U.S. Supreme Court, Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc.

Judicial Estoppel

 

Equitable Doctrine

 

Bankruptcy Proceedings

 

 

 

Judicial estoppel is an “equitable doctrine” intended “to protect the integrity of the judicial process,” both by “prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment,” and by preventing the “risk of inconsistent court determinations.” New Hampshire, 532 U. S., at 749–751.

 

Sometimes, as happened here, a debtor seeks to litigate a claim against a third party that he failed to disclose in his bankruptcy proceedings.

 

Some lower courts apply judicial estoppel to bar such lawsuits, reasoning that application of the doctrine “raises the cost of lying” and “induces debtors to be truthful in their bankruptcy filings.” Cannon-Stokes v. Potter, 453 F. 3d 446, 448 (CA7 2006).

 

The courts that apply judicial estoppel to claims in the bankruptcy context view the debtor’s failure to disclose a particular claim as an “implicit representation” that the claim does not exist. 18B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4477.9 (3d ed. 2019 and Supp. 2026) (collecting cases). On this view, when the debtor files a lawsuit based on that claim, he has taken inconsistent positions in the two judicial proceedings “by asserting in the civil lawsuit that he has a claim against the defendant while denying under oath in the bankruptcy proceeding that the claim exists.” Slater v. United States Steel Corp., 871 F. 3d 1174, 1176 (CA11 2017) (en banc).

 

Based on that understanding, those lower courts have developed a general rule for the application of judicial estoppel in the bankruptcy context: “If a plaintiff-debtor omits a pending (or soon-to-be-filed) lawsuit from the bankruptcy schedules and obtains a discharge (or plan confirmation), judicial estoppel bars the action.” Ah Quin v. County of Kauai Dept. of Transp., 733 F. 3d 267, 271 (CA9 2013).

 

While this Court has never applied judicial estoppel in the bankruptcy context, in a different context we left open whether it “may be appropriate to resist application of judicial estoppel” when the party’s prior inconsistent position was due to “inadvertence or mistake.” New Hampshire, 532 U. S., at 753. For purposes of this opinion, we assume without deciding that judicial estoppel can apply in the bankruptcy context and that “inadvertence or mistake” can function as an exception to that application. Operating under those assumptions, the Fifth Circuit’s understanding of “inadvertence or mistake” is simultaneously too rigid and too broad.

 

The rigidity comes from the Fifth Circuit’s failure to fully recognize that “judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine.” Id., at 750 (internal quotation marks omitted). As such, its “examination must be made in the light of the recognized principles of equity.” United States Nat. Bank v. Chase Nat. Bank, 331 U. S. 28, 36 (1947). Equity, we have said, “eschews mechanical rules; it depends on flexibility.” Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 396 (1946). Thus, when a court conducts an equitable inquiry, it must act “on a case-by-case basis,” considering all relevant facts and circumstances. Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631, 649–650 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, equitable doctrines require room to consider all of the particulars.

 

By contrast, the Fifth Circuit’s rule allows courts to consider only two circumstances when assessing inadvertence or mistake: whether the debtor knew of the underlying facts of the claim, and whether there was a potential motive to conceal the claim. See In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F. 3d 197, 210 (CA5 1999); Love, 677 F. 3d, at 262. And under

this rule, a court may not look at any other evidence tending to show that the omission was inadvertent. That rigidity is out of step with equity. To determine whether the omission was inadvertent or a mistake, the Fifth Circuit instead should have examined the totality of the circumstances surrounding Keathley’s failure to report his personal-injury claims earlier. See, e.g., Ah Quin, 733 F. 3d, at 276 (“Rather than applying a presumption of deceit, judicial estoppel requires an inquiry into whether the plaintiff ’s bankruptcy filing was, in fact, inadvertent or mistaken, as those terms are commonly understood” (emphasis added and deleted)).

