Common law in California: (…) Although this provision
makes it clear that the legislative
enactment of Health and Safety Code section 1797.196 and Civil Code section
1714.21 was not intended, and may not be construed by California courts, to
require a building owner or manager to acquire and install an automated (or
automatic) external defibrillator (AED) in any building, the subdivision in
question does not purport to address the separate and distinct question
whether, and if so under what circumstances, California common law may embody a duty to acquire and make available an AED
as part of the general common law duty of care owed by a business establishment
to its patrons or customers. It is well
established under California law that a business establishment’s legal
obligations to its customers and others may arise not only from the
Legislature’s enactment of a statutory provision but also, alternatively, under
the common law. (See, e.g., City of Moorpark v. Superior Court
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 1143, 1147; Kentucky
Fried Chicken of Cal., Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 14 Cal.4th 814,
822-824; Coulter v. Superior Court (1978)
21 Cal.3d 144, 152-154.) Under the common law, the existence and
scope of an individual’s or entity’s common law duty of reasonable care is
dependent upon a variety of circumstances.
(See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian
(1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113.)
Past California decisions recognize that “as a general
rule, ‘unless expressly provided, statutes should not be interpreted to alter
the common law, and should be construed to avoid conflict with common law
rules.’ ” (California Assn. of Health Facilities v. Department of Health Services
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 284, 297.)
“Accordingly, ‘there is a presumption that a statute does not, by
implication, repeal the common law. Repeal by implication is recognized only
where there is no rational basis for harmonizing two potentially conflicting
laws.’ ” (Ibid.)
In other contexts, the Legislature has used much
clearer and more explicit statutory language when it has intended entirely to
preclude the imposition of liability upon an individual or entity under common
law principles for acting or for failing to act in a particular manner. For example, after this court, in Coulter v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.3d 144, concluded that
under California common law a social host who serves alcoholic beverages to an
obviously intoxicated person who the host knows intends to drive a motor
vehicle may be held liable for injuries to a third person caused by the
intoxicated person, the Legislature enacted Civil Code section 1714,
subdivision (c), which provides: “No
social host who furnishes alcoholic beverages to any person may be held legally
accountable for damages suffered by that person, or for injury to the person or
property of, or death of, any third person, resulting from the consumption of
those beverages.”
Similarly, after this court, in Van Horn v. Watson (2008) 45 Cal.4th 322, interpreted an existing
statutory immunity provision as extending immunity only to a person who renders
emergency medical care and as not
affecting the potential common law liability of a person who renders emergency nonmedical care, the Legislature amended
the relevant statute to state explicitly that “No person who in good faith, and
not for compensation, renders emergency medical or nonmedical care at the scene
of an emergency shall be liable for any civil damages resulting from any act or
omission.” (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 1799.102, subd. (a).
Do the current
California AED statutes reflect a legislative intent to “occupy the field” with
regard to AEDs and thus implicitly preclude recognition of a common law duty to
acquire and make available an AED?
As already noted, in addition to relying upon Health
and Safety Code section 1797.196, subdivision (f), Target alternatively
contends that current California AED statutes, viewed as a whole, “occupy the
field” with regard to the regulation of AEDs, and thus implicitly preclude
courts from determining whether California common law imposes on a business
establishment a duty to acquire or make available an AED for the use of its
customers in a medical emergency, either generally or in particular
circumstances. As explained, we conclude
that current California AED statutes do not support this claim. As this court
observed in I.E. Associates v. Safeco
Title Ins. Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 281, 285:
“the general rule is that statutes do not supplant the common law unless
it appears that the Legislature intended to cover the entire subject or, in
other words, to ‘occupy the field.’
‘General and comprehensive legislation, where course of conduct,
parties, things affected, limitations and exceptions are minutely described,
indicates a legislative intent that the statute should totally supersede and
replace the common law dealing with the subject matter.’ ”
(…) As this court explained in City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, supra, 18 Cal.4th at
page 1156: “when courts enforce a
common law remedy despite the existence of a different statutory remedy, they
are not ‘saying that a different rule for the particular facts should have been
written by the Legislature.’ They are simply saying that the common law ‘rule’
coexists with the statutory ‘rule.’ ”
Under
California Law, Does Target Have a Common Law Duty to Acquire and Make
Available One or More AEDs to Aid a Patron in a Medical Emergency?
