Hungary v. Simon, 604 U. S. 115, 118–119 (2025). This posture reflected the venerable international law principle that states are independent sovereign entities, and it encouraged others to respect the sovereignty of the United States in their courts. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling Co., 581 U. S. 170, 179 (2017). Notably, this immunity was not statutorily or constitutionally required. Instead, we have long understood foreign sovereign immunity as “a matter of grace and comity,” so judges historically “`deferred to the decisions of the political branches—in particular, those of the Executive Branch—on whether to take jurisdiction' over particular actions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities.” Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U. S. 677, 689 (2004) (quoting Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 486 (1983)). In practice, that usually entailed the State Department filing a case-specific “`suggestion of immunity’” whenever a foreign sovereign was sued, and when that occurred, the court would abide by the suggestion. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U. S. 305, 311 (2010) (quoting Ex parte Peru, 318 U. S. 578, 581 (1943)).

 

 

The Act also waives immunity for suits to confirm arbitration awards. §1605(a)(6). The arbitration exception applies in four statutorily defined contexts, including where the “agreement or award” is “governed by a treaty or other international agreement in force for the United States calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.” §1605(a)(6)(B). The United States, for instance, has acceded to the New York Convention, which requires it to enforce certain awards issued abroad. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U. S. T. 2517, T. I. A. S. No. 6997;

9 U. S. C. §§ 201–208. In such instances, and when the FSIA is otherwise satisfied, the arbitration exception would also apply.

Whenever an FSIA immunity exception applies, jurisdiction usually follows.

 

 

(…) To the extent that some or all FSIA exceptions satisfy International Shoe, it is only because the exceptions Congress wrote happen to meet that standard, not because § 1330(b) secretly incorporated our jurisdictional due-process cases.

 

 

(…) See Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 587 U. S. 1, 4–5, 8–13 (2019) (discussing § 1608's specialized service-of-process rules).

 

 

28 U. S. C. § 1330(b) provides:

 

“Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under section 1608 of this title.”

 

 

Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 451, Comment b (2017).

 

 

 

 

(U.S. Supreme Court, June 5, 2025, CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., 605 U.S. 223, J. Alito, Unanimous)

U.S. Supreme Court, CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., 605 U.S. 223

Remand

 

Forfeiture

 

Waiver

 

 

 

(…) We decline to answer those questions today. The Ninth Circuit relied exclusively on its interpretation of the FSIA's personal-jurisdiction provision, so that court has not yet addressed Antrix's alternative arguments. “And, for that reason, neither shall we.” F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S. A., 542 U. S. 155, 175 (2004); accord, United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 532 U. S. 483, 494 (2001). Of course, Antrix is welcome to litigate these contentions on remand consistent with principles of forfeiture and waiver.

 

 

 

(U.S. Supreme Court, June 5, 2025, CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., 605 U.S. 223, J. Alito, Unanimous)

 

 

 

 

California Court of Appeal, Bartel v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., Docket No. H052083

Punitive Damages

 

Clear and Convincing Standard

 

Insurance Law

 

California Law

 

 

 

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, §3294, subd. (a).) A plaintiff is never entitled to punitive damages as a matter of right. (Uzyel v. Kadisha (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 866, 923.) Rather, “a claim for punitive damages requires ‘evidence which establishes by “clear and convincing evidence” that the defendant has been “guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” If a plaintiff is to recover on such a claim, it will be necessary that the evidence presented meet this higher evidentiary standard.’” (Food Pro, supra,169 Cal.App.4th at p.994; see Civ. Code, §3294, subd. (a).) In the context of failure to properly administer an insurance claim, punitive damages are ordinarily “based on ‘malice’ or ‘oppression,’ rather than on the third possible ground for the award, ‘fraud.’ Both ‘malice’ and ‘oppression’ are defined in Civil Code section 3294 as involving ‘despicable conduct,’ which in the case of malice ‘is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others,’ and as to oppression is ‘conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.’” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1286–1287 (Tomaselli).) We review de novo whether the undisputed facts underlying Chicago Title’s claim handling in this case satisfy the requirements of Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a).  (See Ghirardo, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p.801.)

