Antitrust: evidence: discovery: work product doctrine:
opinion product doctrine: attorney-client privilege:
The FTC issued an administrative subpoena seeking
various documents. Boehringer withheld hundreds of responsive documents under
the work product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege. After the FTC
objected, the District Court reviewed in camera a sample of the
contested documents, and found that almost all were properly withheld under the
work product doctrine or the attorney-client privilege. On appeal, the FTC
challenges the District Court’s application of the work product doctrine.
The FTC argues that the District Court committed legal
error by applying an overly expansive definition of “opinion” work product,
which is highly protected, as opposed to “fact” work product, which is
substantially less so. Because we agree that the District Court misapprehended
the proper distinction between fact and opinion work product, we reverse and
remand on this issue.
Boehringer manufactures Aggrenox and Mirapex, two
patented pharmaceutical drugs that earn hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S.
sales each year. In 2005, Barr sought and received FDA approval to market
generic versions of these drugs, which led Boehringer to sue Barr for patent
infringement. See Boehringer Ingelheim Int’l GmbH v. Barr Labs. Inc.,
Civ. Action No. 05-700-JJF (D. Del. filed Sept. 26, 2005). Barr, in turn,
contended that Boehringer’s patents were invalid. While the Delaware litigation
was pending, Boehringer and Barr entered into settlement negotiations.
Boehringer’s senior vice president and general counsel, Marla Persky, served as
its lead negotiator during these discussions. FTC Investig. Hr’g Tr. at 70-71, J.A.
755-56. To this end, Persky and her staff engaged in both legal and business
activities, including evaluating possible litigation outcomes, considering
potential antitrust concerns, and evaluating and negotiating the business terms
of the settlement. Id. at 113-16, 118, 120-23, J.A. 772-80.
On August 11, 2008, the two companies settled their
dispute on the following terms: Barr would refrain from marketing its generic
versions of Aggrenox and Mirapex in the immediate future, but Boehringer would
permit Barr to enter the market several months ahead of the expiration of
Boehringer’s patents. Boehringer, 286 F.R.D at 105; see also Aggrenox
Settlement Agreement, J.A. 871-83; Press Release, J.A. 886-88. In the meantime,
under a related co-promotion agreement, Barr would help Boehringer promote
Aggrenox to medical professionals in exchange for certain specified fees and
royalties on Aggrenox sales. Boehringer, 286 F.R.D at 105; see also Co-Promotion
Agreement, J.A. 889-930.
While this type of settlement deal is not necessarily
unlawful, see FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237-38 (2013),
such a settlement may be subject to antitrust scrutiny if it appears that the
patent-holding firm – here, Boehringer – was using the co-promotion agreement
as a vehicle to avoid legitimate competition. Id. at 2236-37. And,
indeed, the specific terms of this settlement raised the suspicions of the FTC
that Boehringer was simply paying Barr off in order to delay the entry of
generics into the market. Boehringer, 286 F.R.D at 105. The FTC
initiated an investigation and served Boehringer with a subpoena duces tecum.
Id. After Boehringer failed to meet a deadline for production, the FTC
filed a petition in district court for an order enforcing the subpoena. Id.
Appellant’s Br. 12-16: limiting challenge on appeal to
financial documents analyzing litigation settlement and co-promotion agreement.
By agreement of the parties, Boehringer submitted a
sample set of documents in camera to the District Court. Boehringer,
286 F.R.D at 106. After reviewing the documents, the District Court issued a
decision largely upholding Boehringer’s work product claims. (see FED.
R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) (protecting from disclosure materials “prepared in
anticipation of litigation”)).
We review a district court’s decision to enforce an
administrative subpoena for abuse of discretion. See U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n
v. ASAT, Inc., 411 F.3d 245, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). A district court
necessarily abuses its discretion if it applies the incorrect legal standard, a
question that is reviewed de novo. See Conservation Force v. Salazar,
699 F.3d 538, 542 (D.C. Cir. 2012); FTC v. Church & Dwight Co., 665
F.3d 1312, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2011). A district court’s factual findings are
reviewed for clear error. Boca Investerings P’ship v. United States, 314
F.3d 625, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2003). A finding is clearly erroneous, even where
there is record evidence to support it, if “the reviewing court on the entire
record is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 6-7 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
The Supreme Court first articulated the federal work
product doctrine in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), where it was
asked to define the reach of the pre-trial deposition and discovery mechanisms
established by the then-new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These rules,
which required each party “to disgorge whatever [relevant, non-privileged]
facts he has in his possession,” dramatically expanded the scope of pre-trial
discovery. Id. at 507. Under a literal reading of the Rules, a party
would be entitled to discover any non-privileged trial preparation materials,
such as attorney notes from witness interviews, created by his opponent in that
litigation. See id. at 506.
