U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Radu v. Johnson Shon, Docket No. 22-16316

International Child Abduction

 

New Evidentiary Hearing

 

Ameliorative Measures

 

Pending Criminal Charges

 

Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Convention), Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670

 

 

 

 

Domestically, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) implements the Convention’s rules, creates the United States Central Authority, and gives our courts jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes under the Convention. 22 U.S.C. § 9001 et seq.

 

 

Gaudin v. Remis made the consideration of ameliorative measures mandatory. See 415 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Courts applying ICARA have consistently held that, before denying the return of a child because of a grave risk of harm, a court must consider alternative remedies that would allow both the return of the children to their home country and their protection from harm.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

 

 

(…) The district court then contacted the State Department, Office of Children’s Issues’ country officer for Germany, who contacted the German Central Authority for the court.

 

 

(…) Shon again appealed. We stayed the appeal pending the Supreme Court’s resolution of Golan and eventually remanded for reconsideration in light of Golan’s clarification that consideration of ameliorative measures is discretionary rather than mandatory. See 142 S. Ct. at 1892–93.

 

 

The present appeal arises from the third return order. Given the parties’ uncertainty about aspects of the ordered remedy, and unresolved logistical issues, we ordered a limited remand while retaining jurisdiction to avoid further delay. See Friery v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 448 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2006) (ordering “a limited remand to the district court”). We directed the district court to clarify (1) its current Article 13(b) grave-risk finding and ameliorative measure(s) ordered, (2) whether Radu must pay for airfare, (3) whether Radu must pay for separate living arrangements, (4) the custody arrangements (sole or joint) while Shon was temporarily residing in Germany, (5) the custody arrangements if Shon is no longer able to legally reside in Germany before a German court decides custody, (6) the need to notify German child protective services upon the children’s arrival, and (7) whether, if necessary, German child protective services have jurisdiction to oversee the children’s wellbeing.

 

 

(…) Any categorical rule requiring new hearings would contravene the Convention’s directive for expeditious resolution.

 

 

(…) Our sister circuits agree. In March v. Levine, the question presented was whether the district court improperly granted summary judgment to a father petitioning for his children’s return without allowing discovery or a hearing on the merits. See 249 F.3d 462, 468 (6th Cir. 2001). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Recognizing that Convention cases are unique, the court explained that “neither [the Convention nor ICARA] expressly requires a hearing or discovery”; instead they require “expeditious action.” Id. at 474. The court also found persuasive that “courts in other Contracting States to the treaty have also upheld summary proceedings on review.” Id. at 475 (discussing Australian court proceedings). The Tenth Circuit reached the same conclusion in West v. Dobrev, reasoning that Article 18’s permission to order return at any time provides trial courts “a substantial degree of discretion in determining the procedures necessary to resolve a petition filed pursuant to the Convention and ICARA.” 735 F.3d 921, 929 (10th Cir. 2013).

 

 

We now hold that, in cases governed by the Convention, the district court has discretion as to whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing following remand and must exercise that discretion consistent with the Convention. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold a third evidentiary hearing when the factual record was fully developed.

 

 

(…) “While a district court has no obligation under the Convention to consider ameliorative measures that have not been raised by the parties, it ordinarily should address ameliorative measures raised by the parties or obviously suggested by the circumstances of the case . . . .” Golan, 142 S. Ct. at 1893.

 

 

(…) The record supports the district court’s determination that the time frame in which a German court would determine custody would be a few months rather than years. The district court found that a merits decision would be made within months. Radu, 2023 WL 142908, at *2. Shon’s German law expert’s testimony supports this finding. He testified that a German court would likely require the children to live in Germany for up to six months before determining custody but that the court would also have discretion to make an earlier decision. And the district court cited a German statute providing that the determination of custody issues “shall have priority” and “shall be handled in an expedited manner.” That the waiting period is likely to be months instead of years is supported by the record.