 

 

(…) Furthermore, we have determined that the manner in which Chicago Title repeatedly rejected tender in the face of a clear duty to defend amounted to bad faith. Nevertheless, we are not persuaded that Chicago Title’s bad faith refusal to defend Bartel under the policy until partway through Composti III rises to the level of malice or oppression within the meaning of Civil Code section 3294.

 

 

The heightened legal standard for imposing punitive damages guides our determination. “Under the clear and convincing standard, the evidence must be ‘“‘“so clear as to leave no substantial doubt”’”’ and ‘“‘“sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.”’’”’” (Butte Fire Cases (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1158.) This stringent standard must be accompanied by evidence of “‘malice,’” defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights ...of others” (Civ. Code, §3294, subd. (c)(1)), or “‘oppression,’” defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights” (id., subd. (c)(2)). “‘Despicable conduct’ is conduct that is ‘“so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.”’ ” (Butte Fire Cases, at p.1159.)

 

 

 

(California Court of Appeal, Bartel v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., May 30, 2025, Docket No. H052083, Certified for Publication)

 

 

California Court of Appeal, Bartel v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., Docket No. H052083

Statute of Limitations

 

Equitable Tolling

 

Insurance Law

 

Duty to Defend

 

California Law

 

 

 

(…) Chicago Title contends the trial court erred in applying equitable tolling to reject its statute of limitations defense and deciding Bartel’s title insurance action was timely. Bartel counters that the interim judgment properly rejected Chicago Title’s statute of limitations defense and applied equitable tolling consistent with the California Supreme Court’s decision in Lambert, 53 Cal.3d 1072, and with the primary right doctrine. Bartel asserts in the alternative that, even assuming equitable tolling paused upon the dismissals of Composti I and Composti II, it resumed when Bartel timely reasserted tender of defense based on Composti III.

 

 

(Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1191(Aryeh).) “A plaintiff must bring a claim within the limitations period after accrual of the cause of action.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806; see Code Civ. Proc., § 312.) A cause of action typically “accrues at ‘the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.’” (Fox, at p. 806.) “Actions on title insurance policies are subject to a two-year statute of limitation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 339, subd. (1).)” (Lee v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 583, 599.) Accrual of a cause of action upon a contract or policy of title insurance does not occur “until the discovery of the loss or damage suffered by the aggrieved party thereunder.” (Code Civ. Proc., §339, subd. (1).) Certain equitable exceptions “may alter the rules governing either the initial accrual of a claim, the subsequent running of the limitations period, or both.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p.1192.) These exceptions exist “to align the actual application of the limitations defense more closely with the policy goals animating it.”  (Ibid.) Equitable tolling, applied by the trial court here, “may suspend or extend the statute of limitations when a plaintiff has reasonably and in good faith chosen to pursue one among several remedies and the statute of limitations’ notice function has been served.” (Ibid.)

 

In Lambert, our Supreme Court examined whether a cause of action under a title insurance policy alleging a failure to defend accrues when the insurer refuses to defend or when the underlying action is terminated by final judgment. (Lambert, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p.1074.) After considering the statutory language and policies underlying the duty to defend, the court concluded that “although the statutory period commences upon the refusal to defend, it is equitably tolled until the underlying action is terminated by final judgment.” (Id. at p.1077.) While resolution of the statute of limitations is normally a question for the trier of fact, the application of the statute of limitations on undisputed facts is a purely legal question that we review de novo. (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p.1191; see Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1112.)

 

 

We agree with the parties that Lambert guides our resolution of the application of the statute of limitations here. In that decision, our Supreme Court explained, “The duty to defend in a title insurance case is governed by the same principles which govern the duty to defend under general liability policies. The duty commences upon tender of the defense, and continues until the underlying lawsuit is concluded.”  (Lambert, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p.1077.) In rejecting a prior appellate decision that had held that the statute of limitations begins to run upon the rejection of tender, the court stated that such a rule “would allow expiration of the statute of limitations on a lawsuit to vindicate the duty to defend even before the duty itself expires. This grim result is untenable. The insured must be allowed the option of waiting until the duty to defend has expired before filing suit to vindicate that duty.” (Ibid.) The Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations begins to run “upon accrual, which in this case occurs upon the refusal to defend.” (Lambert, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p.1078.) It further decided that the statute of limitation should be equitably tolled between accrual and a final judgment. It reasoned, “the duty to defend is a continuing duty. It is equitable and consistent with the legislative intent to toll the limitations period in which this duty continues from the date of accrual of a cause of action to final judgment.” (Id. at p.1079.)