The Supreme Court rejected this literal reading,
holding that compelled disclosure of attorney work product would “contravene
the public policy underlying the orderly prosecution and defense of legal
claims.” Id. at 510. The Court explained that in performing one’s duties
as a lawyer (…) it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of
privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.
Proper preparation of a client’s case demands that he assemble information,
sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare
his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless
interference. Id. at 510-11. Readily compelling the disclosure of such
work product to opposing counsel would lead to “inefficiency, unfairness and
sharp practices.” Id. at 511. Hickman clarified that discovery of
an attorney’s work materials was permitted only in limited circumstances. Id.
A party seeking such materials must establish “adequate reasons to justify
production through subpoena or court order,” and even then, discovery is
limited to “relevant and non-privileged facts.” Id. at 511-12.
Hickman was later codified in
substantial part in Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules. Rule 26 provides that a
party generally may not discover “documents and tangible things that are
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or
its representative.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A). Such discovery is
permissible, however, if “the party shows that it has substantial need for the
materials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their
substantial equivalent by other means,” so long as counsel’s “impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories” are not disclosed. FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(3)(A)-(B); see FED. R. CIV. P. 81(a)(5) (providing that the
Federal Rules apply to proceedings to enforce an administrative subpoena).
The work product protection is broader than the
attorney-client privilege in that it is not restricted solely to confidential
communications between an attorney and client. In re Sealed Case, 676
F.2d 793, 808-09 (D.C. Cir. 1982). It is narrower, however, insofar as the
doctrine protects only work performed in anticipation of litigation or for
trial. See Senate of Puerto Rico v. Dep’t of Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 586
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (“The work product doctrine does not extend to every written
document generated by an attorney . . . rather, work product covers only
documents prepared in contemplation of litigation”). A document prepared as
work product for one lawsuit will retain its protected status even in
subsequent, unrelated litigation. See FTC v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19,
27-28 (1983); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 333-35 (8th Cir. 1977)
(holding that materials prepared for patent settlement retained work product
protection in subsequent antitrust litigation).
The FTC does not challenge the District Court’s ruling
that documents created by Boehringer for the purpose of settling the patent
infringement litigation are protected work product. It takes issue, however,
with the District Court’s finding that the materials relating to the
co-promotion agreement fall within the category of protected settlement
documents.
We find no merit in the proposition that any
settlement term that has some independent economic value to both parties must
always be treated as an ordinary (non-litigation) business transaction for
purposes of work product protection. Common sense and practical experience
teach that settlement deals routinely include arrangements that could be
isolated from the overall agreement and stand on their own but were nonetheless
crafted for the purpose of settling litigation. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s
refusal in Actavis to hold reverse payment settlement agreements
presumptively unlawful anticipates that a reverse payment could “represent
payment” for “other services” aside from a party’s agreement to end litigation
yet still be part of the settlement. 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
Upon our review of the record, we find no clear error
in the District Court’s factual finding that the co-promotion agreement was
“integral” to the broader settlement. Boehringer, 286 F.R.D. at 109.
Accordingly, the District Court did not err in drawing the legal conclusion
that the co-promotion agreement materials were prepared “in anticipation of”
the patent litigation and were therefore entitled to work product protection.
Because we find that the documents are protected, we
do not reach Boehringer’s alternative argument that the co-promotion agreement
materials are protected because counsel used them to evaluate potential
antitrust liability.
When a factual document selected or requested by
counsel exposes the attorney’s thought processes and theories, it may be
appropriate to treat the document as opinion work product, even though the
document on its face contains only facts. See Dir., Office of Thrift
Supervision v. Vinson & Elkins, LLP, 124 F.3d 1304, 1308 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (“At some point . . . a lawyer’s factual selection reflects his focus; in
deciding what to include and what to omit, the lawyer reveals his view of the
case.”). At the same time, however, “not every item which may reveal some
inkling of a lawyer’s mental impressions . . . is protected as opinion work
product.” In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 859 F.2d 1007,
1015 (1st Cir. 1988). Opinion work product protection is warranted only if the
selection or request reflects the attorney’s focus in a meaningful way. See
Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision, 124 F.3d at 1308; In re San Juan
Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 859 F.2d at 1015 (heightened protection is
triggered only if “disclosure creates a real, nonspeculative danger of
revealing the lawyer’s thoughts”). And where a document contains both opinion
and fact work product, the court must examine whether the factual matter may be
disclosed without revealing the attorney’s opinions.