In analyzing the scope of the common law duty of
reasonable care that a business entity owes to its patrons or customers to
determine whether that duty includes an obligation to acquire and make
available an AED, we begin with the well-established principle, set forth in
the governing California cases, that whereas, as a general rule, an individual
or entity does not have a duty under the common law to come to the aid of another
person whom the individual or entity has not injured (the general
no-duty-to-rescue rule; see Rest.2d Torts, § 314, p. 116), a
different rule is applicable with regard to the common law duty that a business
entity owes to its patrons on its business premises. Because of the so-called “special
relationship” between a business entity and its patrons, past California cases
have recognized that a business may have a duty, under the common law, to take
reasonable action to protect or aid patrons who sustain an injury or suffer an
illness while on the business’s premises, including “undertaking relatively
simple measures such as providing ‘assistance to their customers who become ill
or need medical attention . . . .’ ” (Delgado
v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 241 (Delgado); see Breaux, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d at p. 382; De Vera v. Long Beach Pub. Transportation
Co. (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 782, 793-794; see generally Rest.2d Torts,
§ 314A, p. 118.).
All the parties in this case agree that, under California
law, Target has a common law duty to provide at least some assistance to a
patron who suffers a sudden cardiac arrest while shopping at a Target
store. The parties sharply disagree,
however, as to the scope of that duty.
Target maintains that its employees fully satisfied its common law duty
of reasonable care by immediately summoning emergency medical personnel upon
learning of the patron’s collapse, and that at most it might be required to
provide simple first aid measures but that it had no duty to acquire an AED in
advance of the incident for potential use in the event of such a medical
emergency. By contrast, plaintiffs
assert that because of the important potentially life-saving role that an AED
may play in the event of sudden cardiac arrest, the size of the Target store in
question, the number of customers who patronize the store, and the relatively
low cost of an AED device, Target’s common law duty of reasonable care to its
patrons included an obligation to obtain an AED, and that a jury could properly
find that Target acted unreasonably and negligently in failing to do so and
that such negligence was a substantial cause of the sudden-cardiac-arrest
victim’s death. For the reasons set
forth below, we conclude that the common law duty of reasonable care that
Target owes to its business patrons does not include such an obligation.
There have been a few California Court of Appeal cases
that directly involved the question of a business’s common law duty to provide
first aid or medical assistance to a patron who is injured or becomes ill on
the business’s premises. (See, e.g., Rotolo, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th 307; Breaux,
supra, 153 Cal.App.3d 379.) However, all of the most analogous California
common law cases that have reached this court have involved the distinct but
related question whether a business has a common law duty to take steps to
protect its patrons from criminal activity of third persons that endangers such
patrons on its premises. (See, e.g., Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc. (1966) 65
Cal.2d 114; Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial
Hospital (1985) 38 Cal.3d 112; Ann M.
v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666 (Ann M.); Kentucky Fried
Chicken of Cal., Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 14 Cal.4th 814; Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th 224; Castaneda
v. Olsher, supra, 41 Cal.4th
1205.) As noted above, section 314A of
the Restatement Second of Torts groups together both the duty to provide aid to
an ill or injured patron and the duty to protect a patron against an unreasonable
risk of physical harm, reflecting the fact that in both settings the legal duty
to the patron arises from the relationship between the parties and exists even
though a business has not itself caused the injury or illness in question. This court’s decision in Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th 224, which involved the scope of a
business’s common law duty to protect a patron against a third-party criminal
assault, recognized the similarity between the two settings, citing and relying
upon one of the California Court of Appeal decisions that set forth a
business’s common law duty to “undertake relatively simple measures” to aid
patrons who become ill or need medical attention while on the business’s
premises. (Id. at p. 241 [citing Breaux,
supra, 153 Cal.App.3d 379, 382].) In
considering the scope of a business’s common law duty to take reasonable steps
to protect the health of its patrons while the patrons are on the business’s
premises, we draw a comparable distinction between (1) a business’s common law
duty to take precautionary steps prior to
the time such an injury or illness has occurred in light of the
foreseeability that such an injury or illness may occur, and (2) a business’s
common law duty to act to assist a patron from an ongoing threat to the patron’s
health and safety after the patron has
experienced an injury or illness on the business’s premises. In the present
case, plaintiffs do not claim that Target failed to take adequate steps to
protect its patron after she suffered sudden cardiac arrest. Thus, this second aspect of a business’s
common law duty is not implicated in this case.
