Jury system: minor, criminal law, evidence: in
California: sexual offense: proof that defendant has propensity to engage in
such conduct; children under 14:
Under Evidence Code section 1108, in the trial of
sexual offense charges, evidence the defendant committed another sexual offense
may be admissible to prove that the defendant has a propensity to engage in
such conduct; Penal Code section 26(One) creates a rebuttable presumption that
a child under 14 is incapable of committing a crime. We have not previously considered whether
this legal presumption and attendant burden of proof come into play at a later
criminal trial where the prosecution offers evidence under 1108 of an
unadjudicated sexual offense committed when the defendant was under 14; we have
long held that a finding of capacity is a prerequisite to an adjudication of
wardship for a minor under 14. (In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855,
867.) The prosecution may rebut Penal
Code section 26(One)’s presumption of incapacity by producing “ ‘clear proof’ ”
that the minor appreciated the wrongfulness of the conduct when it was
committed, “as demonstrated by the child’s age, experience, conduct, and knowledge
. . . .” (In re Manuel L. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 229, 232 (Manuel L.).) “Clear proof”
in this context means clear and convincing evidence. (Ibid.) While knowledge of wrongfulness may not be
inferred from the act alone, “ ‘the attendant circumstances of the crime, such
as its preparation, the particular method of its commission, and its
concealment’ may be considered. Moreover, a minor’s ‘age is a basic and
important consideration, and, as recognized by the common law, it is only
reasonable to expect that generally the older a child gets and the closer he
approaches the age of 14, the more likely it is that he appreciates the
wrongfulness of his acts.’ ” (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334,
378 (Lewis).) Although Penal Code
section 26(One) requires the prosecution to prove that a minor under 14
understood the wrongfulness of his conduct, capacity is not an “element” of the
underlying offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (Manuel
L., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 238.)
Rather, the presumption of incapacity operates to exempt the minor from
legal responsibility. (People v. Roberts (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d
385, 388; see also 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012)
Defenses, § 4, pp. 428, 430.) In this
respect, capacity is similar to the issue of sanity, which is not a fact
material to guilt but is a “ ‘prerequisite to a valid judgment and
sentence.’ ” (Manuel L., at pp. 238-239.)
Accordingly, the prosecution need not rebut the presumption of
incapacity beyond a reasonable doubt.
Instead, it must satisfy the distinct standard of proof by clear and
convincing evidence. (Id. at pp. 236, 238.)
Here, however, the issue of capacity did not arise as
a prerequisite to a valid judgment.
Instead it was a foundational question to the admissibility of evidence
proffered under section 1108. That
section permits evidence that the defendant committed other sexual offenses to
prove his propensity to commit the charged sexual offenses. (§ 1108, subd. (a); People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1012-1013 (Reliford); People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 915, 917-920 (Falsetta).) The provision specifically defines “ ‘sexual
offense’ ” as “a crime under the law
of a state or of the United States” (§ 1108, subd. (d)(1), italics added), that
involves certain listed offenses or types of conduct, including a lewd or
lascivious act on a child (§ 1108, subd. (d)(1)(A); Pen. Code, § 288).
Considering these statutes together, we hold that the
presumption of incapacity set forth in Penal Code section 26(One) applies when
the prosecution seeks to prove that the defendant committed an unadjudicated
sexual offense before reaching age 14.
The presumption must be overcome before the evidence may be
admitted. This conclusion is dictated by
the statutory language. Section 1108
authorizes admission of such evidence only if the conduct amounts to a
“crime.” (§ 1108, subd.
(d)(1).) As the Court of Appeal
reasoned, “for prior sexual offense evidence to be admitted the offense must be
a crime, and to be a crime, a child under 14 years of age must appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct.”; despite their agreement that Penal Code section
26(One)’s presumption of incapacity applies to the evidence proffered here, the
parties disagree about whether the trial court or the jury should ultimately
resolve that question; we conclude that the trial court evaluates whether a
defendant had the capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his or her
conduct, under Penal Code section 26(One), as a threshold question to
admitting an unadjudicated sexual offense.
Section 1108 addresses the admissibility or inadmissibility of this
evidence. (See People v. Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1161 [discussing §§
1101 & 1108]; Villatoro, at pp.