 

 

(…) Third, based on the lack of any evidence or testimony about pending criminal charges in Germany, the court drew the supported inference that none existed.

 

 

 

 

 

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, March 13, 2023, Radu v. Johnson Shon, Docket No. 22-16316, for Publication)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, V.D. v. E.G., Docket No. 21-1289

Child Abduction

 

Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction

 

Mature Child Defense

 

 

 

 

Y. violated her joint custody agreement with X. by traveling from Switzerland to the United States with their then-12-year-old daughter, M.D., in July 2020. X. filed a petition seeking M.D.’s return to Switzerland, pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the Hague Convention), Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11, 670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89. After an evidentiary hearing on the merits, the district court denied the petition based on the mature child defense, finding that M.D. was of sufficient age and maturity such that the court should take account of her views and that she objected to returning to Switzerland. X. appeals.

 

 

X., a citizen of Ukraine, and Y., a citizen of Russia, married in December 2007 while living in California. They have one child together, M.D., who was born in June 2008 in California and is a United States citizen. In 2011, the family moved to Lausanne, Switzerland, where Y. had taken a job as a chemistry professor at a university, and became permanent Swiss residents. Y. and X. separated in 2015, and Y. filed for divorce in December 2017, after the mandatory two-year waiting period under Swiss law. Y. was temporarily awarded full custody of M.D. during the pendency of divorce proceedings, but the ultimate conciliation agreement, reached in April 2018, provided for shared custody of M.D., including alternating custody on a weekly basis and split vacations and holidays.

 

 

During M.D.’s school summer break in 2020, Y. and X. agreed that M.D. would spend July 3 to 24 with X. and July 24 to August 21 with Y. They also agreed that, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, neither would take M.D. on any trips requiring air travel, and they specifically agreed not to take M.D. to North America, where pandemic conditions were much worse than in Switzerland. Yet, on July 25, 2020, Y. traveled with M.D. to the United States. Unbeknownst to X. and M.D., Y. had accepted a permanent faculty position at the University of Missouri and had purchased a home in Columbia, Missouri. Y. did not tell M.D. about the trip until the day they left Switzerland, but Y. had purchased round-trip tickets in case M.D. did not want to stay in the United States. On July 28, 2020, X. learned Y. and M.D. had traveled to the United States. Two days later, he petitioned a Swiss court to order their return to Switzerland, and on August 4, the court ordered Y. to return M.D. to Switzerland in time for her to start the school year. On August 13, 2020, Y. petitioned a Swiss court to transfer M.D.’s residence to the United States on the grounds that M.D. had decided she wanted to stay in Missouri. The Swiss court denied the petition and characterized Y. actions as an illegal abduction. The court found that Y. violated the custody arrangement and granted X. the sole right to determine M.D.’s residence. The ruling was upheld on appeal on September 11, 2020. X. also initiated criminal proceedings against Y. in Switzerland, and there is a warrant for Y.’s arrest if she returns to Switzerland or any other country in the Schengen Area.

 

 

1 X. represented to the district court that if the court granted his petition and M.D. returned to Switzerland, he would drop the criminal charges against Y. so that she could visit M.D.

 

 

Despite the Swiss court’s ruling, Y. and M.D. remained in Columbia, Missouri, with M.D.’s half-sister and Y.’s partner, and M.D. started attending middle school in Missouri when the 2020–21 school year began.

 

 

On October 23, 2020, X. filed a petition with the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri seeking return of M.D. to Switzerland pursuant to the Hague Convention, implemented through the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001–11. X. alleged that M.D.’s country of habitual residence is Switzerland and that Y.’s actions constitute an unlawful retention. He asked that the court order M.D. be returned to Switzerland. In response, Y. asserted two affirmative defenses—that there is a grave risk that M.D. would be exposed to physical or psychological harm or otherwise be in an intolerable situation if she returned to Switzerland (the grave risk of harm defense), and that M.D. objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity such that the court should take account of her views (the mature child defense). On December 2, 2020, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition and heard testimony from X.; one of X.’s friends who spent time with X. and M.D. in Switzerland; Y.; and Y.’s Swiss custody lawyer. Y. also called M.D. as a witness, 2 and the court interviewed M.D. with only her parents’ attorneys present.

