California Court of Appeal, Ng v. Super. Ct., Docket No. G064257M

Demurrer

 

Verified Answer

 

California Law

 

 

 

 

(…) Because the Medical Center’s “response is not a demurrer or verified answer, it does not constitute a ‘return’ and does not effectively deny any of the allegations in the petition.” (Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 372, fn. 5, disapproved on other grounds by ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 196, fn. 8.) Thus, as against the Medical Center, “all facts pleaded in the petition are accepted as true. [Citation.] That consequence, however, has little, if any, significance in this proceeding, which involves an issue of statutory interpretation . . . .” (Caliber Bodyworks, Inc., at p. 373, fn. 5.) (Fn. 2).

 

 

 

(California Court of Appeal, Feb. 20, 2025, Ng v. Super. Ct., Docket No. G064257M, Certified for Publication)

 

California Court of Appeal, Fox Paine & Company, LLC v. Twin City Fire Insurance Company, A168803

Demurrer

 

Dismissal

 

California Law

 

 

 

 

(…) We set forth the governing principles in Chiatello v. City & County of San Francisco (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 472, 480: “‘Because this case comes to us on a demurrer for failure to state a cause of action, we accept as true the well pleaded allegations in plaintiffs’ third amended complaint. “‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.]”’ We likewise accept facts that are reasonably implied or may be inferred from the complaint’s express allegations.’ [Citations.] ‘“‘A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint . . ..’ [Citations.] On appeal from a dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer, we review the order de novo, exercising our independent judgment about whether the complaint states a cause of action as a matter of law. [Citations.] When the trial court sustains a demurrer without leave to amend, we must also consider whether the complaint might state a cause of action if a defect could reasonably be cured by amendment. If the defect can be cured, then the judgment of dismissal must be reversed to allow the plaintiff the opportunity to do so. The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating a reasonable possibility to cure any defect by amendment.”’” In 2021, we added this: “We also assume the attachments to the complaint are true, and they take precedence over any conflicting allegations in the TAC. [Citation.] Finally we ‘will affirm if there is any ground on which the demurrer can properly be sustained, whether or not the trial court relied on proper grounds or the defendant asserted a proper ground in the trial court proceedings.” (George v. eBay, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 620, 628 (George).)

 

Although we review the complaint de novo, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the facts pleaded are sufficient to establish every element of the cause of action and overcoming all of the legal grounds on which the trial court sustained the demurrer. If the defendant negates any essential element, we will affirm the order sustaining the demurrer as to the cause of action. [Citation]. Kahan v. City of Richmond (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 721, 730 (Kahan).)

 

 

 

 

 

California Court of Appeal, Sept. 5, 2024, Fox Paine & Company, LLC v. Twin City Fire Insurance Company, A168803, Certified for Publication)

 

California Court of Appeal, Carrillo v. County of Santa Clara, Docket No. B322810

Statute of Limitations

 

Demurrer Without Leave to Amend

 

Civil Procedure

 

Suit Brought Against a Public Entity

 

Accrual of a Cause of Action

 

Discovery Rule

 

Delayed Discovery Exception

 

Medical Malpractice

 

California Law

 

 

 

Appellant Emilio Carrillo appeals from a judgment of dismissal of his medical negligence claim against respondent County of Santa Clara after the trial court sustained the County’s demurrer without leave to amend on statute of limitations grounds. We affirm.

 

 

On July 12, 2019, the County demurred to Carrillo’s FAC. The County argued that Carrillo’s medical negligence claim was time-barred, citing Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 (MICRA),1which provides that a plaintiff must file suit “within three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5.) Because Carrillo’s foot was amputated on December 20, 2017, the County argued he was required to file suit no later than December 20, 2018, making his January 18, 2019, complaint untimely.

 

 

1 MICRA is the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act. (Anson v. County of Merced (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1195, 1199 (Anson).)

 

 

The County also argued that MICRA’s one-year limitations period was not extended by Government Code section 945.6 (the Government Claims Act), which provides that “any suit brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a pre-filing claim is required to be presented” to the public entity must be filed within six months after the public entity’s rejection of the claim. The County argued that, for his claim against the County to be timely, Carrillo was required to satisfy the deadlines in both statutes.

 

 

Except in circumstances inapplicable here, “any suit brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented” must be brought within six months after the County’s rejection of the claim. (Gov. Code, § 945.6, subd. (a)(1).) Additionally, under MICRA, a plaintiff alleging medical negligence must file suit within “three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5.) As to the one-year limitations period, MICRA “sets forth two alternate tests for triggering the limitations period: (1) a subjective test requiring actual suspicion by the plaintiff that the injury was caused by wrongdoing; and (2) an objective test requiring a showing that a reasonable person would have suspected the injury was caused by wrongdoing.” (Kitzig v. Nordquist (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1384,1391.)

 

 

(…) We hold that, here, where both section 945.6 and MICRA apply, Carrillo was obligated to meet the deadlines set forth in both statutes.

 

 

Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, supra, 35 Cal.4th 797 at 806). The “discovery rule” is an exception to this general rule and postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action. (Id. at 807.) To rely on the discovery rule for delayed accrual of a cause of action, a plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence. (Id. at 808.) In assessing the sufficiency of the allegations of delayed discovery, the court places the burden on the plaintiff to show diligence. (Ibid.) Conclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer. (Ibid.)

 

 

(…) Because Carrillo filed his suit more than a year after his amputation, the trial court did not err in sustaining the County’s demurrer on statute of limitations grounds.

 

 

 

 

(California Court of Appeal, March 13, 2023, Carrillo v. County of Santa Clara, Docket No. B322810, Certified for Publication)

Hansen v. Newegg.com Americas, Inc., Docket B271477

Competition law: Unfair competition: Advertising: Consumer protection: Price: Origin: Geographic origin: Labeling of origin: Demurrer:

The complaint alleged that Newegg’s website advertised fictitious former price and discount information that was intended to induce customers to purchase its products (…) Hansen further asserted that he would not have purchased the products had he known the “true nature of the discounts.”