1169, 1172 (conc. & dis. opn. of Corrigan, J.); id. at p. 1182 (conc. & dis. opn. of Liu, J.).) The language of section 1108 itself demands
that, before the conduct may be admitted, it must amount to a “crime.” This is a legal question essential for
admissibility. “All questions of law
(including but not limited to questions concerning the construction of statutes
and other writings, the admissibility of evidence, and other rules of evidence)
are to be decided by the court.”
(§ 310, subd. (a).); (…) trial court must determine whether a prior
conviction qualifies as a serious felony for purposes of the “Three Strikes
Law”.
The legal question of admissibility, in turn, involves
a factual component. To establish
“criminal” conduct, the prosecution must show that a minor under 14 knew his or
her conduct was wrong at the time it was committed. (Pen. Code, § 26(One).) “The factual nature of the issue, however,
does not determine whether the issue must or should be submitted to a
jury.” (People v. Betts (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1039, 1048.) On the contrary, the trial court must resolve
all questions of fact preliminary to the admission of evidence. (§ 310, subd. (a).)
Under section 403, then, the trial court performs a
threshold screening function to shield the jury from evidence that is so
factually weak as to undermine its relevance.
(Lucas, at p. 466.)
The procedures outlined in section 405 reflect the
general policy that it is for the trial court to decide questions of law,
“ ‘including the admissibility of testimony, and the facts preliminary to
such admission . . . .’ ” (Assem. Com. com. at p. 41, quoting former
Code of Civ. Proc., § 2102, superseded by § 310.) The rule protects the defendant by ensuring
that the trial court reviews the legal basis for admissibility before evidence
is submitted to the jury. (Assem. Com.
com. at p. 44.)
In light of this statutory scheme, we hold that
whether a defendant understood the wrongfulness of an unadjudicated sexual
offense allegedly committed before age 14 is an evidentiary question for the
court to determine under section 405.
The general public policy on character or propensity
evidence is that it is not admissible
to prove conduct on a given occasion. (§
1101, subd. (a); see also Falsetta,
supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 913.) Section 1108 creates a narrow exception to
this rule based on the recognition that “ ‘the propensity to commit sexual
offenses is not a common attribute among the general public.’ ” (People
v. Johnson (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 520, 532, fn. 9, quoting Sen. Rules Com.,
Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 882
(1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 18, 1995, p. 8.)
At the same time, the Legislature placed a significant
restriction on the scope of section 1108 by limiting admissibility to certain
enumerated sexual offenses amounting to crimes.
A bill analysis before the Assembly Committee on Public Safety observed
that “this legislation would not generally authorize the admission of evidence
of other ‘bad acts’ by the defendant, but only evidence of criminal sexual
offenses of the same type as those with which he is formally charged.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of
Assem. Bill No. 882 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 4, 1995, p. 2.)
It reflects a policy choice striking a balance between
the general ban on character evidence to prove conduct, and an exception
permitted in strictly limited circumstances.
Our application of section 405 in this context does
not mean the jury cannot consider the defendant’s age and mental state at the
time of his juvenile conduct. Section
405, subdivision (b) anticipates that, in some instances, a preliminary fact
decided by the trial court will also bear on a fact at issue in the
action. (See Assem. Com. com., reprinted
at West’s Ann. Evid. Code, supra,
foll. § 405, p. 42.) Accordingly, we
must examine the jury’s role in assessing 1108 evidence.
While a sexual offense must qualify as a crime to be
admissible under section 1108, the defendant does not stand trial on that
uncharged conduct and cannot be convicted of it. Such evidence is admitted only as circumstantial evidence supporting an inference that the defendant committed
the charged offense, by demonstrating the defendant’s propensity and bolstering
the victim’s credibility. (Reliford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp.
1012-1014; Falsetta, supra, 21
Cal.4th at pp. 911, 915.) “A jury may
not convict the defendant based solely
on evidence of a prior sexual crime.” (People v. Loy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 46, 72,
italics added.)
As with evidence admitted under section 1101, the jury
must determine whether the defendant committed the act in question. Only if the jury so concludes by a
preponderance of the evidence can it consider such evidence in deciding whether
the defendant is guilty of the charged crimes.
(Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502
U.S. 62, 73-74; People v. Ewoldt
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 405.) It must also
consider the defense response to the evidence.
“When evidence of other crimes or acts has been admitted for some
purpose an accused should be allowed to explain or deny the transactions.” (People
v. Zerillo (1950) 36 Cal.2d 222, 230.)
