U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, WICKFIRE, L.L.C. v. WOODRUFF, Docket No. 17-50340

 

Contract Law

Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations

Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relations

Civil Conspiracy Claim

Lost Profits

Texas Law

 

 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 1:14-CV-34.

 

(…) The case at bar presents a different situation than that addressed in Dastar. WickFire has alleged that TriMax created false advertisements appearing to have originated with WickFire in order to, inter alia, harm WickFire’s reputational interests in this industry. WickFire is not alleging TriMax wrongfully incorporated WickFire’s ideas or concepts into TriMax’s advertisements. That is, WickFire is not concerned with protecting an original idea or its creative thought, as Fox was attempting to do in Dastar. Instead, WickFire is interested in protecting the genuineness of its brand. We cannot say, based on Dastar, that WickFire’s claim is frivolous.

 

Gensler v. Strabala, 764 F.3d 735, 737 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Dastar held that a copyright can’t be extended by using the Lanham Act.”).

 

Gen. Universal Sys., Inc., 379 F.3d at 149 (concluding Dastar foreclosed the plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim because the plaintiff was alleging the defendant had “copied the ideas, concepts, structures, and sequences embodied in the plaintiff’s copyrighted work”).

 

To prevail at trial on its tortious interference with contractual relations claim, WickFire needed to present sufficient proof of the following: “(1) an existing contract subject to interference, (2) a willful and intentional act of interference with the contract, (3) that proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury, and (4) caused actual damages or loss.”44

 

44 Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fin. Rev. Servs., Inc., 29 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Tex. 2000) (citing ACS Invs, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 943 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex. 1997)).

 

Our review of Texas law46 indicates that to prevail on an interference claim, the plaintiff must “present evidence that some obligatory provision of a contract was breached.”47 Intermediate appellate courts in Texas have, on occasion, suggested an actual breach is not required. Relying on those decisions, our own court in Cuba v. Pylant noted the following: “Although it does not appear that an actual breach must occur, the defendant must have intended to induce a breach (even if unsuccessful), thereby making performance more difficult in some way that injured the plaintiff.”48

 

But since Cuba was issued, the Supreme Court of Texas appears to have clarified the law in this area. In El Paso Healthcare System, Ltd. v. Murphy, the Supreme Court of Texas stated the following: “To prevail on a claim for tortious interference with an existing contract, the plaintiff must present evidence that the defendant induced the plaintiff’s cocontracting party to ‘breach the contract,’ and thus interfered with the plaintiff’s ‘legal rights under the . . . contract.’”49 This unequivocal language leaves little doubt that a breach must result from the defendant’s conduct in order for the plaintiff to prevail. To induce commonly connotes not merely attempts at interference, but

46 See El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd. v. Murphy, 518 S.W.3d 412, 421-22 (Tex. 2017).

47 Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 749 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Houston, Inc. v. John Moore Servs., Inc., 441 S.W.3d 345, 361 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied)).

48 814 F.3d 701, 717 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Fluor Enters., Inc. v. Conex Int’l Corp., 273 S.W.3d 426, 443 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, pet. denied)).

49 518 S.W.3d at 421-22 (first quoting Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793, 794-95 (Tex. 1995); and then quoting Associated Indem. Corp. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 964 S.W.2d 276, 288 (Tex. 1998)).

 

actual interference.50 Accordingly, without sufficient proof that the defendant’s conduct resulted in “some obligatory provision of a contract having been breached,” the plaintiff’s tortious interference claim is infirm as a matter of law.51

 

50 See Induce, MERRIAM–WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com /dictionary/induce (last visited Feb. 24, 2021) (defining induce to mean either “to move by persuasion or influence” or “to call forth or bring about by influence or stimulation”).

51 Walker, 938 F.3d at 749 (quoting Better Bus. Bureau, 441 S.W.3d at 361); see Duncan v. Hindy, 590 S.W.3d 713, 726-28, 729 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, pet. denied) (affirming summary judgment as to a tortious interference claim because the plaintiff offered insufficient proof that a breach resulted from the defendant’s conduct); see also Duradril, L.L.C. v. Dynomax Drilling Tools, Inc., 516 S.W.3d 147, 168 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (“To establish the element of a willful and intentional act of interference, the plaintiff must produce evidence that the defendant was a more-than-willing participant and knowingly induced one of the contracting parties to breach its obligations under the contract. To do so, the plaintiff must present evidence that an obligatory provision of the contract was breached.” (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)).

 

Next, we consider the evidence offered in support of WickFire’s tortious interference with prospective business relations claim. This claim required proof of the following five elements:

(1) there was a reasonable probability that the plaintiff would have entered into a business relationship with a third party; (2) the defendant either acted with a conscious desire to prevent the relationship from occurring or knew the interference was certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of the conduct; (3) the defendant’s conduct was independently tortious or unlawful; (4) the interference proximately caused the plaintiff injury; and (5) the plaintiff suffered actual damage or loss as a result.66

66 Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909, 923 (Tex. 2013) (first citing Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711, 726 (Tex. 2001); and then citing Bradford v. Vento, 48 S.W.3d 749, 757 (Tex. 2001)).

To recover lost profits under Texas law, a party “must do more than show that it suffered some lost profits”—it must show the amount of profits lost “by competent evidence with reasonable certainty.” “What constitutes reasonably certain evidence of lost profits is a fact intensive determination.” “At a minimum, opinions or estimates of lost profits must be based on objective facts, figures, or data from which the amount of lost profits may be ascertained.” However, “it is not necessary to produce in court the documents supporting the opinions or estimates.” Although there are a number of valid methods for measuring lost profits, “once a party has chosen a particular method for measuring its lost profits, the party must provide a complete calculation.” “Uncertainty as to the fact of legal damages is fatal to recovery, but uncertainty as to the amount will not defeat recovery.”73

73 Phillips v. Carlton Energy Grp., LLC, 475 S.W.3d 265, 280 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Sw. Battery Corp. v. Owen, 115 S.W.2d 1097, 1099 (Tex. 1938)).

