Rhode Island Supreme Court, Vermont Mutual Insurance Comp. v. New England Property Services Group, LLC, Docket No. 2023-335

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

 

Jurisdiction

 

Rhode Island Law

 

 

 

(…) We first turn our attention to NEPSG’s argument as to subject matter jurisdiction. This Court has long acknowledged that a “challenge to subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived by any party and may be raised at any time in the proceedings.” E.T. Investments, LLC v. Riley, 262 A.3d 673, 676 (R.I. 2021) (quoting Federal National Mortgage Association v. Malinou, 101 A.3d 860, 866 (R.I. 2014)). We would note at the outset that it is our view that in actuality NEPSG is not genuinely contesting the Superior Court’s jurisdiction over this matter. It is clear that the Superior Court had jurisdiction under G.L. 1956 § 8-2-14 and the Arbitration Act. Rather, NEPSG is actually questioning the nature of the appraisal process and, more specifically, whether it should be considered arbitration. Thus, it appears to us that NEPSG is questioning the authority of the Superior Court to decide this particular issue and not the court’s jurisdiction as such. Simply put, NEPSG is contending that the Superior Court improperly exercised its jurisdiction. See Cronan v. Cronan, 307 A.3d 183, 191 (R.I. 2024) (“This Court has noted* * * that the term subject-matter jurisdiction is often misused; when properly used, it refers only to a court’s power to hear and to decide a particular case, and not to whether a court, having the power to adjudicate, should exercise that power.”) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and deletion omitted); see also Pollard v. Acer Group, 870 A.2d 429, 433 (R.I. 2005) (“The term ‘lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter’ means quite simply that a given court lacks judicial power to decide a particular controversy.”).

 

 

 

(Rhode Island Supreme Court, Vermont Mutual Insurance Comp. v. New England Property Services Group, LLC, March 20, 2025, Docket No. 2023-335-Appeal)

 

 

 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, In Re: Google LLC, Docket No. 2023-101

Motion to Transfer

 

Venue

 

Jurisdiction

 

Federal Law

 

 

 

 

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas in No. 6:21-cv-00985-ADA

 

 

 

Google LLC (“Google”) petitions for a writ of mandamus directing the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas to vacate its order denying Google’s motion to transfer and to transfer the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. (…) For the following reasons, we grant the petition and direct transfer.

 

 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district court where the action might have been brought for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice.

 

 

In re Planned Parenthood Fed. of Am., Inc., 52 F.4th 625, 629 (5th Cir. 2022), when a movant “demonstrates that the transferee venue is clearly more convenient” the district court “should” grant transfer, In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc); see also Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 629 (“The ultimate inquiry is whether the destination venue is ‘clearly more convenient than the venue chosen by the plaintiff.’”) (quoting Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315).

 

 

The Fifth Circuit has identified “private and public interest factors,” which are “not necessarily exhaustive or exclusive,” to be evaluated in connection with determining whether a case should be transferred. Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 630 (internal quotation marks omitted). The private interest factors are: (1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. Id. The public interest factors are: (1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws or in the application of foreign law. Id.

 

 

The district court held that the “administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion” factor weighed slightly against transfer. While we defer to the district court’s assessment of the average time to trial data, see Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 631; In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“We do not disturb the district court’s suggestion that it could dispose of the case more quickly than if the case was transferred to the Northern District of California.”), in this case it was a clear abuse of discretion to accord this factor any weight, see Juniper, 14 F.4th at 1322 (discounting time-to-trial difference because there was no “need of a quick resolution” where patentee lacked “position in the market . . . being threatened”). It appears undisputed that Jawbone (unlike its predecessor owners of the patents) is not engaged in product competition in the marketplace and is not threatened in the market in a way that, in other patent cases, might add urgency to case resolution and give some significance to the time-to-trial difference. Nor does the record reveal any other basis on which to accord significance to whatever greater speed the district court speculates it could reach trial as compared to Northern California. See Genentech, 566 F.3d at 1347 (describing this factor as “most speculative”). This factor, then, is neutral.

 

 

By contrast, the events giving rise to this patent infringement suit clearly have a particularized connection with Northern California. The patented technology was invented in, and the patents prosecuted from, that forum. Additionally, the district court found that Google developed the accused products in the Northern District, notwithstanding Google’s separate office in Austin. Appx932; see also Def. Distributed v. Bruck, 30 F.4th 414, 435 (5th Cir. 2022) (“The local interest in having localized interests decided at home, ‘most notably regards not merely the parties’ significant connections to each forum writ large, but rather the significant connections between a particular venue and the events that gave rise to a suit.’”) (quoting In re Apple Inc., 979 F.3d 1332, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2020)). It was clear error not to find that the local interest factor favors transfer.

 

 

We agree with the district court, and both parties, that the “familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case” and the “problems associated with conflicts of law” are neutral.

 

 

In sum, on the record before us, four factors favor transfer and four factors are neutral. No factor weighs against transfer. The center of gravity of this action, focusing on the Volkswagen factors and the overriding convenience inquiry, is clearly in the Northern District of California, not in the Western District of Texas. The district court clearly erred in finding otherwise and its decision to deny Google’s motion to transfer was a clear abuse of discretion.

