Showing posts with label Eleventh Circuit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Eleventh Circuit. Show all posts

Friday, June 23, 2023

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Travelers Property Casualty Company of America v. Ocean Reef Charters LLC, Docket No. 21-14509


Insurance Law

 

Marine Insurance Warranty

 

Declaratory Action

 

Anti-Technical Statute (to Prevent the Insurer from Avoiding Coverage on a Technical Omission Playing No Part in the Loss)

 

Admiralty Law

 

New York State Law

 

Florida Law

 

 

 

 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 9:18-cv-81270-RAR

 

 

Insurance coverage dispute between Travelers Property Casualty Company of America (“Travelers”) and Ocean Reef Charters LLC, (“Ocean Reef”), a Florida Limited Liability Company. Ocean Reef owned a 92-foot yacht, the M/Y My Lady, which was destroyed during Hurricane Irma in September 2017. Ocean Reef had a $2 million insurance policy with Travelers covering property damage to the yacht. One of the My Lady’s representatives for Ocean Reef with respect to the boat, Richard Gollel, moored the yacht to a dock behind his Pompano Beach, Florida residence as the hurricane approached. But the yacht was destroyed by what registered as a Category 4 storm.

 

 

Travelers tried to avoid paying for the loss by preemptively seeking a declaratory judgment that the policy did not cover the loss because Ocean Reef did not have a full-time, licensed captain and crew for the yacht during the hurricane, as required under warranties in the insurance policy. It brought the declaratory action in the Western District of New York, alleging that Ocean Reef had an office and its principal place of business in Rochester, New York. Under New York state law, an insured forfeits coverage by violating a marine insurance warranty, regardless of whether the violation had any effect on the accidentThe same is true under federal admiralty law as applied to at least some marine insurance warranties. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Ocean Reef Charters LLC, 996 F.3d 1161, 1167–68 (11th Cir. 2021).

 

 

2 See Com. Union Ins. Co. v. Flagship Marine Servs., Inc., 190 F.3d 26, 31–32 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing how, “under . . . the law of most states,” including New York, “warranties in maritime insurance contracts must be strictly complied with, even if they are collateral to the primary risk that is the subject of the contract, if the insured is to recover” (citing N.Y. Ins. L. § 3106(c))). “However, unlike New York and the majority of states, Florida does not require strict compliance with all warranties, but it does preclude recovery where the ‘breach or violation increased the hazard by any means within the control of the insured.’” Id. at 32 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 627.409(2)). (Fn. 2).

 

 

Florida Statute § 627.409(2) is a “so-called ‘anti-technical statute.’” Travelers, 996 F.3d at 1164. The statute “was ‘designed to prevent the insurer from avoiding coverage on a technical omission playing no part in the loss.’” Id. at 1170 (quoting parenthetically Pickett v. Woods, 404 So. 2d 1152, 1153 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)). (Fn. 3).

 

 

On remand, because Travelers offered no expert witness—such as a licensed captain competent to speak to the issue—to prove that the lack of a full-time captain and crew played a role in the destruction of the yacht during Irma, the District Court granted summary judgment to Ocean Reef. We affirm.

 

 

Ocean Reef’s insurance policy had contained two express warranties since Ocean Reef first insured the My Lady with Travelers in 2014. One was called the “Captain Warranty.” The Captain Warranty provides: It is warranted you employ a professional captain for the yacht shown on the Declarations Page of this policy. Such captain shall be employed full time and approved by us. We will pay up to $1,500 for the cost of hiring a replacement captain, approved by us, if your captain is unable to perform his regular duties due to a medically certified cause. The other warranty was called the “Crew Warranty.” The Crew Warranty provides: You employ 1 full time or part time professional crew for your yacht shown on the Declarations Page of this policy. We also provide coverage for any additional, temporary crew you employ.

 

 

(…) As indicated supra, Travelers likely engaged in a strategy to avoid the application of Florida’s anti-technical statute, Fla. Stat. § 627.409(2). Under that statute, it would need to prove that the lack of a full-time captain and crew played a material role in the My Lady’s sinking to avoid paying Ocean Reef. On the other hand, under the federal rule that applies to some marine insurance warranties, Travelers, 996 F.3d at 1167–68, “and the law of most states,” including New York, “warranties in maritime insurance contracts must be strictly complied with, even if they are collateral to the primary risk that is the subject of the contract, if the insured is to recover.” Com. Union Ins. Co. v. Flagship Marine Servs., Inc., 190 F.3d 26, 31–32 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing N.Y. Ins. L. § 3106(c)).