(74 ERI Consulting Eng’rs, Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 877 (Tex. 2010) (concluding that the plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence to support “the amount of damages awarded by the trial court” but did proffer adequate evidence to prove a lesser amount).)

 

 

We turn now to the civil conspiracy claim. The elements of a civil conspiracy under Texas law are as follows:

(1) a combination of two or more persons; (2) the persons seek to accomplish an object or course of action; (3) the persons reach a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts are taken in pursuance of the object or course of action; and (5) damages occur as a proximate result.

(…) But the Supreme Court of Texas has repeatedly emphasized that “civil conspiracy is a ‘derivative tort,’ meaning it depends on some underlying tort or other illegal act.” The court’s “use of the word ‘derivative’ in this context means a civil conspiracy claim is connected to the underlying tort and survives or fails alongside it.”

 

 

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, February 26, 2021, WICKFIRE, L.L.C. v. WOODRUFF, Docket No. 17-50340)

 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, OMEGA SA, SWATCH SA v. 375 CANAL, LLC, Docket No. 19-969-cv

 

Trademark

Swatch, Omega

Contributory Infringement

Theory of Willful Blindness (‘Knows or Has Reason to Know’)

 

Admission of evidence of alleged infringement of non-plaintiff brands

Omega elected to receive only statutory damages, which is an option the Lanham Act provides to address the problem facing a plaintiff unable to prove actual damages.

 

 

Defendant 375 Canal, LLC (“Canal”), appeals from a judgment entered June 12, 2019, awarding $1.1 million in statutory damages to Plaintiff Omega SA for Canal’s contributory infringement of Omega’s trademarks, arising from sales of counterfeit Omega watches at Canal’s property in Manhattan. Canal challenges the district court’s denial of Canal’s pretrial motion for summary judgment, the jury instructions on the elements of contributory infringement, several evidentiary rulings, and the scope of the permanent injunction. We reject Canal’s arguments on all issues. We dismiss Canal’s appeal of the denial of summary judgment and affirm the judgment and injunction.

 

We nevertheless reach the merits of Canal’s trademark arguments via its appeal of the jury instructions, and we reject Canal’s position as inconsistent with our precedent in Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). In Tiffany, we held that a defendant may be liable for contributory trademark infringement if it was willfully blind as to the identity of potential infringers—that is, under circumstances in which the defendant did not know the identity of specific infringers. Id. at 109-10. That holding precludes Canal’s argument that Omega needed to identify a specific infringer to whom Canal continued to lease property. At trial, Omega pursued a theory of willful blindness, and the district court’s jury instructions accurately captured Tiffany’s requirements. We therefore reject Canal’s challenges to those instructions.

 

(…) Also in 2006, Louis Vuitton Malletier sued Canal for counterfeiting activities at 375 Canal Street. Canal entered into a consent order permanently enjoining Canal from violating Louis Vuitton’s trademarks, requiring Canal to post signs for two years stating that the sale and purchase of counterfeit Louis Vuitton items is illegal, and allowing walk-throughs by Louis Vuitton representatives. See Order for Permanent Injunction on Consent, Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Canal Assocs., L.P., No. 1:06-cv-306 (S.D.N.Y.), ECF No. 4 (Jan. 17, 2006).

 

(…) In September 2011, counsel for Swatch SA (which owns Omega) sent a letter to Albert Laboz, one of Canal’s owners, informing him of the December 2010 arrest at 375 Canal Street and stating, “As the owner of this premise [sic] with the ability to oversee and control the tenants residing within, you can be found liable for the conduct of your tenants. This includes contributory and vicarious liability for the sale of counterfeit products.” J. App’x 2681. Canal’s counsel responded in October 2011 by email stating that the tenant in question had “apparently ... sublet the space to an entity that was selling counterfeit goods bearing your clients’ trademarks,” and Canal claimed that it had “been informed that the tenant had the offending tenant removed.” J. App’x 2692. At trial, however, Omega put forward evidence that the ejection may not have occurred until 2012 and that Canal did not act between 2010 and 2012 to stem counterfeiting, such as by posting anti-counterfeiting signs, conducting walk-throughs, or inspecting the property for hidden compartments that could contain counterfeit goods.

 

In May 2012, an Omega private investigator visited 375 Canal Street and documented his purchase of a counterfeit Omega Seamaster watch, which precipitated this lawsuit.

 

In September 2012, Omega sued Canal for contributory trademark infringement, alleging that Canal had continued to lease space at 375 Canal Street despite knowing that vendors at the property were selling counterfeit Omega goods.

 

After discovery, Canal moved for summary judgment, contending that Omega had not identified a specific vendor to whom Canal continued to lease property despite knowing or having reason to know that the specific vendor was selling counterfeit goods. In opposition, Omega argued that it did not need to identify a specific vendor because Omega’s primary theory was one of willful blindness: Canal could not avoid liability by shielding itself from learning the identities of the vendors who were selling counterfeits.

 

On December 22, 2016, the district court denied Canal’s motion, agreeing with Omega that under this court’s decision in Tiffany, 600 F.3d 93, Omega was not required to identify a specific vendor to whom Canal continued to lease its property despite knowledge of counterfeiting by that vendor. Omega SA v. 375 Canal, LLC, No. 12- CV-6979, 2016 WL 7439359, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2016), reconsideration granted in part on other grounds, 324 F.R.D. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); see also Omega SA v. 375 Canal, LLC, No. 12-CV-6979, 2013 WL 2156043, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2013) (addressing the same issue when denying an earlier motion to dismiss).

 

The Lanham Act does not expressly create liability for contributory trademark infringement, but the Supreme Court has concluded that “liability for trademark infringement can extend beyond those who actually mislabel goods with the mark of another.” Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853 (1982).

