Connecticut Supreme Court, Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank, SC 20473

 

Enforcement of a Foreign Judgment

Action in the Superior Court in Connecticut Seeking to Enforce the California Judgment

Default Judgment in California

Personal Jurisdiction

Due Process Clause

Nonsignatory to a Contract Bound by a Forum Selection Clause Contained Therein?

Breach of Contract

Full Faith and Credit

Common-Law Enforcement of a Foreign Judgment

Conflict of Laws

Service of Process (California Law)

 

 

This appeal arises out of a dispute between the plaintiff, Meribear Productions, Inc., doing business as Meridith Baer and Associates, and the defendants, Joan E. Frank and George A. Frank, in connection with a contract for the design, decoration, and staging for sale of the defendants’ residence at 3 Cooper Lane in Westport. After the plaintiff staged the defendants’ home by installing rental furniture, antiques, art, and home décor for the purpose of enhancing its appearance and, thereby, its prospects for sale, the defendants defaulted on their contractual payment obligations to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, a California company, obtained a default judgment against the defendants in its home state and thereafter filed an action in the Superior Court in Connecticut seeking to enforce the California judgment or, alternatively, to recover under the theories of breach of contract or quantum meruit.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff against George Frank on the count seeking to enforce the California judgment and in favor of the plaintiff against Joan Frank on the breach of contract count. On appeal, the defendants claim that (1) the California judgment is unenforceable for lack of personal jurisdiction, (2) the contract is unenforceable under the Home Solicitation Sales Act (HSSA), General Statutes § 42-134a et seq., and (3) the amount of damages awarded by the trial court was improper. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

 

The relevant facts either are undisputed or were found by the trial court following a bench trial. The plaintiff is a California corporation that provides residential design and decoration services, including the delivery, staging and leasing of home furnishings and décor. The defendants are a married couple who resided in a home owned by Joan Frank at 3 Cooper Lane in Westport. In an effort to sell their home and make it more attractive to potential purchasers, Joan Frank, as the homeowner, entered into a ‘‘staging services and lease agreement’’ (agreement) with the plaintiff on March 13, 2011. Under the terms of the agreement, Joan Frank agreed to pay the plaintiff a ‘‘ ‘staging fee’ ’’ in the amount of $19,000, which represented a nonrefundable ‘‘ ‘initial payment’ ’’ due ‘‘prior to the delivery and installation’’ of the furnishings. After the delivery and installation of the furnishings, the agreement provided that Joan Frank would make monthly rental payments in the amount of $1900 beginning on July 23, 2011. The initial term of the agreement was for four months ‘‘or until the buyer’s contingencies are either satisfied or waived with respect to the purchase of the property, whichever comes first.’’ If the property did not sell after four months, then the agreement would continue on a monthly basis, subject to the right of either party to terminate the agreement by providing written notice.

 

Joan Frank was the sole signatory to the agreement. Although George Frank did not sign the agreement and was not a party to it, he participated in its negotiation. Indeed, in negotiating the agreement, the plaintiff dealt exclusively with George Frank, his office assistant, and the defendants’ realtor. The plaintiff had no meaningful dealings with Joan Frank other than her execution of the agreement.

 

In addition to negotiating the agreement, George Frank signed an addendum to the agreement, addendum B, which is a credit card authorization expressly made ‘‘a part of the agreement . . . .’’ Pursuant to the credit card authorization, George Frank ‘‘authorized the plaintiff to charge his Visa credit card a ‘total amount’ of $19,000.’’ George Frank crossed out language in the addendum providing that he agreed to personally guarantee ‘‘any obligations that may become due.’’

 

Although George Frank was not a party to the agreement, he made substantive modifications to its terms. Paragraph 19 of the agreement contains a choice of law provision, which provides that ‘‘this agreement and the rights of the parties hereunder shall be determined, governed by and construed in accordance with the internal laws of the state of California without regard to conflicts of laws principles.’’ Paragraph 19 also contains a forum selection clause, which provides that ‘‘any dispute under that agreement shall only be litigated in any court having its situs within the city of Los Angeles, California, and the parties consent and submit to the jurisdiction of any court located within such venue.’’ Despite the choice of law provision, George Frank unilaterally added the following language at the end of paragraph 19: ‘‘Since this is a contract for an agreement taking place in the state of Connecticut, Connecticut laws will supersede those of California.’’

 

After George Frank made the initial payment of $19,000, the plaintiff delivered and installed the rental furnishings and décor pursuant to the terms of the agreement. Thereafter, the defendants defaulted on their rental obligation. The plaintiff hired a crew of movers to remove the rental furnishings and décor from the defendants’ residence, but the defendants denied the movers access to the premises. The defendants demanded that the plaintiff provide a written release of all claims, but the plaintiff refused.

 

The litigation began in California. On February 15, 2012, the plaintiff filed suit against the defendants in the Superior Court of California, county of Los Angeles, claiming, inter alia, breach of contract and conversion. That action resulted in a default judgment against the defendants in the amount of $259,746.10. When the default judgment remained unsatisfied, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendants in the Superior Court for the judicial district of Fairfield, seeking to enforce the foreign judgment. Alternatively, the plaintiff sought recovery against the defendants for breach of contract and quantum meruit under counts two and three of the complaint, respectively. The defendants raised various special defenses. In particular, the defendants claimed that (1) the California judgment was unenforceable for lack of personal jurisdiction, (2) the agreement was unenforceable under the HSSA because the plaintiff failed to advise the defendants of their cancellation rights, and (3) the plaintiff failed to mitigate its damages and breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

 

On count one of the plaintiff’s complaint, seeking enforcement of the California judgment, the trial court found that the California court lacked personal jurisdiction over Joan Frank due to insufficient service of process but that ‘‘the substituted service of process on George Frank was valid.’’ ‘‘To the extent that George Frank claimed that the California court lacked sufficient minimum contacts over him’’ to satisfy the due process clause of the federal constitution, the trial court ‘‘disagreed.’’ The trial court reasoned that ‘‘George Frank admitted that he signed a guarantee of the staging agreement with a company that has a principal place of business in California and that the agreement provides that the city of Los Angeles is the appropriate forum. He disputes only the extent of the guarantee. The California court possessed personal jurisdiction over George Frank, and its judgment is entitled to full faith and credit as to him.’’ Therefore, the trial court rendered judgment ‘‘in favor of the plaintiff and against George Frank on the first count of the complaint for common-law enforcement of a foreign judgment.’’