 

 

(…) On February 25, 2019, Ocean Reef disclosed Captain Thomas Danti and Allister Dredge, a marine surveyor, as expert witnesses. They attached both experts’ reports to the disclosure. The disclosure included both experts’ qualifications, their opinions, and the bases for their opinions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2). Captain Danti opined, after interviewing Gollel and inspecting the site, that the “storm preparations by Mr. Gollel met the standard of care of a professional Mariner.” He also opined that “the main cause of the vessel’s damage was unforeseeable failure of a mooring pile.” So, “the lack of a full time captain would not have prevented the yacht from becoming a total loss.” Danti’s bottom-line conclusion was: “There was no increased hazard in risk to the vessel by not having a full time captain at the time of the incident.” Dredge, the surveyor, also opined that the damage to the yacht was a “constructive total loss,” as repairs would cost $2.5 million.

 

 

(…) For the reasons discussed in Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America v. Ocean Reef Charters LLC, 996 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 2021), Florida law applies.

 

 

The Florida anti-technical statute we must apply provides: A breach or violation by the insured of a warranty, condition, or provision of a wet marine or transportation insurance policy, contract of insurance, endorsement, or application does not void the policy or contract, or constitute a defense to a loss thereon, unless such breach or violation increased the hazard by any means within the control of the insured. Fla. Stat. § 627.409(2). “The statute is designed to prevent the insurer from avoiding coverage on a technical omission playing no part in the loss.” Pickett, 404 So. 2d at 1153. Whether an insured increased the hazard by noncompliance with a warranty “is typically a question of fact for the jury.” Serendipity at Sea, LLC v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London Subscribing to Pol’y No. 187581, 56 F.4th 1280, 1290 (11th Cir. 2023) (citing Pearl Assurance Co. v. S. Wood Prods. Co., 216 F.2d 135, 136 (5th Cir. 1954)).

 

 

The effect of Ocean Reef’s failure to retain a full-time captain and crew leading up to and during Hurricane Irma is exactly the kind of issue that requires expert testimony. The question is hypothetical. Discussing what would have happened if a captain were in charge of the My Lady during Hurricane Irma necessarily requires hypothesizing. “And the ability to answer hypothetical questions is ‘[t]he essential difference’ between expert and lay witnesses.” United States v. Henderson, 409 F.3d 1293, 1300 (11th Cir. 2005).

 

 

 

 

 

Secondary Sources: Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 701.03[1] (2023); Stephen A. Saltzburg et al., 3 Federal Rules of Evidence Manual § 701.02[7] (Matthew Bender 12th ed.)

 

 

 

 

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, June 23, 2023, Travelers Property Casualty Company of America v. Ocean Reef Charters LLC, Docket No. 21-14509, Publish)

Eleventh Circuit - Decisions of the Former Fifth Circuit


Eleventh Circuit

 

Decisions of the Former Fifth Circuit

 

 

 

Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued before October 1, 1981, constitute binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Fn. 7).

 

 

 

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, June 23, 2023, Travelers Property Casualty Company of America v. Ocean Reef Charters LLC, Docket No. 21-14509, Publish)

 

 

 

Monday, April 22, 2019

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Fresh Results, LLC, v. ASF Holland, B.V., Total Produce, PLC, Docket No. 18-11595


Forum Non Conveniens
Conflicts of Laws
Dismissal
Jurisdiction
Enforcement of Judgments

Fresh Results, an American company, arranged bulk shipments of blueberries for ASF Holland, a Dutch company that repacks wholesale produce to sell to European customers.

ASF Holland created reports about the results of its inspection of the shipments, and those reports determined the final price it paid for the blueberries. Fresh Results filed a complaint against ASF Holland in the Southern District of Florida, alleging that it had falsified the reports and fraudulently deflated the price. ASF Holland moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Netherlands was a more convenient forum for the suit, and the district court agreed.

Because we agree that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to consider the relevant public factors and committed two errors in its analysis of the private factors, we vacate and remand.

(…) During the second season, one of the growers hired an auditor to make an unannounced inspection of a blueberry shipment at ASF Holland’s facility in the Netherlands. The auditor allegedly discovered that the blueberries were still in their original freight package, even though ASF Holland had reported to Fresh Results that the shipment had been inspected, sorted, and repacked. After learning of the auditor’s inspection, Fresh Results demanded that ASF Holland pay the market price for each shipment of blueberries it had received, but ASF Holland refused.