 

We nevertheless review the substance of Canal’s trademark arguments via its challenge to the district court’s jury instructions on contributory infringement. As noted above, Canal insists that the district court erred by not instructing the jury that Omega had to prove that Canal continued to lease space to a specific, identified vendor that it knew or should have known was selling counterfeit Omega goods. We reject Canal’s argument, which conflicts with this court’s opinion in Tiffany, 600 F.3d 93.

 

In Tiffany, we affirmed a bench trial verdict that eBay had not engaged in contributory trademark infringement. Private sellers had used eBay’s website to sell counterfeit Tiffany products, and eBay promptly removed listings that it identified as selling counterfeits; eBay also formed a team to identify and remove such listings proactively. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 97-100. Nevertheless, eBay was unable to eliminate the sale of counterfeit Tiffany goods on the website. We affirmed the district court’s verdict that there was no contributory infringement, noting that “Tiffany failed to demonstrate that eBay was supplying its service to individuals who it knew or had reason to know were selling counterfeit Tiffany goods.” Id. at 109.

 

Canal relies on the portion of Tiffany that describes contributory trademark infringement as occurring when the defendant “continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement,” id. at 108 (emphasis in original) (quoting Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854), meaning that the defendant must be aware of “particular sellers” whom it “knew or had reason to know were selling counterfeit [plaintiff] goods,” id. at 109.

 

Canal argues that the district court’s jury instructions failed to follow these requirements by allowing for liability without a showing that Canal continued providing services to a specific vendor suspected of infringement. But Canal is wrong that actual knowledge of a specific infringer is required in all cases. In the course of holding that the plaintiff must identify particular sellers suspected of counterfeiting, Tiffany explained that evidence of willful blindness would also suffice: “A service provider is not, we think, permitted willful blindness. When it has reason to suspect that users of its service are infringing a protected mark, it may not shield itself from learning of the particular infringing transactions by looking the other way.” A defendant may be willfully blind either to particular transactions or to the identities of infringers: “If eBay had reason to suspect that counterfeit Tiffany goods were being sold through its website, and intentionally shielded itself from discovering the offending listings or the identity of the sellers behind them,” we said, “eBay might very well have been charged with knowledge of those sales sufficient to satisfy Inwood’s ‘knows or has reason to know’ prong.”

 

Tiffany’s discussion of willful blindness confirms that a defendant may be held liable for contributory trademark infringement despite not knowing the identity of a specific vendor who was selling counterfeit goods, as long as the lack of knowledge was due to willful blindness. Tiffany therefore precludes Canal’s argument that Omega was required to identify a specific individual or entity to whom Canal continued to lease its property despite knowing or having reason to know of infringement by that same individual or entity.

 

Canal insists that the verdict below portends widespread liability even for innocent actors. But Tiffany made clear that contributory trademark infringement based on willful blindness does not create liability simply because of a defendant’s “general knowledge as to counterfeiting on its” property, or because a defendant “failed to anticipate that others would use its service to infringe a protected mark”. Tiffany provided a test for identifying which scenarios could result in liability: “Contributory liability may arise where a defendant is ... made aware that there was infringement on its site but ... ignored that fact.” There is no inherent duty to look for infringement by others on one’s property. Indeed, the district court’s jury instructions correctly stated that Canal had no affirmative duty to police trademarks.

 

But where a defendant knows or should know of infringement, whether that defendant may be liable for contributory infringement turns on what the defendant does next. If it undertakes bona fide efforts to root out infringement, such as eBay did in Tiffany, that will support a verdict finding no liability, even if the defendant was not fully successful in stopping infringement. But if the defendant decides to take no or little action, it will support a verdict finding liability. See Coach, Inc. v. Goodfellow, 717 F.3d 498, 505 (6th Cir. 2013) (upholding liability because the defendant knew or had reason to know of infringement yet continued to lease vending space “without undertaking a reasonable investigation or taking other appropriate remedial measures”). The jury, properly instructed, reasonably found that the latter scenario occurred here.

 

Accordingly, we reject Canal’s challenges to the jury instructions on contributory liability.

 

(…) The defendants object to the admission of evidence of alleged infringement of non-plaintiff brands, arguing that this evidence was also irrelevant and unduly prejudicial because the plaintiff failed to show that the non-plaintiff goods were actually counterfeit. Yet the jury reasonably could have inferred that even mere allegations of counterfeit sales of non-plaintiff products should have alerted the defendants to watch out for infringement of plaintiff’s brands, so this evidence was relevant to the jury’s determination of liability. Luxottica, 932 F.3d at 1319-20.

 

Canal also fails to explain how it suffered prejudice. It argues that it was not permitted to offer evidence showing that “Omega would have been unable to prove actual damages.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 23-24. But Omega elected to receive only statutory damages, which is an option the Lanham Act provides “to address the problem facing a plaintiff unable to prove actual damages.” Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 110 (2d Cir. 2012). Given that statutory damages were necessarily in lieu of actual damages in this case, Canal cannot show that it was prejudiced by not being allowed to offer evidence refuting an actual-damages claim that Omega did not pursue.

(The award is by law capped at $2 million “per counterfeit mark per type of goods or services sold” where the “use of the counterfeit mark was willful.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(2)).

 

 

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Jan 6, 2021, OMEGA SA, SWATCH SA v. 375 CANAL, LLC, Docket No. 19-969-cv)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Hard Candy, LLC, v. Anastasia Beverly Hills, Inc., Docket No. 18-10877

Trademark Infringement

Remedy of an Accounting and Disgorgement of Profits

Remedies of Accounting, Constructive Trust, and Restitution

Injunctive Relief

Jury Trial

Seventh Amendment Right to Trial by Jury

Common Law

Equity

Monetary Damages Available to a Lanham Act Trademark Plaintiff

Fair Use Defense to Infringement

Likelihood of Confusion

Hard Candy filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Anastasia, claiming trademark infringement under § 32(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1); unfair competition under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); common law trademark infringement; and common law unfair competition. Hard Candy sought an accounting and the disgorgement of Anastasia’s profits, statutory damages, a permanent injunction barring Anastasia’s use of its mark, declaratory relief, and fees and costs. The complaint included a request for actual damages, but, notably, Hard Candy dropped this application before trial. The district court then struck Hard Candy’s jury trial demand because all of the remaining remedies were equitable in nature.

