Tuesday, April 27, 2021

Data Security Oversight - Corporate Boards

 

Corporate boards: Don’t underestimate your role in data security oversight

 

Federal Trade Commission

For businesses in the middle of a global pandemic, there’s no such thing as “business as usual.” The percentage of Americans working remotely has grown substantially, now reportedly up to 33% of the U.S. workforce. Accompanying that seismic shift have been increased security threats to data, with one analysis reporting that over 36 billion online records were exposed in the first half of 2020 alone. Consumers whose lives have been upended by identity theft are paying close attention to how corporations are responding. But is the typical corporate Board of Directors giving data security the attention it deserves?

 

In addition to the significant costs to consumers, data breaches, network intrusions, and looming cyber threats can open up a firm to substantial financial costs, reputational hits, and legal liability. The FTC has continued to challenge allegedly deceptive or unfair conduct related to companies’ data security practices. A few recent examples include settlements with SkyMed International, Tapplock, and Zoom. We’re also in the process of reviewing some data security rules for industry, including the Health Breach Notification Rule and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Safeguards Rule.

 

Against that backdrop, it’s essential for corporate boards to do what they can to ensure that consumer and employee data is protected. The good news is that according to a recent study, 60% of directors surveyed said they plan to improve their cybersecurity oversight role over the next year. What would that look like for a typical corporation? FTC staff has five common-sense recommendations for conscientious directors.

 

MAKE DATA SECURITY A PRIORITY.

Contrary to popular belief, data security begins with the Board of Directors, not the IT Department. A corporate board that prioritizes data security can set the tone throughout an organization by instilling a culture of security, establishing strong security expectations, and breaking down internal silos to facilitate technical and strategic collaboration. While there’s no one-size-fits-all formula, here are strategies some companies have implemented to make security a priority.

  • Build a team of stakeholders from across your organization. Despite a 2018 study that found that 89% of CEOs treat cybersecurity as an IT function, experience suggests that cyber risk management is a “whole business” issue. A sound data security program should incorporate stakeholders from business, legal, and technology departments across the company – both high-level executives and operational experts. Of course, many committees include the Chief Information Officers and the Chief Information Security Officer, but other companies promote practical synergies by also including executives who bring a different perspective to the issues – for example, the CEO, CFO, or General Counsel. A broad and diverse range of voices can provide the board with cross-cutting information about cyber risks and solutions.
  • Establish board-level oversight. Some corporate boards delegate their cyber risk oversight duties to an audit committee. Others have a stand-alone cybersecurity committee at the board level. Irrespective of how an organization structures its cyber risk oversight duties, the key takeaway is that cyber risks should be a priority within the board room. Board-level oversight helps to ensure that cybersecurity threats, defenses, and responses have the attention of those at upper echelons and get the resources needed to do the job right.
  • Hold regular security briefings. When it comes to security, board members need to be in the know, but research suggests many of them are out of the loop. A 2012 survey found that fewer than 40% of corporate boards regularly received reports about privacy and security risks and 26% rarely or never got that information. According to another study, only 12% of boards frequently received cyber threat briefings. A survey of public companies conducted six years later in 2018 didn’t suggest much progress. Only 37% of board members said they felt “confident” or “very confident” that their company was properly secured against cyberattack. Of course, cybersecurity isn’t a one-and-done proposition. It’s a dynamic process that requires board members to be informed, engaged, and updated. Regular briefings prepare boards to carry out their oversight responsibility, navigate the security landscape, and prioritize threats to the company.

 

UNDERSTAND THE CYBERSECURITY RISKS AND CHALLENGES YOUR COMPANY FACES.

A strong data security program starts at the top. While it might not be the board’s role to manage day-to-day security operations, it is their job to set priorities and allocate the resources necessary to ensure effective security. Board members need to talk the talk and walk the walk. They should demonstrate a sophisticated grasp of the data security challenges their company faces and act in a way that sets the tone for the entire organization.

 

DON’T CONFUSE LEGAL COMPLIANCE WITH SECURITY.

In 2019, the FTC held a series of hearings on consumer protection and technology in the 21st century. One common theme was that compliance doesn’t necessarily translate into good security. Cybersecurity threats are constantly and rapidly evolving. A strong data security program should never be reduced to a “check the box” approach geared toward meeting compliance obligations and requirements. Instead, boards should ensure that their security programs are tailored to their companies’ unique needs, priorities, technology, and data. Boards should ask tough questions about whether their policies and procedures effectively address their company’s security risks and whether actual security practices effectively address the threats they face. That no-holds-barred conversation might include fundamental questions like:

  • What kind of data are we keeping and why? And where are we keeping it?
  • Are our policies and procedures adequate to protect our data?
  • Are our actual security practices in line with our policies and our public-facing statements?
  • Are our security investments and expenditures in line with our security risks and threats?

 

IT’S MORE THAN JUST PREVENTION.