 

The trial court proceeded to address counts two and three of the plaintiff’s complaint against Joan Frank for breach of contract and quantum meruit, respectively. In connection with count two, the trial court found that ‘‘the plaintiff’s evidence relevant to the claimed breach was credible,’’ that ‘‘the furnishings were delivered to, and installed in, the residence in March, 2011,’’ and that ‘‘Joan Frank failed to make the July rent payment, and the rent payments and other charges due thereafter.’’ Moreover, the trial court found that, following Joan Frank’s default on the rental payments, the plaintiff attempted to remove the inventory from the defendants’ residence, but the defendants wrongfully ‘‘denied the movers access to their home unless the plaintiff provided them with a full release of all claims,’’ which the plaintiff ‘‘reasonably refused . . . .’’ The trial court therefore concluded that Joan Frank had breached the agreement.

 

The trial court rejected Joan Frank’s claim that the agreement was unenforceable under the HSSA (…)

 

The trial court also rejected Joan Frank’s claim that the plaintiff had failed to mitigate its damages, finding that it was Joan Frank who had ‘‘wrongfully prevented’’ the removal of the home furnishings and décor. Furthermore, because ‘‘Joan Frank . . . wrongfully withheld payments under the agreement, and wrongfully refused the plaintiff’s attempts to reclaim the inventory,’’ the trial court found that she had breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by ‘‘injuring the rights of the plaintiff to receive the benefits of the staging agreement.’’ The trial court therefore rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against Joan Frank on the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. Having determined that ‘‘the plaintiff proved that Joan Frank breached the contract,’’ the trial court stated that it ‘‘need not consider the alternative claim for quantum meruit.’’

 

Finally, the trial court addressed the issue of damages. On the first count of the complaint, enforcement of the California judgment against George Frank, the trial court awarded the plaintiff the full amount of the California judgment: $259,746.10. On the second count of the complaint, breach of contract against Joan Frank, the trial court awarded the plaintiff damages for the loss of the home furnishings and décor in the amount of $235,598 and an additional $47,508.45 for ‘‘the rental loss and related late fees,’’ for a total of $283,106.45.

 

The defendants jointly appealed from the trial court’s judgment to the Appellate Court, claiming that (1) the California judgment was unenforceable against George Frank for lack of personal jurisdiction, (2) the agreement was unenforceable because it did not provide the defendants with notice of their cancellation rights under the HSSA, and (3) the damages award was improper because (a) the trial court awarded double damages against George Frank and Joan Frank for the same loss, and (b) the trial court incorrectly included damages for conversion of the home furnishings in the breach of contract award against Joan Frank. See Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank, 165 Conn. App. 305, 311, 316, 321–22, 140 A.3d 993 (2016), rev’d, 328 Conn. 709, 183 A.3d 1164 (2018). The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that (1) the California judgment was enforceable as to George Frank because he consented to personal jurisdiction in California by signing addendum B, which was incorporated into the agreement; see id., 315; (2) the agreement was not subject to the provisions of the HSSA because it fell within the statutory exemption for transactions pertaining to the sale or rental of real property under § 42-134a (a) (5); see id., 316, 321; and (3) the measure of damages was proper because (a) the plaintiff may recover the full amount of damages under either count one or count two of the complaint but may not recover twice for the same loss; see id., 322; and (b) the amount of damages on the breach of contract claim was not clearly erroneous in light of the trial court’s factual findings ‘‘that Joan Frank had breached the staging services agreement by failing to pay the rent due, by wrongfully using the furniture in the defendants’ personal residence for approximately three years, and by thwarting the plaintiff’s efforts to retrieve its inventory, thereby resulting in the total loss of that inventory to the plaintiff.’’ Id., 323.

 

This court granted the defendants’ joint petition for certification to appeal. See Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank, 322 Conn. 903, 138 A.3d 288 (2016). During the adjudication of that appeal, a question arose ‘‘whether George Frank’s appeal had been taken from a final judgment when the trial court’s ruling had not disposed of all counts against him,’’ namely, the plaintiff’s alternative theories of recovery in counts two and three of the complaint, breach of contract and quantum meruit. Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank, 328 Conn. 709, 715, 183 A.3d 1164 (2018). Following oral argument and supplemental briefing from the parties, we determined that the trial court’s judgment was not final given that counts two and three ‘‘remained unadjudicated’’ as to George Frank and ‘‘presented the possibility that he could be found liable for additional damages.’’ Id., 726. Accordingly, we reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court and remanded to that court with direction to dismiss the defendants’ joint appeal. See id.

 

On remand to the trial court, the plaintiff withdrew counts two and three as to George Frank. The defendants thereafter filed a joint appeal with the Appellate Court, which we transferred to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-2.

 

The full faith and credit clause of the United States constitution provides in relevant part that ‘‘Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the . . . judicial Proceedings of every other State. . . .’’ U.S. Const., art. IV, § 1.

 

Of course, the due process clause sets the outer limits of a state court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 180 L. Ed. 2d 796 (2011) (‘‘the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment sets the outer boundaries of a state tribunal’s authority’’ to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant); WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980) (‘‘a judgment rendered in violation of due process is void in the rendering state and is not entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere’’). Consistent with the requirements of the full faith and credit clause, however, we first must determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the applicable law of the foreign state. Under some circumstances—including the present case, as we shall see—we need go no further than an examination of state law because, if jurisdiction is established under state law, then the due process clause is satisfied.

 

The defendants first claim that the foreign judgment against George Frank is unenforceable for lack of personal jurisdiction because George Frank’s sole contact with California was ‘‘signing a single credit authorization in Connecticut, and every relevant action the plaintiff took with regard to George Frank was taken in Connecticut. ‘‘The defendants contend that, under these circumstances, George Frank lacked sufficient minimum contacts with California and that the assertion of personal jurisdiction over him in that state offended traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice in violation of the due process clause of the United States constitution. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985) (‘‘an individual’s contract with an out-of-state party alone cannot automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts in the other party’s home forum’’ (emphasis in original)). The defendants further argue that George Frank did not consent to jurisdiction in California because he was not a party to the agreement, and, therefore, the forum selection clause in the agreement ‘‘cannot form a proper basis for jurisdiction.’’

 

The full faith and credit clause of the United States constitution governs an action to enforce a foreign judgment. ‘‘The full faith and credit clause requires a state court to accord to the judgment of another state the same credit, validity and effect as the state that rendered the judgment would give it. . . . This rule includes the proposition that lack of jurisdiction renders a foreign judgment void. . . . A party can therefore defend against the enforcement of a foreign judgment on the ground that the court that rendered the judgment lacked personal jurisdiction, unless the jurisdictional issue was fully litigated before the rendering court or the defending party waived the right to litigate the issue.’’ (Citations omitted.) Packer Plastics, Inc. v. Laundon, 214 Conn. 52, 56, 570 A.2d 687 (1990). The party raising a jurisdictional claim as a defense against the enforcement of a foreign judgment bears the burden of proving, ‘‘by a preponderance of the evidence, facts that demonstrate that the foreign court lacked jurisdiction.’’ Maltas v. Maltas, 298 Conn. 354, 364 n.11, 2 A.3d 902 (2010).