 

 

2 X. had filed a motion in limine to exclude or limit M.D.’s testimony the day before the bench trial. The district court did not rule on the motion prior to the hearing but afterward denied the motion as moot.

 

 

Two days after the evidentiary hearing, the district court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 706,3 appointed psychologist Dr. James Straub to “provide information about the maturity and independence of M.D.” because the court was concerned that M.D. may have been unduly influenced by her mother when she was removed from Switzerland. X. objected to Dr. Straub’s appointment. Notwithstanding that objection, Dr. Straub examined M.D. and submitted a written report to the court on December 14, 2020. Dr. Straub concluded that M.D.’s responses to his questions were based on her own thoughts and not from coaching. He opined, “M.D. expressed well thought out responses about her future and choices about where to live with a maturity beyond what is typical for her age,” and M.D. shows the intelligence and maturity to process and understand information about her situation and make decisions about where to live.” After receiving the report, the district court again interviewed M.D. in camera, this time outside the presence of counsel. On January 7, 2021, the district court denied X.’s petition, relying on the mature child defense. The district court found that M.D. was “sufficiently mature and independent such that the court could account for her views” and that M.D. had “stated an objection to returning to Switzerland,” with reasons similar to those “an adult might consider when deciding where to live, i.e., family responsibilities, comfort, and opportunities to pursue goals that are meaningful and inspiring to them.” The district court noted M.D. “was reluctant to use the word objection because she did not want to make her father sad,” but nonetheless concluded that “there is no doubt based on her words and expressions that she does not want to return to Switzerland.” The court further explained it was “confident M.D.’s decision was made independently of either parent’s influence.” On February 5, 2021, X. appealed.

 

 

 

The Hague Convention “entitles a person whose child has wrongfully been removed to or retained in the United States to secure the prompt return of the child to the child’s country of habitual residence, unless the respondent can establish that an affirmative defense applies.” Custodio v. Samillan, 842 F.3d 1084, 1087 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Rydder v. Rydder, 49 F.3d 369, 372 (8th Cir. 1995)); see also 22 U.S.C. § 9001(a). The primary purpose of the Hague Convention is “to restore the status quo ante and to deter parents from crossing international boundaries in search of a more sympathetic court.” Rydder, 49 F.3d at 372. “It is the Convention’s core premise that the interests of children in matters relating to their custody are best served when custody decisions are made in the child’s country of habitual residence.” Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 723 (2020) (cleaned up). To establish a prima facie case for a child’s return, a petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that “(1) immediately prior to removal or retention, the child habitually resided in another Contracting State; (2) the removal or retention was in breach of the petitioner’s custody rights under that State’s law; and (3) the petitioner was exercising those custody rights at the time of the removal or wrongful retention.” Custodio, 842 F.3d at 1088. If a petitioner establishes this prima facie case, the child must be “promptly returned unless one of the narrow exceptions set forth in the Convention applies.” Id. at 1089 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 9001(a)(4)). Here, there is no dispute that X. has established a prima facie case; the sole issue on appeal is whether the district court erred by applying one of the narrow exceptions—the mature child defense—to deny his petition.