A strong data security program ensures that a company is undertaking reasonable precautions to protect its network and consumers’ personal information from intruders. However, no data security program is perfect and no program can guarantee that a company will be protected from attack or a data breach. If nothing else, recent breaches have demonstrated the importance of both a strong data security program and a robust incident response plan. In responding to a security incident, time is often of the essence. Every minute that employees spend attempting to flag down key executives and focus their attention on what’s happened is time taken away from the critical tasks of stanching the damage to data and implementing an appropriate response. In contrast, an effective security program ensures that when it’s appropriate, a security incident can be swiftly elevated to the appropriate level. In addition, building organizational resilience into your security program can help your company sustain operations while responding to a security incident.

 

LEARN FROM MISTAKES.

If your company has had the misfortune of experiencing a data breach, take the opportunity to learn from the incident and improve your program. Companies often require periodic independent third-party assessments to establish a baseline against which future progress can be measured and – in the event of a security incident – to determine how a breach occurred. Of course, learning from other companies’ mistakes can be just as valuable (and substantially less painful). There are certainly no shortage of data breaches and many likely involve competitors or other parties in similar lines of business. Boards should take the opportunity to understand the cybersecurity risks related to their industry and learn from their company’s own mistakes as well as the mistakes of others.

The FTC Business Center has data security resources for companies of any size and in any sector.

 

Monday, April 26, 2021

California Court of Appeal, Loomis v. Amazon.com LLC, Docket No. B297995

 

E-Commerce

Strict Products Liability

Distribution Agreement

When the Defendant Falls Outside the Vertical Chain of Distribution: Marketing Enterprise Theory or Stream of Commerce Approach

Amazon

Consumer Law

Punitive Damages

Standards: Underwriter’s Laboratories

California Law

 

Kisha Loomis brought suit against Amazon.com LLC (Amazon) for injuries she suffered from an allegedly defective hoverboard. The hoverboard was sold by a third party seller named TurnUpUp through the Amazon website. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Amazon. The primary issue on appeal is whether Amazon may be held strictly liable for Loomis’s injuries from the defective product. Recently, the Fourth District addressed this issue as a matter of first impression in Bolger v. Amazon.com, LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 431 (Bolger), review denied November 18, 2020. Bolger held Amazon “is an ‘integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective products.’ ” (Id. at p. 453.) Our own review of California law on strict products liability persuades us that Bolger was correctly decided and that strict liability may attach under the circumstances of this case. We reverse and remand with directions.

 

Where Amazon is the seller of a product, it is identified as the seller on the product detail page, and it sources the product, sets the price, and holds title to it. This case does not involve an Amazon-listed product. Where a third party is the seller, it is identified as such on the product detail page and again on the order confirmation page before the user places the order. The third party sources the product, sets the price, and holds title to it.

 

Some third party sellers utilize Fulfillment by Amazon (FBA) services, which allow the seller to store its inventory in an Amazon warehouse. If a product is sold under the FBA, Amazon packages and ships the product to the purchaser. TurnUpUp did not elect to utilize the FBA services.

 

At issue in this appeal are Loomis’s strict and negligent product liability claims.

 

B. The Doctrine of Strict Products Liability in California

Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57, 62 (Greenman) established the doctrine of strict products liability when it held “a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.” “The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.” (Id. at p. 63).

 

The California Supreme Court extended the doctrine to retailers in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 256 (Vandermark), reasoning, “Retailers like manufacturers are engaged in the business of distributing goods to the public. They are an integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective products. [Citation.] In some cases the retailer may be the only member of that enterprise reasonably available to the injured plaintiff. In other cases the retailer himself may play a substantial part in insuring that the product is safe or may be in a position to exert pressure on the manufacturer to that end; the retailer’s strict liability thus serves as an added incentive to safety. Strict liability on the manufacturer and retailer alike affords maximum protection to the injured plaintiff and works no injustice to the defendants, for they can adjust the costs of such protection between them in the course of their continuing business relationship.” (Id. at pp. 262-263).

 

California courts must consider the policies underlying the doctrine to determine whether to extend strict liability in a particular circumstance. (Anderson v. Owens–Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 987, 995 (Anderson); O’Neil v. Crane Co. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 335, 362–363 (O’Neil).) The public policies articulated in Greenman and Vandermark that form the foundation for the application of strict liability are the following: (1) whether Amazon may play a substantial part in insuring that the product is safe or may be in a position to exert pressure on the manufacturer to that end, (2) whether Amazon may be the only member in the distribution chain reasonably available to the injured plaintiff, and (3) whether Amazon is in a position to adjust the costs of compensating the injured plaintiff amongst various members in the distribution chain. (Vandermark, supra, 61 Cal.2d at pp. 262-263).