 

On appeal, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings but exercise plenary review over the ultimate question of personal jurisdiction. See Ryan v. Cerullo, 282 Conn. 109, 118, 918 A.2d 867 (2007). ‘‘The question of whether another state’s court properly exercised personal jurisdiction is determined with reference to the law of that state.’’ Maltas v. Maltas, supra, 298 Conn. 367; see, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 174 Conn. 434, 438–39, 389 A.2d 756 (1978); J. Corda Construction, Inc. v. Zaleski Corp., 98 Conn. App. 518, 524, 911 A.2d 309.

 

In California, ‘‘a civil court gains jurisdiction over a person through one of four methods. There is the old-fashioned method—residence or presence within the state’s territorial boundaries. . . . There is minimum contacts—activities conducted or effects generated within the state’s boundaries sufficient to establish a ‘presence’ in the state so that exercising jurisdiction is consistent with ‘ ‘‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ’’ . . . A court also acquires jurisdiction when a person participates in a lawsuit in the courthouse where it sits, either as the plaintiff initiating the suit . . . or as the defendant making a general appearance . . . . Finally, a party can consent to personal jurisdiction, when it would not otherwise be available.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) Global Packaging, Inc. v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1623, 1629, 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813 (2011).

 

We need not address the defendants’ minimum contacts argument because we conclude that George Frank consented to personal jurisdiction in California. ‘‘Due process permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant . . . when the defendant consents to jurisdiction. . . . A party, even one who has no minimum contacts with a state, may consent to jurisdiction in a particular case. . . . Agreeing to resolve a particular dispute in a specific jurisdiction, for example, is one means of expressing consent to the personal jurisdiction of courts in the forum state for purposes of that dispute. . . . Although subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, personal jurisdiction can be so conferred, and consent may be given by a contract provision.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia) VII v. Changzhou SinoType Techonology Co., Ltd., 9 Cal. 5th 125, 140, 460 P.3d 764, 260 Cal. Rptr. 3d 442, cert. denied, U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 374, 208 L. Ed. 2d 98 (2020); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, supra, 471 U.S. 472 n.14 (‘‘Because the personal jurisdiction requirement is a waivable right, there are a variety of legal arrangements by which a litigant may give express or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court. . . . For example, particularly in the commercial context, parties frequently stipulate in advance to submit their controversies for resolution within a particular jurisdiction. . . . When such forum selection provisions have been obtained through freely negotiated agreements and are not unreasonable and unjust . . . their enforcement does not offend due process.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)).

 

In the present case, the agreement expressly provided in relevant part that ‘‘any dispute under the agreement shall only be litigated in any court having its situs within the city of Los Angeles, California, and the parties consent and submit to the jurisdiction of any court located within such venue.’’ (Emphasis added.) The defendants do not dispute that the forum selection clause in the agreement is valid and enforceable and, therefore, that its ‘‘enforcement does not offend due process.’’ Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, supra, 471 U.S. 472 n.14. Instead, they contend that George Frank is not bound by the forum selection clause because he did not sign the agreement. We disagree.

 

Generally, a nonsignatory to a contract is not bound by a forum selection clause contained therein. See, e.g., Berclain America Latina S.A., de C.V. v. Baan Co. N.V., 74 Cal. App. 4th 401, 404–405, 409, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745 (1999) (holding that nonsignatory to contract lacked standing to enforce forum selection clause). An exception to this general rule exists, however, for non-signatories who are ‘‘so closely involved in the agreement or associated with a party to the transaction as to be functionally equivalent to that party.’’ Id., 403; see Net2Phone, Inc. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. App. 4th 583, 589, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 149 (holding that forum selection clause was enforceable against nonsignatory on ground that it was ‘‘ ‘closely related’ to the contractual relationship because it stands in the shoes of those whom it purports to represent’’), review denied, Docket No. S117411 (Cal. August 27, 2003); Bancomer, S. A. v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1450, 1461, 52 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1996) (to demonstrate that nonsignatory is ‘‘ ‘so closely related to the contractual relationship’ that it is entitled to enforce the forum selection clause, it must show by specific conduct or express agreement that (1) it agreed to be bound by the terms of the . . . agreement, (2) the contracting parties intended the nonsignatory to benefit from the . . . agreement, or (3) there was sufficient evidence of a defined and intertwining business relationship with a contracting party’’); Lu v. Dryclean-U.S.A. of California, Inc., 11 Cal. App. 4th 1490, 1494, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906 (1992) (holding that nonsignatories were bound by forum selection clause because they were ‘‘closely related to the contractual relationship’’ in that they allegedly ‘‘participated in the fraudulent representations that induced the plaintiffs to enter into the agreement’’).

 

Under the ‘‘closely related’’ doctrine, a nonsignatory to a contract may be bound by a forum selection clause if the nonsignatory was so intimately involved in the negotiation, formation, execution, or ratification of the contract that it was reasonably foreseeable that he or she would be bound by the forum selection clause. See, e.g., Carlyle Investment Management, LLC v. Moonmouth Co. SA, 779 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 2015) (‘‘even if the defendants are not parties to the agreement or third-party beneficiaries of it, they may be bound by the forum selection clause if they are closely related to the agreement in such a way that it would be foreseeable that they would be bound’’); Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1299 (11th Cir. 1998) (nonsignatories who signed letters of credit to provide collateral for signatories were bound by forum selection clause because their ‘‘interests . . . in the dispute are completely derivative of those of the signatories—and thus ‘directly related to, if not predicated upon’ the interests of the signatories’’), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093, 119 S. Ct. 851, 142 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1999); Hugel v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 999 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1993) (‘‘in order to bind a nonparty to a forum selection clause, the party must be ‘closely related’ to the dispute such that it becomes ‘foreseeable’ that it will be bound’’); Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 514 n.5 (9th Cir. 1988) (nonsignatories were bound by forum selection clause because they were ‘‘so closely related to the contractual relationship’’). In determining whether a nonsignatory may be bound by a forum selec- tion clause, ‘‘courts consider the nonsignatory’s . . . relationship to the signatory and whether the nonsignatory received a direct benefit from the agreement.’’ Carlyle Investment Management, LLC v. Moonmouth Co. SA, supra, 219.