 

 

 

 

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Feb. 1^st, 2023, In Re: Google LLC, Docket No. 2023-101)

California Court of Appeal, T.A.W. Performance, LLC v. Brembo, S.P.A., Docket No. A157400, A157841

 

Personal Jurisdiction

 

California Law

 

Contract Drafting

 

Exclusive Distribution Agreement

 

Role of the Choice of Law Provision

 

California Franchise Act

 

Export

 

Motion to Quash Service of the Summons

 

 

On July 1, 2014, Brembo, an Italian joint stock corporation with its headquarters in Italy, and TAW, a California limited liability company with its principal office in North Carolina, entered into a written “Exclusive Distribution Agreement” (hereinafter the agreement).  Brembo manufactured brake systems for vehicles (hereinafter referred to as products), which were exported for international sale.  Under the agreement, TAW was appointed as the sole and exclusive distributor of Brembo’s products to be resold by TAW to third parties within the “Territory” of the United States, Canada, and Mexico.

 

The agreement had a five-year term, from July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2019. Early termination could be effectuated by either party giving at least one (1) year’s notice in writing. In the event of a dispute not resolved by mediation, the parties consented “to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and federal courts of the State of New York for all disputes or controversies which may arise between the Parties out or in connection with this Agreement or its construction, interpretation, effect, performance or non-performance, or the consequences thereof. Each Party agrees that such courts, to the exclusion of all other courts, tribunals and administrative bodies, shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to any and all such disputes and controversies and that any and all such disputes and controversies shall be determined only by litigation in one of such courts . . ..” The parties also agreed that the agreement and “any dispute or claim arising out of or in connection with it or its subject matter or formation” would be governed by the laws of the State of New York.

 

In 2018, while Brembo’s New York state lawsuit was pending, TAW filed this California lawsuit seeking monetary damages based on Brembo’s alleged wrongful termination of the agreement without cause. In its first amended complaint (FAC), TAW alleged it was a “California limited liability Company, formerly headquartered in Sonoma California, currently located in Cramerton, North Carolina with offices in Sonoma, California” and that “Richard Martin is the principal and controlling member of TAW. He is a United Kingdom citizen and non- immigrant alien, living in the United States pursuant to a valid E-2 Visa, who at all relevant times has been residing in Sonoma, California.” TAW further alleged Brembo was “an Italian corporation located in Italy that does business in the State of California by and through subsidiaries and California based distributors.”

 

The FAC included causes of action for breach of contract and violations of California’s Franchise Relations Act (Bus. & Prof. Code
§ 20001(a)-(c)) (Franchise Act).

 

Brembo moved to quash service of summons on the ground it did not have sufficient contacts with California for the court to exercise either general or specific jurisdiction.

 

“A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State. [Citation.]” (Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown (2011) 564 U.S. 915, 919 (Goodyear).)

 

In contrast to general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction “depends on an ‘affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy,’ principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation. [Citations.] In contrast to general, all-purpose jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of ‘issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.’ [Citation.]” (Goodyear, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 919.) In other words, “when determining whether specific jurisdiction exists, courts consider the ‘ “ ‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ ” ’ ” (Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 269 (Pavlovich), quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall (1984) 466 U.S. 408, 414 (Helicopteros), quoting Shaffer v. Heitner (1977) 433 U.S. 186, 204 (Shaffer).)

 

Thus, “a court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if: (1) ‘the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of the forum benefits’ (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 446); (2) ‘the “controversy is related to or ‘arises out of’ the defendant’s contacts with the forum” ’ (ibid., quoting Helicopteros, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 414); and (3) ‘ “the assertion of personal jurisdiction would be reasonable in that it would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’ ” ’ (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 447, quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 472-473 [85 L.Ed. 528, 105 S. Ct. 2174] (Burger King)).” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th p. 269.)

 

Pertinent to the matter before us, the Burger King court specifically found that a choice of law provision by which the parties stipulated “in advance to submit their controversies for resolution” in a specific jurisdiction may be germane to the jurisdictional analysis. (Id. at p. 472, fn. 14; see Id. at pp. 482-483 [Burger King court admonished Court of Appeals for failure to give adequate consideration to choice of law provision in parties’ franchise agreement in determining question of personal jurisdiction over defendant franchisee].)

 

While the parties had a prior relationship in California, six months before and at the time of the execution of the 2014 agreement the parties’ relationship was no longer “California-directed in any meaningful sense.” (Halyard Health, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 1076.) TAW had moved its principal place of business to North Carolina and the distribution agreement was not limited to California but included the entirety of the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Under the agreement, Brembo shipped its products to TAW’s principal place of business in North Carolina. Of particular significance given the 2014 agreement’s anticipation of nationwide and international distribution of Brembo products through resales by TAW, Brembo made a commercially reasonable effort “to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation” in any portion of the designated distribution territory by including choice of law and forum selection clauses limiting the forum in which TAW could file a lawsuit to New York. (World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, 444 U.S. at p. 297.)

 

We see no merit to TAW’s assertion that Brembo’s shipment of its products to North Carolina is insignificant, compared to where the products were eventually resold by TAW (i.e. California), because pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code title to the goods passed to TAW in California where TAW was required to pay state excise taxes on the products it resold in the state. As our high court has admonished, we do not look at TAW’s contacts with California, but instead limit our analysis to an evaluation of Brembo’s contacts with the state. Even assuming title to the goods passed to TAW in California, we fail to see how that circumstance demonstrates that Brembo purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of the laws of California. Simply put, TAW’s unilateral resale of Brembo’s products in California is not sufficient to demonstrate that Brembo purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in California.