 

Applying these policy considerations, courts have extended strict products liability to entities within the chain of distribution, including bailors and lessors (Price v. Shell Oil Company (1970) 2 Cal.3d 245, 248); wholesalers and distributors (Barth v. B. F. Goodrich Tire Co. (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 228, 252- 253; Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co. (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 44, 52 (Canifax)); and sellers of mass-produced homes (Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc. (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 224, 227). Courts have found these defendants were responsible for passing the product down the line to the consumer, had the ability to affect product safety by exerting pressure on the manufacturer, and were able to bear the cost of compensating for injuries. (Arriaga v. CitiCapital Commercial Corp. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1527, 1535 (Arriaga).) Courts, however, have declined to extend the doctrine to hotel proprietors (Peterson v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1185); sellers of used products (Wilkinson v. Hicks (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 515); and auctioneers (Tauber–Arons Auctioneers Co. v. Superior Court (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 268 (Tauber-Arons)), who were found to have little to no relationship with the manufacturer and thus lacked the ability to affect product safety.

 

A consumer injured by a defective product “may now sue ‘any business entity in the chain of production and marketing, from the original manufacturer down through the distributor and wholesaler to the retailer; liability of all such defendants is joint and several.’ ” (Wimberly v. Derby Cycle Corp. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 618, 628.) The purpose for this approach “is to extend liability to all those engaged in the overall producing and marketing enterprise who should bear the social cost of the marketing of defective products.” (Kaminski v. Western MacArthur Co. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 445, 455-456).

 

“The strict liability doctrine derives from judicially perceived public policy considerations, i.e., enhancing product safety, maximizing protection to the injured plaintiff, and apportioning costs among the defendants. [Citations.] Where these policy justifications are not applicable, the courts have refused to hold the defendant strictly liable even if that defendant could technically be viewed as a ‘ “link in the chain” ’ in getting the product to the consumer market. [Citation.] In other words, the facts must establish a sufficient causative relationship or connection between the defendant and the product so as to satisfy the policies underlying the strict liability doctrine.” (Arriaga, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1535).

 

The court in Bay Summit Community Assn. v. Shell Oil Co. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 762 (Bay Summit), set forth three factors to determine whether such a causative relationship or connection exists when the defendant falls outside the vertical chain of distribution. Under the marketing enterprise theory or stream of commerce approach, the plaintiff must show: “(1) the defendant received a direct financial benefit from its activities and from the sale of the product; (2) the defendant’s role was integral to the business enterprise such that the defendant’s conduct was a necessary factor in bringing the product to the initial consumer market; and (3) the defendant had control over, or a substantial ability to influence, the manufacturing or distribution process.” (Id. at p.776; Kasel v. Remington Arms Co. (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 711 (Kasel)).

 

(…) Lastly, the court found the federal CDA did not shield Amazon from strict liability because liability was based on Amazon’s own conduct, not the content of the seller’s product listing. (Bolger, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 465).

 

(…) We are persuaded that Amazon’s own business practices make it a direct link in the vertical chain of distribution under California’s strict liability doctrine.

 

(…) These actions – 1) interacting with the customer, 2) taking the order, 3) processing the order to the third party seller, 4) collecting the money, and 5) being paid a percentage of the sale – are consistent with a retailer or a distributor of consumer goods.

 

Although we conclude Amazon is a link in the vertical chain of distribution, we nevertheless recognize e-commerce may not neatly fit into a traditional sales structure. The stream of commerce approach or market enterprise theory offers an alternative basis for strict liability.

 

“Under the stream-of-commerce approach to strict liability no precise legal relationship to the member of the enterprise causing the defect to be manufactured or to the member most closely connected with the customer is required before the courts will impose strict liability.

 

It is the defendant’s participatory connection, for his personal profit or other benefit, with the injury-producing product and with the enterprise that created consumer demand for and reliance upon the product (and not the defendant’s legal relationship (such as agency) with the manufacturer or other entities involved in the manufacturing- marketing system) which calls for imposition of strict liability. [Citation.]” (Kasel , supra, 24 Cal.App.3d at p. 725.) Thus, a defendant may be strictly liable under the stream of commerce approach if: “(1) the defendant received a direct financial benefit from its activities and from the sale of the product; (2) the defendant’s role was integral to the business enterprise such that the defendant’s conduct was a necessary factor in bringing the product to the initial consumer market; and (3) the defendant had control over, or a substantial ability to influence, the manufacturing or distribution process.” (Bay Summit, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 778).

 

(…) For example, the BSA allows Amazon to require certification of products it lists from the Underwriter’s Laboratories, which, among other things, establishes standards for manufacturing practices.

 

(…) We are persuaded the trial court erroneously granted summary adjudication on the strict liability claim based on a stream of commerce approach.

 

(…) Read in context, however, it is clear O’Neil did not intend to overturn five decades of case law extending strict liability to lessors, bailors, and others within the stream of commerce who may not bear the label of manufacturer, seller, or supplier. (See, e.g., Fortman v. Hemco, Inc. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 241, 251 [“entities in the stream of commerce for purposes of strict liability are not limited to those readily identifiable as designer, manufacturer, or vendor of the defective product”]).

 

We likewise reject Amazon’s argument it is merely a service provider who is not subject to strict products liability. We have identified how it was instrumental in the sale of the hoverboard to Loomis.