 

Applying these factors, we conclude that George Frank was so closely related to the agreement that he is bound by the forum selection clause explicitly providing that the ‘‘the parties consent and submit to the jurisdiction of any court located within’’ the city of Los Angeles, California. First, the record reflects that George Frank participated in the negotiation of the agreement prior to its execution. Indeed, even though Joan Frank was ‘‘the sole signatory to the agreement,’’ she had no ‘‘meaningful dealings concerning the matter’’ and ‘‘was not involved in the process other than signing the agreement.’’ Instead, George Frank negotiated the agreement, ‘‘took charge of the project and dealt with the plaintiff.’’ George Frank was a party to the agreement in all but name.

 

Second, George Frank made substantive changes to the agreement prior to its execution. Specifically, ‘‘George Frank unilaterally added the following language to the end of paragraph 19,’’ which is the portion of the agreement that contains the forum selection clause and the choice of law provision: ‘‘Since this is a contract for an agreement taking place in the state of Connecticut, Connecticut laws will supersede those of California.’’ Notably, George Frank made no amendments to the forum selection clause.

 

Third, in addition to negotiating and amending the agreement, George Frank executed addendum B, which is a credit card authorization that expressly was made ‘‘a part of the agreement . . . .’’ Pursuant to addendum B, George Frank authorized a onetime credit card payment in the amount of $19,000, which represented the ‘‘initial payment’’ or ‘‘staging fee’’ due under the agreement. By doing so, George Frank authorized the sole payment made to the plaintiff and prompted the plaintiff’s full performance of its contractual obligations under the terms of the agreement.

 

Lastly, we consider George Frank’s relationship with the parties and whether he benefited from the agreement. As we previously explained, George Frank is married to Joan Frank and resided with her at 3 Cooper Lane—where the home furnishings and décor were installed and remained for years. See footnote 3 of this opinion. Given that George Frank plainly enjoyed the use and benefit of the home furnishings and décor and shared his wife’s desire to enter into the agreement for the purpose of selling their marital residence, we have no trouble concluding that he received a direct benefit under the agreement.

 

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that George Frank consented to personal jurisdiction in California. Accordingly, the trial court properly found that the California judgment is enforceable against George Frank under the full faith and credit clause.

 

The concurring and dissenting opinion objects to our reliance on the closely related doctrine to affirm the trial court’s enforcement of the foreign judgment against George Frank, arguing that ‘‘the plaintiff did not advance this theory, either in the trial court or before this court,’’ and that the plaintiff did not raise it as an alternative ground for affirmance under Practice Book § 63-4 (a). It is true that the plaintiff did not frame its jurisdictional argument using the line of cases discussed in this opinion. In all but name, however, the gravamen of the plaintiff’s argument throughout this litigation has been that George Frank was so closely related to the transaction that he should be bound by the forum selection clause in the agreement signed by his wife, Joan Frank. The record reveals that the plaintiff consistently has maintained that George Frank consented to personal jurisdiction in California via the forum selection clause, even though he was not a signatory to the agreement. In support of this argument, the plaintiff always has emphasized George Frank’s close involvement in the negotiation and execution of the agreement, pointing out that he signed addendum B and ‘‘made specific, handwritten changes to the agreement in certain places, including to the forum selection clause, which . . . expressly included the selection of California for litigation arising under the agreement, yet did not alter or delete his consent to California jurisdiction.’’

 

The plaintiff’s failure to cite the applicable, governing case law is not fatal to its claim because it is well established that ‘‘we may . . . review legal arguments that differ from those raised’’ by the parties ‘‘if they are subsumed within or intertwined with arguments related to the legal claim before the court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jobe v. Commissioner of Correction, 334 Conn. 636, 644 n.2, 224 A.3d 147 (2020); see State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, 124, 122 A.3d 1 (2015) (‘‘We generally do not consider claims or issues that the parties themselves have not raised . . . but in cases too numerous to mention, we have considered arguments or factors pertaining to those claims or issues that were not expressly identified by the parties.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.)). This is because, ‘‘when a case is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 311 Conn. 123, 148, 84 A.3d 840 (2014); see In re David B., 167 Conn. App. 428, 448 n.10, 142 A.3d 1277 (2016) (‘‘in resolving a claim raised by the parties, we are not required to constrain our analysis to the law relied on by the parties’’). Our independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of the governing law is particularly important in a case such as the present one, given our constitutional obligation to afford full faith and credit to the California judgment. See, e.g., State v. Santiago, supra, 124 (emphasizing importance of our power to identify and apply proper construction of governing law ‘‘when plenary consideration is necessary to thoroughly address and accurately decide constitutional claims and other matters of substantial public importance’’). In light of the clear applicability of the closely related doctrine to the facts marshaled by the parties and found by the trial court, we affirm the trial court’s judgment enforcing the California judgment against George Frank.

 

Service of Process

The plaintiff ‘‘attempted constructive service on the defendants’’ at the office of LCP Homes, Inc., ‘‘located at 1175 Post Road East in Westport.’’ LCP Homes, Inc., ‘‘is a corporation owned by George Frank, and in which he and Joan Frank are corporate officers.’’ The trial court determined that service of process on Joan Frank was insufficient under § 415.20 (b) of the California Code of Civil Procedure because ‘‘Joan Frank is not an owner or operator of the company, and, moreover, there is no evidence that she was ever present at the office.’’ See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.20 (b) (Deering Supp. 2020) (providing that, in lieu of personal service, ‘‘a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person’s . . . usual place of business’’). With respect to George Frank, the trial court found that substituted service of process was sufficient on the ground that ‘‘he is an owner of LCP Homes Inc. and Andy Frank Builders, which shared the office at 1175 Post Road East,’’ and ‘‘he had a presence at the office at the time of service . . . .’’

 

 

 

(Connecticut Supreme Court, Jan. 11, 2022, Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank, SC 20473)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Plixer International, Inc. v. Scrutinizer GMBH, Docket No. 18-1195

Jurisdiction: Specific personal jurisdiction: Trademark infringement: Internet: Websites: Due Process: Fifth Amendment: Interlocutory appeal:

Given the particular facts of this case, we affirm the thoughtful holding of the district court that the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction against a German corporation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) does not offend the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. We note that this is an area in which the Supreme Court has not yet had the occasion to give clear guidance, and so we deliberately avoid creating any broad rules.

Scrutinizer GmbH (Scrutinizer) is a German corporation with its principal place of business in Kassel, Germany. Through its interactive, English-language website, Scrutinizer runs a "selfservice platform" that helps customers build better software. Scrutinizer brings its customers' code from a third-party hosting service like GitHub2 to its "controlled cloud environment," where it runs "software analysis tools" meant to "improve source-code quality, eliminate bugs, and find security vulnerabilities."