To prevail on each of its claims, Hard Candy had to establish that Anastasia’s use of the words “hard candy” created a likelihood of confusion. See Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Cmty. Coll. Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1026 & n.14 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that the elements of trademark infringement under common law and the Lanham Act “are the same,” and that “an unfair competition claim based only upon alleged trademark infringement is practically identical to an infringement claim”). Applying our seven-factor likelihood of confusion test, the district court determined that Hard Candy had not met its burden. The court also concluded that even if Hard Candy could establish infringement, Anastasia had made out a fair use defense because it used the term “hard candy” in good faith as a description of the product, not as a mark.

This appeal requires us to decide whether the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury applies when a trademark plaintiff attempts to recover the profits the defendant made by selling the allegedly infringing goods.

A plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial in an action that is “analogous” to a claim that would have been brought in the English law courts at common law, but not if the claims sounded in equity or admiralty. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987).

The remedy of an accounting and disgorgement of profits for trademark infringement is equitable in nature and has long been considered that way, so we hold that a plaintiff seeking the defendant’s profits in lieu of actual damages is not entitled to a jury trial.

(…) Injunctive relief is the quintessential form of equitable remedy; it does not entitle a plaintiff to a jury trial.

The monetary damages available to a Lanham Act trademark plaintiff can be divided into five rough categories: recovery of the defendant’s profits, actual business damages and out-of-pocket losses (like corrective advertising), lost profits, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees.  “Actual damages” in this context covers everything from damages from lost sales or licensing fees due to the infringer’s sale of offending goods to intangible harm like reputational damage and loss of good will. As we have said, a trademark plaintiff “may recover for all elements of injury to the business of the trademark owner proximately resulting from the infringer’s wrongful acts.” Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 597 F.2d 71, 75 (5th Cir. 1979).

The Supreme Court has set out a two-part test to determine whether the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee applies to a particular claim: To determine whether a statutory action is more similar to cases that were tried in courts of law than to suits tried in courts of equity or admiralty, the Court must examine both the nature of the action and of the remedy sought. First, we compare the statutory action to 18th- century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, we examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature.

We begin, then, by examining the nature of the action, here trademark infringement and unfair competition based on infringement. “Trademarks and their precursors have ancient origins, and trademarks were protected at common law and in equity at the time of the founding of our country.” Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017). Trademark infringement claims began as common law actions for fraud or “deceit.” Sandforth’s Case, heard in an English court of law in 1584, may be the earliest trademark infringement action at common law. See Keith M. Stolte, How Early Did Anglo-American Trademark Law Begin? An Answer to Schechter’s Conundrum, 8 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 505, 509 (1998); 1 McCarthy § 5:2.

By the time the Seventh Amendment was ratified in 1791, the common law trademark infringement action was well established. See, e.g., Singleton v. Bolton (1783) 99 Eng. Rep. 661, 661; 3 Dougl. 293, 293 (stating that “if the defendant had sold a medicine of his own under the plaintiffs name or mark, that would be a fraud for which an action would lie”). Trademark actions also were brought in courts of equity during the same period. Blanchard v. Hill (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 692; 2 Atk. 484, is the earliest reported trademark case brought in equity. See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1839, 1852 (2007). Shortly thereafter, the accepted rule was “that equity could be invoked to protect the plaintiff’s title to his marks.” See id. at 1854. Early American case law likewise demonstrates that trademark rights could be enforced at equity. See, e.g., Taylor v. Carpenter, 23 F. Cas. 742, 744 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1844) (No. 13,784). Thus, because when the Seventh Amendment was ratified trademark rights had “been long recognized by the common law and the chancery courts of England,” Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879), this part of the Supreme Court’s test is indeterminate.

The second prong -- the nature of the remedy -- is the “more important” consideration and provides substantially more guidance here. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196. Hard Candy does not seek actual damages, and it is undisputed that a plaintiff seeking only injunctive relief, costs, and fees would not be entitled to a jury trial. Thus, our analysis centers on Hard Candy’s request for an accounting of Anastasia’s profits and for the accompanying disgorgement of those gains. Our review is necessarily broader than the origins of the statutory remedy contained in the Lanham Act. As the Second Circuit recently explained, “the ancient remedies of accounting, constructive trust, and restitution have compelled wrongdoers to ‘disgorge’ -- i.e., account for and surrender -- their ill-gotten gains for centuries.” S.E.C. v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 119 (2d Cir. 2006).

The remedy sought by Hard Candy, an accounting and disgorgement of profits, was historically a matter for courts of equity. (…) In other words, a court of law, limited to providing legal relief, would not be able to provide full redress to a trademark infringement plaintiff, but a court of equity could do so by providing an injunction along with ordering an accounting and disgorgement of the defendant’s profits -- precisely the remedy Hard Candy seeks here.

(…) Likelihood of confusion. The district court applied our seven-factor test (Op. III, A) (…) We look to the: (1) type of mark, (2) similarity of mark, (3) similarity of the products the marks represent, (4) similarity of the parties’ retail outlets and customers, (5) similarity of advertising media used, (6) defendant’s intent and (7) actual confusion.

(…) A defendant is entitled to the fair use defense if it establishes that it used the allegedly infringing term “(1) other than as a mark, (2) in a descriptive sense, and (3) in good faith.”

Secondary authorities: McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition (5th ed. 2018).