 

The Fifth Circuit’s rule is not only overly rigid; it is also overly broad. In particular, the Fifth Circuit holds that an omission falls outside of the exception any time a debtor knows certain facts or could potentially benefit from non-disclosure of a claim. But it is rare for a debtor to be unaware of the underlying facts of his claim, and a debtor will almost always hypothetically benefit from not revealing such a claim to his creditors. In essence, then, the Fifth Circuit’s approach is a one-size-fits-all test that requires courts to view as purposeful nearly every bankruptcy omission. Indeed, the decision below acknowledged as much, noting that, under Fifth Circuit precedent, the potential-motive element “‘is almost always met if a debtor fails to disclose a claim or possible claim to the bankruptcy court.’” 2025 WL 673434, *5 (quoting Love, 677 F. 3d, at 262).

 

The overbreadth of the Fifth Circuit’s rule (the fact that it almost always is satisfied) makes it patently incompatible with an inadvertence-or-mistake standard, which suggests that circumstances—and outcomes—may vary. A near-dispositive criterion is a poor fit for a fair inquiry into whether an omission is actually the result of inadvertence or mistake.

 

Today’s decision is straightforward. The Fifth Circuit artificially narrowed its inquiry into whether Keathley’s bankruptcy-schedule omission was the result of inadvertence or mistake by assessing only whether he had knowledge of the underlying facts or a potential motive to conceal his personal-injury suit. That was error. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 

(The parties also dispute at some length whether bad faith is required for judicial estoppel to apply (...) In light of our narrow holding - responding only to the analysis used by the Fifth Circuit - we need not resolve any further questions about the application of judicial estoppel in the bankruptcy context).

 

(U.S. Supreme Court, June 11, 2026, Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc., J. Jackson, Unanimous)

 

 

 

 

 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, CH Offshore v. Mexiship Ocean, Docket No. 24-20525

Admiralty

 

Maritime Law

 

Writ of Maritime Garnishment

 

Attachment to Certain Funds in a U.S. Bank Account

 

Charter Party Agreement

 

Alter Ego Theory of Liability

 

Federal Maritime Law v. State Law

 

 

 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:24-CV-219

 

 

The Charter Agreement, executed on May 21, 2021, provided that CH Offshore would charter the Vessel to Mexiship Ocean for an initial period of eighteen months. The agreement further stipulated that CH Offshore could terminate the agreement if Mexiship Ocean failed to promptly pay for the charter hire and if, upon notice, the failure to pay persisted. Once the charter period expired, Mexiship Ocean was to redeliver the Vessel in a timely manner. Failure to return the Vessel accordingly would result in an enhanced hire rate but would not extend the duration of the charter.

 

 

In September of 2022, CH Offshore initiated arbitration proceedings against Mexiship Ocean to recover damages for unpaid charter hire.

 

 

Later, in May of 2023, with the Vessel still in Mexiship Ocean’s possession, CH Offshore integrated its claim for the Vessel’s redelivery in the arbitration proceedings, seeking an injunction requiring Mexiship Ocean to return the Vessel.

 

 

The present action began with an accidental email. In January of 2024, CH Offshore was copied on an email between Mexiship Ocean’s CEO, Edgardo Armando Perez Robert (“Mr. Perez”), and a representative from Seahorse Marine & Energy Joint Stock Company (“Seahorse”) related to a charter between those two entities. The email included an attachment of a settlement agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”) between Mexiship Ocean and Seahorse, which provided that Seahorse would return a deposit from Mexiship Ocean in an amount of $808,238.72 (the “Settlement Refund”). CH Offshore brought the present action to secure its debt—and enforce the arbitration award—by attaching the property that the Settlement Agreement revealed: Mexiship Ocean was to receive the Settlement Refund and direct it to a U.S. bank account at Vantage Bank, with the beneficiary listed as Mexiship Ocean CCC LLC (“Mexiship Texas”), a U.S. company. The complication central to the current dispute is whether defendant Mexiship Ocean or non-party Mexiship Texas owns the funds that CH Offshore seeks to attach.