 

Choice-of-law and forum selection clauses, “standing alone”, are not dispositive, and may be discounted where a foreign corporation’s other minimum contacts establish jurisdiction in the forum state. However, they may “reinforce” whether or not a foreign corporation has made such “a deliberate affiliation with the forum state” as to support a conclusion that it should have reasonably foreseen “possible litigation there.”

 

Here, Brembo’s contacts with the United States were already directed away from California before the parties entered into the agreement. TAW had moved its principal place of business to North Carolina, Brembo was shipping its products to North Carolina, and TAW’s resale of Brembo’s products was expanded to include the entirety of the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Given these circumstances, Brembo made a concerted effort to “alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation” (World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, 444 U.S. at p. 297) by limiting dispute resolution to New York.

 

(…) Whether or not the enforceability of the parties’ 2014 agreement is governed by California law has nothing to do with whether enforceability may be determined by a California court.

 

Lastly, we are not persuaded by TAW’s assertions that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to consider Brembo’s direct sales, marketing, advertising, and issuance of warranties for its products that were resold by TAW to California consumers as relevant factors. Such evidence would not be relevant, let alone material, to the subject of this lawsuit, Brembo’s alleged wrongful termination of the agreement. The controversy therefore lacks any substantial connection to Brembo’s purported contacts with California through its direct sales, marketing and advertising activities and its issuance of warranties for its products sold in California.

 

(Halyard Health, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 1073; see Id. at p. 1069 [specific jurisdiction not demonstrated where, among other factors, defendant foreign corporation’s California “sales” in the millions were not sufficiently connected to the gist of plaintiff’s declaratory relief action concerning the meaning and enforceability of an indemnification clause in the parties’ agreement].)

 

 

(California Court of Appeal, August 17, 2020, T.A.W. Performance, LLC v. Brembo, S.P.A., Docket No. A157400, A157841, Certified for Partial Publication)

 

 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Psara Energy, Ltd., v. Advantage Arrow Shipping, LLC, Docket No. 19-40071

Admiralty

Arbitration

Final, Appealable Order

Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals

Plaintiff Psara Energy Limited appeals the district court’s January 2019 Order granting a motion to refer to arbitration this suit filed against Defendant-Appellees.

We dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction because the district court’s Order, which administratively closed the case, is not a final, appealable order either as we have construed the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) or under any other theory.

(…) In conjunction with its lawsuit, Psara sought and obtained a maritime attachment (…).

(…) The Advantage Defendants’ motions under Supplemental Admiralty Rule E(4)(f) to vacate the respective attachments were rejected, but the vessels were released upon the posting of substitute security. In the case of the ADVANTAGE ARROW, the district court’s order stated, “the court will address the ‘Motion to Vacate Attachment’ at a later time.”

(…) The district court granted the motion to refer to arbitration.

(…) The district court then “administratively closed” the case, denied pending motions as moot, and retained jurisdiction to enforce any arbitration award.

A preliminary, and here dispositive, issue is whether the district court’s order referring the suit to arbitration and administratively closing the case constitutes an appealable order. “If not, then this Court lacks jurisdiction and the appeal should be dismissed, which would pretermit any consideration of the merits of [the Appellant’s] appeal.” Mire v. Full Spectrum Lending, Inc., 389 F.3d 163, 165 (5th Cir. 2004).

Psara’s first theory turns on whether the district court’s order is final. Section 16 of the FAA “governs appellate review of arbitration orders.” Apache Bohai Corp., LDC v. Texaco China, B.V., 330 F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2003). The statute accomplishes Congress’s intent to favor arbitration “by authorizing immediate appeals from orders disfavoring arbitration and forbidding immediate appeals from orders favoring arbitration.” S. La. Cement, Inc. v. Van Aalst Bulk Handling, B.V., 383 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 2004). Thus, 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3) permits appeals taken from “a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title,” but § 16(b)(3) explicitly denies appellate jurisdiction over nonfinal orders “compelling arbitration under section 206.” See also S. La. Cement, 383 F.3d at 300.

The Supreme Court has explained that a “final decision with respect to an arbitration” means “a decision that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 86 (2000) (quoting Dig. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994)). In Green Tree, because the district court “ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration, and dismissed all the claims before it,” the order constituted a final, appealable decision. Id. at 89. Crucially, the Supreme Court went on to state that “had the District Court entered a stay instead of a dismissal in this case, that order would not be appealable.” Id. at 87 n.2; see also Mire, 389 F.3d at 165.

Acknowledging the dichotomy expressed in Green Tree, this Circuit has repeatedly held that “an arbitration order entering a stay, as opposed to a dismissal, is not an appealable final order.” S. La. Cement, 383 F.3d at 300; see also Apache, 330 F.3d at 309 (“An arbitration order entering a stay, as opposed to a dismissal, is not an appealable final order.”); Cargill Ferrous Int’l v. SEA PHOENIX MV, 325 F.3d 695, 697, 701–02 (5th Cir.2003) (dismissing for lack of appellate jurisdiction because the stay pending arbitration was not “a final judgment by the district court”).

Nearly on point with this case, the court held in Mire that administratively closing a case “is the functional equivalent of a stay” and “thus not an appealable order under the FAA.” Mire, 389 F.3d at 167. This is because the entry of a stay, as opposed to a dismissal, indicates that “the district court perceives that it might have more to do than execute the judgement once arbitration has been completed.” Apache, 330 F.3d at 309 (quoting ATAC Corp. v. Arthur Treacher’s Inc., 280 F.3d 1091, 1099 (6th Cir. 2002)).