Instead, we consider whether Target had a common law
duty to take the precautionary step of acquiring and making available an AED in
advance of a medical emergency in light of the possibility that such a medical
emergency might occur on the business premises sometime in the future.
In evaluating whether a business is under a duty to
provide precautionary measures to protect patrons against potential third-party
criminal conduct, past California cases generally have looked primarily to a
number of factors, including (1) the degree of foreseeability that the
danger will arise on the business’s premises and (2) the relative burden that
providing a particular precautionary measure will place upon the business. (See, e.g., Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th
at pp. 678-679; Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd. (1999) 21 Cal.4th
1181, 1189-1199; Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 236-240; Castenada v. Olsher, supra, 41 Cal.4th at
pp. 1213-1214.). If the relative burden of providing a particular
precautionary safety or security measure is onerous rather than minimal, the
governing cases have held that absent a showing of a “heightened” or “high
degree” of foreseeability of the danger in question, it is not appropriate for
courts to recognize or impose a common law duty to provide the measure. (See, e.g., Ann M., supra, at
p. 679; Delgado, supra, at pp. 243-244, fn. 24; Castaneda v. Olsher, supra, at p. 1213.) These decisions implicitly recognize that, in
the absence of such heightened foreseeability, the determination whether a
business (or businesses in general) should be required to provide a costly or
burdensome precautionary safety measure to protect against potential future
third-party criminal conduct should more appropriately be made by the
Legislature rather than by a jury applying a general reasonableness standard in
a particular case.
For purposes of resolving the issue before us in this
case, however, we need go no further than to conclude that, as in the criminal
assault cases, when the precautionary medical safety measures that a plaintiff
contends a business should have provided are costly or burdensome rather than
minimal, the common law does not impose a duty on a business to provide such safety
measures in the absence of a showing of a heightened or high degree of
foreseeability of the medical risk in question.
In the absence of at least a showing of heightened foreseeability of the
particular medical risk at issue, the policy decision whether a particular type
of business (or businesses in general) should be required to provide a costly
or burdensome precautionary safety measure for use in the event of a possible
medical emergency resulting from a patron’s medical condition is appropriately
made by the Legislature, rather than by a jury on a case-by-case basis guided
only by a general, unfocused “reasonable care” standard after a medical
emergency has already occurred.
We agree with plaintiffs’ apparent current concession
that a general common law duty to acquire and make available an AED for the use
of its patrons would impose considerably more than a minor or minimal burden on
a business establishment. The statutory
provisions and related regulations establishing the prerequisites to civil
immunity for those entities acquiring an AED reflect the numerous related
requirements that a jury is likely to view as reasonably necessary to comply
with such a duty. Apart from the initial
cost of the AEDs themselves, significant obligations with regard to the number,
the placement, and the ongoing maintenance of such devices, combined with the
need to regularly train personnel to properly utilize and service the AEDs and
to administer CPR, as well as to have trained personnel reasonably available on
the business premises, illustrate the magnitude of the burden. (See Health & Saf. Code, § 1797.196,
subd. (b); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, §§ 100031-100056.2.) Compliance with these numerous obligations
clearly implicates more than a minor or minimal burden.
In light of the extent of the burden that would be
imposed by a requirement to acquire and make available an AED and in the
absence of any showing of heightened foreseeability of sudden cardiac arrest or
of an increased risk of death, we conclude that under California law, Target
owes no common law duty to its customers to acquire and make available an
AED. Under these circumstances, it is
appropriate to leave to the Legislature the policy decision whether a business
entity should be required to acquire and make available an AED for the
protection of its patrons. (Cf., e.g., Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co. v.
Montes-Harris (2006) 40 Cal.4th 151, 163 [“the Legislature stands in the
best position to identify and weigh the competing consumer, business, and
public safety considerations”];
Accordingly, in response to the Ninth Circuit’s
request, we conclude that, under California law, Target’s common law duty of
reasonable care to its patrons does not include an obligation to acquire and
make available an AED for the use of its patrons in a medical emergency. (Cal. S. Ct.,
S207313, 23.06.2014, Verdugo v. Target Corp.).
Notion de
Common law en droit californien : le contenu de la Common law est établi
dans cette affaire principalement sur la base de l’analyse d’un Restatement of
Torts et sur le contenu de la jurisprudence.