Newegg filed a demurrer arguing that Hansen lacked “standing to . . . assert any claim under the FAL, UCL or CLRA” because he had “suffered no loss of money or property as a result of Newegg’s actions.” According to Newegg, Hansen’s complaint showed he had received the “products he wanted for the prices he agreed to pay”; he had not alleged that “the products were different than what he wanted, were unsatisfactory in any way, or were worth less than what he paid for them.” Accordingly, he had suffered no form of “economic injury.”

Summary of Applicable Law:

Unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200) (UCL):

“The UCL’s purpose is to protect both consumers and competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial markets for goods and services.” (Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 949.) “In service of that purpose, the Legislature framed the UCL’s substantive provisions in “broad, sweeping language” and provided ‘courts with broad equitable powers to remedy violations’.” (Kwikset, 51 Cal.4th at p. 320.)

False advertising law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17500 et seq.) (FAL):

“Any violation of the false advertising law . . . necessarily violates the UCL.” (Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 950.) Section 17500 “proscribes not only advertising which is false, but also advertising which, although true, is either actually misleading or which has a capacity, likelihood or tendency to deceive or confuse the public.” (Colgan v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 663, 679.) Section 17501 specifically limits the use of advertisements that purport to convey the former price of a product: “No price shall be advertised as a former price of any advertised thing, unless the alleged former price was the prevailing market price . . . within three months next immediately preceding the publication of the advertisement or unless the date when the alleged former price did prevail is clearly, exactly and conspicuously stated in the advertisement.” As used in section 17501, the term “‘former price’ . . . includes but is not limited to the following words and phrases when used in connection with advertised prices; ‘formerly –,’ ‘regularly –,’ ‘usually –,’ ‘originally –,’ ‘reduced from ___,’ ‘was ___ now ___,’ ‘___% off.’” (4 Cal. Code Regs., § 1301.) (…) Our Legislature has adopted multiple statutes that specifically prohibit the use of deceptive former price information and misleading statements regarding the amount of a price reduction. (See § 17501; Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a)(13).) These statutes make clear that, contrary to Newegg’s assertions, our Legislature has concluded “reasonable people can and do attach importance to a product’s former price in their purchasing decisions.” (Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 333 [statutory prohibition on use of deceitful “Made in U.S.A.” labels shows that reasonable consumers do rely on that form on information]; see also id. at p. 329 [Legislature’s prohibition on deceitful Made in the U.S.A. labels demonstrates “the materiality of this representation”].) As noted in Hinojos, this conclusion is supported by empirical research showing that the presence of a higher original price affects consumers’ perceptions “about the product’s worth,” and increases their willingness to buy the product. (Hinojos, 718 F.3d at p. 1106.)

Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.) (CLRA)

The CLRA makes unlawful . . . various “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer.” The CLRA sets forth 27 proscribed acts or practices. (Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a)(1)-(27).) (Veera v. Banana Republic, LLC (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 907, 915 (Veera).) One of those “proscribed acts” is “making false or misleading statements of fact concerning . . . the existence of, or amounts of, price reductions.” (Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a)(13).)

(Examples: are prohibited: To some consumers, processes and places of origin matter.  In particular, to some consumers, the ‘Made in U.S.A.’ label matters. (Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 328-329.) The Court noted that the “Legislature had recognized the materiality of this form of representation by specifically outlawing deceptive and fraudulent ‘Made in America’ representations.” (Id. at p. 329 (citing § 17533.7) [prohibiting deceitful representations that a product was “Made in the U.S.A.”] and Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a)(4) [prohibiting deceptive representations of geographic origin].) (…) the Legislature has also specifically prohibited false former price advertising, as it did false labeling of origin. (See § 17501, Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a).)

(…) Kwikset, however, held that a consumer’s decision to pay more for a product than he or she would have but for the misrepresentation is itself a form of economic injury: In the eyes of the law, a buyer forced to pay more than he or she would have is harmed at the moment of purchase.

(…) The Supreme Court has concluded that to establish standing under California’s UCL and FAL, a consumer need only allege that he or she relied on a misrepresentation when purchasing the product, and that he or she would not have purchased the product but for the representation. (Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 317.)

(California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, July 31, 2018, Hansen v. Newegg.com Americas, Inc., Docket B271477, Certified for Publication, Acting P.J. Zelon)

Le demandeur soutient que le site Internet de l’entreprise défenderesse contenait des prix avant rabais qui ne correspondaient pas à la réalité, dans l’intention d’inciter le consommateur à l’achat. Il allègue en outre que sans cette publicité, il n’aurait pas acheté de produits à la défenderesse.

Celle-ci soutient pour sa part que la demande doit être rejetée d’entrée de cause, le demandeur n’ayant pas subi de dommage économique : les allégués de la demande démontreraient que le demandeur aurait reçu les produits qu’il voulait pour des prix qu’il avait consenti à payer, sans prétendre avoir reçu d’autres produits, des produits défectueux, ou de moindre valeur que la somme effectivement payée.

Cette affaire est jugée en application du droit californien, et les dispositions topiques sont les suivantes :

Loi contre la concurrence déloyale (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200) : il est rappelé ici que la loi utilise des formulations non restrictives, attribuant ainsi aux Tribunaux des compétences de décision étendues.

Loi contre la publicité mensongère (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17500 et seq.) : toute violation de dite loi implique nécessairement violation de la loi contre la concurrence déloyale. Dite loi proscrit non seulement la publicité mensongère, mais aussi la publicité qui ne l’est pas mais qui a la capacité, la possibilité, ou la tendance de tromper ou d’induire en erreur le public. La Section 17501 de la loi limite spécifiquement la publicité d’un ancien prix : un ancien prix ne peut pas apparaître, sauf si cet ancien prix correspondait au prix du marché dans les trois mois antérieurs à la publicité, ou sauf si la publicité indique clairement la date à laquelle l’entreprise pratiquait effectivement cet ancien prix.