In Sealed Case (1997), for example, we held
that attorney notes of preliminary interviews with a witness were not
necessarily opinion work product, as the mere fact that an attorney had chosen
to write a fact down was not sufficient to convert that fact into opinion work
product. 124 F.3d at 236-37. Rather, there must be some indication that the
lawyer “sharply focused or weeded the materials.” Id. at 236.
Where an attorney’s mental impressions are those that
“a layman would have as well as a lawyer in these particular circumstances, and
in no way reveal anything worthy of the description ‘legal theory,’” those
impressions are not opinion work product. In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec.
Litig., 250 F.R.D. 8, 11 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting In re John Doe Corp.,
675 F.2d 482, 493 (2d Cir. 1982)).
A party’s ability to discover work product often turns
on whether the withheld materials are fact work product or opinion work
product. A party generally must make an “extraordinary showing of necessity” to
obtain opinion work product. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 811; see
also Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision, 124 F.3d at 1307 (observing that
opinion work product is “virtually undiscoverable”). By contrast, “to the
extent that work product contains relevant, nonprivileged facts,” the
work product doctrine “merely shifts the standard presumption in favor of
discovery and requires the party seeking discovery to show ‘adequate reasons’
why the work product should be subject to discovery.” In re Sealed Case,
676 F.2d at 809 (quoting Hickman, 329 U.S. at 512). This “adequate
reasons” test corresponds to Rule 26(b)(3)’s requirement, adopted in 1970, that
a party seeking fact work product demonstrate that “it has substantial need for
the materials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain
their substantial equivalent by other means.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii); see
In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 809 n.59.
The meaning of Rule 26(b)(3)’s
“substantial need” requirement is not clear from the plain language of the rule.
Cf. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 563-64 (1988) (discussing the
ambiguity implicit in the term “substantial” while interpreting 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(1)(A)); see also A.I.A. Holdings, S.A. v. Lehman Bros., Civ.
Action No. 97-4978, 2000 WL 1639417, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2000) (noting that
“the law is not well developed as to what constitutes ‘substantial need’”);
Special Project, The Work Product Doctrine,
68 CORNELL L. REV. 760, 802 (1983) (“The substantial need requirement is the
least uniformly applied by the courts.”). Helpfully, the Advisory Committee’s
notes on the amendments “provide a reliable source of insight into the meaning
of a rule, especially when, as here, the rule was enacted precisely as the
Advisory Committee proposed.” United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 64 n.6
(2002) (interpreting FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(h)).
The “substantial need” and “undue hardship”
requirements were added to Rule 26(b)(3) in an attempt to clarify and codify
the tests developed by the Supreme Court in Hickman and by the lower
courts construing former Rule 34’s “good cause” provision. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 1970 Amendments (hereinafter
Advisory Committee’s Notes), reproduced at 48 F.R.D. 487, 500-01; see
also In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 810 n. 59; WRIGHT ET AL., supra,
§ 2023, at 489 (characterizing Rule 26(b)(3) as “a largely accurate
codification of the doctrine announced in the Hickman case and developed
in later cases in the lower courts”). The Committee explained that the
amendments were intended to require an inquiry into “the importance of and need
for” the fact work product at issue, as well as “alternative sources for
securing the same information.” Advisory Committee’s Notes, 48 F.R.D. at 500.
The Committee did not further define the “substantial need” and “undue
hardship” concepts.
The Committee did provide guidance, however, by
pointing to four cases that had demanded a “special showing” to obtain trial
preparation materials; it explained that the new “substantial need” and “undue
hardship” requirements reflected the holdings of those cases. Id.
(citing Guilford Nat’l Bank v. Southern Ry., 297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir.
1962); Mitchell v. Bass, 252 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1958); Hauger v.
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 216 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1954); Burke v.
United States, 32 F.R.D. 213 (E.D.N.Y. 1963)). The Committee also approved
of a list of circumstances under which witness statements could be
discoverable, as recited in a fifth case, Southern Ry. v. Lanham,
403 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1968). Advisory Committee’s Notes, 48 F.R.D. at 501.