 

Even if Amazon may be characterized as a service provider, Murphy v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 672 (Murphy) and Hernandezcueva v. E.F. Brady Co., Inc. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 249 (Hernandezcueva), cited by Amazon, are instructive on the issue of when strict liability attaches to service providers.

 

In both cases, the court determined the defendant provided both a service and sale of a product. Therefore, “the propriety of imposing strict liability on a party that both supplies and installs a defective component hinges on the circumstances of the transaction.” (Hernandezcueva, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 260.) In Murphy, the court determined the service aspect of the defendant pharmacist’s role predominated over its sale of prescription drugs. (Murphy, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 675.) In Hernandezcueva, the court determined the subcontractor that installed drywall in a commercial project provided both a service (the installation) and the sale of a product (the drywall). Despite its dual role, the subcontractor was a participant in the stream of commerce for strict liability purposes. (Hernandezcueva, supra, at p. 263).

 

Here, Amazon provides a service to TurnUpUp in the form of a website to list its product and, as described above, was also instrumental in the sale of the product by placing itself squarely between TurnUpUp and Loomis. That it did not hold title to the product and did not have physical possession of the hoverboard does not automatically render it solely a service provider and remove it from strict liability.

 

 

(California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, April 26, 2021, Loomis v. Amazon.com LLC, Docket No. B297995, Certified for Publication)

 

Sunday, April 25, 2021

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Janssen Ortho, LLC v. United States, Docket No. 20-1663

 

Customs

HTSUS

Tariff Classification

Pharmaceutical Appendix

Import - Export

Learned Hand

 

Appeal from the United States Court of International Trade in No. 1:13-cv-00296-JCG.

This opinion was originally filed under seal and has been unsealed in full.

All citations to the HTSUS are to the 2010 version, in keeping with Janssen’s initial entries at issue. See LeMans Corp. v. United States, 660 F.3d 1311, 1314 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

 

Appellee, Janssen Ortho, LLC (“Janssen”), filed suit against Appellant, the United States (“the Government”), in the U.S. Court of International Trade (“CIT”), challenging U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (“Customs” or “CBP”) classification of Janssen’s darunavir ethanolate, the active ingredient in Prezista®, a medication for the treatment of the human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”), under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”) and the Pharmaceutical Appendix to the Tariff Schedule (“Pharmaceutical Appendix”).  Janssen alleges that it has paid approximately $100 million in duties for entries of darunavir ethanolate that should have received duty-free treatment. Following a bench trial, the CIT concluded that the subject merchandise was properly classified under HTSUS subheading 2935.00.60 and subject to duty-free treatment under the Pharmaceutical Appendix. Janssen Ortho LLC v. United States, 425 F. Supp. 3d 1352, 1355 (Ct. Int’l Trade), as amended (Feb. 19, 2020), judgment entered, 429 F. Supp. 3d 1383 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2020); see J.A. 36 (Judgment).

 

The Government appeals the CIT’s decision as to darunavir ethanolate’s duty-free treatment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5). We affirm.

 

“The first four digits of an HTSUS provision constitute the heading, whereas the remaining digits reflect subheadings.” Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. United States, 845 F.3d 1158, 1163 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2017). “The headings and subheadings . . . are enumerated in chapters 1 through 99 of the HTSUS (each of which has its own section and chapter notes).” R.T. Foods, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.3d 1349, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2014). There are two types of HTSUS headings, “eo nomine and use provisions.” Schlumberger, 845 F.3d at 1164. “An eo nomine provision . . . describes an article by a specific name.” CamelBak Prods., LLC v. United States, 649 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). A use provision describes an article by its principal or actual use. See Aromont USA, Inc. v. United States, 671 F.3d 1310, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

 

The HTSUS is “considered . . . a statutory provision of law for all purposes.” 19 U.S.C. § 3004(c)(1). “The legal text of the HTSUS includes all provisions enacted by Congress or proclaimed by the President,” HTSUS, Preface 1 (22d ed. 2010), including the headings, subheadings, “General Rules of Interpretation” (“GRI”), “Additional U.S. Rules of Interpretation” (“ARI”), “General Notes,” and “various appendices for particular categories of goods.” R.T. Foods, 757 F.3d at 1353 (footnote omitted); see Chemtall, Inc. v. United States, 878 F.3d 1012, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that “the tenth-digit statistical suffixes . . . are not statutory,” as those suffixes are not incorporated in the HTSUS’s legal text).