 

 

CH Offshore filed suit in the Southern District of Texas on January 19, 2024, seeking a writ of garnishment to attach funds held in the Vantage Bank account under Rule B of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions (“Rule B”) and damages for “conversion of the Vessel arising out of Mexiship Ocean’s unlawful refusal to return the Vessel.” CH Offshore brought this suit to “enforce its Partial Final Award issued in” the Singapore arbitration and to “obtain security for its still pending claims.”  On January 23, 2024, the district court granted CH Offshore’s request for a writ of garnishment against Vantage Bank up to the amount of $3,370,976.88.

 

 

After the limited discovery period expired, CH Offshore filed a proposed order on September 30, 2024, stating that the district court should grant it leave to amend its complaint to join Mexiship Texas and Mr. Perez as named defendants under an alter ego theory of attachment and to plead “Texas state attachment law as an alternative basis for maintaining the attachment of the funds held at Vantage Bank.” Mexiship Texas opposed this amendment, both in form and substance.

 

 

“Maritime attachment is a distinctive admiralty remedy that was a part of American jurisprudence at the time the Constitution was adopted.” Ultra Deep Picasso, 119 F.4th at 441 (quoting Boland Marine & Indus., LLC v. Bouchard Transp. Co., No. 1:20-CV-66-LY-ML, 2020 WL 10051743, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2020)). As such, we recognize the important role it plays in the context of maritime disputes, wherein parties cross both jurisdictional and oceanic lines. In the federal context, Rule B provides an avenue for attaching a defendant’s property in a maritime action for the purpose of “securing a respondent’s appearance and assuring satisfaction in case the suit is successful.” Malin, 817 F.3d at 244 (quoting Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684, 693 (1950)). Texas state law also provides a parallel attachment law subject to separate requirements. See, e.g., Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 952 F.3d 207, 215 (5th Cir. 2015). CH Offshore’s challenges on appeal relate to both federal and state pathways for attachment. We take each claim in turn.

 

 

(…) We (…) consider whether CH Offshore has met its burden for a Rule B attachment. See Ultra Deep Picasso, 119 F.4th at 441. To meet this burden, we review whether CH Offshore has demonstrated each of four parts: 1) it has a valid prima facie admiralty claim against the defendant; 2) the defendant cannot be found within the district; 3) the defendant’s property may be found within the district; and 4) there is no statutory or maritime law bar to the attachment. Id. (quoting Aqua Stoli Shipping Ltd. v. Gardner Smith Pty Ltd., 460 F.3d 434, 445 (2nd Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Shipping Corp. of India Ltd. v. Jaldhi Overseas Pte Ltd., 585 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2009)). While our court has not “expressly endorsed Aqua Stoli’s four-part test,” it has employed the test, emphasizing the first three requirements. Ultra Deep Picasso, 119 F.4th at 441 (discussing the third requirement); K Invs., Inc. v. B.-Gas, Ltd., No. 21-40642, 2022 WL 964210, at *2 (5^th Cir. Mar. 30, 2022) (per curiam) (discussing the first two requirements). We adopt the same approach here, requiring CH Offshore to demonstrate that each of the four test elements is met.

 

 

(…) Our court has recognized that “for maritime attachments under Rule B, the question of ownership is critical.” Malin, 817 F.3d at 246 (cleaned up). Thus, the central question before the district court, and now on appeal, is whether Mexiship Ocean has a recognizable direct ownership claim over the Settlement Refund in the Vantage Bank account, despite Mexiship Texas being the account’s named beneficiary.

 

 

While neither the district court order nor party briefing examines the Settlement Agreement with supporting law, there are relevant precedents on the question of ownership of the funds at issue and on the distinction between ownership and beneficiary status. Texas law on ownership is of particular import, as our court has held that when there is a void regarding how federal maritime law would treat the type of interest at issue, we can “look to state law to determine property rights,” because “precedent in federal admiralty law is so thin that we should turn to state law more directly on point.” Malin, 817 F.3d at 246–47.