In contrast, “a district court order that compels arbitration and dismisses or closes a case outright possesses finality and confers jurisdiction on this court.” Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London, 772 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2014).

(…) The effect of an administrative closure is no different from a simple stay, which district courts often use “to remove from their pending cases suits which are temporarily active elsewhere (such as before an arbitration panel) or stayed (such as where a bankruptcy is pending).” Mire, 389F.3d at 167. The court’s order staying and administratively closing the case pending arbitration was nonfinal for purposes of appellate review.

(…) We are obliged to consider whether appellate jurisdiction exists over the order compelling arbitration under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3), which confers jurisdiction over “interlocutory decrees of such district courts or the judges thereof determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed.” We hold this avenue is also closed to Psara. (…) compelling arbitration and determining the appointment of arbitrators “was not a determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties; rather, it merely settled ‘how and where the rights and liabilities would be determined. This holding is consistent with our precedent limiting the applicability of § 1292(a)(3) to orders determining the parties’ substantive rights and liabilities. These cases take a strict view of the statute’s language about “determining the rights and liabilities.”

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, January 9, 2020, Psara Energy, Ltd., v. Advantage Arrow Shipping, LLC, Docket No. 19-40071)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Dental Dynamics, LLC, v. Jolly Dental Group, LLC, Docket No. 18-6107

Personal Jurisdiction

Specific Jurisdiction

Bill of Sale

Opinion Letter Sent from an Out-of-State Law Firm

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

Oklahoma Law

This case presents a question of personal jurisdiction. Namely, whether a federal court sitting in Oklahoma has specific personal jurisdiction over Dr. Scott Jolly—a dentist and Arkansas resident—and the limited liability company through which he runs his dentistry practice, Jolly Dental Group, LLC. The plaintiff below, Dental Dynamics, LLC, argues that three isolated business interactions and an allegedly fraudulent contract suffice to establish federal court jurisdiction over its breach of contract and fraud claims.

We disagree. With respect to Dental Dynamics’s breach of contract claim, Jolly Dental’s contacts with Oklahoma are too random, fortuitous, and attenuated to establish personal jurisdiction there. With respect to Dental Dynamics’s fraud claim, we conclude that Dental Dynamics fails to show Dr. Jolly’s allegedly tortious conduct sufficiently targeted Oklahoma to establish personal jurisdiction there. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Dental Dynamics’s claims for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Since 2008, Dr. Jolly has inquired into prospective business transactions with Dental Dynamics on three occasions. First, in 2008, Dr. Jolly contacted Dental Dynamics regarding the potential sale of a pre-owned piece of equipment he owned. Haller informed Dr. Jolly that she could not sell the machine. Next, in May 2017, Dr. Jolly engaged Dental Dynamics to broker the sale of a 2014 Planmex Promax MID X-Ray Unit (X-Ray unit) that is the subject of the present lawsuit. Third, in June 2017, Dr. Jolly contacted Dental Dynamics regarding the purchase of a separate X-Ray unit. Jolly Dental paid Dental Dynamics the purchase price for this unit. But after a defect was discovered with the machine, Dental Dynamics returned the purchase price to Jolly Dental.1 The parties prepared and executed these transactions through telephonic, email, and text communications.

Dental Dynamics’s present claims arise out of the second transaction. On or around May 20, 2017, Dental Dynamics secured the sale of the X-Ray unit from Jolly Dental to Dr. Joiner, a dentist practicing in California. On May 26, 2017, Jolly Dental, through Dr. Jolly, executed a bill of sale selling the X-Ray unit to Dental Dynamics. The bill of sale represents that the X-Ray unit is in “perfect working condition” and that the sale includes the X-Ray unit’s hardware, software, manuals, and “all accessories and any other items pertaining” to the X- Ray unit. Id. at 14–15. The negotiations pertaining to the bill of sale were conducted through text messages and email. To pay for the X-Ray unit and associated items, “Dr. Joiner tendered the sales price to Dental Dynamics in Oklahoma, and Dental Dynamics subsequently mailed a check . . . to Dr. Jolly.” Id. at 36.

The bill of sale notes that “disassembly, packaging, and shipment” would be handled by an independent support company. Id. at 14. Dental Dynamics does not dispute that the X-Ray unit was shipped directly from Dr. Jolly’s offices in Arkansas to Dr. Joiner’s offices in California without ever entering Oklahoma. After receipt of the X-Ray unit, Dr. Joiner discovered that it was not in perfect working condition as represented. Due to certain defects and missing hardware and software, the X-Ray unit Dr. Joiner received was “worthless” in that it would “cost more to repair than to purchase a brand new unit.” Id. at 9–10. Dr. Joiner notified Dental Dynamics of the X-Ray unit’s unsatisfactory condition.

In turn, Dental Dynamics brought the present action in federal court in Oklahoma, alleging breach of contract against Jolly Dental and fraud against Dr. Jolly. Dental Dynamics alleges Jolly Dental breached its contractual obligations outlined in the bill of sale by “failing to properly disassemble and crate the X-Ray Unit; failing to provide the software and computer hardware required . . . and materially misrepresenting the condition of the X-Ray Unit.” Id. at 10. With respect to its fraud allegations, Dental Dynamics alleges Dr. Jolly knowingly made false representations regarding the X-Ray unit’s condition and his intention to satisfactorily disassemble and crate the X-Ray unit to induce Dental Dynamics to secure the sale of the unit.