Les
dispositions topiques du Code de santé et de sécurité, et du Code civil,
n’établissent aucune obligation, pour le propriétaire ou le manager d’un
immeuble, d’installer dans les lieux un défibrillateur externe automatique
(AED). Mais ces dispositions sont muettes s’agissant de la question distincte
de savoir si et dans quelles circonstances la Common law de Californie contient
pour un établissement commercial un devoir dû à sa clientèle d’acquérir et
rendre disponible un AED, obligation qui serait basée sur le devoir général de
diligence prévu par dite Common law.
Il est établi
en droit californien que les obligations légales d’un établissement commercial
envers ses clients et envers les tiers peuvent découler aussi bien de la loi au
sens formel que de la Common law. Selon la Common law, l’existence et l’étendue
d’un devoir de diligence raisonnable à charge d’un individu ou d’une entité
juridique dépendent d’une variété de circonstances.
La
jurisprudence californienne reconnaît que de manière générale, sauf disposition
expresse contraire, une loi ne doit pas être interprétée comme modifiant le
contenu de la Common law, mais doit être interprétée de manière à éviter des
conflits avec elle. Par conséquent, il est présumé qu’une loi n’abroge pas la
Common law. Une abrogation implicite n’est reconnue que s’il n’existe aucune
base rationnelle pour harmoniser deux règles potentiellement en conflit.
Par exemple,
dans sa décision Coulter v. Superior Court, la Cour Suprême de Californie a
jugé que la Common law impliquait la responsabilité d’un hôte qui fournit de
l’alcool à un invité manifestement en état d’ébriété pour un dommage causé
ensuite par l’invité en question, si l’hôte savait que son invité entendait
prendre le volant après consommation. Cette disposition de la Common law a par
la suite été expressément abrogée par le Code civil de Californie.
De même, dans
une décision rendue en 2008, la Cour Suprême de Californie a jugé qu’une
disposition légale accordait l’immunité à une personne qui procurait une aide
médicale d’urgence, l’immunité étant limitée à l’aide médicale d’urgence, et
non à une aide non médicale urgente, conformément à ce que prévoit la Common
law. En réponse, le législateur de l’état a amendé la disposition légale, qui
prévoit désormais que l’immunité comprend également l’aide apportée en cas
d’urgence non médicale.
Par ailleurs,
la loi californienne sur les AED n’implique pas abrogation de la Common law de
l’état qui pourrait s’appliquer en matière d’AED. En effet, la règle générale
est que la loi ne remplace pas la Common law à moins qu’il n’apparaisse que
l’intention du législateur était de couvrir l’entier du domaine réglementé,
autrement dit que l’intention du législateur était d’occuper le terrain dans sa
totalité. Une législation générale qui décrit minutieusement le mode de
conduite, les parties, l’objet de la réglementation, les limitations et
exceptions, est présumée remplacer la Common law en la matière.
Lorsqu’un
Tribunal accorde un remède déduit de la Common law nonobstant l’existence d’un
autre remède prévu par la loi, le Tribunal ne dit pas que le législateur s’est
trompé, il dit simplement que la règle prévue par la Common law coexiste avec
la règle déduite du droit édicté.
Il s’agit
maintenant d’analyser l’étendue du devoir de diligence raisonnable déduit de la
Common law qui est dû par une entité commerciale envers ses clients. Ce devoir
inclut-t-il une obligation d’acquérir et de rendre disponible un AED ? Il
convient de débuter l’analyse en rappelant le principe bien établi par la
jurisprudence californienne, prévoyant qu’une personne physique ou morale n’a
pas l’obligation selon la Common law d’aider une personne à laquelle elle n’a
pas porté préjudice (la règle générale d’absence d’obligation de porter
secours, telle que décrite dans le 2è Restatement sur la responsabilité civile
(torts)). Mais une règle différente est applicable en Common law s’agissant du
devoir à charge d’une entité commerciale envers ses clients, dans le périmètre
de l’entreprise. Du fait des relations spéciales entre une entité commerciale
et ses clients, la jurisprudence californienne a reconnu qu’une entité
commerciale peut avoir une obligation, déduite de la Common law, d’agir
raisonnablement pour protéger ou aider des clients victimes d’un dommage
corporel ou d’une maladie pendant qu’ils se trouvaient dans le périmètre de l’entreprise.