 

 

For one, our court has held that control, rather than named beneficiary status, is the primary factor in determining ownership. In the bankruptcy context, a panel of our court acknowledged that “control is the primary determinant of ownership of bank accounts . . . .” In re IFS Fin. Corp., 669 F.3d 255, 262, 264 (5th Cir. 2012); see also In re Southmark Corp., 49 F.3d 1111, 1116–17 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that whether the debtor had “unfettered discretion to pay creditors of its own choosing, including its own creditors . . . is . . . particularly important” (footnotes omitted)). In In re IFS, our court drew on Texas garnishment law in particular, recognizing that “Texas law counsels that the legal titleholder to a bank account is not always the owner of its contents,” and that courts should “examine the individual facts of each case,” rather than the legal relationship between the parties. In re IFS, 669 F.3d at 262.

 

 

(…) There is at least sufficient evidence that requires further analysis and explication from the district court, especially as it pertains to the question of control vis-à-vis ownership. Because the evidence of control is complex but was not discussed in the district court’s order, we find that the district court abused its discretion by failing to engage with the relevant evidence and caselaw regarding the Rule B attachment. See McKinney ex rel. NLRB, 783 F. 3d at 298. The district court remains closest to the evidence produced, especially given the lengthy discovery disputes in this case, and is therefore well-positioned to draw out where control and, therefore, ownership of the Settlement Refund lies on remand.

 

 

The second issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in denying CH Offshore leave to amend its complaint. CH Offshore included its request for leave to amend in a proposed order—filed in place of a typical brief at the district court’s direction—in response to Mexiship Texas’s motion to vacate the writ of garnishment. CH Offshore sought leave to amend to include a state-law basis for attachment using an alter ego theory of liability.

 

 

(As discussed above, CH Offshore’s core claim for attachment rests on the terms of Mexiship Ocean’s Settlement Agreement and attaching to the Settlement Refund. But the parties also dispute the extent to which CH Offshore could reach additional funds in Mexiship Texas’s Vantage Bank account. To reach these additional funds, CH Offshore initially pled that Mexiship Ocean operates as an alter ego of Mexiship Texas, such that any of the latter’s funds could be reached to secure the debt of the former. Due to Rule B, which requires the defendant to not be present in the jurisdiction with the property, an alter ego claim would necessarily destroy federal jurisdiction—i.e., with a successful alter ego theory, if Mexiship Texas is found in the district, Mexiship Ocean would inherit the same jurisdictional properties. CH Offshore admits as much and does not present this argument on appeal as a basis for its existing Rule B attachment claim. Instead, as discussed further below, it intends to plead an alter ego theory purely in the alternative to its Rule B claim. Fn 4).

 

 

 

 

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Dec. 19, 2025, CH Offshore v. Mexiship Ocean, Docket No. 24-20525)

 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, CH Offshore v. Mexiship Ocean, Docket No. 24-20525

Alter Ego Relationship

 

To Pierce the Corporate Veil

 

State Law Attachment Claim

 

Texas Law

 

 

 

Next, CH Offshore’s alternative pleading would rest on an alter ego relationship between Mexiship Ocean and Mexiship Texas. Namely, CH Offshore would bring a state law attachment claim to reach additional funds in the Vantage Bank account and, therefore, seeks to pierce the corporate veil between Mexiship Texas and Mexiship Ocean. Because this is a state law claim, Texas law regarding alter ego would apply. See Ledford v. Keen, 9 F.4th 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2021). “Texas law permits courts to ʻdisregard the corporate fiction . . . when the corporate form has been used as part of a basically unfair device to achieve an inequitable result.’” Ledford, 9 F.4th at 339. Texas law applies alter ego by considering the “total dealings,” to determine if there is “such unity between the parties that the separateness of the corporation has ceased.” Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tex. 1990) (citing Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 276 (Tex. 1986)); see also Villar v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 990 F.2d 1489, 1496 (5th Cir. 1993) (discussing Texas law providing three categories in which to pierce the veil, including when the “corporation is the alter ego of its owners or shareholders”).