 

“In 1995, the United States and twenty-one other countries” entered into the “Pharmaceutical Zero-for-Zero Initiative,” agreeing “to reciprocally eliminate tariffs on pharmaceutical products, their derivatives, and certain chemical intermediates used to manufacture pharmaceuticals.” Advice Concerning the Addition of Certain Pharm. Prod. & Chem. Intermediates to the Pharm. Appendix to the HTSUS (“USITC Pharma. Advice”), Inv. No. 332-476, USITC Pub. 3883, 2006 WL 2950495, at *1 (2006). The United States codified this agreement through HTSUS General Note 13 and the Pharmaceutical Appendix. Id. at *6. “General Note 13 permits duty free treatment of certain pharmaceutical products.” Forest Labs., Inc. v. United States, 476 F.3d 877, 882 (Fed. Cir. 2007). It provides that “whenever” an HTSUS heading or subheading has the “symbol ‘K’ in parentheses” in the “‘Special’ duty rate subcolumn,” “any product (by whatever name known) classifiable in such provision which is the product of a country eligible for tariff treatment . . . shall be entered free of duty, provided that such product is included in the Pharmaceutical Appendix.” HTSUS, General Note 13 (emphasis omitted); see USITC Pharma. Advice, 2006 WL 2950495, at *6 (similar).

 

Table 1 of the Pharmaceutical Appendix “enumerates products described by International Non-proprietary Names (‘INN’),” with “the Chemical Abstracts Service (‘CAS’) registry numbers also set forth . . . to assist in the identification of the products concerned,” to “be entered free of duty under General Note 13 to the HTSUS.” Pharmaceutical Appendix at 2 (Table 1 Chapeau). The chapeau to Table 1 further provides that, “for purposes of the HTSUS, any references to a product enumerated in Table 1 includes such product by whatever name known.” Id. Table 1 lists “darunavir,” along with the CAS registry number “206361-99-1.” Pharmaceutical Appendix at 15. Table 2 of the Pharmaceutical Appendix provides that the “salts, esters, and hydrates of the products enumerated in Table 1 . . . that contain in their names any of the prefixes or suffixes listed in Table 2 shall also be entered free of duty under General Note 13” so long as they are “classifiable in the same” HTSUS heading “enumerated in Table 1.” Pharmaceutical Appendix at 57 (Table 2 Chapeau); see id. (providing that Table 2 similarly covers “such product by whatever name known”).

 

II. The Subject Merchandise

This appeal involves multiple entries of darunavir ethanolate, made by Janssen at the port of San Juan, Puerto Rico, between September 2010 and March 2012. J.A. 1246, 4452–55; see J.A. 1246–50 (Stipulated Facts), 4452–55 (Summons); see also Janssen, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 1355, 1361. Janssen is a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson and the owner of U.S. Patent No. 7,700,645 (“the ’645 patent”), which discloses darunavir ethanolate. J.A. 1247; see ’645 patent, col. 29 l. 62–col. 30 l. 65 (claims 1–8) (expressly claiming darunavir ethanolate solvate).

 

III. Procedural History

Customs liquidated Janssen’s entries under HTSUS subheading 2935.00.95, at a duty rate of 6.5 percent ad valorem. J.A. 4453; see HTSUS subheading 2935.00.95 (covering “Sulfonamides: Other: Drugs: Other”). Janssen filed protests of these actions, asserting that its darunavir ethanolate should have been classified under HTSUS sub- heading 3003.90.00, duty free, or HTSUS subheading 2935.00.60, duty free. Janssen, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 1355; J.A. 4453; see 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(2) (providing that an importer may protest to Customs “the classification and rate and amount of duties chargeable” on an entry); HTSUS subheading 3003.90.00 (covering certain “medicaments . . . consisting of two or more constituents which have been mixed together for therapeutic or prophylactic uses”); HTSUS, General Note 13 (providing for duty-free treatment for certain HTSUS headings or subheadings that have the “symbol ‘K’ in parentheses” in the “‘Special’ duty rate subcolumn” as “included in the Pharmaceutical Appendix”). Customs denied Janssen’s protests. Janssen, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 1355; see 19 U.S.C. § 1515 (providing Customs with the authority to review protests made under 19 U.S.C. § 1514).

 

In December 2013, Janssen filed a summons and complaint before the CIT, contesting Customs’ denial of its protests. Janssen, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 1355; see J.A. 76–97 (Complaint), 4452–55 (Summons); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (giving the CIT “exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced to contest the denial of a protest, in whole or in part, under 19 U.S.C. § 1515”). Janssen subsequently amended its complaint to raise claims under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Janssen, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 1355; see J.A. 111–41 (First Amended Complaint). The Government filed a partial motion to dismiss Janssen’s Due Process claim. Janssen, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 1355. The CIT “bifurcated the action into two trials,” the first to address the merits of Janssen’s tariff classification arguments, the second to address Janssen’s Due Process claim. Id.; see id. (staying the Government’s partial motion to dismiss and “reserving scheduling of the second trial pending the outcome of the first trial”). The parties filed pre-trial briefs, and in July 2019, the CIT conducted a three-day bench trial, hearing testimony from fact and expert witnesses. Id.