 

 

The Supreme Court emphasized that its decision was grounded in equitable principles: “It is harsh to require an insured—often a private homeowner—to defend the underlying action, at the homeowner’s own expense, and simultaneously to prosecute—again at the homeowner’s own expense—a separate action against the title company for failure to defend. ‘The unexpected burden of defending an action may itself make it impractical to immediately bear the additional cost and hardship of prosecuting a collateral action against an insurer.’” (Lambert, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p.1078.) The court reasoned that this rule would not prejudice the insurer. “By tendering defense of a third party action to an insurer, the insured will have put the insurer on notice that it may be required under the policy to defend the action. Thus, the insured [sic] will be aware that it must take the steps necessary to prepare and preserve a defense to an action by its insured.” (Id. at p. 1079.) Moreover, an insured has the option of bringing suit against the insurer prior to the entry of final judgment in the underlying litigation. Nothing “prohibits the insured from commencing an action once the insurer has refused a tender of defense. We merely conclude that the insured is not required to do so.” (Id. at p.1080.)

 

 

Applying the principles articulated in Lambert to the facts here, we decide that Bartel’s title insurance action against Chicago Title was timely. Composti filed Composti I, which asserted a right-of-way easement benefiting Composti’s parcel over Bartel’s parcel, on May 25, 2010. Bartel tendered defense to Chicago Title in Composti I on March 18, 2011, triggering Chicago Title’s duty to defend. (See Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, 46 (Buss) [stating the duty to defend “arises as soon as tender is made”].)

 

 

On July 27, 2011, Chicago Title declined (in connection with Composti II) to accept tender. Bartel’s claim against Chicago Title therefore accrued on July 27, 2011. Under the principles articulated in Lambert, the claim was equitably tolled until October 16, 2012, the date on which Composti II was dismissed without prejudice. Beginning on that date, Bartel had two years—that is, until October 16, 2014—to bring a claim against Chicago Title for violation of its duty to defend in Composti I and Composti II.

 

 

We reject Bartel’s contention that equitable tolling continues after a dismissal without prejudice. The duty to defend is bound to the pendency of the underlying action and terminates upon its conclusion. Once dismissed, there is no pending action on that claim, regardless of whether a future action arises. (See Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 650, 666 [“Claims that have been dismissed, whether with or without prejudice, are not ‘pending.’”].) (Fn. 10).

 

 

On September 5, 2014 (over one month before the running of the statute of limitations from the dismissal of Composti II), Bartel again tendered defense to Chicago Title. Under the Supreme Court’s analysis in Lambert, this tender of defense triggered Chicago Title’s duty to defend.  (See Lambert, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p.1077 [“The duty commences upon tender of the defense, and continues until the underlying lawsuit is concluded.”].) We decide that, on these facts, Bartel’s tender of the defense equitably tolled the statute of limitations for bringing suit against Chicago Title as of the date of the tender.  

 

 

 

(California Court of Appeal, Bartel v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., May 30, 2025, Docket No. H052083, Certified for Publication)

 

 

 

 

 

California Court of Appeal, Bartel v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., Docket No. H052083

Prejudgment Interest

 

California Law

 

 

 

Prejudgment interest “‘provides just compensation to the injured party for loss of use of the award during the prejudgment period—in other words, to make the plaintiff whole as of the date of the injury.’” (Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506, 574 (Hewlett-Packard).) Code of Civil Procedure section 3287, subdivision (b), applicable here, “governs cases involving unliquidated contract claims and grants the court discretion to award prejudgment interest from a date no earlier than the filing of the action.” (Hewlett-Packard, at p. 574.) We review the court’s ruling on prejudgment interest under the statute for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) An abuse of discretion occurs when the court’s ruling “is ‘so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.’” (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773.) Conversely, we will uphold a court’s exercise of discretion “‘if it is based on a “reasoned judgment” and complies with the “legal principles and policies appropriate to the particular matter at issue.”’” (Hewlett-Packard, at pp. 574–575, quoting Bullis v. Security Pac. Nat. Bank (1978) 21 Cal.3d 801, 815.)