 

 

The mature child defense comes from Article 13 of the Hague Convention, which provides that a judicial or administrative authority may “refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.” Hague Convention art. 13; see also Elisa Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report: Hague Convention on Private International Law ¶ 30 (1981), https://assets.hcch.net/upload/expl28.pdf (“The Convention also provides that the child’s views concerning the essential question of its return or retention may be conclusive . . . . The Convention gives children the possibility of interpreting their own interests.”). The drafters of the Hague Convention “deemed it inappropriate to return a mature child ‘against its will.’” Rodriguez v. Yanez, 817 F.3d 466, 476 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting see Pérez-Vera, supra ¶ 30). For the mature child defense to apply, the respondent must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the child has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of her views, and (2) the child objects to being returned. Custodio, 842 F.3d at 1089 (citing Hague Convention art. 13); see also 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(B). If a child is found to be mature, the reasons the child objects to being returned are immaterial. See Custodio, 842 F.3d at 1091 (adopting the rule from Rodriguez, 817 F.3d at 475–76, that the mature child defense may apply “whatever the reason for the child ’s objection”). We construe the mature child defense narrowly. Id., 842 F.3d at 1089. A stricter standard also applies when a child’s views are the sole reason for denying repatriation. See Tsai-Yi Yang v. Fu-Chiang Tsui, 499 F.3d 259, 278 (3d Cir. 2007). On appeal, X. does not contest the district court’s finding that M.D. had attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of her views. Rather, X. argues that the district court erred at the second step by accepting M.D.’s preference for staying in Missouri, rather than requiring an objection to returning to Switzerland. Indeed, “a preference is not an objection,” and there is a “substantive difference between preferring to live in one of two countries . . . and affirmatively objecting to returning to one country.” Rodriguez, 817 F.3d at 476–77. Under the Hague Convention, a child’s preference or “generalized desire” to remain in the United States is insufficient to invoke the narrow mature child exception. See Tsai-Yi Yang, 499 F.3d at 279. Instead, the child’s testimony must include “particularized objections” to returning to the former country of residence. Id. The district court recognized the important distinction between a preference and an objection, citing a dictionary definition for objection, “a reason, ground, or cause for expressing opposition,” and noting that an objection “connotes more than a preference for the alternative.”

 

 

M.D. testified that she “would love to live in Missouri because she has a lot of things here, and it would be really great for her dad to come to Missouri for vacation.” When asked about returning to Switzerland, however, she said that she thought she would be “okay,” and that she was not afraid to go back there. But she added that she would be “unhappy” if she had to move to Switzerland, and she gave several reasons: she would not be able to attend the same school as her close friend who lived in a different Swiss town; she could not bring her dog with her; she would miss her mother, her half-sister, and her friends in Missouri; and it was more difficult to ride horses in Switzerland. In an effort to determine whether M.D. truly “objected” to returning to Switzerland, the district court asked her if she knew the meaning of the words “objection” and “preference.” M.D., speaking in a second language, said she did not understand “object.” The court tried to explain the difference between the two words by offering M.D. some examples: “I object to cleaning the bathroom.” “I object to my little sister yelling in my ears.” “Do you object to getting up early in the morning to go to school?” The court continued by saying that “an objection is something you don’t want. You’re displeased. One is stronger than the other.” When the court then asked M.D. whether she “objected” to returning to Switzerland or whether she simply “preferred” one location over the other, M.D. was equivocal.

 

 

Her most complete answer was: “I would say it’s, like, middle, but, yeah. Maybe I object — I don’t know.  . . . I mean, I — I’m kind of in the middle, but I think I — I’m more on the object — object side. I don’t know. Objection. Yeah.” The court asked M.D. why she hesitated in her answer, and M.D. responded, “I don’t know. It’s, like, hard . . . .”