Customers who contract to use Scrutinizer's online service can pay only in euros. Scrutinizer's standard contract with those customers contains a forum-selection clause and a choice-of-law clause that provide that all lawsuits relating to the contract be brought in German courts and under German law. Scrutinizer maintains no U.S. office, phone number, or agent for service of process; it directs no advertising at the United States; and its employees do not go to the United States on business.

Scrutinizer provides its service globally.

Plixer International, Inc. (Plixer), a Maine corporation, sued Scrutinizer in federal district court in Maine on November 21, 2016, for trademark infringement.

(…) Scrutinizer moved for permission to file an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The district court granted that motion. The district court found that the matter met the standard for such an appeal: it involved a controlling question of law on which there was substantial ground for difference of opinion and the resolution of which would help bring an end to the litigation.

We granted this interlocutory appeal on the district court's recommendation.

Plixer's basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over Scrutinizer is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).

Rule 4(k)(2) states: For a claim that arises under federal law, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant if: (A) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state's courts of general jurisdiction; and (B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution and laws.

Rule 4(k)(2) has three requirements: (1) the cause of action must arise under federal law; (2) the defendant must not be subject to the personal jurisdiction of any state court of general jurisdiction; and (3) the federal court's exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with due process.

All parties agree that the first two requirements are met here. The question is whether personal jurisdiction comports with due process.

This is a federal question case, so constitutional limits on jurisdiction come from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause requires the plaintiff to "show that the defendant has adequate contacts with the United States as a whole, rather than with a particular state."

To see if Scrutinizer's nationwide contacts are adequate, we turn to the familiar "minimum contacts" framework.

Plixer has asserted specific personal jurisdiction over Scrutinizer, so the minimum contacts inquiry has three prongs: relatedness, purposeful availment, and reasonableness.

That is, Plixer must show that (1) its claim directly arises out of or relates to the defendant's forum activities; (2) the defendant's forum contacts represent a purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities in that forum, thus invoking the benefits and protections of the forum's laws and rendering the defendant's involuntary presence in the forum's courts foreseeable; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. A Corp., 812 F.3d at 59.

Scrutinizer has conceded the first requirement; we hold that Plixer has met the remaining two.

A Corp., 812 F.3d at 61 (holding that "the mere availability of a passive website" cannot by itself subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction in the forum).

Cossaboon v. Maine Med. Ctr., 600 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting that the running of a "website that is visible in a forum and that gives information about a company and its products" cannot alone support the exercise of jurisdiction).

The district court held that Scrutinizer had not merely made its website available in the United States; it had used that website to engage "in sizeable and continuing commerce with United States customers." Plixer, 293 F. Supp. 3d at 242. As a result, Scrutinizer "should not be surprised at United States-based litigation." Id. We agree.

(…) An objectively clearer picture of Scrutinizer's intent to serve the forum, the crux of the purposeful availment inquiry. See C.W. Downer, 771 F.3d at 66.

(…) Scrutinizer can take steps to limit access to its website. For instance, Scrutinizer could design its site to not interact with U.S. users, cf. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2006), but it has not done so.

And Scrutinizer could take the low-tech step of posting a disclaimer that its service is not intended for U.S. users. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997); cf. Illinois v. Hemi Group LLC, 622 F.3d 754, 755 (7^th Cir. 2010). Again, it has not done so. Instead, Scrutinizer's website (https://scrutinizer-ci.com/) is globally accessible.

In contrast, Scrutinizer did take a step to deal with foreign contract-based litigation -- it included a forum-selection clause and a choice-of-law clause in its standard customer contract. Those clauses provide that all lawsuits be brought in German courts and under German law. But Scrutinizer never suggests that Plixer could bring this suit in an alternate forum, whether Germany or elsewhere. And the clauses do not apply here; Plixer is not a party to Scrutinizer's contract, and Scrutinizer does not suggest that Plixer is bound by the contract. As the district court correctly noted, those clauses suggest that Scrutinizer "knew it was extending its reach outside Germany." Plixer, 293 F. Supp. 3d at 241.

(…) Second, Scrutinizer voluntarily served U.S. customers. Specific personal jurisdiction must be based on a defendant's voluntary contact with the forum.

Third, Scrutinizer's purposeful U.S. contacts were sufficient to put Scrutinizer on notice that it should expect to be haled into U.S. court. Scrutinizer has "targeted the world" by making its website globally accessible. See Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 890 (Breyer, J., concurring). But Scrutinizer says that it could not reasonably anticipate specific jurisdiction because it did not specifically target the United States with its business. We disagree.

(…) Ultimately, although a close call, we conclude that the German company could have "reasonably anticipated" the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction based on its U.S. contacts. Scrutinizer's "regular flow or regular course of sales" in the United States show that it has purposefully availed itself of the U.S. forum. The record does not reveal what percentage of Scrutinizer's business came from the United States. Nor does the record reveal whether Scrutinizer ever did an online trademark search for the term "Scrutinizer," either before or after it sought U.S. customers.

(Since 2000, the public has been able to search and retrieve for free "the almost millions of pending, registered, abandoned, cancelled or expired trademark registrations" online. McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 19:6 (5th ed.)).

(…) The record does show that Scrutinizer used its website to obtain U.S. customer contracts. Those contracts yielded nearly $200,000 in business over three-and-a-half years. This is not a situation where a defendant merely made a website accessible in the forum.

In contrast, a New Jersey federal district court found no regular course of sales when, over about a year, fewer than ten in-state sales brought the defendant "less than $3,383 in revenue." Oticon, Inc. v. Sebotek Hearing Sys., LLC, 865 F. Supp. 2d 501, 514-15 (D. N.J. 2011). "Such scant sales activity" did not "justify the exercise of specific jurisdiction" there.

Reasonableness: Though Plixer has satisfied the first two prongs of the analysis, we must still see whether the exercise of jurisdiction here is fair and reasonable. We consider five "gestalt" factors: (1) the defendant's burden of appearing in the forum, (2) the forum's interest in adjudicating the dispute, (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, (4) the judicial system's interest in obtaining the most effective resolution of the controversy, and (5) the common interests of all sovereigns in promoting substantive social policies.

We consider first the burden on Scrutinizer. (…) For further support, Scrutinizer points to the burden of cross-Atlantic travel. (…) and modern travel "creates no especially ponderous burden for business travelers," (…) A defendant hoping to show that travel burdens should make the difference must show that those burdens are "special or unusual." (…) many of the case's logistical challenges "can be resolved through the use of affidavits and video devices."

On the second factor, Scrutinizer does not dispute that the United States has an interest in adjudicating a dispute over the application of U.S. trademark law. (…) Further, the United States has an interest in remedying an alleged injury that occurs in the United States.

(…) "When minimum contacts have been established, often the interests of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant."