(The 1970 amendments abolished the distinction between
factual materials prepared by counsel and those prepared by non-attorneys. FED.
R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A); see Nobles, 422 U.S. at 254 n.16).
These cases indicate that a moving party’s burden is
generally met if it demonstrates that the materials are relevant to the case,
the materials have a unique value apart from those already in the movant’s
possession, and “special circumstances” excuse the movant’s failure to obtain
the requested materials itself. See Mitchell, 252 F.2d at 518-19
(permitting discovery of opponent’s witness statements where witnesses refused
to speak with movant); Burke, 32 F.R.D. at 215 (permitting discovery of
accident report materials where information contained therein was otherwise
unavailable); cf. Hauger, 216 F.2d at 505-06 (finding no “special
circumstances” warranting disclosure of witness statements where plaintiff had
deposed those same witnesses, and plaintiff’s purported need for materials for
purposes of impeachment was speculative); Guilford, 297 F.2d at 923-27
(finding no “special circumstances” where plaintiff possessed substantially
similar materials and impeachment value was speculative). A list of special
circumstances was provided in Lanham, where the Fifth Circuit observed
that a contemporaneous witness statement typically would be discoverable if the
witness was unavailable, reluctant, or hostile, or if the witness had a lapse
of memory or deviated from prior statements. 403 F.2d at 128-31.
Although each of these cases mentioned the relevance
of the requested documents, none articulated a requirement that the documents
be essential to the claim or probative of a critical element. The Advisory
Committee notably did not cite any of the then-existing decisions demanding a
heightened showing of relevance. Compare Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner
Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1967) (requiring party seeking fact work
product to demonstrate that the documents were “essential to the preparation of
[movant’s] case on a critical issue” in the litigation). Boehringer’s argument
that factual work product is discoverable only if it contains a “smoking gun”
therefore has no basis in the Committee notes or the cases cited therein.
Of course, this interest in liberal discovery must be
balanced against the key goal underlying the protection for fact work product:
that each side must undertake its own investigation of the relevant facts and
not simply freeload on opposing counsel. See Guilford, 297 F.2d at 926
(work product rule serves to prevent a less-than-diligent litigant from
“performing its functions either without wits or on wits borrowed from the
adversary”) (quoting Hickman, 329 U.S. at 516 (Jackson, J.,
concurring)); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., Inc.,
967 F.2d 980, 985 (4th Cir. 1992). But neither of these competing interests is
served when unique, relevant information is withheld from a party that never
had an opportunity to obtain the information on its own. The “substantial need”
inquiry requires a careful examination of whether non-disclosure will impair
the truth-seeking function of discovery. See Dir., Office of Thrift
Supervision, 124 F.3d at 1308 (finding no substantial need for fact work
product where movant already possessed similar materials). A moving party need
not show, however, that the requested documents are critical to, or dispositive
of, the issues to be litigated.
Books: CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE § 2024, at 502 (3d ed. 2010) ; JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.70[5][c], at 26-457 to 26-459 (3d ed. 2009).
(U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, Feb. 20,
2015, FTC v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 12-5393, Circuit
Judge Wilkins).
Preuves :
documents dont la production ne peut pas être exigée, car au bénéfice d’un
privilège, soit de confidentialité (« opinion product doctrine »),
soit de contenu (« work product doctrine ») :
Dans
ce cas de droit des cartels jugé par le 2è Circuit fédéral, la FTC avait
ordonné la production par B. d’un certain nombre de pièces. B. refusa la
production, invoquant les deux privilèges précités. Saisie, la cour de district
fédérale procéda hors la présence des parties à la révision de ces documents,
les jugeant après examen couverts par les privilèges. La FTC déposa un recours
devant la présente Cour d’appel.
La
confidentialité sous l’angle d’ »opinion product » est plus étendue
que sous l’angle «work product ».
En
l’espèce, un fabricant de médicaments a obtenu l’autorisation de commercialiser
sous forme générique deux médicaments encore vendus par le titulaire du brevet.
Le titulaire actionna en violation du brevet. L’entreprise générique argua de
la nullité du brevet. Pendant la procédure, des discussions transactionnelles
débutèrent, dirigées par la responsable du service juridique du côté de
l’entreprise titulaire du brevet.