Le législateur a considéré que dans sa décision d’achat, le consommateur attachait de l’importance à l’ancien prix.

La loi « consumers legal remedies » (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.) : dite loi consacre l’illicéité de diverses méthodes déloyales ou trompeuses, soit avec l’objectif de vendre (biens ou services), soit qui résultent effectivement en une vente (biens ou services). La loi décrit 27 pratiques illicites. L’une de ces pratiques consiste à déclarer de manière fausse ou trompeuse des faits relatifs à l’existence ou au montant d’une réduction de prix. D’autres pratiques consistent notamment à tromper quant à l’origine géographique d’un produit.

Roy Allan Slurry Seal v. Amer. Asphalt South, S225398

Demurrer: Civil procedure: Pleadings: Dismissal: A demurrer is properly sustained when “the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)  On appeal, a resulting judgment of dismissal is reviewed independently.  (McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 412, 415.)  “We accept as true all the material allegations of the complaint” (Korea Supply, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1141), but do not “assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law” (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967). 

(Cal. S.C., February 16, 2017, Roy Allan Slurry Seal v. Amer. Asphalt South, S225398).

Notion de demurrer, plaidé par l'adverse partie dans une situation où le mémoire allègue des faits qui ne suffisent pas à permettre un quelconque jugement en faveur du demandeur (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)  Le Tribunal qui accueille le demurrer rend une décision d'irrecevabilité ("judgment of dismissal"). L'autorité d'appel considérera comme vraie toutes les allégations matérielles (les faits) de la demande. La partie "en droit" du mémoire de demande ne sera quant à elle pas considérée comme juridiquement exacte, mais sera revue de manière indépendante.

P. v. Arroyo, S219178

Grand Jury indictment or preliminary hearing, minors: Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d), adopted as part of Proposition 21, the “Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998,” allows prosecutors the option of filing charges against certain juveniles accused of specified offenses, directly in criminal court.  Here we determine whether this provision allows prosecutors to charge such juveniles in criminal court by grand jury indictment.  We conclude it does, and thus affirm the Court of Appeal.

The district attorney presented the case to the Orange County grand jury.  The grand jury returned an indictment against defendant Arroyo and six codefendants on charges of conspiracy to commit murder (Pen. Code, §§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 187, subd. (a)) (count 1) and active participation in a criminal street gang (id., § 186.22, subd. (a)) (count 2), with an allegation that defendant engaged in the conspiracy for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang, L. C., with the intent to promote, further, and assist in criminal conduct by members of that gang.  The grand jury specifically found reasonable cause to believe defendant came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d)(4) (hereafter section 707(d)(4)).

Defendant was arraigned and initially pleaded not guilty.  He later demurred to the indictment on the ground that Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d)(4) requires the prosecution to proceed by way of a preliminary hearing and information when filing criminal charges against a minor in adult court, and because he was a juvenile at the time of the alleged commission of the offenses the grand jury had no legal authority to inquire into the offenses charged.  (Pen. Code, § 1004, subd. 1 [demurrer challenging grand jury’s authority].)  The trial court allowed defendant to withdraw his plea; sustained his demurrer, agreeing with him that Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d)(4) “requires a magistrate’s determination that a juvenile” qualifies for prosecution in adult court; and dismissed him from the indictment.

The prosecution appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed. 

“ ‘In interpreting a voter initiative’ ” such as Proposition 21, “ ‘we apply the same principles that govern statutory construction. Thus, [1] “we turn first to the language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning.”  [2]  The statutory language must also be construed in the context of the statute as a whole and the overall statutory scheme [in light of the electorate’s intent].  [3]  When the language is ambiguous, “we refer to other indicia of the voters’ intent, particularly the analyses and arguments contained in the official ballot pamphlet.” ’ ”  (Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 900–901.)  “In other words, our ‘task is simply to interpret and apply the initiative’s language so as to effectuate the electorate’s intent.’ ”  (Id. at p. 901.)

As amended by Proposition 21, section 707 gives prosecutors discretionary authority to file charges against minors directly in criminal court for specified offenses and under specified circumstances.  The provisions of subdivision (d)(1) through (3) set out those offenses and circumstances.  (§ 707, subd. (d).)  Section 707, subdivision (d)(4) provides:  “In any case in which the district attorney or other appropriate prosecuting officer has filed an accusatory pleading against a minor in a court of criminal jurisdiction pursuant to this subdivision, the case shall then proceed according to the laws applicable to a criminal case.  In conjunction with the preliminary hearing as provided in Section 738 of the Penal Code, the magistrate shall make a finding that reasonable cause exists to believe that the minor comes within this subdivision.  If reasonable cause is not established, the criminal court shall transfer the case to the juvenile court having jurisdiction over the matter.”  

Penal Code section 738 provides that “before an information is filed there must be a preliminary examination of the case against the defendant and an order holding him to answer made under Section 872.  The proceeding for a preliminary examination must be commenced by written complaint, as provided elsewhere in this code.”  In turn, Penal Code section 872, among other things, specifies that when it appears from the examination that a public offense has been committed and there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant is guilty, the magistrate must hold the defendant to answer.  Sections 738 and 872, which apply to all prosecutions initiated by information, read together articulate the applicable requirements for proceeding against a defendant by way of information; they do not limit the prosecutor’s options for commencing a prosecution.

Defendant contends section 707(d)(4) entitles him to a preliminary hearing.  He first focuses on the language of the statute, in particular the sentence italicized above. 

As the People soundly point out, Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d)(4), provides that in any case in which the district attorney has exercised discretion to file against a juvenile in criminal court, “the case shall then proceed according to the laws applicable to a criminal case.”  The Penal Code defines the initial pleading in a felony case as “the indictment, information, or the complaint in any case certified to the superior court under Section 859a.”  (Pen. Code, § 949.)  Consequently, as the People contend, a prosecution that is commenced by indictment “proceeds according to the laws applicable to a criminal case.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707(d)(4).)