In response, Dr. Jolly and Jolly Dental (together Jolly Dental) moved to dismiss the action for lack of specific personal jurisdiction. Jolly Dental argues it lacks the requisite minimum contacts with Oklahoma to establish jurisdiction and that, even if the minimum contacts test is satisfied, exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable.

The district court granted Jolly Dental’s motion, holding Dental Dynamics failed to establish specific personal jurisdiction over either its breach of contract or fraud claim.

To show personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in a diversity action, Dental Dynamics must demonstrate that jurisdiction is proper under the laws of the forum state—in this case Oklahoma—and that the exercise of jurisdiction complies with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 282 (2014); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). This requires us to focus on state law, and particularly, the relevant state’s long-arm statute. That statute establishes the extent to which the state intends its courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents. Oklahoma’s long-arm statute authorizes courts to “exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States.” Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 12, § 2004(F). Neither party raises any objection based on the Oklahoma constitution. Accordingly, the analysis collapses into a single due process inquiry. See Old Republic, 877 F.3d at 903; Newsome v. Gallacher, 722 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th Cir. 2013).

The Due Process Clause authorizes personal jurisdiction if two elements are met. First, a defendant must have “purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum state.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Second, the assertion of personal jurisdiction must comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).

The minimum contacts test for specific personal jurisdiction has two requirements: (1) a defendant must have “purposefully directed its activities at residents of the forum state,” and (2) the plaintiff’s injuries must arise out of the defendant’s forum-related activities. Old Republic, 877 F.3d at 904. With respect to the first requirement, purposeful direction ensures that defendants will not be haled into court in foreign jurisdictions solely as a result of “random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475. The mere foreseeability of causing injury in another state is insufficient on its own to establish purposeful direction. See Old Republic, 877 F.3d at 905.

The “purposeful direction” prong of the minimum contacts test is sometimes referred to as the “purposeful availment” prong. See, e.g., Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1071 (noting the interchangeability of these terms).

If the minimum contacts test is met, we must then assess whether exercising personal jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See id. at 909. To do so, we consider the following factors: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum state’s interest in resolving the dispute;
(3) the plaintiff’s interest in receiving convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and (5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental social policies. See id.; see also Pro Axess, Inc. v. Orlux Distrib., Inc., 428 F.3d 1270, 1279–80 (10th Cir. 2005).

Analyzing purposeful direction with respect to Dental Dynamics’s breach of contract claim requires us to look to Jolly Dental’s continuing “relationships with the forum state and its residents.” Old Republic, 877 F.3d at 905; see also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472. Although contractual obligations may create sufficient ties to establish jurisdiction, an out-of-state resident’s contract with a resident of the forum state is insufficient, standing alone, to create personal jurisdiction. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478; Benton v. Cameco Corp., 375 F.3d 1070, 1077 (10th Cir. 2004). In Burger King, the Supreme Court eschewed such “mechanical” tests in favor of looking to the “business negotiations,” “future consequences” of the contract, and the “actual course of dealing” between the parties. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478–79.

Here, the record shows that the parties’ entire business relationship comprises three transactions over nine years. None of these transactions was negotiated or executed in person. Each transaction was a discrete occurrence, unrelated to the others in any meaningful way. On only two occasions did the parties reach an agreement, and only once—in the transaction subject to this lawsuit—was that agreement substantially performed.

These contacts are insufficient to show purposeful direction. Each transaction concerned the isolated sale or prospective sale of a piece of dental equipment without any long-term or continuing obligations involving Oklahoma. See Old Republic, 877 F.3d at 910 (finding no purposeful direction even where a contract with a forum-state entity was accompanied by the parties’ contemplation of “some potentially ongoing consequences” because the record lacked evidence of “any significant course of dealing” or long-term contractual commitments associated with the forum state). Moreover, the transactions implicated Oklahoma in only an attenuated fashion, as Dental Dynamics serves as a broker in transactions between dentists located across the United States. See C5 Med. Werks, LLC v. CeramTec GMBH, 937 F.3d 1319, 1325 (10th Cir. 2019) (holding no purposeful direction established where a party attended numerous trade shows in the forum state, but the location was selected by a third-party).

Dental Dynamics analogizes to Burger King, but the comparison confirms no purposeful direction exists here. In Burger King, the Supreme Court found minimal contacts satisfied due to a heavily negotiated and “carefully structured” 20-year franchise agreement that “envisioned continuing and wide-reaching contacts” with the forum state. 471 U.S. at 478–80. But in this case none of Burger King’s persuasive factors are present. The primary contract that Dental Dynamics relies on is a two-page bill of sale negotiated over email that envisions no enduring relationship between the parties and concerns only the sale of a single piece of equipment that never physically passed through the forum state.

(…) Rambo v. Am. S. Ins. Co., 839 F.2d 1415, 1418 (10th Cir. 1988) (“Ordinarily ‘use of the mails, telephone, or other international communications simply do not qualify as purposeful activity.’” (quoting Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1262 (9th Cir. 1985))).

In sum, the contemplated and executed business transactions between the parties are too attenuated to demonstrate Jolly Dental established sufficient minimum contacts with Oklahoma.