 

The CIT held that darunavir ethanolate “is properly classified under HTSUS subheading 2935.00.60 and is eligible for duty-free treatment under the Pharmaceutical Appendix.” Id. The CIT explained that “because darunavir ethanolate is a sulfonamide,” it “belongs to the ‘sulfonamides’ class or kind of organic compounds that are classifiable under HTSUS subheading 2935.00.60.” Id. at 1363 (second alteration in original); see HTSUS subheading 2935.00.60 (covering “Sulfonamides: Other: Drugs: Other”). The CIT then noted that HTSUS subheading 2935.00.60 lists the symbol “K” in the special duty rate subcolumn and, therefore, “cross-references the Pharmaceutical Appendix.” Janssen, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 1364; see HTSUS, General Note 13. The CIT concluded that “‘darunavir’ is a product listed on the Pharmaceutical Appendix” for duty-free treatment. Janssen, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 1364; see Pharmaceutical Appendix at 2, 15. The CIT further found that, because the “evidence at trial” established “that darunavir ethanolate is a name by which the INN darunavir is known,” darunavir ethanolate falls “within the terms of Table 1 of the Pharmaceutical Appendix” and should receive duty-free treatment. Janssen, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 1365; see id. (discussing exemplary evidence in support, including expert testimony); see also id. at 1357 (finding, inter alia, that “the INN for darunavir ethanolate is darunavir,” “darunavir ethanolate is also known as darunavir,” and “darunavir ethanolate is the only commercially available form of darunavir”). The CIT reasoned that, while “darunavir ethanolate has been assigned a separate CAS registry number” from “darunavir,” this did not alter its conclusion, because “by the terms of the chapeau, CAS registry numbers are not exclusive or exhaustive identifiers as to whether a named product is within the scope of the Pharmaceutical Appendix.” Id. at 1364–65.

 

II. The CIT Properly Classified Janssen’s Darunavir Ethanolate as INN “Darunavir”

The CIT concluded that darunavir ethanolate “is properly classified under HTSUS subheading 2935.00.60 and is eligible for duty-free treatment under the Pharmaceutical Appendix.” Janssen, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 1355. The CIT explained that because “‘darunavir’ is a product listed on the Pharmaceutical Appendix,” and “‘darunavir ethanolate’ is a name by which darunavir is known,” it “is within the terms of Table 1 of the Pharmaceutical Appendix.” Id. at 1364–65. The Government argues that the CIT erred “in its interpretation of General Note 13 and the Pharmaceutical Appendix,” Appellant’s Br. 9 (capitalization normalized), because neither the “INN ‘darunavir’” nor “CAS Registry No. 206361-99-1 . . . identifies darunavir ethanolate,” id. at 10, 12 (capitalization normalized). We disagree with the Government.

 

First, the Pharmaceutical Appendix expressly includes products described by the INN “darunavir.” Table 1 of the Pharmaceutical Appendix “enumerates products described by their International Non-proprietary Names” or “INN” for duty-free treatment, with “any references to a product enumerated” encompassing “such product by whatever name known.” Pharmaceutical Appendix at 2. It further provides associated “CAS registry numbers . . . to assist in the identification of the products concerned.” Id. That is, by its plain language, the Pharmaceutical Appendix covers “such products,” by “whatever name known,” that are “described by” an INN listed in Table 1. Id.; see United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 254 (1980) (“This is a case in which the meaning of a statute may be determined by the admittedly old-fashioned but nonetheless still entirely appropriate ‘plain meaning’ canon.”). CAS registry numbers are provided to “assist in the identification of the products,” and, therefore, while helpful, are not dispositive. Pharmaceutical Appendix at 2; see Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) (“We do not read the enumeration of one case to exclude another unless it is fair to suppose that Congress considered the unnamed possibility and meant to say no to it.”). Table 1 lists the INN “darunavir,” along with the CAS registry number “206361-99- 1.” Pharmaceutical Appendix at 15. Therefore, the Pharmaceutical Appendix covers “such products,” by “whatever name otherwise known,” that are “described by” the INN “darunavir,” with the CAS registry number 206361-99-1 provided to “assist in its identification.” Id. at 2, 15; see Carl Zeiss, 195 F.3d at 1379 (“Absent contrary legislative intent, HTSUS terms are to be construed according to their common and commercial meanings, which are presumed to be the same.”).

 

Second, darunavir ethanolate is a product described by the INN “darunavir.” The CIT found that “the INN for darunavir ethanolate is darunavir,” “darunavir ethanolate is also known as darunavir,” and the INN for Prezista, of which “the active pharmaceutical ingredient” is “darunavir in the form of darunavir ethanolate,” is also “darunavir.” Janssen, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 1364; see J.A. 1246– 50 (Stipulated Facts). The CIT further found, based on “evidence at trial,” that the “INN darunavir” is commonly and commercially used to refer to “darunavir ethanolate.” Janssen, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 1364; see id. at 1357 (finding that “the prescribing information for Prezista describes the product as ‘PREZISTA (darunavir), in the form of darunavir ethanolate,’” and “darunavir ethanolate is the only commercially available form of darunavir”); id. at 1364 (finding that the WHO “identifies that the INN ‘darunavir’ is manufactured as ‘darunavir (ethanolate),’” as well as the National Institute of Health, National Center for Biotechnology Information PubChem Compound database, and the FDA (citing, inter alia, J.A. 1778– 83, 1784–91, 1860–62)). The CIT acknowledged the Government’s evidence that “darunavir ethanolate is assigned a separate CAS registry number” from darunavir, Janssen, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 1364–65; see J.A. 1248, but found this difference “unavailing” because, by Table 1’s plain language, “CAS registry numbers are not exclusive or exhaustive identifiers as to whether a named product is within the scope of the Pharmaceutical Appendix,” Janssen, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 1365. Based on the evidence presented, the CIT concluded that darunavir ethanolate falls within the products described by the INN “darunavir.” Id. We perceive no clear error in this finding. See Renda Marine, Inc. v. United States, 509 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948))).