The People’s reading of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d)(4) better accounts for the statutory language as a whole.  Had the provision’s drafters intended that prosecutions under this statute be commenced only by way of information, they would have so specified instead of using the broad term “ ‘accusatory pleading,’ ” which includes an indictment.  (Pen. Code, §§ 691, subd. (c), 949.)  The indictment, although returned by the grand jury, becomes the accusatory pleading of the prosecutor once it is presented in superior court.  (Guillory v. Superior Court (2003) 31 Cal.4th 168, 173–175, 177 (Guillory).)  Since prosecutions initiated by information and those commenced by indictment both normally proceed “according to the laws applicable to a criminal case,” we see nothing in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d)(4) that precludes indictment as the mechanism for initiating the prosecution of a minor in a discretionary direct-file case.

Rather than creating a right to a preliminary hearing (and thus inferentially precluding prosecution by indictment in discretionary direct-file cases), Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d)(4)’s reference to a preliminary hearing simply recognizes that in cases where the prosecution chooses to proceed against a minor in adult court by way of information, the preliminary hearing is where the existence of reasonable cause to believe the criteria of section 707(d) are met is litigated. 

The People acknowledge, and we agree, that in prosecutions initiated by indictment the grand jury must make the equivalent finding, i.e., that reasonable cause exists to believe the minor comes within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d).  Such a finding may, but need not, be express.  A grand jury properly instructed to make the finding will be deemed to have done so by returning an indictment if the record contains sufficient supporting evidence.  (Cf. Pen. Code, § 939.8 [“The grand jury shall find an indictment when all the evidence before it, taken together, if unexplained or uncontradicted, would, in its judgment, warrant a conviction by a trial jury”].)

Further in support, the People observe that Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d)(4) contains no explicit limitation on the grand jury’s historical power to “inquire into all public offenses committed or triable within the county and present them to the court by indictment” (Pen. Code, § 917).

Grand jury authority under Penal Code section 917, as we have seen, encompasses the power to inquire into all public offenses committed within the county and to present them to the court by indictment.  When the electorate broadened the categories of minors subject to prosecution in courts of criminal jurisdiction, it necessarily—absent an explicit limitation not found in Proposition 21—expanded the reach of the grand jury over minors who commit public offenses.  Viewed another way, had the electorate not intended to permit the initiation of prosecutions against minors in adult court to be by grand jury indictment, one would expect it to have made such an intention plain by explicitly limiting the grand jury’s statutory authority.  We will not read such a limitation into the relevant statutes, especially as Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d)(4) specifically states that, in a direct-file situation, “the case shall . . . proceed according to the laws applicable to a criminal case.”

As we have observed, “the grand jury serves as the functional equivalent of a magistrate who presides over a preliminary examination on a felony complaint.”  (Guillory, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 174; see Stark v. Superior Court (2011) 52 Cal.4th 368, 406.) 

Defendant may move under Penal Code section 995 to set aside the indictment.

(Cal. S. Ct., Jan. 14, 2016, P. v. Arroyo, S219178).

Mise en accusation des mineurs, pour certaines infractions, par décision du Grand Jury californien, au lieu de par le biais de la procédure d’audience préliminaire et d’instruction :

La Section 707 (d) du Code Welfare and Institutions, adoptée comme partie de la proposition 21 soumise au vote des Californiens (la loi de 1998 de prévention de la violence des gangs et de prévention des infractions commises par des mineurs), attribue aux Procureurs la compétence de poursuivre certains mineurs, pour certaines infractions, directement devant les juridictions criminelles (pour adultes). Dans la présente affaire, la Cour Suprême de Californie juge que la Section 707 (d) précitée autorise les Procureurs à mettre ces mineurs en accusation devant dites juridictions criminelles par le biais d’une décision du Grand Jury.

Le Procureur de district a soumis le dossier devant le Grand Jury du Comté d’Orange. Le Grand Jury a rendu une décision de mise en accusation contre A. notamment, les préventions retenues étant la conspiration en vue de commettre un meurtre (count 1) et la participation active à un gang de rue criminel (count 2). Il a en outre été retenu contre A. qu’il s’était engagé dans la conspiration pour le bénéfice du gang, qu’il s’était soumis aux directives de ce gang, avec l’intention de promouvoir – et de participer à -  la conduite criminelle des membres de ce gang. Par ailleurs, le Grand Jury a retenu une « cause raisonnable » lui permettant d’estimer que A. remplissait les conditions d’application de la Section 707(d)(4) précitée.

Présenté devant la cour pénale de première instance, A. plaida non coupable. Il requit ensuite l’abandon de l’accusation, considérant que la Section 707(d)(4) imposait au Procureur de suivre la procédure de l’audience préliminaire et instruction (« preliminary hearing and information ») quand il entendait mettre un mineur en prévention devant une cour pour adultes. Selon A., du fait qu’il était un mineur au moment de la commission alléguée des infractions, le Grand Jury était dépourvu de l’autorité légale d’investiguer les préventions retenues.

La cour pénale de première instance autorisa l’accusé à retirer un accord de condamnation auquel il avait consenti, et annula sa mise en accusation, observant que la Section 707 (d)(4) requerrait la détermination par un magistrat qu’un mineur remplissait les conditions d’une poursuite devant une cour pour adultes. Le Procureur a déposé recours, et la cour d’appel a renversé la décision.

En interprétant une initiative soumise au vote des Californiens, telle que la Proposition 21, la Cour applique les principes qui régissent l’interprétation des lois au sens formel. Tout d’abord, le texte est examiné sous l’angle de l’interprétation littérale, les mots étant lus selon leur sens ordinaire. La disposition à interpréter doit aussi être examinée dans son contexte légal, à la lumière de l’intention des votants. En cas d’ambigüité du texte, la Cour se réfère à d’autres indices de l’intention des votants, en particulier les analyses et les arguments contenus dans la documentation officielle distribuée à la population avant le vote.