For example, the defendant may introduce evidence of a previous
acquittal of criminal charges relating to acts admitted under section 1101 or
1108. (People v. Griffin (1967) 66 Cal.2d 459, 465; People v. Mullens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 648, 665-667, 669.) The defendant also may challenge the
inference the prosecution urges should be drawn from the conduct by calling
into question his state of mind or motive (Simon,
supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at pp. 130-131) or by introducing competing evidence
of good character (People v. Callahan
(1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 356, 375-379).
Finally, the jury must decide whether that act demonstrates the
defendant’s propensity to commit the charged sexual offenses. If not, the jury may accord the evidence no
weight. (Reliford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1014; Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 920.)
None of these questions requires the jury to reassess
the trial court’s determination that the prosecution established the legal
foundation required to support admissibility by rebutting Penal Code section
26(One)’s presumption of incapacity.
Rather, in enacting section 1108, the Legislature simply contemplated
that the jury would make a “ ‘ “rational assessment . . . of evidence so
admitted.” ’ ” (Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 912,
quoting Letter by Assemblyman Rogan regarding Assem. Bill No. 882 (1995-1996
Reg. Sess.) published in 2 Assem. J. (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) p. 3278, reprinted
at 29B pt. 3B West’s Ann. Evid. Code (2009 ed.) foll. § 1108, p. 352.)
In this regard the respective roles of judge and jury
are similar to those at play when a defendant’s confession is offered against
him. The defendant may seek to bar its
admission arguing that the statement was obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436,
and its progeny. (See § 402, subd.
(b).) If the Miranda requirements were violated, “public policy and binding
precedent require its exclusion.”
(Assem. Com. com., reprinted at West’s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. § 405, p. 41.) In ruling on such a motion, the trial court
determines whether, as a matter of law, the statement is barred by Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence. If the
statement is admitted, the jury is not then instructed on the nuanced legal
principles related to interrogation and waiver.
This is because the jury is not permitted to revisit the court’s legal
determination of admissibility. (People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375,
389-390, disapproved on another ground in People
v. Lessie (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1152, 1168; see also § 405, subd. (b)(2).) As we observed in People v. Thornton, supra, 11 Cal.3d 738, “section 405 of the
Evidence Code clearly indicates that the court’s decision on the issue of
admissibility of confessions is final and not subject to a ‘second look’ by the
jury . . . .” (Id. at p. 767, fn. omitted.)
The defense is free, however, to “present evidence of
the circumstance under which a confession . . . was made where such evidence is
relevant to the credibility of the statement, even though such evidence may
duplicate to some degree the evidence presented to the court on the issue of
admissibility.” (Assem. Com. com.,
reprinted at West’s Ann. Evid. Code, supra,
foll. § 405, p. 44.) Based on such
evidence, the defense may argue that the defendant did not make the statement
or that the evidence carries no weight because the defendant was confused,
fatigued, or tricked, thus depriving the statement of any probative value. “But the jury’s sole concern is the truth or
falsity of the facts stated, not the admissibility of the statement.” (Ibid.; accord, People
v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 607, disapproved on another ground in People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478,
510, fn. 17; Jackson v. Denno (1964)
378 U.S. 368, 386, fn. 13.) (Cal.S.C., 22.07.2013, P. v. Cottone, S194107).
Système du
jury en général et dans le cas particulier de la présente espèce. Selon le code
des moyens de preuve, section 1108, dans un procès pénal portant sur des
infractions d'ordre sexuel, la preuve que le prévenu a commis auparavant
d'autres infractions de nature sexuelle peut être admissible pour établir que
le prévenu souffre d'une propension à la commission de tels délits.
La section
26(1) du Code pénal crée une présomption réfragable qu'un enfant de moins de 14
ans est incapable de commettre un crime. A ce jour, la Cour n'a pas jugé si
cette présomption légale s'appliquait lors d'un procès pénal ultérieur au cours
duquel l'accusation offre la preuve selon section 1108 d'un acte répréhensible
de nature sexuelle resté sans jugement et commis alors que le prévenu était âgé
de moins de 14 ans.
La Cour
considère depuis longtemps qu'une constatation de capacité est un prérequis à
l'adjudication d'un gardien en faveur d'un mineur de moins de 14 ans.