 

The Government’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. First, the Government argues that the CIT “erroneously construed” Table 1 to the Pharmaceutical Appendix because both “the INN ‘darunavir’ and the CAS registry number ‘206361-99-1’ uniquely identify the darunavir molecule, not darunavir ethanolate.” Appellant’s Br. 10 (capitalization normalized). Framing an issue of fact as a legal challenge, the Government asserts that “because the INN ‘darunavir’ does not describe darunavir ethanolate, and because the unique CAS registry number assigned to darunavir ethanolate, number 635728-49-3, is not included in Table 1, darunavir ethanolate is not a ‘product enumerated in Table 1.’” Id. (capitalization normalized). The Government is incorrect.

 

Table 1’s listing of INN “darunavir” does not uniquely identify the darunavir molecule. Table 1 expressly “enumerates products,” not molecules, “described by” their INN. Pharmaceutical Appendix at 2; see Forest Labs., 476 F.3d at 882 (“General Note 13 permits duty free treatment of certain pharmaceutical products.” (emphasis added)); cf. J.A. 1348 (WHO, noting that INNs are assigned broadly to “pharmaceutical substances”). It is well-established that “HTSUS terms are to be construed according to their common and commercial meanings” and that “eo nomine designations . . . will ordinarily include all forms of the named article.” Carl Zeiss, 195 F.3d at 1379 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Further, contrary to the Government’s understanding, darunavir ethanolate is the darunavir molecule. Specifically, darunavir ethanolate is the darunavir molecule compounded with ethanol to form a solvate. Janssen, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 1356 (finding that “darunavir ethanolate is created by crystallizing darunavir and ethanol molecules into a crystal lattice structure,” “darunavir ethanolate is a channel solvate,” and “ethanol molecules in the channels of darunavir ethanolate support the crystal lattice”); see id. (finding that the chemical names for darunavir ethanolate are darunavir “compounded with ethanol” in equal parts); see J.A. 1249 (same).

 

Nor does Table 1’s listing of the CAS registry number “206361-99-1” exclude all but the darunavir molecule. As explained above, Table 1 provides that CAS numbers are included “to assist in the identification of the products” listed by INN. Pharmaceutical Appendix at 2. That is, as the Government acknowledges, CAS numbers are not dispositive and cannot be read to exclude other CAS numbers. See Appellant’s Br. 14 (“The Government has never contended that CAS registry numbers are ‘dispositive.’”). It is unclear, then, what result the Government expects from its assertion that the CIT should have, nonetheless, more closely “evaluated” “the listed CAS registry numbers.” Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (explaining that, under the “harmless error” rule, we “give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties”). Further, the Government’s own expert witness testified that CAS numbers default to including both the indexed compound and their solvate forms, J.A. 1150 (Government’s expert, testifying that “solvates are not indexed in the system generally”), 1179 (Government’s expert, agreeing that “CAS, as a baseline rule, won’t separately index solvates” but rather indexes them “under the unsolvated form”); see Janssen, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 1356 (finding that “darunavir ethanolate is a channel solvate” formed by “crystallizing darunavir and ethanol”), such that, while darunavir ethanolate, having been patented, has its own CAS registry number, J.A. 1661 (CAS registry entry for darunavir ethanolate); see J.A. 1151–52 (Government’s expert, explaining that “in the case of solvates, those would be separately registered when they’re in a patent example or claim” because “it’s a disclosure”), 1179–80 (similar), the CAS number for darunavir may nonetheless “assist in the identification” of darunavir ethanolate as the product INN “darunavir,” Pharmaceutical Appendix at 2, 15; see J.A. 1178–79 (Government’s expert, agreeing that “if you search the CAS registry for darunavir’s CAS registry number” or the name “darunavir,” “it will return the entry for darunavir ethanolate”); see also J.A. 1012–13 (the Government’s second expert, testifying that “obviously” “if you use the structure of the darunavir molecule to search in the CAS system, among the associated index entries is the entry for darunavir ethanolate”); J.A. 633 (Janssen’s expert, explaining that the CAS registry number for darunavir “assists in identifying darunavir ethanolate” because their CAS registry numbers “are linked numbers”).