Tel qu’amendée par la Proposition 21, la Section 707 attribue aux Procureurs la compétence discrétionnaire de poursuivre pénalement un mineur directement devant le Tribunal pénal (pour adultes), cela dans le cadre d’infractions spécifiques et de circonstances spécifiques. Les subdivisions (d)(1) à (3) décrivent ces infractions et ces circonstances. La Section 707 (d)(4) dispose que dans les cas où le Procureur de district ou une autre autorité de poursuite a déposé une demande de mise en accusation d’un mineur devant une cour pénale, demande fondée sur la présente subdivision, la procédure est régie par le droit applicable à une affaire pénale identique mais concernant un majeur. En conjonction avec l’audience préliminaire telle que prévue par la Section 738 du Code pénal, le magistrat doit rendre un considérant exposant la « cause raisonnable » lui permettant de croire que le mineur peut être attrait devant la juridiction pour adultes. Si aucune « cause raisonnable » ne peut être trouvée, le Tribunal pénal doit transmettre le dossier au Tribunal des mineurs compétent.

La Section 738 du Code pénal prévoit qu’avant la mise en accusation, un examen préliminaire des charges contre l’intéressé doit avoir lieu, et une ordonnance le désignant comme prévenu doit être rendue au sens de la Section 872. Selon la  Section 872, quand il apparaît de l’examen préliminaire qu’une infraction pénale a été commise et qu’il existe des motifs suffisant pour penser que l’intéressé est coupable, le magistrat doit poursuivre la procédure. Les Sections 738 et 872 s’appliquent à toutes les poursuites pénales initiées par une instruction préliminaire (« information ») et ne limitent pas les options qui permettent au Procureur d’initier la poursuite pénale.

Le prévenu soutient que la Section 707(d)(4) lui confère le droit à une audience préliminaire. Il se base en premier lieu sur le texte de la disposition (« (…) en conjonction avec l’audience préliminaire telle que prévue par la Section 738 du Code pénal, le magistrat doit déterminer s’il existe une « cause raisonnable » (…) »).

Comme l’invoque à juste titre le Procureur, la Section 707(d)(4) dispose que dans tous les cas où le Procureur de district a exercé sa discrétion en renvoyant un mineur devant le Tribunal pénal pour adultes, l’affaire doit ensuite se poursuivre selon le droit applicable aux procédures pénales (pour adultes). Le Code pénal retient comme acte introductif initial dans une affaire impliquant un crime (et non un délit) : la mise en accusation (« indictment ») par le Grand Jury, la procédure d’information, ou la plainte selon la procédure devant les diverses « superior court » (cf. Section 859a). Par conséquent, comme le soutient en l’espèce l’accusation, une poursuite pénale qui commence par un « indictment » procède conformément au droit applicable à une procédure pénale devant le Tribunal pénal pour adultes.

Si les rédacteurs de la Section 707(d)(4) avaient voulu prévoir que la mise en accusation d’un mineur selon cette disposition ne peut se faire que par « information » et non par « indictment, ils l’auraient spécifié, au lieu d’utiliser la formulation générale d’acte introductif initial. Dès qu’il est prononcé par le Grand Jury, l’ »indictment » devient l’acte introductif initial du Procureur devant la « superior court ». Et comme les poursuites pénales initiées par « information » et celles initiées par « indictment » se continuent toutes les deux conformément au droit applicable à la poursuite pénale (pour majeurs), rien dans la Section 707(d)(4) n’empêche l’ »indictment » d’être le mécanisme initiant la poursuite d’un mineur dans un cas de poursuite discrétionnaire.

La Section 707(d)(4) ne crée pas un droit à une audience préliminaire, lequel par inférence prohiberait la poursuite pénale par « indictment » dans ces procédures pénales discrétionnaires dirigées contre des mineurs. Bien plutôt, dite Section se réfère à une audience préliminaire simplement pour reconnaître que dans les cas où le Procureur choisit de procéder contre le mineur devant une cour pour adultes par la voie de l’ »information », l’audience préliminaire est le lieu où se discute l’existence d’une « cause raisonnable » permettant de croire que les critères de la Section 707(d) sont remplis.

Ainsi, dans les poursuites pénales initiées par « indictment », le Grand Jury doit se prononcer de la même manière, soit déterminer s’il existe une « cause raisonnable » permettant de croire que le mineur entre dans les conditions de la Section 707(d). Une telle détermination peut, mais ne doit pas, être expresse. Un Grand Jury correctement instruit sera considéré comme ayant trouvé ces « causes raisonnables » s’il décide d’un « indictment » et si le dossier contient des preuves suffisantes qui l’appuient. A cet égard, la Section 939.8 du Code pénal précise bien que le Grand Jury doit prononcer un « indictment » quand toutes les preuves devant lui, sans discussion ni contradiction, impliqueraient une condamnation par la cour pénale.

La Cour observe encore que la Section 707(d)(4) ne contient aucune limitation explicite du pouvoir historique du Grand Jury d’investiguer toutes les infractions publiques commises dans le Comté, ou susceptibles d’y être jugées, et de porter ces infractions devant la cour pénale par « indictment ».

Quand le corps électoral élargit les catégories de mineurs sujets à la poursuite pénale devant les cours pour adultes, il étend nécessairement, en l’absence d’une limitation explicite qui ne se trouve pas dans la Proposition 21, la compétence du Grand Jury de connaître des affaires impliquant des mineurs ayant commis des infractions pénales. Le Grand Jury est l’équivalent fonctionnel du magistrat qui préside une audience préliminaire portant sur une accusation de commission d’un crime.

Enfin, il est important de relever que la procédure de l’ »indictment », plutôt que celle de l’information avec une audience préliminaire,  ne porte pas préjudice à la personne poursuivie : elle peut toujours invoquer la Section 995 du Code pénal et requérir l’abandon des poursuites.