 

 

We recognize the challenges that come with deciphering the difference between an objection and a preference in a child’s testimony. If given two choices, country A and country B, an objection to living in A will almost always (although not invariably) indicate a preference for living in B. But a preference to live in B does not necessarily indicate an objection to living in A. In this case, M.D.’s testimony fails to show by a preponderance of the evidence that she “objected” to returning to Switzerland. Rather, when asked why she would be “unhappy,” or “dissatisfied” if she had to go back to Switzerland, M.D. consistently responded with reasons why she preferred to stay in Missouri. As to the district court’s discussion of M.D.’s above-average intelligence, strong personality, and well-developed sense of responsibility for her younger sibling and the feelings of others, such findings are relevant to whether the child has reached the age and maturity at which it is appropriate to consider her views on repatriation. But these observations do not speak to whether M.D. has in fact lodged an objection to being returned to Switzerland. Here, M.D.’s desire to remain in the United States was not coupled with a particularized objection to returning to Switzerland. As a result, it is insufficient to meet the strict standard that applies when the mature child defense is the sole grounds for denying an abducted child’s return. See Tsai-Yi Yang, 499 F.3d at 278. We agree with the district court that M.D. is an “innocent party” in this acrimonious dispute. But because M.D. did not express a particularized objection to returning to Switzerland, instead describing a preference—for a variety of understandable reasons—to remain in the United States, the district court’s finding that M.D.’s statements constituted an objection within the meaning of the mature child defense was clearly erroneous. Custodio, 842 F.3d at 1089 (whether a mature child has objected to the return to her country of habitual residence is reviewed for clear error).

 

 

For the above-stated reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case with directions to grant the petition for the return of M.D. under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

 

 

Secondary Sources: Elisa Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report: Hague Convention on Private International Law ¶ 30 (1981), https://assets.hcch.net/upload/expl28.pdf

 

 

 

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Dec. 6, 2022, V.D. v. E.G., Docket No. 21-1289)

U.S. Supreme Court, Monasky v. Taglieri, Docket No. 18-935, J. Ginsburg

International Child Ab­duction

Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Ab­duction

Habitual Residence

Swift Resolution (Six-Week Target Time for Resolving a Return-Order Petition)

The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Hague Convention or Convention), implemented in the United States by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. §9001 et seq., provides that a child wrongfully removed from her country of “habitual residence” ordinarily must be returned to that country.

(Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, Con­vention of 25 Oct. 1980 on the Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Ab­duction, Status Table, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/ conventions/status-table/?cid=24.)

The Convention’s return requirement is a “provisional” remedy that fixes the forum for custody proceedings. Sil­berman, Interpreting the Hague Abduction Convention: In Search of a Global Jurisprudence, 38 U. C. D. L. Rev. 1049, 1054 (2005). Upon the child’s return, the custody adjudication will proceed in that forum. To avoid delaying the custody proceeding, the Convention instructs contract­ing states to “use the most expeditious procedures avail­able” to return the child to her habitual residence. Art. 2, Treaty Doc., at 7. See also Art. 11, id., at 9 (prescribing six weeks as normal time for return-order decisions).

T. petitioned the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio for A. M. T.’s return to Italy under the Convention, pursuant to 22 U. S. C. §9003(b), on the ground that the child had been wrongfully removed from her country of “habitual residence.”

A child’s habitual residence depends on the totality of the circum­stances specific to the case, not on categorical requirements such as an actual agreement between the parents.

(…) A child habitu­ally resides where she is at home.

This fact-driven inquiry must be “sensitive to the unique circumstances of the case and informed by common sense.” Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F. 3d 729, 744. Acclima­tion of older children and the intentions and circumstances of caregiv­ing parents are relevant considerations, but no single fact is dispositive across all cases. The treaty’s “negotiation and drafting history” cor­roborates that habitual residence depends on the specific circum­stances of the particular case. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U. S. 491, 507. This interpretation also aligns with habitual-residence determinations made by other nations party to the Convention.

(…) Domestic violence should be an issue fully explored in the custody adjudication upon the child’s return. The Convention also has a mechanism for guarding children from the harms of domestic violence: Article 13(b) allows a court to refrain from ordering a child’s return to her habitual residence if “there is a grave risk that [the child’s] return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.”