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Sept. 13, 2018, Plixer International, Inc. v. Scrutinizer GMBH, Docket No. 18-1195, Circuit Judge Lynch)

Une entreprise allemande propose ses services (dans le domaine digital) par le biais de son site Internet. Le site et les services sont accessibles dans le monde entier. Un certain nombre de clients sont domiciliés dans divers états U.S. Ils rapportent à l’entreprise un chiffre d’affaire non négligeable.

L’entreprise n’a pas davantage de présence aux Etats-Unis. Elle n’y a ni présence physique ni employé. Elle n’a pas nommé d’agent auquel un envoi officiel pourrait être notifiée.

Une entreprise de l’état du Maine ouvre action devant la cour de district fédérale pour violation du droit des marques.

La question de la compétence de la cour est litigieuse.

En application du Cinquième Amendement de la Constitution fédérale (Due Process Clause), et tout en reconnaissant l’absence de jurisprudence de la Cour Suprême fédérale sur les questions précises que pose le cas d’espèce, le Premier Circuit fédéral juge que les conditions de la juridiction personnelle spécifique sont données, en précisant que la décision se limite aux faits de la cause et ne doit pas être interprétée largement. Le critère déterminant au sens du Cinquième Amendement est celui des contacts suffisants avec les Etats-Unis plutôt qu’avec l’un de ses états en particulier.

L’entreprise allemande n’a pas bloqué l’accès de son site aux clients U.S., n’a même pas posté un disclaimer refusant les clients U.S., mais, au contraire, leur propose, ainsi qu’au reste du monde, de contracter avec elle par le biais d’un site Internet en anglais. Elle a exécuté contre paiement nombre de prestations en faveur de nombre de clients U.S., et devait ainsi s’attendre à être actionnée devant une cour U.S. Le fait d’avoir inséré dans ses conditions contractuelles la loi allemande comme droit applicable et une cour allemande comme Tribunal compétent n’est d’aucun secours à l’entreprise allemande : bien au contraire, ces indications démontrent une volonté de s’engager internationalement, et la demanderesse à l’action en violation du droit à la marque n’est pas en rapport contractuel avec l’entreprise allemande.

Enfin, reconnaître la compétence de la cour de district fédérale satisfait aussi la condition d’une reconnaissance équitable : les voyages transatlantiques ne sont pas un fardeau qui ne saurait être exigé. D’autant que les productions de pièces et l’usage de moyens vidéos peuvent permettre d’éviter le déplacement de personnes. Un voyage transatlantique qui serait spécialement problématique peut permettre une décision d’incompétence de la cour U.S.

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., Docket 16-466

Specific Jurisdiction: Due Process Clause: Fourteenth Amendment: Fifth Amendment: Federalism:

Reverses and remands 1Cal. 5th 783, 377 P. 3d 874 (S221038, August 29, 2016, Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of San Francisco County).

(…) We granted certiorari to decide whether the California courts’ exercise of jurisdiction in this case violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 580 U. S. ___ (2017).

(California law provides that its courts may exercise jurisdiction “on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution . . . of the United States,” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. §410.10 (West 2004)).

(…) Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which “limits the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant,” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 291 (1980).

(…) The Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism.

Our settled principles regarding specific jurisdiction control this case. In order for a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a claim, there must be an “affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, prin­cipally, an activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U. S. 915, 919 (2011).

(…) Even regu­larly occurring sales of a product in a State do not justify the exercise of jurisdiction over a claim unrelated to those sales.

(…) What is needed—and what is missing here—is a connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.

(…) Walden, 571 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8): In that case, Nevada plaintiffs sued an out-of-state defendant for conducting an allegedly unlawful search of the plaintiffs while they were in Georgia preparing to board a plane bound for Nevada. We held that the Nevada courts lacked specific jurisdiction even though the plain­tiffs were Nevada residents and “suffered foreseeable harm in Nevada.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 11). Because the “relevant conduct occurred entirely in Georgia . . . the mere fact that this conduct affected plaintiffs with con­nections to the forum State did not suffice to authorize jurisdiction.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14).

In today’s case, the connection between the nonresi­dents’ claims and the forum is even weaker. The relevant plaintiffs are not California residents and do not claim to have suffered harm in that State. In addition, as in Wal­den, all the conduct giving rise to the nonresidents’ claims occurred elsewhere. It follows that the California courts cannot claim specific jurisdiction.

(…) (Keeton held that there was jurisdiction in New Hampshire to consider the full measure of the plaintiff ’s claim, but whether she could actually recover out-of-state damages was a merits question governed by New Hampshire libel law).

(Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U. S. 320, 332 (1980); see Walden, 571 U. S., at ___ (slip op, at 8) (“A defendant’s relationship with a . . . third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction”)).

(…) In addition, since our decision concerns the due process limits on the exer­cise of specific jurisdiction by a State, we leave open the question whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court. See Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U. S. 97, 102, n. 5 (1987).

(U.S.S.C., June 19, 2017, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., Docket 16-466, J. Alito (only J. Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion)).

Notion de "specific jurisdiction", telle que limitée par la Clause "Due Process" du Quatorzième Amendement, en cas de procédure devant le Tribunal d'un état, impliquant plusieurs demandeurs, certains domiciliés hors de l'état du for.

La Cour rappelle sa jurisprudence : un Tribunal est compétent s'il existe un lien entre le for et la prétention déduite en justice, par exemple suite à une activité ou à un événement qui s'est produit dans l'état du for. (En l'espèce, action de classe en Californie contre un fabricant de médicament. Les demandeurs californiens peuvent invoquer un dommage subi en Californie, suite à un achat du produit en Californie. Ces éléments ne peuvent pas être invoqués par les demandeurs domiciliés dans un autre état).

Des ventes régulières dans un état ne suffisent pas à fonder la compétence des Tribunaux de cet état si la prétention n'est pas liée aux ventes.

Dans une décision Walden, des demandeurs domiciliés au Nevada avaient agi devant le Tribunal du Nevada contre un défendeur domicilié en Géorgie. Les prétentions en dommages-intérêts découlaient d'une fouille prétendument illégale subie en Géorgie juste avant d'embarquer un vol à destination du Nevada. La Cour a jugé que les Tribunaux du Nevada n'étaient pas compétents (absence de "specific jurisdiction"), même si les demandeurs étaient résidents du Nevada et même s'ils subissaient un dommage dans cet état. La conduite relevante s'était en effet produite entièrement en Géorgie.

En l'espèce, la connexion entre les prétentions des demandeurs hors de l'état du for et le for lui-même est encore plus ténue que dans Walden. Ces demandeurs ne résident pas en Californie et n'ont pas subi de dommage dans cet état. En outre, comme dans Walden, la conduite à la base des prétentions s'est entièrement déroulée hors de l'état du for. Dès lors, les cours californiennes ne sont pas compétentes au sens de la "specific jurisdiction".