 

The Government further asserts that “without explanation,” the CIT erroneously “disregarded the CAS registry number identified in Table 1.” Appellant’s Br. 14. However, as noted above, the CIT did address darunavir’s CAS registry number. See Janssen, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 1365 (explaining that, while darunavir has a different CAS registry number than darunavir ethanolate, that difference was not “dispositive”). In effect, the Government argues that the CIT failed to give sufficient weight to the fact that darunavir and darunavir ethanolate have different CAS registry numbers. See Appellant’s Br. 14. This argument is misplaced. “The weighing of conflicting evidence is a task within the special province of the trial judge who, having heard the evidence, is in a better position than we to evaluate it.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 668 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).

 

Second, the Government asserts that the CIT’s “expansive reading of” the Table 1 chapeau “renders Table 2 of the Pharmaceutical Appendix inoperative.” Appellant’s Br. 18. The Government argues that the “purpose of Table 2” is to “identify . . . the specific derivative forms of the products listed in Table 1 that are afforded duty-free treatment,” such that, in order for Janssen’s product to receive duty-free treatment, it must be listed in both Table 1 and Table 2. Id. at 18–19 (citing Sigma-Tau HealthSci., Inc. v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 3d 1365, 1377 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2015), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 838 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); see Sigma-Tau, 98 F. Supp. 3d at 1377 (quoting General Note 13 and concluding that “thus to qualify for K designation, the derivative products at issue must be listed in both Table 1 and Table 2”); see also Sigma-Tau, 838 F.3d at 1277 n.2 (noting that the CIT’s conclusions as to General Note 13 were not at issue on appeal). This argument is without merit.

 

(…) “A tariff classification has no claim to judicial deference under Chevron, there being no indication that Congress intended such a ruling to carry the force of law”.

(…) “There is no dispute that the products at issue were imported from eligible countries.” Janssen, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 1364 n.6.

(…) General Note 13 provides that “products in the Pharmaceutical Appendix” may be entered “free of duty,” and, further, that “products in the pharmaceutical appendix include the salts, esters and hydrates of INN products enumerated in Table 1 . . . that contain in their names any of the prefixes of suffixes listed in Table 2.” HTSUS, General Note 13 (emphasis added). “The term ‘include’ . . . signifies a non-exhaustive list.” Apple Inc. v. Voip-Pal.com, Inc., 976 F.3d 1316, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Table 1 “enumerates products” to “be entered free of duty under General Note 13,” Pharmaceutical Appendix at 2, and Table 2 further provides that the “salts, esters, and hydrates of the products enumerated in Table 1 . . . that contain in their names any of the prefixes or suffixes listed” in Table 2, may “also be entered free of duty under General Note 13 . . . provided that each is classifiable in the same 6-digit tariff provision as the relevant product enumerated in Table 1,” id. at 57 (emphasis added). That is, by its plain language, Table 2 provides an additional list of products that may “also be entered duty free.” Id.; see King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (“Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence.” (quoting NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941) (L. Hand, J.))); cf. USITC Pharma. Advice, 2006 WL 2950495, at *1 (explaining that the “Pharmaceutical Zero-for-Zero Initiative,” as codified at General Note 13, “eliminates tariffs on pharmaceutical products, their derivatives, and certain chemical intermediates”).

 

Here, because Table 1 covers “such products,” by “whatever name otherwise known,” that are “described by” the INN “darunavir,” Pharmaceutical Appendix at 2, 15, and darunavir ethanolate is a product described by the INN “darunavir,” Janssen, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 1357 (“The INN for darunavir ethanolate is darunavir.”), it is unnecessary to reach Table 2. Janssen’s entries of darunavir ethanolate are subject to duty-free treatment under Table 1. See HTSUS, General Note 13. The CIT did not erroneously “render” Table 2 inoperative, Appellant’s Br. 2; Table 2 is simply irrelevant to the classification of darunavir ethanolate, see Pharmaceutical Appendix at 2, 57. Accordingly, the CIT did not err in concluding that Janssen’s entries of subject merchandise, “properly classified under HTSUS subheading 2935.00.60,” are “eligible for duty-free treatment under the Pharmaceutical Appendix.” Janssen, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 1366.

 

Because we resolve darunavir ethanolate’s classification as INN “darunavir,” duty free, at Table 1 of the Pharmaceutical Appendix, we do not reach the parties’ arguments as to how darunavir ethanolate may or may not be classified under Table 2, or Janssen’s Due Process claim, as they are moot. See E.T. Horn Co. v. United States, 367 F.3d 1326, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004); NEC Corp. v. United States, 151 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Appellee’s Br. 20 (noting that Janssen’s Due Process claim has been mooted by the duty-free classification), 57 (arguing that “in the event of reversal, Janssen’s Due Process claim remains to be tried” (capitalization normalized)).

 

 

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, April 26, 2021, Janssen Ortho, LLC v. United States, Docket No. 20-1663, WALLACH, Circuit Judge)