 

 

Our court has also applied a “laundry list” of factors for consideration when piercing the veil for liability purposes, including: common stock ownership, common directors, financing relationships between the parties, the subsidiary operating with inadequate capital, daily operations that are intertwined, and lack of observation of basic corporate formalities, such as keeping books and records and holding board meetings. See United States v. Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 690 n.6, 691–92 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that “federal and state alter ego tests are essentially the same” and citing factors from Nelson v. Int'l Paint Co., 734 F.2d 1084, 1093 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying Texas state law)). In the context of jurisdictional veil-piercing instead, if that were required in the present case, our court has considered similar alter ego factors under Texas state law but acknowledged that there are different elements of proof. See Licea, 952 F.3d at 213 (discussing Texas state jurisdictional alter ego factors).

 

 

For the purposes of the futility inquiry, we need only be concerned that CH Offshore can adequately plead an alter ego theory to support its state law attachment claim. And from limited discovery, a number of facts emerged. To briefly summarize, Mr. Perez occupies roles across both Mexiship Ocean and Mexiship Texas that bestow wide-ranging authority. Mexiship Texas does not have any offices separate from Mexiship Ocean’s, and Mr. Perez conducts Mexiship Texas’s business by making use of Mexiship Ocean’s resources, such as his Mexiship Ocean-domain email address. Further, Mr. Perez has addressed the business model: “The relationship of the companies is very simple. I own both companies, Mexiship Ocean is used for operations of Mexiship and Mexiship Texas is the financing arm of Mexiship.” The companies irrefutably have a business relationship of some sort—as evidenced by Mexiship Texas (the financing arm) sending the deposit to Seahorse for Mexiship Ocean’s (the operating arm) charter at Mr. Perez’s direction and discretion—but the companies deny any such relationship altogether.

 

 

Ultimately, “alter ego determinations are highly fact-based, and require considering the totality of the circumstances in which the instrumentality functions.” Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkm., 345 F.3d 347, 359 (5th Cir. 2003). “In making an alter ego determination, a court is ʻconcerned with reality and not form, and with how the corporation operated.’” Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkmenistan, 447 F.3d 411, 416 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d at 693). Such factual determinations are the prerogative of the district court. But with no explanation from the district court on its Rule 15 analysis, and in light of the foregoing evidence that is already available and that is probative of the alter ego factors, we cannot deduce that no such grounds for CH Offshore’s alternative claim exist.

 

 

As the above discussion details, this is not an instance in which “justification for the denial is readily apparent.” Marucci Sports, L.L.C., 751 F.3d at 378 (cleaned up). Because the district court provided no explanation for its denial despite CH Offshore’s detailed arguments in favor of leave to amend, we reverse the denial as an abuse of discretion.

 

 

For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the district court’s order, which vacated the maritime writ of garnishment and denied CH Offshore leave to amend its complaint, and REMAND with instructions to grant CH Offshore leave to amend its complaint.

 

 

 

 

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Dec. 19, 2025, CH Offshore v. Mexiship Ocean, Docket No. 24-20525)

 

 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, CH Offshore v. Mexiship Ocean

Request for Leave to Amend

 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

 

 

 