 

 

An award of prejudgment interest on an unliquidated contractual claim is discretionary under Code of Civil Procedure section 3287, subdivision (b), including identifying the date from which interest runs, so long as the date does not precede the filing of the action. (Hewlett-Packard, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 574; North Oakland Medical Clinic v. Rogers (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 824, 829.) Absent any evidence or indication in the record that the court failed to properly exercise its discretion, considered inappropriate factors in making its determination, or exceeded the bounds of reasonable judgment, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest.

 

 

 

 

(California Court of Appeal, Bartel v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., May 30, 2025, Docket No. H052083, Certified for Publication)

 

California Court of Appeal, Bartel v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., Docket No. H052083

Insurance Law

 

Coverage

 

Genuine Dispute Doctrine

 

Third Party Duty to Defend

 

Bad Faith

 

California Law

 

 

 

(…)

 

(Chateau Chamberay, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 346; see Century Surety Co. v. Polisso (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 922, 949 [genuine dispute doctrine “holds that an insurer does not act in bad faith when it mistakenly withholds policy benefits, if the mistake is reasonable or is based on a legitimate dispute as to the insurer’s liability”].) Numerous state and federal decisions have recognized the genuine dispute doctrine is not compatible with the principles that govern third party duty to defend cases, in which the possibility of coverage triggers the duty. (See, e.g., Mt. Hawley, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p.1424; Howard, supra,187 Cal.App.4th at p. 530; Harbison v. American Motorists Ins. Co. (E.D. Cal. 2009) 636 F.Supp.2d 1030, 1040.)

 

 

 

(California Court of Appeal, Bartel v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., May 30, 2025, Docket No. H052083, Certified for Publication)

 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Towers Watson & Co. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., Docket No. 24-1302

Insurance Policy

 

Interpretation

 

Virginia Law

 

 

 

Virginia law still governs our interpretation of the Policy. See Towers Watson & Co., 67 F.4th at 653. Under Virginia law, “an insurance policy is a contract, and, as in the case of any other contract, the words used are given their ordinary and customary meaning when they are susceptible of such construction.” Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 375 S.E.2d 727, 729 (Va. 1989). If policy language is ambiguous, i.e., susceptible of two or more reasonable meanings, then “any doubt concerning the meaning of the policy language” must be “resolved against the insurer.” Id. at 730; Erie Ins. Exch. v. EPC MD 15, LLC, 822 S.E.2d 351, 355 (Va.  2019). This contra proferentum rule applies with particular force when construing policy exclusions, as the insurer bears the burden of proving that an exclusion applies. See TravCo Ins. Co. v. Ward, 736 S.E.2d 321, 325 (Va. 2012) (“Language in a policy purporting to exclude certain events from coverage will be construed most strongly against the insurer.” (quoting PBM Nutritionals, LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., 724 S.E.2d 707, 713 (Va. 2012))).

 

 

That said, the Supreme Court of Virginia has “cautioned” courts to “resist” the “temptation” to “give up quickly on the search for a plain meaning by resorting to the truism that a great many words—viewed in isolation—have alternative, and sometimes quite different, dictionary meanings.” Erie Ins. Exch., 822 S.E.2d at 355. Otherwise, “the contra proferentem thumb-on-the-scale would apply to nearly every interpretation of nearly every insurance policy.” Id. Policy language is therefore ambiguous only where the “competing interpretations . . . are ‘equally possible’ given the text and context of the disputed provision.” Id. at 356 (quoting Appalachian Reg’l Healthcare v. Cunningham, 806 S.E.2d 380, 386 n.10 (Va. 2017)). In other words, the mere fact that the parties disagree on the meaning of the terms of a provision does not necessarily render those terms ambiguous. TM Delmarva Power, L.L.C. v. NCP of Va., L.L.C., 557 S.E.2d 199, 200 (Va. 2002).

 

 

 

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, May 28, 2025, Towers Watson & Co. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., Docket No. 24-1302, Published)