L'accusation
peut détruire la présomption d'incapacité précitée en produisant une
"preuve claire" que le mineur a apprécié le caractère incorrect de sa
conduite lors de la commission, à la lumière des critères de l'âge de l'enfant,
de son expérience, de sa conduite et de ses connaissances. La "preuve
claire" dans ce contexte équivaut au standard de preuve "clear and
convincing". La capacité n'est pas un élément de l'infraction sous jacente
qui devrait être prouvée "au-delà d'un doute raisonnable". Ainsi, la
notion de capacité s'apparente à celle de capacité de discernement, qui n'est
pas un fait matériel de culpabilité mais qui constitue un pré réquisit à un
jugement et à une peine valides.
Dans la
présente espèce, cependant, la question de la capacité ne se pose pas en tant
que précondition à un jugement valide. En effet, cette question est
préliminaire à l'admissibilité d'une preuve soumise sous l'angle de la section
1108. Cette section permet d'introduire comme moyen de preuve le fait que le
prévenu a commis dans le passé d'autres infractions de nature sexuelle dénotant
sa propension à commettre l'infraction de nature sexuelle en procès. La section
1108 définit spécifiquement l'infraction de nature sexuelle comme un crime
selon le droit d'un état ou selon le droit fédéral.
Ainsi, la
présomption d'incapacité prévue à la section 26(1) du Code pénal s'applique
lorsque l'accusation cherche à prouver que le prévenu a commis avant
d'atteindre l'âge de 14 ans une infraction de nature sexuelle restée sans
jugement. La présomption doit être renversée avant que la preuve ne puisse être
admise. Cette conclusion est dictée par le texte de la loi : la section 1108
autorise l'admission de cette preuve à la condition que la conduite réprouvée
puisse être qualifiée de crime. On peut donc poser la formulation suivante :
pour qu'une infraction de nature sexuelle antérieure puisse être admise comme
preuve, l'infraction doit être qualifiée de crime, et pour obtenir la
qualification de crime, l'enfant de moins de 14 ans doit pouvoir apprécier le
caractère incorrect de sa conduite.
C'est au
Tribunal lui-même, et non au jury, de déterminer si l'accusation a renversé la
présomption d'incapacité. En effet, déterminer si un acte s'analyse en un crime
est une question de droit. Et toutes les questions de droit (par exemple les
questions d'interprétation d'une loi au sens formel et d'autres écrits, les
questions d'admissibilité des preuves, et les autres règles de preuves) sont
décidées par la Cour et non par le jury. La Cour doit par conséquent aussi
résoudre toutes les questions de fait préalables à l'admission d'une preuve.
Il appartient
aussi à la Cour de procéder à une évaluation pour ne pas soumettre au jury une
preuve qui serait en fait si faible qu'elle en deviendrait irrelevante.
De manière
générale, les preuves portant sur le caractère ou sur la notion de propension
ne sont pas admissibles pour prouver une conduite à une occasion donnée (cf.
section 1101). La section 1108 crée une exception étroite à cette règle,
reconnaissant que la propension à commettre des infractions de nature sexuelle
n’est pas une attribution commune parmi le public en général. Par ailleurs, le
législateur a restreint de manière significative l’étendue de la section 1108,
en limitant l’admissibilité à certaines infractions de nature sexuelle
s’analysant en un crime. Cette législation n’autorise ainsi pas l’admission de
preuves relatives à d’autres mauvaises actions (bad acts) commises par le
prévenu. Le moyen de preuve précité, quand admissible, équivaut à un moyen de
preuve circonstanciel (circumstantial evidence). Un jury ne peut par conséquent
pas condamner le prévenu sur la seule base de la preuve d’un crime sexuel
antérieur.
Comme pour les
preuves admises par la section 1101, le jury doit déterminer si le prévenu a
commis l’acte en question. C’est seulement si le jury conclut par l’affirmative
par une prépondérance des preuves qu’il peut considérer un acte antérieur pour
finalement décider si le prévenu est ou non coupable de l’infraction retenue.
Le jury doit aussi considérer la prise de position de la défense s’agissant
dudit moyen de preuve antérieur. Le prévenu peut notamment alléguer son état
mental, ses motifs, et son bon caractère. Le jury procède ainsi à une
détermination rationnelle du moyen de preuve déclaré admissible par la Cour.