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, April 23, 2019, Hard Candy, LLC, v. Anastasia Beverly Hills, Inc., Docket No. 18-10877, Circuit Judge Marcus, for Publication)

9th Court of Appeals, Multi Time Machine v. Amazon.com, Opinion by Judge Silverman, Dissent by Judge Bea, No. 13-55575

Trademark infringement: Advertisement: Initial interest confusion: Confusion (trademark): Internet: Summary judgment: Lanham Act: Unfair competition: 9^th Circuit:

“The core element of trademark infringement” is whether the defendant’s conduct “is likely to confuse customers about the source of the products.” E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1290 (9^th Cir. 1992). Because Amazon’s search results page clearly labels the name and manufacturer of each product offered for sale and even includes photographs of the items, no reasonably prudent consumer accustomed to shopping online would likely be confused as to the source of the products.

The eight factors enumerated in Sleekcraft are as follows: “1. Strength of the mark; 2. proximity of the goods; 3. similarity of the marks; 4. evidence of actual confusion; 5. marketing channels used; 6. type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; 7. defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and 8. likelihood of expansion of the product lines.” 599 F.2d at 348–49.

“The decision to grant summary judgment in a trademark infringement claim is reviewed de novo, and all reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party.” Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 630

(9th Cir. 2005). “Although disfavored in trademark infringement cases, summary judgment may be entered when no genuine issue of material fact exists.” Id. Indeed, in several trademark cases, we have concluded that there is no likelihood of confusion as a matter of law and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. See, e.g., One Indus., LLC v. Jim O’Neal Distrib., 578 F.3d 1154, 1162–65 (9th Cir. 2009); M2 Software, Inc. v. Madacy Entm’t, 421 F.3d 1073, 1080–85 (9th Cir. 2005); Surfvivor Media, 406 F.3d at 631–34.

To prevail on a claim of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, “a trademark holder must show that the defendant’s use of its trademark ‘is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.’” Fortune Dynamic, Inc.

v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., 618 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)–(a)(1)(A)). “The test for likelihood of confusion is whether a ‘reasonably prudent consumer’ in the marketplace is likely to be confused as to the origin of the good or service bearing one of the marks.” Dreamwerks Prod. Group v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1998). “The confusion must ‘be probable, not simply a possibility.’” Murray v. Cable NBC, 86 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 1996).

Here, the district court was correct in ruling that there is no likelihood of confusion. Amazon is responding to a customer’s inquiry about a brand it does not carry by doing no more than stating clearly (and showing pictures of) what brands it does carry. To whatever extent the Sleekcraft factors apply in a case such as this – a merchant responding to a request for a particular brand it does not sell by offering

other brands clearly identified as such – the undisputed evidence shows that confusion on the part of the inquiring buyer is not at all likely. Not only are the other brands clearly labeled and accompanied by photographs, there is no evidence of actual confusion by anyone.

To analyze likelihood of confusion, we utilize the eight factor test set forth in Sleekcraft. However, “we have long cautioned that applying the Sleekcraft test is not like counting beans.” One Indus., 578 F.3d at 1162; see also Network

Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, 638 F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The Sleekcraft factors are intended as an adaptable proxy for consumer confusion, not a rote checklist.”). “Some factors are much more important than others, and the relative importance of each individual factor will be case-specific.” Brookfield Commc’ns v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999). Moreover, the Sleekcraft factors are not exhaustive and other variables may come into play depending on the particular facts presented. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1145–46. This is particularly true in the Internet context. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054 (“We must be acutely aware of excessive rigidity when applying the law in the Internet context; emerging technologies require a flexible approach.”). Indeed, in evaluating claims of trademark infringement in cases involving Internet search engines, we have found particularly important an additional factor that is outside of the eight-factor Sleekcraft test: “the labeling and appearance of the advertisements and the surrounding context on the screen displaying the results page.” Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1154.

“Initial interest confusion is customer confusion that creates initial interest in a competitor’s product. Although dispelled before an actual sale occurs, initial interest confusion impermissibly capitalizes on the goodwill associated with a mark and is therefore actionable trademark infringement.” Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns. Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2004).

The goods in the present case are expensive. It is undisputed that the watches at issue sell for several hundred dollars. Therefore, the relevant consumer in the present case “is a reasonably prudent consumer accustomed to shopping online.” Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010).

Turning to the second question, as MTM itself asserts, the labeling and appearance of the products for sale on Amazon’s web page is the most important factor in this case. This is because we have previously noted that clear labeling can eliminate the likelihood of initial interest confusion in cases involving Internet search terms.

Here, the products at issue are clearly labeled by Amazon to avoid any likelihood of initial interest confusion by a reasonably prudent consumer accustomed to online shopping. When a shopper goes to Amazon’s website and searches for

a product using MTM’s trademark “mtm special ops,” the resulting page displays several products, all of which are clearly labeled with the product’s name and manufacturer in large, bright, bold letters and includes a photograph of the item. In fact, the manufacturer’s name is listed twice. For example, the first result is “Luminox Men’s 8401 Black Ops Watch by Luminox.” The second result is “Chase-Durer Men’s 246.4BB7-XL-BR Special Forces 1000XL Black Ionic-Plated Underwater Demolition Team Watch by Chase-Durer.” Because Amazon clearly labels each of the products for sale by brand name and model number

accompanied by a photograph of the item, it is unreasonable to suppose that the reasonably prudent consumer accustomed to shopping online would be confused about the source of the goods.

It is possible that someone, somewhere might be confused by the search results page. But, “unreasonable, imprudent and inexperienced web-shoppers are not relevant.” Tabari, 610 F.3d at 1176; see also Network Automation, 638 F.3d at

1153 (“We expect consumers searching for expensive products online to be even more sophisticated.”). To establish likelihood of confusion, MTM must show that

confusion is likely, not just possible. See Murray, 86 F.3d at 861.