Fresh Results filed a complaint, which it later amended, against ASF Holland in the Southern District of Florida. Fresh Results asserted claims of breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, conversion, and tortious interference with its business relationship with the growers. It alleged that ASF Holland fraudulently promised a high reference price but then deflated the actual price it paid by sending false reports. According to Fresh Results, ASF Holland manipulated the price by understating the amount paid by its European customers and by falsely inflating its expenses in the reports. ASF Holland informed the district court that it would pursue counterclaims against Fresh Results for sending substandard blueberries.

ASF Holland then moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim and forum non conveniens.

Because “the forum non conveniens determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court,” we review for abuse of discretion.

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a district court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction when a foreign forum is better suited to adjudicate the dispute. See Kolawole v. Sellers, 863 F.3d 1361, 1369 (11th Cir. 2017). The “central purpose” of forum non conveniens is “to ensure that the trial is convenient.” Id. The doctrine should not be invoked “lightly . . . because it effectively deprives the plaintiff of his favored forum,” id., and so a defendant bears the burden of justifying dismissal based on forum non conveniens, La Seguridad, 707 F.2d at 1309. To satisfy this burden, the defendant must establish that “(1) an adequate alternative forum is available, (2) the public and private factors weigh in favor of dismissal, and (3) the plaintiff can reinstate his suit in the alternative forum without undue inconvenience or prejudice.” Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321, 1330 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2001)).

The second part of the forum non conveniens analysis—the balancing of the private and public factors—is a “comparative inquiry that requires the district court to weigh the ‘relative’ advantages and disadvantages of each respective forum.” The private factors “pertain to the interests of the participants in the litigation.” One of these factors is “the relative ease of access to sources of proof,” which includes the “availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses.” Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947); see also Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6. Other factors are the “possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action” and the enforceability of a judgment, if one is obtained, Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508. And a court may consider “all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Id. The public factors “pertain to the relative interests of the two fora.” Tazoe, 631 F.3d at 1333. Among other things, the public factors consider “the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion,” “the ‘local interest in having localized controversies decided at home,’” and “the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty.” Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6 (quoting Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 509). A court may also consider what law will govern the action, including “the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflicts of laws” and “the application of foreign law.” Id.

Fresh Results argues that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to consider all relevant public factors after concluding that the private factors were not in equipoise. The equipoise standard employed by the district court comes from dicta in our caselaw. Although our holdings are precedential, our dicta are not. See United States v. Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233, 1244 (11th Cir. 2017). Dicta refer to “those portions of an opinion that are not necessary to deciding the case then before us.” Id. In contrast, our holdings “constitute the precedent, as a point necessarily decided” in that case. Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent § 4, at 44 (2016); accord Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “a holding is comprised both of the result of the case and those portions of the opinion necessary to that result by which we are bound”). And we have explained that, “regardless of what a court says in its opinion, the decision can hold nothing beyond the facts of that case.” Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1298 (11th Cir. 2010).

(…) We clarified that the public factors do not “enter the equation only when the private interest factors are at or near equipoise.” Leon, 251 F.3d at 1311. Although “the private factors are generally considered more important than the public factors,” we explained that the public factors are not superfluous, even when the private factors are far from equipoise. Id. And we opined that “the better rule is to consider both factors in all cases,” which “has been our approach in recent cases.” Id.; see also SME Racks, Inc. v. Sistemas Mecanicos Para Electronica, S.A., 382 F.3d 1097, 1100 n.5 (11th Cir. 2004) (“We have clarified that . . . courts should consider both public and private factors in all cases.”)

(…) Enforcement of Judgments, U.S. Dep’t of State,


U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Fresh Results, LLC, v. ASF Holland, B.V., Total Produce, PLC, Docket No. 18-11595


Dicta
Judicial Precedent

(…) Fresh Results argues that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to consider all relevant public factors after concluding that the private factors were not in equipoise. The equipoise standard employed by the district court comes from dicta in our caselaw. Although our holdings are precedential, our dicta are not. See United States v. Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233, 1244 (11th Cir. 2017). Dicta refer to “those portions of an opinion that are not necessary to deciding the case then before us.” Id.  In contrast, our holdings “constitute the precedent, as a point necessarily decided” in that case. Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent § 4, at 44 (2016); accord Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “a holding is comprised both of the result of the case and those portions of the opinion necessary to that result by which we are bound”). And we have explained that, “regardless of what a court says in its opinion, the decision can hold nothing beyond the facts of that case.” Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1298 (11th Cir. 2010).

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Fresh Results, LLC, a Delaware LLC, v. ASF Holland, B.V., a Dutch Corporation, Total Produce, PLC, an Irish Public Limited Company, April 22, 2019, Docket No. 18-11595, Circuit Judge William Pryor, for Publication)