Antitrust, cartels: In Hanover
Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. (1968) 392 U.S. 481 (Hanover Shoe), the United States Supreme Court held antitrust
violators ordinarily could not assert as a defense that any illegal overcharges
had been passed on by a plaintiff direct purchaser to indirect purchasers. Instead, the full measure of the overcharge
is recoverable by the direct purchaser.
In a related decision nine years later, the Supreme Court concluded only
direct purchasers, not indirect purchasers, could sue for price fixing. (Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois (1977) 431 U.S. 720 (Illinois Brick).)
Under state antitrust law, only the first question—who may sue—is
settled. In 1978, in direct response to Illinois Brick, the Legislature amended
the state’s Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16700 et seq.) to
provide that unlike federal law, state law permits indirect purchasers as well
as direct purchasers to sue (§ 16750, subd. (a)). This left open the further question how
damages should be allocated. Does the
Cartwright Act permit a pass-on defense, or in this respect are state and
federal law the same?
We conclude that under the Cartwright Act, as under federal law,
generally no pass-on defense is permitted; Hanover
Shoe’s view of how properly to measure damages was not novel; as Justice
White pointed out, a long line of Holmes and Brandeis opinions had adopted the
same understanding. (See Hanover Shoe, supra, 392 U.S. at pp. 489-490.); “Parens patriae,” literally
“parent of the country,” refers traditionally to [the] role of [the] state as
sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability [¶] . . . [¶] State attorney generals [sic] have parens patriae authority to bring actions on behalf of state
residents for anti-trust offenses and to recover on their behalf.’ ” (Pacific
Gas & Electric Co. v. County of Stanislaus (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1143, 1148,
fn. 6.); in some instances those same damages might already have been
recovered by direct purchasers under the Hanover
Shoe rule prohibiting a pass-on defense (see Hanover Shoe, supra, 392
U.S. at p. 494). The problem of
potential double recovery under Hanover
Shoe was solved by a Senate amendment excluding from parens patriae damage awards any amount that “duplicates amounts
which have been awarded for the same injury.”
(15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1); see Sen.Rep. No. 94-803, 2d Sess.,
p. 44 (1976).); the Legislature moved quickly to incorporate the remedial
framework of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act into the Cartwright Act, enacting a
statute that precisely tracked the federal act and authorized the Attorney
General to sue for Cartwright Act violations on behalf of consumers.
(§ 16760, added by Stats. 1977, ch. 543, § 1, p. 1747.); nowhere
in this or any other committee report did the Legislature suggest
reconciliation could or should instead occur by repudiating Hanover Shoe under the Cartwright
Act. Rather, the existence of the Hanover Shoe rule was taken as a given;
the relevant debate was whether indirect purchaser suits could be accommodated
in a world where Hanover Shoe was the
law. The Legislature, like the Illinois
Brick dissent, apparently preferred procedural devices to a blanket ban on
indirect purchaser suits and passed Assembly Bill No. 3222 to clarify that that
preference was part of existing Cartwright Act law. (See Assem. Com. on
Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3222 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) as introduced
Mar. 27, 1978, p. 2 [measure is “declarative of existing law”].) As with the passage of Assembly Bill No. 1162
(1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) the previous year, the Legislature’s adoption of this
amendment indicates acceptance of Hanover
Shoe, supra, 392 U.S. 481; while
a pass-on defense is generally precluded, a few instances remain in which it
will still be available. First, Hanover
Shoe recognized an exception for “cost-plus” contracts (Hanover Shoe, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 494) and, given the Legislature’s
endorsement of Hanover Shoe, that
exception would apply to the Cartwright Act as well; cases may arise where
application of the Hanover Shoe rule
raises the prospect of duplicative recovery.
In instances where multiple levels of purchasers have sued, or where a
risk remains they may sue, trial courts and parties have at their disposal and
may employ joinder, interpleader, consolidation, and like procedural devices to
bring all claimants before the court. In such cases, if damages must be
allocated among the various levels of injured purchasers, the bar on
consideration of pass-on evidence must necessarily be lifted; defendants may
assert a pass-on defense as needed to avoid duplication in the recovery of
damages (Cal. S. Ct., 12.07.10, Clayworth v. Pfizer, S166435).
Antitrust : cartels :
comparaison entre le droit fédéral et le droit californien : droit d'action des
consommateurs : dans la jurisprudence Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe, la Cour
Suprême fédérale a jugé que l’auteur d’une violation du droit contre les trusts
ne pouvait ordinairement pas, à titre de moyen de défense, se prévaloir du fait
que le surcoût illégal avait été transmis de l’acheteur direct à l’acheteur
indirect. En outre, la pleine mesure du surcoût peut être récupérée par
l’acheteur direct. Dans une décision relative au même sujet rendue neuf ans
plus tard, la Cour Suprême fédérale a jugé que seuls les acheteurs directs, et
non les acheteurs indirects, pouvaient agir en justice pour fixation de prix
illégale. En droit antitrust californien, le législateur a amendé le Cartwright
Act en ce sens que contrairement au droit fédéral, le droit californien
autorise à agir en justice les acheteurs indirects aussi bien que les acheteurs
directs. En outre, selon cet Act, comme selon le droit fédéral, l’auteur de
l’infraction ne peut soutenir valablement, à titre de moyen de défense, que
l’acheteur direct a transféré le surcoût à l’acheteur indirect. Le législateur
californien, pour éviter des indemnisations à double, a en effet préféré
l’usage d’institutions de procédure (jonctions de causes, etc.) plutôt que
d’interdire le droit d’action de l’acheteur indirect. Dans le cadre de
l'allocation du dommage aux différents lésés, les moyens de preuve qui
n'appartiendraient qu'à l'un des lésés à l'exclusion des autres seront pris en
considération, pour permettre une répartition équitable de l'indemnité entre
les différents lésés. L'Attorney general dispose d'un droit d'agir en faveur
des consommateurs.