In light of the clear labeling Amazon uses on its search results page, no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Amazon’s search results page would likely confuse a reasonably prudent consumer accustomed to shopping online as to the source of the goods being offered. Cf. Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1030 n.44 (Clear labeling “might eliminate the likelihood of initial interest confusion that exists in this case.”); Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1154 (same). As Judge Berzon put it, “I do not think it is reasonable to find initial interest confusion when a consumer is never confused as to source or affiliation, but instead knows, or should know, from the outset that a product or web link is not related to that of the trademark holder because the list produced by the search engine so informs him.” Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1034–35 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., concurring).

(9th Court of Appeals, Multi Time Machine v. Amazon.com, Opinion by Judge Silverman, Dissent by Judge Bea, No. 13-55575, October 21, 2015).

L'élément central de la violation du droit à la marque : déterminer si la conduite du défendeur est vraisemblablement susceptible de provoquer la confusion du consommateur s'agissant de l'origine du produit. En l'espèce et en résumé, la page de résultat suite à une recherche online sur le site Amazon donne clairement le nom de chaque produit offert à la vente et le nom de son fabriquant, accompagné d'une photo dudit produit. De la sorte, sous l'angle de la vraisemblance, aucun consommateur raisonnablement prudent habitué à acheter par Internet ne sera dans la confusion s'agissant de l'origine des produits proposés.

Les huit facteurs décrits par la jurisprudence Sleekcraft sont à considérer dans une analyse de violation d'une marque : force de la marque, relation de proximité entre les biens, similarité des marques, preuve d'une confusion effective, canaux marketing utilisés, type de biens et degré d'attention vraisemblablement utilisé par l'acheteur, l'intention du défendeur, vraisemblance de l'expansion des lignes de produits.

La décision de rendre un Jugement sommaire dans une procédure en violation d'une marque est revue de novo, et toutes les inférences raisonnables sont considérées en faveur du défendeur. Bien que désapprouvé dans les affaires en violation du droit à la marque, le Jugement sommaire peut être rendu si les faits allégués ne peuvent impliquer de violation du droit. L'absence de vraisemblance d'une confusion doit pouvoir se déduire d'entrée de cause à la lecture des faits présentés.

Pour l'emporter, le demandeur, titulaire de la marque, qui invoque une violation de son droit à la marque au sens du Lanham Act, doit démontrer que l'usage de sa marque par le défendeur implique une probabilité de causer confusion, erreur ou tromperie (cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)–(a)(1)(A)); (15 U.S. Code § 1125 - False designations of origin, false descriptions, and dilution forbidden). Le test relatif à la vraisemblance d'une confusion revient à se demander si un consommateur raisonnablement prudent sera vraisemblablement dans la confusion s'agissant de l'origine d'un bien ou d'un service portant la marque. La confusion doit être probable, et non seulement une possibilité.

En l'espèce, la cour de district fédérale a correctement nié l'existence d'une vraisemblance de confusion. Le site Internet Amazon répond à la requête d'un internaute portant sur une marque hors de son catalogue en indiquant clairement quelles autres marques sont proposées, photos à l'appui. Peu importe la mesure avec laquelle les facteurs Sleekcraft s'appliquent ici : les preuves administrées démontrent qu'une confusion de la part de l'acheteur n'est pas du tout vraisemblable. Les autres marques sont clairement identifiées et accompagnées de photographies. Aucune preuve ne serait-ce que d'un seul cas de confusion n'est rapportée.

Comme indiqué précédemment, l'analyse de la vraisemblance de la confusion se fait à la lumière des huit facteurs identifiés par la jurisprudence Sleekcraft. Mais ces huit facteurs ne sont pas considérés de manière rigide. Ils sont plutôt des intermédiaires adaptables permettant de mesurer la confusion du consommateur, au cas par cas. Certains facteurs peuvent être bien plus importants que d'autres, et l'importance relative de chacun des facteurs dépend du cas d'espèce. En outre, ces facteurs ne sont pas exhaustifs et d'autres variables peuvent entrer en considération selon les faits de la cause. Ce qui précède étant particulièrement vrai dans le domaine d'Internet. Le Juge doit éviter une rigidité excessive en appliquant la loi dans le domaine d'Internet. Les technologies émergentes demandent une approche flexible. Et précisément, en évaluant les prétentions en violation du droit des marques dans des affaires impliquant des moteurs de recherche Internet, le 9è Circuit a mis en évidence un facteur additionnel hors de la liste établie par Sleekcraft : l'étiquetage et l'apparence des produits proposés et du contexte qui apparaissent sur la page du résultat de la recherche.

(La notion d'"initial interest confusion" est la confusion du consommateur qui crée un intérêt initial pour le produit d'un concurrent. Bien que dissipé avant que ne se produise la vente, l'"initial interest confusion" capitalise de manière inadmissible au détriment du goodwill associé à une marque, de sorte qu'il est actionnable en tant que violation du droit à la marque).

En l'espèce, les biens en question sont des produits chers. Il n'est pas contesté que ces produits horlogers se vendent à plusieurs centaines de dollars. C'est pourquoi ici le consommateur relevant doit être regardé comme un consommateur raisonnablement prudent habitué à faire ses achats en ligne.

La cour relève que l'étiquetage, ou la description du produit sur la page Internet, ainsi que l'apparence de ce produit telle qu'elle apparaît à l'écran, sont les facteurs les plus importants en l'espèce. Cela du fait qu'une description claire est susceptible d'éliminer la vraisemblance d'une "initial interest confusion" dans des cas impliquant des termes de recherche sur Internet.

Dans la présente affaire, les produits sont clairement décrits par Amazon, évitant ainsi toute vraisemblance d'une "initial interest confusion" par un consommateur raisonnablement prudent habitué à acheter en ligne. La recherche aboutit à une page Internet d'Amazon qui décrit clairement le nom des articles, le nom des fabricants, en grands caractères aisément lisibles, photographie de l'article à l'appui. Il n'est ainsi pas raisonnable de supposer que le consommateur précité pourrait être dans la confusion s'agissant de la source de l'article considéré online.