“Leave to amend is in no way automatic, but the district court must possess a substantial reason to deny a party’s request for leave to amend.” Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Burlington Ins. Co., 74 F.4th 275, 288 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Marucci Sports, L.L.C., 751 F.3d at 378). Under the “presumption in favor of allowing pleading amendments, courts of appeals routinely hold that a district court’s failure to provide an adequate explanation to support its denial of leave to amend justifies reversal.” Mayeaux, 376 F. 3d at 426. However, the district court’s failure to explain is not grounds for reversal when “justification for the denial is ʻreadily apparent’” on the record or “ample and obvious” on the record. Marucci Sports, L.L.C., 751 F.3d at 378 (quoting Mayeaux, 376 F.3d at 426). Here, we reverse the district court’s denial of leave to amend because we do not see obvious grounds for denial, and the district court gave no explanation for its finding that there was no good cause to amend. Our court has generally held that district courts should consider numerous factors when determining whether to grant leave to amend, including “1) undue delay, 2) bad faith or dilatory motive, 3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, 4) undue prejudice to the opposing party, and 5) futility of the amendment.” Smith v. EMC Corp., 393 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 2004); see also SGK Props., L.L.C. v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 881 F.3d 933, 944 (5th Cir. 2018); Weyerhaeuser, 74 F.4th at 288. CH Offshore discusses these factors in its brief on appeal, but Mexiship Texas neglects to respond with any specificity. Because any one of these factors may have provided the basis of the district court’s denial for lack of good cause, we take each in turn briefly to confirm whether any such factor provides an obvious basis for denial.

 

 

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Dec. 19, 2025, CH Offshore v. Mexiship Ocean, Docket No. 24-20525)

 

U.S. Supreme Court, CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., 605 U.S. 223

Foreign Sovereign Immunity

 

Personal Jurisdiction over a Foreign Sovereign

 

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

 

Immunity Exception Applies and Service of Process

 

Minimum Contacts?

 

 

 

 

Held: Personal jurisdiction exists under the FSIA when an immunity exception applies and service is proper. The FSIA does not require proof of “minimum contacts” over and above the contacts already required by the Act's enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.

 

 

Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U. S. C. §§ 1330, 1602 et seq., foreign states are generally immune from suit in United States courts, but the Act creates several exceptions. See §§ 1604, 1605–1607. And when an exception applies, § 1330(a) of the FSIA vests federal courts with “original jurisdiction” over such claims.

 

 

This suit concerns the FSIA's neighboring personal-jurisdiction provision. It provides that “personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist” whenever (1) an exception to foreign sovereign immunity applies, and (2) the foreign defendant has been properly served. § 1330(b). In the decision below, however, the Ninth Circuit imposed a third requirement: a plaintiff must also prove that the foreign state has made “minimum contacts” with the United States sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional test set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316 (1945), and its progeny. Because the Ninth Circuit's additional requirement goes beyond the text of the FSIA, we reverse.

 

 

For much of American history, foreign states and their instrumentalities enjoyed near total immunity from suit in our courts. See Hungary v. Simon, 604 U. S. 115, 118–119 (2025). This posture reflected the venerable international law principle that states are independent sovereign entities, and it encouraged others to respect the sovereignty of the United States in their courts. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling Co., 581 U. S. 170, 179 (2017). Notably, this immunity was not statutorily or constitutionally required. Instead, we have long understood foreign sovereign immunity as “a matter of grace and comity,” so judges historically “`deferred to the decisions of the political branches—in particular, those of the Executive Branch—on whether to take jurisdiction' over particular actions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities.” Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U. S. 677, 689 (2004) (quoting Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 486 (1983)). In practice, that usually entailed the State Department filing a case-specific “`suggestion of immunity’” whenever a foreign sovereign was sued, and when that occurred, the court would abide by the suggestion. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U. S. 305, 311 (2010) (quoting Ex parte Peru, 318 U. S. 578, 581 (1943)).

 

 

The Act also waives immunity for suits to confirm arbitration awards. §1605(a)(6). The arbitration exception applies in four statutorily defined contexts, including where the “agreement or award” is “governed by a treaty or other international agreement in force for the United States calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.” §1605(a)(6)(B). The United States, for instance, has acceded to the New York Convention, which requires it to enforce certain awards issued abroad. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U. S. T. 2517, T. I. A. S. No. 6997;

9 U. S. C. §§ 201–208. In such instances, and when the FSIA is otherwise satisfied, the arbitration exception would also apply.