(Si la compétence est admise s'agissant de prétentions de parties demanderesses domiciliées hors de l'état du for, la question de savoir si ces demanderesses peuvent récupérer la totalité de leur préjudice subi hors de cet état est une question qui se juge à la lumière du droit de l'état du for, cf. décision Keeton).

(Les relations du défendeur avec un tiers, domicilié, lui, dans l'état du for, sont insuffisantes à conférer compétence spécifique).

La Cour laisse ouverte la question de savoir si le Cinquième Amendement impose à la compétence d'une cour fédérale les mêmes limites que celles décrites ci-dessus, qui ne concernent que la compétence spécifique des cours d'un état sous l'angle du Quatorzième Amendement.

Hurst v. Florida, Docket No. 14-7505

Death penalty: Sixth Amendment: Jury:

A Florida jury convicted H. of murder­ing his co-worker, C. H. A penalty-phase jury recommended that H.’s judge impose a death sentence. Notwithstanding this recommendation, Florida law re­quired the judge to hold a separate hearing and determine whether sufficient aggravating circumstances existed to justify imposing the death penalty. The judge so found and sentenced H. to death.

We hold this sentencing scheme unconstitutional. The Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death. A jury’s mere recommendation is not enough.

First-degree murder is a capital felony in Florida. See Fla. Stat. §782.04(1)(a) (2010). Under state law, the max­imum sentence a capital felon may receive on the basis of the conviction alone is life imprisonment. §775.082(1). “A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death” only if an additional sentencing pro­ceeding “results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death.” Ibid. “Otherwise such person shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be ineligible for parole.” Ibid.

The additional sentencing proceeding Florida employs is a “hybrid” proceeding “in which a jury renders an advisory verdict but the judge makes the ultimate sentencing determinations.” Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584, 608, n. 6 (2002). First, the sentencing judge conducts an eviden­tiary hearing before a jury. Fla. Stat. §921.141(1) (2010). Next, the jury renders an “advisory sentence” of life or death without specifying the factual basis of its recom­mendation. §921.141(2). “Notwithstanding the recom­mendation of a majority of the jury, the court, after weigh­ing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death.” §921.141(3). If the court imposes death, it must “set forth in writing its findings upon which the sentence of death is based.” Ibid. Although the judge must give the jury recommendation “great weight,” Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975) (per curiam), the sentencing order must “reflect the trial judge’s independent judgment about the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors,” Blackwelder v. State, 851 So. 2d 650, 653 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam).

Here the jury recommended death by a vote of 7 to 5.

The sentencing judge then sentenced H. to death. In her written order, the judge based the sentence in part on her independent determination that both the heinous-murder and robbery aggravators existed.

We granted certiorari to resolve whether Florida’s capi­tal sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment in light of Ring. 575 U. S. ___ (2015). We hold that it does, and reverse.

The Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prose­cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. . . .” This right, in con­junction with the Due Process Clause, requires that each element of a crime be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 3). In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 494 (2000), this Court held that any fact that “exposes the defendant to a greater punishment than that author­ized by the jury’s guilty verdict” is an “element” that must be submitted to a jury.

In Ring, 536 U. S. 584, we concluded that Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme violated Apprendi’s rule because the State allowed a judge to find the facts necessary to sentence a defendant to death. An Arizona jury had convicted R. of felony murder. 536 U. S., at 591. Under state law, “Ring could not be sentenced to death, the statutory maximum penalty for first-degree murder, unless further findings were made.” Id., at 592. Specifically, a judge could sen­tence R. to death only after independently finding at least one aggravating circumstance. Id., at 592–593. R.’s judge followed this procedure, found an aggravating circumstance, and sentenced R. to death. The Court had little difficulty concluding that “‘the required finding of an aggravated circumstance exposed Ring to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict.’” Id., at 604 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U. S., at 494). Had R.’s judge not engaged in any factfinding, R. would have received a life sentence. Ring, 536 U. S., at 597. R.’s death sen­tence therefore violated his right to have a jury find the facts behind his punishment.

The analysis the Ring Court applied to Arizona’s sen­tencing scheme applies equally to Florida’s. Like Arizona at the time of Ring, Florida does not require the jury to make the critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty. Rather, Florida requires a judge to find these facts. Fla. Stat. §921.141(3). Although Florida incorpo­rates an advisory jury verdict that Arizona lacked, we have previously made clear that this distinction is imma­terial: “It is true that in Florida the jury recommends a sentence, but it does not make specific factual findings with regard to the existence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and its recommendation is not binding on the trial judge. A Florida trial court no more has the assistance of a jury’s findings of fact with respect to sen­tencing issues than does a trial judge in Arizona.” Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, 648 (1990); accord, State v. Steele, 921 So. 2d 538, 546 (Fla. 2005) (“The trial court alone must make detailed findings about the existence and weight of aggravating circumstances; it has no jury find­ings on which to rely”).

As with R., the maximum punishment H. could have received without any judge-made findings was life in prison without parole. As with R., a judge increased H.’s authorized punishment based on her own factfinding. In light of Ring, we hold that H.’s sentence violates the Sixth Amendment.

The Sixth Amendment protects a defendant’s right to an impartial jury. This right required Florida to base H.’s death sentence on a jury’s verdict, not a judge’s factfinding. Florida’s sentencing scheme, which required the judge alone to find the existence of an aggra­vating circumstance, is therefore unconstitutional. The judgment of the Florida Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

JUSTICE BREYER, concurring in the judgment: The danger of un­warranted imposition of the death penalty cannot be avoided unless the decision to impose the death penalty is made by a jury rather than by a single government offi­cial; No one argues that Florida’s juries actually sen­tence capital defendants to death—that job is left to Flor­ida’s judges. See Fla. Stat. §921.141(3) (2010). Like the majority, therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.

(U.S.S.C., Jan. 12, 2016, Hurst v. Florida, Docket No. 14-7505, J. Sotomayor)

Sixième Amendement, peine capitale, droit à un Jury impartial :

Dans cette affaire, le Jury d’une cour de Floride a reconnu H. coupable d’homicide. Le Jury siégeant en procédure de fixation de la peine recommanda au Juge de prononcer la peine capitale. Nonobstant cette recommandation, la loi de l’état de Floride impose au Juge de tenir une audience séparée et de déterminer si des circonstances aggravantes permettent de justifier l’imposition de la peine de mort. Je Juge estima que tel était le cas et prononça dite peine.

La présente Cour juge que cette procédure de fixation de la peine est inconstitutionnelle. Le Sixième Amendement exige que la détermination de chaque fait nécessaire à l’imposition de la peine de mort soit effectuée par un Jury, et non par un Juge. La simple recommandation d’un Jury n’est pas suffisante.