Il est certes possible que quelqu'un, quelque part, pourrait être confondu en consultant le résultat de la recherche Internet. Mais les acheteurs déraisonnables, imprudents et sans expérience ne sont pas des acteurs relevant dans notre analyse. Il est attendu des consommateurs qui recherchent des produits chers en ligne d'être encore plus sophistiqués. Pour établir une vraisemblance de confusion, le demandeur doit démontrer que la confusion est vraisemblable, et non seulement possible.

B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., Docket 13-352

Trademark: issue preclusion: registration and infringement: Lanham Act: an agency decision can ground issue preclusion. The Court’s cases establish that when Congress authorizes agencies to resolve disputes, “courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated with the expectation that issue preclusion will apply except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.” Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U. S. 104, 108.

Neither the Lanham Act’s text nor its structure rebuts the “presumption” in favor of giving preclusive effect to TTAB (The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board)  decisions where the ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met. Astoria, 501 U. S., at 108. This case is unlike Astoria. There, where exhaust­ing the administrative process was a prerequisite to suit in court, giv­ing preclusive effect to the agency’s determination in that very ad­ministrative process could have rendered the judicial suit “strictly pro forma.” Id., at 111. By contrast, registration involves a separate proceeding to decide separate rights.

There is no categorical reason why registration decisions can never meet the ordinary elements of issue preclusion. That many registrations will not satisfy those ordinary elements does not mean that none will.

Contrary to the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion, the same likeli­hood-of-confusion standard applies to both registration and infringe­ment. The factors that the TTAB and the Eighth Circuit use to as­sess likelihood of confusion are not fundamentally different, and, more important, the operative language of each statute is essentially the same.

Hargis claims that the standards are different, noting that the reg­istration provision asks whether the marks “resemble” each other, 15 U. S. C. §1052(d), while the infringement provision is directed to­wards the “use in commerce” of the marks, §1114(1). That the TTAB and a district court do not always consider the same usages, however, does not mean that the TTAB applies a different standard to the us­ages it does consider. If a mark owner uses its mark in materially the same ways as the usages included in its registration application, then the TTAB is deciding the same likelihood-of-confusion issue as a district court in infringement litigation. For a similar reason, the Eighth Circuit erred in holding that issue preclusion could not apply because the TTAB relied too heavily on “appearance and sound.”

The fact that the TTAB and district courts use different pro­cedures suggests only that sometimes issue preclusion might be in­appropriate, not that it always is. Here, there is no categorical “rea­son to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness,” Montana v. United States, 440 U. S. 147, 164, n. 11, of the agency’s procedures. In large part they are exactly the same as in federal court.

Trademark law has a long history, going back at least to Roman times. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Compe­tition §9, Comment b (1993).

Though federal law does not create trademarks, see, e.g., Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 92 (1879), Congress has long played a role in protecting them. In 1946, Con­gress enacted the Lanham Act, the current federal trade­mark scheme. As relevant here, the Lanham Act creates at least two adjudicative mechanisms to help protect marks. First, a trademark owner can register its mark with the PTO. Second, a mark owner can bring a suit for infringement in federal court.

Registration is significant. The Lanham Act confers “important legal rights and benefits” on trademark owners who register their marks. 3 McCarthy §19:3, at 19–21 see also id., §19:9, at 19–34 (listing seven of the “procedural and substantive legal advantages” of registration). Regis­tration, for instance, serves as “constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership” of the mark. 15 U. S. C. §1072. It also is “prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the owner’s ownership of the mark, and of the owner’s exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services specified in the certificate.” §1057(b). And once a mark has been regis­tered for five years, it can become “incontestable.” §§1065, 1115(b).

If a trademark examiner believes that registration is warranted, the mark is published in the Official Gazette of the PTO. At that point, “any person who believes that he would be damaged by the registration” may “file an opposition.” Opposition proceedings occur before the TTAB (or panels thereof). The TTAB consists of administrative trademark judges and high-ranking PTO officials, including the Director of the PTO and the Commissioner of Trademarks. Opposition proceedings before the TTAB are in many ways “similar to a civil action in a federal district court.” TTAB Manual of Procedure §102.03 (2014) (hereinafter TTAB Manual), online at http://www.uspto.gov.

These proceedings, for instance, are largely governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence.

When a party opposes registration because it believes the mark proposed to be registered is too similar to its own, the TTAB evaluates likelihood of confusion by apply­ing some or all of the 13 factors set out in In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F. 2d 1357 (CCPA 1973). After the TTAB decides whether to register the mark, a party can seek review in the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, or it can file a new action in district court. See 15 U. S. C. §1071. In district court, the parties can conduct additional discovery and the judge resolves regis­tration de novo.

The Lanham Act, of course, also creates a federal cause of action for trademark infringement. The owner of a mark, whether registered or not, can bring suit in federal court if another is using a mark that too closely resembles the plaintiff ’s. The court must decide whether the de­fendant’s use of a mark in commerce “is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive” with regards to the plaintiff ’s mark. See 15 U. S. C. §1114(1)(a) (regis­tered marks); §1125(a)(1)(A) (unregistered marks).

Books: 2 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition (4th ed. 2014) ; 1 A. LaLonde, Gilson on Trademarks (2014) ; Restatement (Second) of Judgments for a statement of the ordinary elements of issue preclu­sion ; 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Proce­dure (2d ed. 2002)

(U.S.S.Ct., March 24, 2015, B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., Docket 13-352, J. Alito).

Une décision administrative peut revêtir force de chose jugée. Selon la jurisprudence de la Cour Suprême fédérale, lorsque le Congrès attribue à l’administration la compétence de décider un litige, les Tribunaux peuvent considérer comme établi que le Congrès a légiféré dans l’idée de conférer force de chose jugée, sauf si le but de l’une des dispositions légales emporte de manière évidente une conclusion différente.