When analyzing tort-based claims such as Dental Dynamics’s fraud claim, we look to “the harmful effects [of Dr. Jolly’s conduct] in the forum state” to assess purposeful direction. Old Republic, 877 F.3d at 905. Purposeful direction in this context has three elements: (1) an intentional action; (2) expressly aimed at the forum state; and (3) with knowledge that the brunt of the injury would be felt in the forum state. See Newsome, 722 F.3d at 1264–65; see also Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1072.

This framework for analyzing personal jurisdiction in the intentional tort context stems originally from the Supreme Court’s decision in Calder v. Jones. 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (holding personal jurisdiction in California proper in a libel suit by a California resident against a Florida reporter). In Walden v. Fiore, the Supreme Court elaborated on its holding in Calder. See 571 U.S. 277, 286–91 (2014). In Walden, a DEA agent in Georgia stopped two Nevadans who claimed to be professional gamblers returning home with approximately $97,000 in cash winnings. The DEA agent seized the currency and drafted an affidavit in conjunction with the forfeiture proceedings. The Nevadans filed suit in federal court in Nevada alleging that the DEA agent tortiously drafted a false affidavit.

A divided Ninth Circuit held personal jurisdiction existed under Calder and its progeny because the DEA agent “expressly aimed” his submission of the allegedly false affidavit at Nevada by submitting the affidavit with knowledge that it would affect persons with a significant connection to Nevada. See id. at 282.

The Supreme Court reversed. In doing so, the Court clarified that knowledge of an alleged victim’s out-of-state status, standing alone, cannot confer personal jurisdiction over a defendant engaging in allegedly tortious activity. The Court reiterated that the focus of the personal jurisdiction analysis is on the defendant’s relationship with the forum state, even in the intentional tort context. See id. at 282–83 (“The plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum.”).

Subsequent case law from this court confirms a defendant’s interaction with a plaintiff—even when allegedly tortious—is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. See Rockwood Select Asset Fund XI (6)-1, LLC v. Devine, 750 F.3d 1178, 1180 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding alleged falsehoods in an opinion letter sent from an out-of-state law firm defendant to a plaintiff in the forum state failed to establish jurisdiction).

These principles dictate the outcome here. As discussed above, Dental Dynamics fails to show Dr. Jolly had any connections with Oklahoma outside of the allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations and isolated incidents of outreach to Dental Dynamics. These communications into the forum-state are insufficient to establish Dr. Jolly “expressly aimed” his allegedly tortious misrepresentations at Oklahoma. See Rockwood, 750 F.3d at 1180. Nor does the fact that Dr. Jolly knew Dental Dynamics was an Oklahoma entity change this analysis. See C5 Med. Werks, 937 F.3d at 1324.

Secondary sources: Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Adam N. Steinman, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1069.7 (4th ed. 2015).

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, January 9, 2020, Dental Dynamics, LLC, v. Jolly Dental Group, LLC, Docket No. 18-6107, For Publication)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Fresh Results, LLC, v. ASF Holland, B.V., Total Produce, PLC, Docket No. 18-11595

Forum Non Conveniens

Conflicts of Laws

Dismissal

Jurisdiction

Enforcement of Judgments

Fresh Results, an American company, arranged bulk shipments of blueberries for ASF Holland, a Dutch company that repacks wholesale produce to sell to European customers.

ASF Holland created reports about the results of its inspection of the shipments, and those reports determined the final price it paid for the blueberries. Fresh Results filed a complaint against ASF Holland in the Southern District of Florida, alleging that it had falsified the reports and fraudulently deflated the price. ASF Holland moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Netherlands was a more convenient forum for the suit, and the district court agreed.

Because we agree that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to consider the relevant public factors and committed two errors in its analysis of the private factors, we vacate and remand.

(…) During the second season, one of the growers hired an auditor to make an unannounced inspection of a blueberry shipment at ASF Holland’s facility in the Netherlands. The auditor allegedly discovered that the blueberries were still in their original freight package, even though ASF Holland had reported to Fresh Results that the shipment had been inspected, sorted, and repacked. After learning of the auditor’s inspection, Fresh Results demanded that ASF Holland pay the market price for each shipment of blueberries it had received, but ASF Holland refused.

Fresh Results filed a complaint, which it later amended, against ASF Holland in the Southern District of Florida. Fresh Results asserted claims of breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, conversion, and tortious interference with its business relationship with the growers. It alleged that ASF Holland fraudulently promised a high reference price but then deflated the actual price it paid by sending false reports. According to Fresh Results, ASF Holland manipulated the price by understating the amount paid by its European customers and by falsely inflating its expenses in the reports. ASF Holland informed the district court that it would pursue counterclaims against Fresh Results for sending substandard blueberries.

ASF Holland then moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim and forum non conveniens.

Because “the forum non conveniens determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court,” we review for abuse of discretion.

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a district court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction when a foreign forum is better suited to adjudicate the dispute. See Kolawole v. Sellers, 863 F.3d 1361, 1369 (11th Cir. 2017). The “central purpose” of forum non conveniens is “to ensure that the trial is convenient.” Id. The doctrine should not be invoked “lightly . . . because it effectively deprives the plaintiff of his favored forum,” id., and so a defendant bears the burden of justifying dismissal based on forum non conveniens, La Seguridad, 707 F.2d at 1309. To satisfy this burden, the defendant must establish that “(1) an adequate alternative forum is available, (2) the public and private factors weigh in favor of dismissal, and (3) the plaintiff can reinstate his suit in the alternative forum without undue inconvenience or prejudice.” Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321, 1330 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2001)).