P. v. Eroshevich, S210545

Double Jeopardy: the principles of double jeopardy are of federal and state constitutional origin.  The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “no person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”  (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.)  Similarly, the California Constitution provides that “persons may not twice be put in jeopardy for the same offense . . . .”  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.)  Unless sound reason exists, California courts will not interpret the California double jeopardy clause more broadly than its federal counterpart.  (Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 353.) 

At its core, the double jeopardy clause “protects an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense.”  (Green v. United States (1957) 355 U.S. 184, 187.)  The policy underlying the double jeopardy protection “is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual . . . thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity.”  (Id. at pp. 187-188.) 

“The constitutional protection against double jeopardy unequivocally prohibits a second trial following an acquittal,” because the “public interest in the finality of criminal judgments is so strong that an acquitted defendant may not be retried even though ‘the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation.’ ”  (Arizona v. Washington (1978) 434 U.S. 497, 503.)  Consequently, the People cannot appeal from a jury’s verdict acquitting a defendant, seeking a reversal in order to retry the defendant.  “This is justified on the ground that, however mistaken the acquittal may have been, there would be an unacceptably high risk that the Government, with its superior resources, would wear down a defendant, thereby ‘enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.’ ”  (United States v. DiFrancesco (1980) 449 U.S. 117, 130.) 

Similarly, a trial court’s action amounting to the legal equivalent of an acquittal prior to the jury’s verdict cannot be appealed by the People because a successful appeal would result in a second trial, which would violate the protection against double jeopardy.  (Evans v. Michigan (2013) 568 U.S. ___ [133 S.Ct. 1069, 1074] (Evans).)  The trial court’s action is the legal equivalent of an acquittal if it constitutes a ruling that the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to support a conviction, regardless of whether that ruling is legally correct.  (Ibid. [although trial court erred in directing verdict of acquittal at close of prosecution’s case, defendant was acquitted for double jeopardy purposes and could not be retried]; see, e.g., Smalis v. Pennsylvania (1986) 476 U.S. 140 [trial court’s order granting defendant’s demurrer after close of the prosecution’s case on grounds that the evidence was insufficient constituted an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes and barred appeal and retrial]; Sanabria v. United States (1978) 437 U.S. 54, 64 [trial court’s order striking certain evidence and granting judgment of acquittal could not be appealed even if based on erroneous legal conclusions]; United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co. (1977) 430 U.S. 564 [double jeopardy clause barred appeal of trial court’s judgment of acquittal, entered after jury was discharged because it had been unable to agree on a verdict]; Fong Foo v. United States (1962) 369 U.S. 141, 143 [trial court’s order directing jury to return verdicts of acquittal, resulting in judgments of acquittal, barred retrial even if trial court was without power to direct acquittals under the circumstances of the case].) Sometimes when a trial court grants a motion for new trial, it is unclear whether it found the evidence to be legally insufficient or whether it concluded, reviewing the evidence independently as the “13th juror,” that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence.  (See § 1181; People v. Lagunas, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1038, fn. 6.)  In such situations, the reviewing court “must determine whether the ruling . . . , whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.”  (United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., supra, 430 U.S. at p. 571.)  In the present case, however, the record leaves no doubt that the trial court found the evidence to be legally insufficient. On the other hand, if a trial court rules that evidence was insufficient to support a conviction after the jury has returned a verdict the People may appeal that ruling “because reversal would result in reinstatement of the jury verdict of guilt, not a new trial.”  (Evans, supra, 568 U.S. at p. ___ [133 S.Ct. at p. 1081, fn. 9]; accord, United States v. Wilson (1975) 420 U.S. 332, 353 [prosecution may appeal from trial court’s dismissal of indictment after a jury had returned its verdict].)  “Where a Government appeal presents no threat of successive prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended.”  (United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., supra, 430 U.S. at pp. 569-570.) 

Under these decisions, in the present case, double jeopardy principles did not preclude the People from appealing the trial court’s judgment dismissing the charges on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient.  A successful appeal by the People under such circumstances would merely require reinstatement of the jury’s verdict and would not result in a new trial.  (See Evans, supra, 568 U.S. at p. ___, fn. 9 [133 S.Ct. at p. 1081, fn. 9].)  The Court of Appeal found the evidence to be sufficient and reversed the trial court’s ruling, thereby reinstating the jury’s verdict of conviction; because the People’s appeal and the appellate court’s reversal did not require a new trial, neither implicated double jeopardy principles.  The question remains whether, as the Court of Appeal concluded, double jeopardy principles would preclude a retrial if, on remand, the trial court were to grant defendant’s motion for a new trial or dismissal on defendant’s remaining grounds other than insufficiency of the evidence.  The double jeopardy rules are well known.  The protection against double jeopardy generally precludes retrial for the same offense after a conviction or an acquittal.  (People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 563.)  An exception to this rule applies if the judgment of conviction is reversed as a result of defendant’s appeal, motion for new trial, or other challenge by a defendant to his or her conviction.  (People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1, 6-7.)  Like other constitutional guarantees, double jeopardy protections are not absolute, and may be waived by a defendant.  A defendant who files a motion for a new trial, like a defendant who moves for a mistrial, waives state and federal double jeopardy protections.  (Porter v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 125, 136; see Oregon v. Kennedy (1982) 456 U.S. 667, 672-673.)  By seeking reversal of a judgment of conviction on appeal, “ ‘in effect, a defendant assents to all the consequences legitimately following such reversal, and consents to be tried anew.’ ”  (People v. Sachau (1926) 78 Cal.App. 702, 706; see People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 7 [double jeopardy does not bar retrial when conviction is reversed because of a trial court’s erroneous replacement of a juror]; Tibbs v. Florida (1982) 457 U.S. 31, 42 [state appellate court’s reversal because of the weight of the evidence, rather than the insufficiency of the evidence, does not bar retrial].)  Additionally, two policy considerations support allowing retrial in this situation.  First, “society would pay too high a price ‘were every accused granted immunity from punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading to conviction.’  ”  (Tibbs, supra, at p. 40.)  “Second, the Court has concluded that retrial after reversal of a conviction is not the type of governmental oppression targeted by the Double Jeopardy Clause.”  (Ibid.) 