Ni le texte du Lanham Act ni sa structure ne renversent la présomption en faveur de l’attribution de la force de chose jugée aux décisions du Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) lorsque les éléments ordinaires du principe de la force de chose jugée sont établis. La jurisprudence Astoria est à distinguer de la présente affaire. Astoria a jugé que lorsque l’épuisement des voies de recours administratives constitue un préalable à la saisine des Tribunaux, conférer force de chose jugée à la décision administrative ultime rendrait sans objet tout recours à un Tribunal. Par contraste, l’enregistrement d’une marque commerciale implique une procédure séparée portant sur des droits séparés.

Il n’existe pas de raison catégorique qui imposerait de nier dans chaque cas la réalisation des éléments ordinaires de la force de chose jugée s’agissant de décisions portant sur l’enregistrement d’une marque. Le fait que dans de nombreux cas d’enregistrement ces éléments ne se retrouvent pas est insuffisant pour permettre de les nier dans chaque affaire.

Contrairement au jugement rendu par le Huitième Circuit fédéral en l’espèce, le même standard de « confusion vraisemblable » s’applique à la fois à la procédure administrative d’enregistrement et à la fois à la procédure judiciaire en violation du droit à la marque. Les facteurs que le TTAB et que le Huitième Circuit appliquent pour décider respectivement juger de la vraisemblance d’une confusion ne sont pas fondamentalement différents et, plus important, le langage opératif de chaque disposition légale (celle s’appliquant à l’enregistrement et celle s’appliquant à la procédure judiciaire) est essentiellement le même.

Il n’importe ainsi pas, à ce niveau, que la disposition légale applicable à la procédure d’enregistrement demande si les marques en conflit se ressemblent, tandis que la disposition légale applicable à la procédure judiciaire pour violation du droit à la marque s’attache à l’examen de l’ »usage dans le commerce » de la marque. Que le TTAB et une cour de district fédérale ne considèrent pas toujours les mêmes usages ne signifie pas que le TTAB applique un standard différent aux usages qu’il considère. Si un détenteur d’une marque utilise sa marque matériellement de la même manière que ce que disent les usages inclus dans sa requête d’enregistrement, alors le TTAB se prononce sur le même problème de vraisemblance de confusion qu’une cour de district fédérale dans le cadre d’une procédure en violation du droit à la marque. Pour la même raison, le Huitième Circuit s’est trompé en soutenant que la force de chose jugée ne pouvait pas s’appliquer parce que le TTAB avait donné trop d’importance à l’ »apparence et à la sonorité » de la marque.

Par ailleurs, en l’espèce, il n’existe pas de raison catégorique de douter de la qualité, du caractère extensif, ou du caractère équitable des procédures administratives utilisées avant la voie judiciaire. Cette qualité et ces caractères sont pour une large part exactement les mêmes que ceux applicables à la procédure judiciaire fédérale.

Le droit des marques a connu une longue histoire, remontant au moins à l’époque romaine.

Le Lanham Act, promulgué par le Congrès en 1946, constitue la loi fédérale de base s’agissant du droit des marques. Le Lanham Act établit au moins deux mécanismes adjudicatifs pour aider à la protection des marques. Tout d’abord, un détenteur de marque peut enregistrer sa marque auprès du PTO (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office). Ensuite, un détenteur de marque peut déposer une action en violation de son droit à la marque devant une cour fédérale. L’enregistrement est d’importance. Le Lanham Act attribue des droits et des prérogatives importants aux titulaires de marques qui ont procédé à un enregistrement. Par exemple, l’enregistrement implique notification erga omnes de la revendication par le titulaire de sa marque. Il implique aussi la preuve prima facie de la validité de la marque enregistrée et de l’enregistrement lui-même, de la titularité des droits sur la marque, et du droit exclusif du détenteur d’utiliser la marque dans le commerce ou en relation avec les biens ou services spécifiés dans le certificat d’enregistrement. Et dès que la marque a été enregistrée pendant cinq ans, elle devient « incontestable ». Si l’autorité d’enregistrement estime que l’enregistrement peut être accordé, la marque est publiée dans la Gazette officielle du PTO. A ce stade, toute personne estimant qu’elle subirait un dommage du fait de l’enregistrement peut déposer une opposition. La procédure d’opposition se déroule avant le TTAB. Le TTAB est constitué de Juges administratifs compétents en matière de marques et de responsables du PTO. La procédure d’opposition devant le TTAB est largement similaire à une procédure civile devant une cour fédérale. Cette procédure devant le TTAB est largement régie par le droit fédéral de procédure civile et par le droit fédéral en matière d’administration des preuves.

Lorsqu’une partie s’oppose à un enregistrement, invoquant qu’une marque soumise à enregistrement est par trop similaire à la sienne, le TTAB évalue la vraisemblance de confusion en appliquant certains des 13 critères, ou tous les 13 critères, décrits dans la jurisprudence In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co. Suite à  la décision du TTAB, une partie peut recourir devant la Cour d’appel pour le Circuit fédéral, ou peut déposer une nouvelle action devant la cour de district fédérale. Devant la cour de district fédérale, les parties peuvent administrer d’autres moyens de preuve et le Juge revoit librement la question de l’enregistrement.

Bien entendu, le Lanham Act prévoit également un droit d’action fédéral en cas de violation du droit à la marque. Le détenteur d’une marque, qu’elle soit ou non enregistrée, peut ouvrir action devant une cour fédérale si un tiers fait usage d’une marque qui ressemble par trop à la sienne. La cour doit alors décider si l’usage dans le commerce de la marque du tiers est vraisemblablement susceptible de provoquer une confusion, une erreur, ou une tromperie, au regard de la marque du demandeur à l’action.