Agir raisonnablement implique la mise en œuvre de mesures de secours
relativement simples (cf. à nouveau les commentaires à ce sujet dans le 2è
Restatement sur la responsabilité civile).
En l’espèce,
la Cour Suprême de Californie juge que la chaîne de magasins Target n’a pas
d’obligation déduite de la Common law d’équiper ses magasins d’un AED. Le
devoir de diligence raisonnable prévu par la Common law de l’état de Californie
ne s’étend pas aussi loin.
Pour ce qui la
concerne, la Section 314A du Restatement Second of Torts regroupe le devoir
d’apporter de l’aide à un client malade ou blessé et le devoir de protéger un
client contre un risque déraisonnable de subir un dommage corporel, reflétant
le fait que dans les deux situations l’obligation due au client découle de la
relation entre les parties et existe même si l’entreprise n’a pas causé
elle-même le dommage corporel ou la maladie en question. La Cour Suprême de
Californie, dans sa décision Delgado, qui impliquait l’étendue du devoir d’un
entrepreneur, déduit de la Common law, de protéger un client contre un acte
criminel d’un tiers (ici un assault), a reconnu la similarité des deux
situations précitées et, se fondant sur une décision d’une cour d’appel de
l’état, a repris la notion de « mesures relativement simples » à
prendre par l’entrepreneur pour satisfaire à son devoir.
En considérant
l’étendue du devoir, il convient de distinguer (1) le devoir déduit de la
Common law, à charge de l’entrepreneur, de prendre des mesures de précaution
avant la survenance d’un dommage corporel ou d’une maladie, à la lumière de la
prévisibilité de la survenance de tels événements, et (2) le devoir déduit de
la Common law pour l’entrepreneur d’assister un client dans le cadre d’un
dommage corporel survenu ou d’une maladie en cours dans le périmètre de
l’entreprise. Dans la présente affaire, le point (2) n’est pas litigieux. Reste
donc à examiner ce qu’il en est du point (1) : la question revient à se
demander si Target a le devoir déduit de la Common law de prendre la mesure de
précaution consistant à acquérir et à mettre à disposition un AED en prévision
d’une urgence médicale, à la lumière de la possibilité de la survenance dans le
futur d’une telle urgence médicale dans le périmètre de l’entreprise. En évaluant
si une entreprise a l’obligation de mettre en œuvre des mesures de précaution
pour protéger ses clients contre une potentielle activité criminelle de tiers,
la jurisprudence californienne a considéré en priorité certains facteurs,
notamment : (1) le degré de prévisibilité que le danger se concrétise en
les lieux de l’entreprise, et (2) la charge que représente pour l’entreprise la
mise en place d’une mesure de précaution particulière.
Si la mise en
place d’une mesure de précaution est onéreuse au lieu de représenter une charge
minimale, la jurisprudence a jugé qu’il n’est pas approprié pour les Tribunaux
de reconnaître ou d’imposer un devoir déduit de la Common law de mettre en
place la mesure, sauf si une prévisibilité élevée de la survenance du danger est
démontrée. S’il n’est ainsi pas approprié pour les Tribunaux de reconnaître ou
d’imposer un tel devoir dans ces circonstances, le législateur reste bien
entendu compétent pour reconnaître et imposer. Le législateur est en effet
mieux à même de se prononcer à ce sujet qu’un jury appliquant le critère du
caractère raisonnable en statuant dans un cas particulier. Ces considérations
applicables en matière de mesures de précautions contre des activités
criminelles peuvent être reprises pour résoudre la présente affaire :
ainsi, la Common law n’impose pas à une entreprise de prendre des mesures de
précaution de nature médicale lorsque ces mesures sont onéreuses ou difficiles
à mettre en œuvre, sauf si un degré de probabilité élevé de réalisation du
risque médical peut être démontré. Par conséquent, la Cour Suprême de
Californie juge ici que la Common law de l’état n’impose pas à des entreprises
comme Target d’équiper ses magasins d’un AED, s’agissant d’une mesure qui doit
être considérée comme trop contraignante pour les entreprises concernées
(équiper les magasins, entraîner le personnel à la manipulation et aux mesures
de réanimation, veiller à avoir sur place du personnel entraîné, etc.), cela en
l’absence d’une prévisibilité aggravée d’arrêts cardiaques soudains ou de
risques aggravés de décès.