The second part of the forum non conveniens analysis—the balancing of the private and public factors—is a “comparative inquiry that requires the district court to weigh the ‘relative’ advantages and disadvantages of each respective forum.” The private factors “pertain to the interests of the participants in the litigation.” One of these factors is “the relative ease of access to sources of proof,” which includes the “availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses.” Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947); see also Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6. Other factors are the “possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action” and the enforceability of a judgment, if one is obtained, Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508. And a court may consider “all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Id. The public factors “pertain to the relative interests of the two fora.” Tazoe, 631 F.3d at 1333. Among other things, the public factors consider “the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion,” “the ‘local interest in having localized controversies decided at home,’” and “the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty.” Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6 (quoting Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 509). A court may also consider what law will govern the action, including “the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflicts of laws” and “the application of foreign law.” Id.

Fresh Results argues that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to consider all relevant public factors after concluding that the private factors were not in equipoise. The equipoise standard employed by the district court comes from dicta in our caselaw. Although our holdings are precedential, our dicta are not. See United States v. Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233, 1244 (11th Cir. 2017). Dicta refer to “those portions of an opinion that are not necessary to deciding the case then before us.” Id. In contrast, our holdings “constitute the precedent, as a point necessarily decided” in that case. Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent § 4, at 44 (2016); accord Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “a holding is comprised both of the result of the case and those portions of the opinion necessary to that result by which we are bound”). And we have explained that, “regardless of what a court says in its opinion, the decision can hold nothing beyond the facts of that case.” Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1298 (11th Cir. 2010).

(…) We clarified that the public factors do not “enter the equation only when the private interest factors are at or near equipoise.” Leon, 251 F.3d at 1311. Although “the private factors are generally considered more important than the public factors,” we explained that the public factors are not superfluous, even when the private factors are far from equipoise. Id. And we opined that “the better rule is to consider both factors in all cases,” which “has been our approach in recent cases.” Id.; see also SME Racks, Inc. v. Sistemas Mecanicos Para Electronica, S.A., 382 F.3d 1097, 1100 n.5 (11th Cir. 2004) (“We have clarified that . . . courts should consider both public and private factors in all cases.”)

(…) Enforcement of Judgments, U.S. Dep’t of State,

https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/travel-legal-considerations/internl-judicial-asst/Enforcement-of-Judges.html

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Fresh Results, LLC, a Delaware LLC, v. ASF Holland, B.V., a Dutch Corporation, Total Produce, PLC, an Irish Public Limited Company, April 22, 2019, Docket No. 18-11595, Circuit Judge William Pryor, for Publication)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Kroma Makeup EU, LLC (a United Kingdom Limited Liability Company), v. Boldface Licensing + Branding, Inc. (a Nevada Corporation), Docket No. 17-14211, Published

Trademark

Jurisdiction

Conflict of Laws

Distribution Agreement

Licensing Agreement

Standing to Sue

Statutory Standing

Cause of Action

Import in Europe

Motion for a Preliminary Injunction

Promissory Estoppel (under Florida Law)

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Our sister courts of appeals have agreed with the general sentiment that a license agreement between two parties can limit a licensee’s ability to bring a Lanham Act claim.

Plaintiff-Appellant Kroma Makeup EU, LLC (“Kroma EU”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment based on its finding that Kroma EU lacked standing to enforce the KROMA trademark. Because Kroma EU does not have sufficient rights in the mark to sue under the Lanham Act, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

Kroma EU is the former European distributor of cosmetics products using the federally registered mark, KROMA. The owner and registrant of the mark is By Lee Tillett, Inc. (“Tillett”) and the rights to use the KROMA mark in the United States rest solely with Tillett. In October 2012, Tillett granted an exclusive license to Kroma EU to import, sell, and distribute KROMA products in Europe, and to use the KROMA mark in furtherance of its business. As part of the licensing agreement, Tillett guaranteed that it owned the KROMA mark and would hold Kroma EU harmless from any judgments against Tillett based on the mark. Tillett retained the right to use the KROMA mark in the United States.

Defendant-Appellees—the Kardashian sisters—were celebrity endorsers of a cosmetic line called “Khroma Beauty,” sold and manufactured by Defendant Boldface Licensing & Branding, Inc. (“Boldface”). The Kardashians claim that they had no personal knowledge of the KROMA trademark until an entertainment news website, TMZ, published an article about the Kardashians’ potential infringement. However, before the Khroma Beauty line launched, Boldface had purportedly conducted a trademark search that revealed the existence of the KROMA mark. The Kardashians claim that they did not receive this information. Boldface sought to register the KHROMA or KARDASHIAN KHROMA mark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, but registration was denied because of likelihood of confusion with the previously registered KROMA mark.

After the Khroma line was released, Boldface sought a declaratory judgment in California federal court that Boldface did not infringe the KROMA trademark. There, Tillett filed a trademark infringement counterclaim, adding the Kardashians as counterclaim defendants. The California district court granted Tillett’s motion for a preliminary injunction against Boldface, finding that Tillett had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the trademark infringement claim. Boldface Licensing + Branding v. By Lee Tillett, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (C.D. Cal. 2013). Thereafter, Boldface rebranded the product line to “Kardashian Beauty” and the parties settled the dispute. Kroma was not a party to the California action and did not receive a share of the settlement recovery from Tillett.