There is an exception to the rule permitting retrial after the defendant’s successful challenge to his conviction:  the defendant may not be retried if the judgment is reversed because, as a matter of law, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction.  “When a reversal rests upon the ground that the prosecution has failed to produce sufficient evidence . . . , the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the prosecutor from making a second attempt at conviction.”  (Tibbs v. Florida, supra, 457 U.S. at p. 42.)  When the evidence is legally insufficient, it means that “ ‘the government’s case was so lacking that it should not have even been submitted to the jury.’ ”  (Id. at p. 41, citing Burks v. United States (1978) 437 U.S. 1, 16.)  Furthermore, when the defendant seeks a reversal on appeal based on insufficient evidence, or moves for acquittal in the trial court, the defendant does not consent to a disposition that contemplates retrial and therefore does not waive double jeopardy protections.  (Evans, supra, 568 U.S. at p. ___ [133 S.Ct. at p. 1079].)  Even if the defendant moves for a new trial, retrial will nevertheless be barred if the defendant’s motion was granted on grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction.  (See Burks, supra, at p. 17 [“in our view it makes no difference that a defendant has sought a new trial as one of his remedies, or even as the sole remedy”].) In the present case, the Court of Appeal contemplated that, on remand, the trial court could consider the defendant’s remaining grounds for his motion for a new trial and could consider dismissal under section 1385 on grounds other than the insufficiency of the evidence.  As the above discussion makes clear, double jeopardy principles would not preclude a retrial if defendant were successful in obtaining a new trial or a dismissal of charges, because in seeking to overturn his conviction on grounds other than insufficiency of the evidence he would impliedly waive double jeopardy protections and consent to be retried.  (See Porter v. Superior Court, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 136.) (…) All of the cases cited in the quotation from Hatch, upon which the Court of Appeal relied, involved rulings by the trial court before the jury returned a verdict.  In such cases, the prosecution cannot appeal the trial court’s ruling even if it is erroneous because a successful appeal would require a retrial, which is barred by double jeopardy.  (See Sanabria v. United States, supra, 437 U.S. at pp. 59-60 [trial court granted defendant’s motion for acquittal after presentation of the defense case but before the case went to the jury]; People v. Valenti, supra, 49 Cal.2d at pp. 203, 209 [trial court dismissed the information in the middle of trial]; Fong Foo v. United States, supra, 369 U.S. at p. 143 [trial court directed jury to return verdicts of acquittal]; see also Evans, supra, 568 U.S. at p. ___ [133 S.Ct. at p. 1073 [trial court directed verdict of acquittal at close of prosecution’s case]; Mannes v. Gillespie, supra, 967 F.2d at pp. 1313-1316 [after jury was dismissed because it deadlocked on murder charge, trial court dismissed the charges on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient].)  Arizona v. Rumsey (1984) 467 U.S. 203, upon which defendant relies, is distinguishable for the same reason.  In Rumsey, the high court held that the trial court’s judgment imposing a life sentence rather than the death penalty was the equivalent of an acquittal on the merits and precluded defendant from being resentenced to death after the state supreme court reversed the trial court’s decision for legal error.  In Rumsey, there was no jury; the trial court in that case was the “sole decisionmaker” in the proceeding.  (Id. at p. 211.)  Thus, “there was no verdict of ‘guilty’ for the appellate court to reinstate.”  (Id. at p. 212.)  Consequently, the appellate reversal in Rumsey would have subjected the defendant to a second sentencing trial, in violation of double jeopardy principles.  In contrast, in the present case reversal of the trial court’s judgment of “acquittal” will allow reinstatement of the jury’s guilty verdict. 

Under these authorities, the trial court’s order in the present case would have precluded a retrial had the People chosen not to appeal it or had it been affirmed on appeal.  But the People did appeal and the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s ruling and reinstated the jury verdict.  “It is well settled that the reversal of a judgment or order ordinarily leaves the proceeding in the same situation in which it stood before the judgment or order was made.”  (Odlum v. Duffy (1950) 35 Cal.2d 562, 564; see 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) § 869, p. 928 [reversal of an order granting a new trial “leaves the judgment as if no such order had been made, i.e., as if the motion had been denied”].)  “When an order has been reversed the effect is that ‘it no longer has any vitality or force . . . .’ ”  (Estate of Pusey (1918) 177 Cal. 367, 371, quoting Estate of Mitchell (1899) 126 Cal. 250.)  The effect of the Court of Appeal’s order barring a retrial upon remand was to improperly give legal force and effect to a ruling of the trial court that it had reversed.  (C.J. Cantil-Sakauye, with six Justices concurring, no dissent, case Anna Nicole Smith (also known as Vicki Lynn Marshall), Cal. S. Ct., 03.11.2014, P. v. Eroshevich,  S210545).

