McMillin Albany LLC v. Superior Court, S229762

Distinctions between tort and contract theories of recovery: Distinction between Common law and state statutes:

In Aas v. Superior Court (2000) 24 Cal.4th 627, 632 (Aas), this court held that the economic loss rule bars homeowners suing in negligence for construction defects from recovering damages where there is no showing of actual property damage or personal injury. We explained that requiring a showing of more than economic loss was necessary to preserve the boundary between tort and contract theories of recovery, and to prevent tort law from expanding contractual warranties beyond what home builders had agreed to provide. (Id. at pp. 635–636; see Seely v. White Motor Co. (1965) 63 Cal.2d 9, 18.) We emphasized that the Legislature was free to alter these limits on recovery and to add whatever additional homeowner protections it deemed appropriate. (Aas, at pp. 650, 653.)

Two years later, spurred by Aas and by lobbying from homeowner and construction interest groups, the Legislature passed comprehensive construction defect litigation reform. (Stats. 2002, ch. 722, principally codified at Civ. Code, §§ 895–945.5 (commonly known as the Right to Repair Act, hereafter the Act); all further unlabeled statutory references are to the Civil Code.) The Act sets forth detailed statewide standards that the components of a dwelling must satisfy. It also establishes a prelitigation dispute resolution process that affords builders notice of alleged construction defects and the opportunity to cure such defects, while granting homeowners the right to sue for deficiencies even in the absence of property damage or personal injury.

We are asked to decide whether the lawsuit here, a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage, is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The answer depends on the extent to which the Act was intended to alter the common law — specifically, whether it was designed only to abrogate Aas, supplementing common law remedies with a statutory claim for purely economic loss, or to go further and supplant the common law with new rules governing the method of recovery in actions alleging property damage. Based on an examination of the text and legislative history of the Act, we conclude the Legislature intended the broader displacement. Although the Legislature preserved common law claims for personal injury, it made the Act the virtually exclusive remedy not just for economic loss but also for property damage arising from construction defects. The present suit for property damage is therefore subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures (…).

(…) When the Legislature intended to preserve common law claims as a complement to claims under the Act, it did so expressly. (§§ 931, 943, subd. (a); see Gillotti v. Stewart (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 875, 894.)

In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded, we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act. Nor does our holding embrace claims such as those for breach of contract, fraud, or personal injury that are expressly placed outside the reach of the Act’s exclusivity. (§ 943, subd. (a).)

(Cal.S.C., Jan. 18, 2018, McMillin Albany LLC v. Superior Court, S229762).

Les défauts affectant la construction immobilière étaient susceptibles d'une action contractuelle (en garantie p. ex.), mais non d'une action extracontractuelle ("in negligence") si le propriétaire ne pouvait démontrer aucun autre dommage affectant son immeuble ou aucun préjudice corporel. La Cour mettait ainsi une limite à la possibilité d'amplifier l'indemnisation contractuelle par le recours aux principes de l'indemnisation délictuelle. Seul le législateur était compétent pour déplacer cette limite en faveur du propriétaire (tel était l'état du droit au sens de la jurisprudence Aas, rendue en l'année 2000).

Deux ans plus tard, le législateur californien a passé une nouvelle loi, intégrée au Code Civil, révisant la procédure et le droit de fond en matière de défauts de constructions immobilières.

En l'espèce, la Cour doit juger si la présente procédure, commencée par une action en Common law alléguant des défauts de construction ayant entraîné une perte économique et des dommages à la propriété, relève ou non du droit mis en place par la nouvelle loi. La solution dépend de l'étendue selon laquelle dite loi modifie la Common law : la loi n'est-elle destinée qu'à abroger la jurisprudence Aas (ajoutant aux remèdes de la Common law une action en indemnisation d'un simple dommage économique (soit sans un dommage à la propriété immobilière elle-même)), ou est-elle destinée non seulement à abroger Aas, mais encore à remplacer à cet égard la Common law par de nouvelles règles s'agissant des procédures liées à un dommage à la propriété immobilière ? Basé sur un examen du texte et de l'histoire législative de la loi, la Cour conclut que le législateur entendait retenir la seconde des deux solutions possibles précitées. Tout en maintenant les actions en Common law en cas de préjudice corporel, il a édicté dite loi avec l'intention qu'elle s'applique aux situations de dommages purement économiques ainsi qu'aux situations de dommages à la propriété résultant de défauts de construction.

La Cour ne se prononce pas ici sur l'étendue de l'application de la Common law à une action établie par la nouvelle loi. La présente affaire ne traite pas non plus des actions pour "breach of contract", "fraud", ou, comme indiqué plus haut, en dommages corporels.

P. v. Super. Ct., S232639

Common law v. statute:

(…) The general rule that we do not presume the Legislature intends to abrogate the common law unless it clearly and unequivocally says so. (Reynolds v. Bement (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1075 (Reynolds)). Reynolds, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1086.) The Reynolds rule therefore applies when the common law test of employment would have been appropriate in the same context at common law. But as we explained in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, the common law test of employment is not always appropriate beyond the tort context in which it was originally developed. (Id. at pp. 350–351.) Outside of tort, rather than rigidly applying the common law test, we look to the history and fundamental purposes of the statute at issue to determine whether the Legislature intended the test to apply. (Ibid. [declining to apply the common law test in light of the history and purposes of the workers‘ compensation statute at issue]; Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35, 64 [declining to apply the common law test in light of the full historical and statutory context of the statute at issue].) In Reynolds itself, we observed that the plaintiff in that case had not persuaded us that one may infer from the history and purposes of the statute at issue a clear legislative intent to depart . . . from the common law as to the question at issue. (Reynolds, at p. 1087, fn. 8.)

The rule of the common law, that penal statutes are to be strictly construed, has no application to this Code. All its provisions are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice.

(Cal. S.C., June 26, 2017, P. v. Super. Ct., S232639).

En règle générale, les Tribunaux de l'état de Californie présument que le législatif entend maintenir la Common law quand il légifère, sauf s'il indique clairement et sans équivoque vouloir l'abroger. Les travaux législatifs, l'analyse systématique et l'analyse téléologique sont d'importance.

Atlantic v. Townsend

Common law: relations between common law and statutes: under these settled legal principles, respondent is entitled to pursue punitive damages unless Congress has enacted legislation that departs from the common-law understanding; the plain language of the Jones Act does not provide a basis for overturning the common-law rule; this Court has consistently observed that the Jones Act preserves common-law causes of action such as maintenance and cure, see. e.g., The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U. S. 110, and its case law supports the view that punitive damages awards, in particular, continue to remain available in maintenance and cure actions, see Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U. S. 527 (U.S.S.Ct., 25.06.09, Atlantic v. Townsend, J. Thomas).

Common law : relations entre la Common law et la loi au sens formel : selon des principes juridiques bien établis, une partie est fondée à réclamer des dommages punitifs à moins que le Congrès ait légiféré d’une manière qui diverge des notions de la Common law. La lecture littérale du Jones Act ne procure pas de base permettant de révoquer la règle découlant de la Common law. La Cour a observé avec consistance que le Jones Act préserve les actions déduites de la Common law, telles que les action en entretien ou en remise en état, et la jurisprudence de la Cour confirme le point de vue selon lequel les dommages punitifs, en particulier, continuent de rester disponibles dans le cadre des actions en maintenance et en remise en état.