Kroma EU subsequently filed this action in the Middle District of Florida against Boldface and the Kardashians, alleging that Boldface directly infringed the KROMA trademark under common law trademark infringement and the Lanham Act by distributing “Khroma” branded cosmetics in Europe, and that the Kardashians were vicariously liable for Boldface’s infringement. Kroma EU also brought claims against Tillett, alleging a cause of action for promissory estoppel. As to the promissory estoppel claim, the district court held in an earlier order that under Florida law, a foreign licensee could not state a claim for promissory estoppel against its licensor; however, Kroma EU was able to proceed against Tillett under a breach of contract theory. Kroma Makeup EU, Ltd. v. Boldface Licensing + Branding, Inc., No. 6:14-cv-1551-ORL, 2015 WL 1708757, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2015).

The Kardashians moved for summary judgment arguing that Kroma EU did not have the requisite standing to bring the infringement action and that the trademark infringement cause of action was barred by claim preclusion. Kroma EU also moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. Earlier in the litigation, Tillett successfully moved to compel arbitration and Kroma EU’s claim against Tillett remains stayed pending the arbitration.

The district court granted the Kardashians’ motion. The court found that Kroma EU lacked standing to sue for trademark infringement and did not reach the Kardashians’ claim preclusion argument. Relying primarily on the licensing agreement between Tillett and Kroma EU, the district court held that the agreement “plainly authorized only Tillett to enforce the trademarks” and to “protect” the mark “from any attempts of illegal use,” while “Kroma EU’s sole directive was to inform Tillett of instances of infringement.” Based on this reading, the district court concluded that these provisions “plainly authorized only Tillett to enforce the trademarks governed by the License Agreement.” Therefore, Kroma EU “lacked contractual authority, and hence standing, to pursue § 1125(a) violations against infringers in its own capacity.” Based on Kroma EU’s purported lack of standing, the court denied Kroma EU’s motion for partial summary judgment as moot.

The issue before us is the extent of a licensee’s rights in a trademark infringement action under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. While the Lanham Act typically evokes questions of standing, as a licensee, Kroma EU’s rights thereunder rely upon the licensing agreement it entered with Tillett. We adopt the position taken by the district courts in this circuit—that a licensee’s right to sue to protect the mark “largely depends on the rights granted to the licensee in the licensing agreement.” Drew Estate Holding Co. v. Fantasia Distrib., Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (quoting Hako-Med USA, Inc. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., No. 8:06-cv- 1790-T-27EAJ, 2006 WL 3755328, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2006)). See also Aceto Corp. v. TherapeuticsMD, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (“Standing to sue depends largely on the rights granted to the licensee under the licensing agreement.”).

(…) The statute affords a cause of action to “any person who believes that he or she is likely to be damaged.” But, despite this broad language, 1125(a) does not get “such an expansive reading” so as to allow “all factually injured plaintiffs to recover.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 129 (2014) (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Inv'r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 266 (1992)). This is especially true where, as here, a licensing agreement between two parties governs each party’s entitlement to infringement claims.

The court below focused its attention on whether the license agreement between Tillett and Kroma EU conferred adequate standing on Kroma EU to bring a claim under Section 1125(a). But, the question before us is not that of traditional standing. Indeed, it is “not of standing at all.” City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262, 1276 (11th Cir. 2015), vacated on other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017). Rather, it is whether the statute “grants the plaintiff the cause of action that he asserts.” Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1302 (2017). See also Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 128 n.4. (“We have on occasion referred to this inquiry as ‘statutory standing’ and treated it as effectively jurisdictional. That label is an improvement over the language of ‘prudential standing,’ since it correctly places the focus on the statute. But it, too, is misleading, since the absence of a valid . . . cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the court’s statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” In other words, does the licensing agreement between Tillett and Kroma EU give Kroma EU, the licensee, sufficient “rights in the name” to sue under the Lanham Act? Camp Creek Hosp. Inns, Inc. v. Sheraton Franchise Corp., 139 F.3d 1396, 1412 (11th Cir. 1998).

The answer is no.

To start, “a statutory cause of action extends only to plaintiffs whose interests ‘fall within the zone of interest protected by the law invoked.’” Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 129 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). The licensing agreement affords rights and imposes obligations on the parties relating to the enforcement of any trademark claims. As such, there is little dispute between the parties that we turn to that agreement to determine if Kroma’s interests fall within the zone of interest protected by the Lanham Act. In so doing, we fall back on basic principles of contract interpretation and “construe the agreement as a whole,” Westport Ins. Corp. v. Tuskegee Newspapers, Inc., 402 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2005), careful to afford the plain language meaning of “each and every word the agreement contains,” Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Fla. Mowing & Landscape Serv., Inc., 556 F.3d 1232, 1242 (11th Cir. 2009).

Here, applying the licensing agreement to this inquiry is a straightforward exercise. The plain language of the agreement demonstrates the parties’ intent for Tillett to retain all ownership and enforcement rights. Kroma EU—while it may have other rights under the agreement—does not possess the ability to assert its rights in the mark in this proceeding.

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Kroma Makeup EU, LLC (a United Kingdom Limited Liability Company), v. Boldface Licensing + Branding, Inc. (a Nevada Corporation), April 1, 2019, Docket No. 17-14211, Judge Goldberg, Published)

Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, United States Court of International Trade Judge, sitting by designation.