Ne bis in idem : ce principe trouve son origine dans les Constitutions fédérale et californienne. Au plan fédéral, le Cinquième Amendement prévoit que nul ne saurait être prévenu deux fois pour la même infraction. L’art. I, § 15 de la Constitution de Californie est de même contenu. A moins de raisons fondées, les Tribunaux californiens n’interprètent pas la disposition de manière plus large que ce que prévoit la disposition sœur fédérale. Le but de ce principe est d’empêcher le Gouvernement de procéder à des tentatives répétées de condamner un individu, le soumettant ainsi à des pressions, y compris financières, et le contraignant de vivre dans un état continu d’anxiété et d’insécurité. La protection constitutionnelle contre une double mise en accusation interdit la tenue d’un second procès pénal après un acquittement, même si l’acquittement est fondé sur des considérations erronées. Par conséquent, l’accusation ne peut appeler d’une décision d’acquittement rendue par un jury, cela dans le but de juger à nouveau le prévenu acquitté. De même, une quelconque action émanant cette fois-ci non pas du jury mais du Tribunal de première instance, action constituant un équivalent juridique d’un acquittement et rendue avant la décision du jury, ne peut pas non plus être appelée par l’accusation, parce qu’un appel qui viendrait à être jugé bien-fondé entraînerait la tenue d’une seconde procédure, violant ainsi le principe ne bis in idem. L’action du Tribunal pénal de première instance constitue l’équivalent juridique d’un acquittement si elle décide que les preuves apportées par l’accusation sont insuffisantes pour entraîner une condamnation. Peu importe que la décision du Tribunal soit juridiquement exacte ou non. Par exemple, la clause ne bis in idem ne permet pas à l’accusation d’appeler d’un jugement d’acquittement prononcé après la libération du jury au motif que dit jury ne parvenait pas à s’accorder sur la question de la culpabilité. Parfois lorsqu’une cour de première instance accorde une requête sollicitant un nouveau procès, il n’est pas clair de déterminer si la cour a estimé les preuves juridiquement insuffisantes ou si elle a conclu, après avoir revu les preuves de manière indépendante, en tant que « treizième juré », que la décision du jury ne correspondait pas à l’état des preuves. Dans de telles situations, la cour supérieure doit déterminer si la décision de première instance, quel que soit son intitulé, représente véritablement une résolution, correcte ou non, de certains éléments de fait, ou de tous les éléments de fait, de l’infraction reprochée. Dans la présente affaire, le dossier ne laisse planer aucun doute : la cour de première instance a jugé que les preuves étaient légalement insuffisantes. Par ailleurs, si la cour de première instance juge que les preuves sont insuffisantes pour permettre une condamnation après condamnation rendue par le jury, l’accusation peut appeler de la décision de la cour car une annulation de dite décision résultera en la remise en vigueur de la décision de culpabilité rendue par le jury, sans impliquer la tenue d’un nouveau procès. Quand un appel de l’accusation ne présente aucune menace de poursuites successives, la clause ne bis in idem est respectée. Cependant demeure la question de savoir si la clause ne bis in idem serait susceptible d’empêcher la tenue d’un nouveau procès si, la cause étant renvoyée à la cour de première instance, dite cour venait à accorder la requête d’un prévenu sollicitant la tenue d’un nouveau procès, ou sollicitant l’annulation de la procédure basée sur d’autres moyens que l’insuffisance des preuves. La clause ne bis in idem est bien connue. De manière générale, la protection contre une double mise en accusation empêche un nouveau procès pour la même infraction après condamnation ou acquittement. Une exception à cette règle s’applique si le jugement condamnatoire est renversé suite à un appel déposé par le condamné, comme conséquence  d’une requête sollicitant un nouveau procès, ou suite à de nouvelles allégations du condamné contre sa condamnation. Comme d’autres garanties constitutionnelles, la protection découlant de la clause ne bis in idem n’est pas absolue et le condamné peut y renoncer. Ainsi, un condamné qui dépose une requête sollicitant la tenue d’un nouveau procès, ou sollicitant l’annulation de la procédure, renonce à la protection conférée par la clause ne bis in idem, que cette clause découle du droit étatique ou du droit fédéral. En outre, la clause ne bis in idem n’empêche pas la tenue d’un nouveau procès lorsque la condamnation est renversée du fait que la cour de première instance a remplacé un juré de manière erronée. Et une annulation par la cour d’appel d’un jugement de première instance en raison de la trop faible valeur convaincante des preuves n’empêche pas la tenue d’un nouveau procès. Une annulation pour insuffisance des preuves, quand à elle, empêche la tenue d’un nouveau procès. Il est encore ici rappelé qu’il existe une exception à la règle qui permet un nouveau procès après que le condamné ait mis en cause avec succès sa condamnation : un nouveau procès ne peut pas avoir lieu si le jugement a été annulé pour insuffisance de preuves à charge apportées par l’accusation, la Clause ne bis in idem ne laissant pas à l’accusation une seconde tentative de condamner. En effet, lorsque les preuves apportées sont juridiquement insuffisantes à obtenir une condamnation, il s’ensuit que le dossier de l’accusation était à ce point déficient qu’il n’aurait même pas dû être soumis au jury. Par ailleurs, lorsque le condamné conclut à l’annulation du jugement condamnatoire en procédure d’appel basée sur l’insuffisance des preuves à charge, ou lorsque le prévenu conclut à son acquittement devant la cour de première instance, le prévenu ou le condamné ne consent pas à un nouveau procès et par conséquent ne renonce pas à la protection conférée par la Clause ne bis in idem. En l’espèce, la cour d’appel remarque que, après renvoi à l’autorité inférieure, dite cour est en droit de considérer les autres motifs à la base de la requête du prévenu sollicitant un nouveau procès (sauf les motifs abandonnés pour insuffisance de preuves), et est en droit d’annuler toutes préventions pour d’autres motifs que l’insuffisance des preuves apportées par l’accusation. Dans les cas où la cour se prononce avant le jury, l’accusation ne peut pas appeler de la décision de la cour, même si elle est juridiquement erronée, parce qu’un appel victorieux impliquerait la tenue d’un nouveau procès, ce que ne permet pas la Clause ne bis in idem. Par exemple, dans sa décision Arizona v. Rumsey (1984), la Cour Suprême fédérale jugea que la décision de la cour de première instance prononçant une peine privative de liberté à vie au lieu de la peine de mort constituait à ce niveau un acquittement au fond et interdisait le prononcé d’une condamnation à mort dans un procès ultérieur, procès ultérieur tenu après que la cour suprême de l’état ait renversé le jugement de première instance pour une erreur de droit. La cour Rumsey n’était pas une cour avec jury. En l’espèce, l’accusation a appelé du jugement de première instance et la cour d’appel a renversé ce jugement, avec pour effet de laisser intacte la décision du jury. Par conséquent, une nouvelle décision doit être rendue par la cour de première instance, sur la base de la décision du jury.