Whenever an FSIA immunity exception applies, jurisdiction usually follows.

 

 

(…) To the extent that some or all FSIA exceptions satisfy International Shoe, it is only because the exceptions Congress wrote happen to meet that standard, not because § 1330(b) secretly incorporated our jurisdictional due-process cases.

 

 

(…) See Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 587 U. S. 1, 4–5, 8–13 (2019) (discussing § 1608's specialized service-of-process rules).

 

 

28 U. S. C. § 1330(b) provides:

 

“Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under section 1608 of this title.”

 

 

Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 451, Comment b (2017).

 

 

 

 

(U.S. Supreme Court, June 5, 2025, CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., 605 U.S. 223, J. Alito, Unanimous)

U.S. Supreme Court, CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., 605 U.S. 223

Remand

 

Forfeiture

 

Waiver

 

 

 

(…) We decline to answer those questions today. The Ninth Circuit relied exclusively on its interpretation of the FSIA's personal-jurisdiction provision, so that court has not yet addressed Antrix's alternative arguments. “And, for that reason, neither shall we.” F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S. A., 542 U. S. 155, 175 (2004); accord, United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 532 U. S. 483, 494 (2001). Of course, Antrix is welcome to litigate these contentions on remand consistent with principles of forfeiture and waiver.

 

 

 

(U.S. Supreme Court, June 5, 2025, CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., 605 U.S. 223, J. Alito, Unanimous)

 

 

 

 

California Court of Appeal, Bartel v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., Docket No. H052083

Punitive Damages

 

Clear and Convincing Standard

 

Insurance Law

 

California Law

 

 

 

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, §3294, subd. (a).) A plaintiff is never entitled to punitive damages as a matter of right. (Uzyel v. Kadisha (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 866, 923.) Rather, “a claim for punitive damages requires ‘evidence which establishes by “clear and convincing evidence” that the defendant has been “guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” If a plaintiff is to recover on such a claim, it will be necessary that the evidence presented meet this higher evidentiary standard.’” (Food Pro, supra,169 Cal.App.4th at p.994; see Civ. Code, §3294, subd. (a).) In the context of failure to properly administer an insurance claim, punitive damages are ordinarily “based on ‘malice’ or ‘oppression,’ rather than on the third possible ground for the award, ‘fraud.’ Both ‘malice’ and ‘oppression’ are defined in Civil Code section 3294 as involving ‘despicable conduct,’ which in the case of malice ‘is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others,’ and as to oppression is ‘conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.’” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1286–1287 (Tomaselli).) We review de novo whether the undisputed facts underlying Chicago Title’s claim handling in this case satisfy the requirements of Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a).  (See Ghirardo, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p.801.)

 

 

(…) Furthermore, we have determined that the manner in which Chicago Title repeatedly rejected tender in the face of a clear duty to defend amounted to bad faith. Nevertheless, we are not persuaded that Chicago Title’s bad faith refusal to defend Bartel under the policy until partway through Composti III rises to the level of malice or oppression within the meaning of Civil Code section 3294.

 

 

The heightened legal standard for imposing punitive damages guides our determination. “Under the clear and convincing standard, the evidence must be ‘“‘“so clear as to leave no substantial doubt”’”’ and ‘“‘“sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.”’’”’” (Butte Fire Cases (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1158.) This stringent standard must be accompanied by evidence of “‘malice,’” defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights ...of others” (Civ. Code, §3294, subd. (c)(1)), or “‘oppression,’” defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights” (id., subd. (c)(2)). “‘Despicable conduct’ is conduct that is ‘“so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.”’ ” (Butte Fire Cases, at p.1159.)

 

 

 

(California Court of Appeal, Bartel v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., May 30, 2025, Docket No. H052083, Certified for Publication)