En Floride, un meurtre au premier degré est un crime susceptible de la peine de mort. Selon le droit de cet état, la peine maximale à laquelle un tel criminel peut être condamné – du seul fait du meurtre au premier degré – est l’emprisonnement à vie. Une personne condamnée pour un crime susceptible de la peine de mort ne sera effectivement condamnée à mort que si une procédure additionnelle de fixation de la peine, devant le Juge et non devant le Jury, apporte des éléments permettant la fixation de dite peine. A défaut de ces éléments, une telle personne sera punie de l’emprisonnement à vie, sans possibilité de libération.

La procédure additionnelle à laquelle recourt l’état de Floride est une procédure hybride : un Jury rend un verdict sous forme de recommandation. Les ultimes constatations relatives à la fixation de la peine sont de la compétence du Juge. La procédure additionnelle consiste en ceci : tout d’abord, le Juge conduit une audience de preuves devant le Jury. Ensuite, le Jury délivre une proposition de fixation de peine, qui s’analyse en une simple recommandation au Juge. Le Jury propose ainsi soit la réclusion sans possibilité de libération, soit la peine de mort. Il n’indique pas quels sont les faits à la base de sa recommandation. Enfin, nonobstant la recommandation de la majorité du Jury, la Cour apprécie les circonstances aggravantes et atténuantes, puis prononce la peine, soit la réclusion à vie sans possibilité de libération, soit la peine de mort. Si le Juge retient la peine capitale, il doit exposer par écrit les fondements de sa décision. Bien que le Juge soit tenu d’accorder beaucoup d’importance à la recommandation du Jury, la peine qu’il prononce doit refléter son jugement indépendant portant sur l’existence des circonstances aggravantes et atténuantes.

En l’espèce, le Jury recommanda la peine de mort par un vote de 7 contre 5.

Le Juge condamna ensuite H. à mort. Dans les considérants de sa décision, elle motiva notamment la peine sur sa conviction que les circonstances aggravantes de meurtre haineux et de vol étaient réunies.

La présente Cour doit en l’espèce définir si la procédure de fixation de la peine prévue par le droit de l’état de Floride porte atteinte au Sixième Amendement, tel qu’appliqué dans la jurisprudence Ring (2015). La Cour juge qu’il en est ainsi, de sorte que la décision de l’instance précédente est annulée.

Le Sixième Amendement stipule que dans toutes les procédures pénales, le prévenu est au bénéfice du droit à un procès rapide et public, mené par un Jury impartial. Ce droit, combiné à la Clause du droit à un procès équitable (Due Process Clause), exige que chaque élément constitutif d’un crime soit établi par le Jury, au-delà de tout doute raisonnable. Dans sa jurisprudence Apprendi, la Cour a jugé que tous les faits qui exposent le prévenu à une peine plus sévère que celle autorisée par le verdict de culpabilité rendu par le Jury doivent être soumis audit Jury.

Dans sa décision Ring (536 U.S. 584), la Cour a conclu que la procédure pénale en place dans l’état de l’Arizona pour les cas impliquant la peine capitale n’était pas conforme à la jurisprudence Apprendi, en ce que l’état attribuait à un Juge, et non au Jury, la compétence de se prononcer sur les faits nécessaires à une condamnation à la peine capitale. Dans l’affaire Ring, un Jury de l’Arizona avait reconnu le prévenu coupable de meurtre, un crime (felony).

Selon le droit de l’état de l’Arizona, donc, R. ne pouvait être condamné à mort, soit à la peine légale maximale pour meurtre au premier degré, que si des faits additionnels étaient établis. Plus spécifiquement, un Juge ne pouvait condamner R. à mort qu’après avoir, de manière indépendante, établi au moins un fait constitutif d’une circonstance aggravante. Et le Juge de R. a suivi cette procédure, en retenant tout d’abord l’existence d’une circonstance aggravante, puis en prononçant une condamnation à mort. Le Juge a ainsi pu conclure que l’élément de fait additionnel permettant de retenir une circonstance aggravante était établi, et il permettait de condamner R. à une peine plus sévère que celle autorisée par le prononcé de culpabilité rendu par le Jury. Si le Juge n’avait pas entrepris ce travail d’établissement de fait, R. aurait été condamné à la prison à vie. Le prononcé de la peine capitale violait par conséquent le droit de R. à ce que le Jury procède à la détermination des faits à la base de la sentence rendue contre lui.

L’analyse de la procédure de l’Arizona effectuée par le Juge de R. s’applique également à notre affaire jugée en Floride. Tout comme en Arizona à l’époque du procès de R., le droit de Floride n’impose pas que le Jury procède à l’établissement des faits nécessaires au prononcé de la peine de mort. Bien plutôt, le droit de l’état de Floride impose au Juge de déterminer l’existence de ces faits. Même si le droit de l’état de Floride incorpore la décision du Jury sous la forme d’une recommandation – ce que ne contenait pas le droit de l’Arizona – la Cour a déjà jugé cette distinction immatérielle : même s’il est vrai qu’en Floride le Jury recommande une peine, il ne procède pourtant pas à la détermination d’éléments de faits portant sur les circonstances atténuantes ou aggravantes, et au surplus, sa recommandation ne lie pas le Juge. En Floride, le Tribunal pénal de première instance ne bénéficie pas davantage que celui de l’Arizona de l’assistance du Jury s’agissant de la détermination des faits à la base de la peine retenue.

Comme R. dans l’affaire jugée en Arizona, H., dans la présente affaire jugée en Floride, pouvait être condamné – comme peine la plus sévère et sans établissement des faits par le Juge - à la réclusion à vie sans possibilité de libération anticipée. Et comme dans l’affaire R., un Juge a aggravé la peine de H. sur la base de sa propre détermination des faits de la cause. Par conséquent, à la lumière de la jurisprudence R., la Cour juge en l’espèce que la peine prononcée contre H. viole le Sixième Amendement.

Le Sixième Amendement protège le droit du prévenu à un Jury impartial. Ce droit imposait à l’état de Floride de fonder le prononcé de la peine de mort sur la décision d’un Jury, et non sur des faits établis par le Juge. La procédure conduisant au prononcé de la peine capitale telle que prévue par l’état de Floride, qui impose au Juge seul de se prononcer sur l’existence d’une circonstance aggravante, est dès lors contraire à la Constitution fédérale.

Dans son opinion concurrente, le Juge Breyer observe que le danger d’imposer à tort la peine de mort ne peut être évité si elle est décidée par un seul représentant du Gouvernement. D’où la nécessité que la décision émane du jury.