(…) A remand would consume time when swift resolution is the Convention’s objective. The instant return-order pro­ceedings began a few months after A. M. T.’s birth. She is now five years old. The more than four-and-a-half-year du­ration of this litigation dwarfs the six-week target time for resolving a return-order petition. See Art. 11, Treaty Doc., at 9. T. represents that custody of A. M. T. has so far been resolved only “on an interim basis,” Brief for Respond­ent 56, n. 13, and that custody proceedings, including the matter of M.’s parental rights, remain pending in It­aly. Tr. of Oral Arg. 60–61. Given the exhaustive record before the District Court, the absence of any reason to an­ticipate that the District Court’s judgment would change on a remand that neither party seeks, and the protraction of proceedings thus far, final judgment on A. M. T.’s return is in order.

(U.S. Supreme Court, February 25, 2020, Revised February 26, 2020, Monasky v. Taglieri, Docket No. 18-935, J. Ginsburg)

Chafin v. Chafin

Mootness: the return of a child to a foreign country pursuant to a Conven­tion return order does not render an appeal of that order moot; the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Ab­duction; the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) implements the Convention in the United States; the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot, on the ground that once a child has been returned to a foreign coun­try, a U. S. court becomes powerless to grant relief; Article III restricts the power of federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies,” and this “requirement subsists through all stages of the proceedings,” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U. S. 472, 477. No case or controversy exists, and a suit becomes moot, “when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome,” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U. S. ___, ___. But a case “becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party,” Knox v. Service Employees, 567 U. S. ___, ___. As “long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot,” ibid. 

Because the Chafins continue to vigorously contest the question of where their daughter will be raised, this dispute is very much alive. This case does not address “a hypothetical state of facts,” Lew­is, supra, at 477, and there continues to exist between the parties “that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of is­sues,” Camreta v. Greene, 563 U. S. ___, __; as to the effectiveness of any relief, even if Scotland were to ignore a re-return order, this case would not be moot. The U. S. courts continue to have personal jurisdiction over Ms. Chafin and may command her to take action under threat of sanctions. She could decide to comply with an order against her and return E. C. to the United States. Enforcement of the order may be uncertain if Ms. Chafin chooses to defy it, but such uncertainty does not typically render cases moot (U.S. S. Ct., 19.02.2013, Chafin v. Chafin, C.J. Roberts, unanimous).

Instance : absence d’instance (le cas d’espèce est éteint) : le retour d’un enfant dans un état étranger selon un ordre de retour rendu conformément à la Convention de la Haye sur les aspects civils de l’enlèvement international d’enfants n’a pas pour effet de périmer l’instance et d’empêcher un recours. Il ne faut pas confondre extinction d’instance et rejet sur le fond. L’article III de la Constitution fédérale restreint le pouvoir de cognition des cours fédérales aux causes qui présentent un litige actuel, aux causes pouvant faire l’objet d’un jugement effectif. Tel est le cas s’agissant d’une querelle entre parents portant sur le lieu de résidence et d’éducation de l’enfant commun, même si l’enfant n’est plus sur sol U.S. suite à une décision de justice, qui peut ainsi faire l’objet d’un recours. Du fait que les parents continuent de se disputer vigoureusement sur la question de savoir dans quel pays leur fille doit être élevée, l’existence d’une contestation vivante ne peut être niée. Cette affaire ne demande pas de juger un état de fait hypothétique. S’agissant de l’effectivité du jugement, même si le pays tiers devait ignorer un jugement ordonnant le retour de l’enfant, ce cas ne serait pas périmé. La juridiction personnelle continue d’être donnée aux Tribunaux U.S. qui peuvent ordonner un comportement déterminé à la partie à l’étranger sous peine de sanctions. La mère de l’enfant peut aussi décider de se conformer au jugement U.S. et retourner l’enfant dans ce pays. L’exécution forcée d’un jugement qui serait rendu contre la mère de l’enfant est incertaine quant à son résultat, mais cette incertitude ne périme pas l’instance.