La
négociation a abouti : l’entreprise générique s’est engagée à ne pas
commercialiser son produit dans un futur immédiat, et l’entreprise titulaire du
brevet autorisa son adverse partie à entrer dans le marché quelques mois avant
l’expiration du brevet. Par ailleurs, pendant cette période transitoire de
quelques mois, l’entreprise générique s’est engagée à aider l’entreprise titulaire
à faire la promotion du médicament, moyennant rémunération dépendante du succès
des ventes.
Ce
type d’arrangement n’est pas en soi illégal, mais selon la jurisprudence
Actavis (2013, Cour Suprême fédérale), sa conformité au droit fédéral des cartels
doit être évaluée s’il apparaît que l’entreprise titulaire du brevet utilise
l’accord de co- promotion comme moyen d’éviter une concurrence légitime. Et en
l’espèce, les termes de l’accord ont fait craindre à la FTC que l’entreprise
titulaire ne faisait rien d’autre que payer sa concurrente pour retarder
l’entrée des génériques sur le marché.
La
FTC initia une enquête et notifia à B, entreprise titulaire du brevet, une
ordonnance en production de documents. B n’a rien produit dans les délais, de
sorte que la FTC déposa une requête devant la cour de district fédérale,
sollicitant une ordonnance d’exécution.
En
l’espèce, ne reste litigieux que le sort de la production de documents
financiers qui analysent un accord en procédure ainsi qu’un accord de co-promotion.
D’entente
entre parties, B. soumit à la cour de district, statuant hors la présence des
parties, un exemplaires des documents précités. Après examen, la cour rendit
une décision reprenant largement la position de B., fondée sur l’argument du « work
product » (qui protège de la divulgation les éléments préparés en
prévision d’un litige).
La
présente Cour revoit sous l’angle de l’abus du pouvoir de discrétion une
décision d’une cour de district se prononçant sur la question de l’exécution
d’une requête administrative en production de documents. L’abus du pouvoir de
discrétion est donné si la cour de district a appliqué une théorie juridique
incorrecte, question revue avec un pouvoir d’examen complet. Les constatations
de la cour de district portant sur les faits sont revues sous l’angle de
l’erreur manifeste (« clear error »).
La
Cour Suprême fédérale caractérisa pour la première fois la doctrine de
« federal work product » dans sa décision Hickman (1947), dans le
cadre de la détermination de l’étendue des mécanismes de la procédure de
« discovery » et de dépositions avant procès tels que mis en place
par les nouvelles Règles fédérales de procédure civile. Ces Règles, qui
permettaient d’exiger de chaque partie la production de tous les éléments relevants,
en leur possession, qui n’étaient pas privilégiés, étendirent substantiellement
les possibilités de « discovery » avant procès (rendant par exemple
possible d’obtenir le dépôt au dossier des notes de l’avocat prises à
l’occasion de l’interrogatoire d’un témoin avant procès).
La
Cour Suprême fédérale rejeta toutefois une lecture aussi large des Règles,
jugeant que contraindre la production du travail de l’avocat, sans distinction,
serait contraire à la notion d’ordre public qui sous-tend l’instruction
ordonnée d’un procès civil et la défense dans ce procès. La Cour précisa que
dans l’accomplissement de ses tâches, il est essentiel que l’avocat puisse
travailler avec une certaine marge de confidentialité, libre d’intrusions sans
nécessité de l’adverse partie. Hickman précisa ainsi que la production, par la
procédure de « discovery », du produit du travail de l’avocat, ne
pouvait être permis que dans des circonstances limitées. Celui qui recherche la production comme moyen
de preuve du produit du travail de l’avocat doit établir des raisons adéquates,
et la production ne sera pas ordonnée pour ce qui est du travail qualifié de
privilégié.
La
jurisprudence Hickman a été ultérieurement codifiée dans la Règle 26(b)(3) des
Règles fédérales de procédure civile. Cette règle prévoit que de manière
générale une partie ne peut pas obtenir la production de documents ou de choses
préparées en anticipation d’une procédure. La production sera cependant
possible si la partie qui la requiert démontre qu’elle en a un besoin
substantiel pour préparer son dossier judiciaire et qu’elle ne peut pas, sans
une peine qui ne saurait être exigée d’elle, obtenir un équivalent substantiel
par d’autres moyens. Mais même dans cette situation, les impressions, les
conclusions, les avis et les théories juridiques d’un avocat seront toujours
retranchés de la production. Il est ici en outre rappelé que la Règle 81(a)(5)
prévoit l’application des Règles de procédure civile aux procédures d’exécution
d’une ordonnance administrative de production.
La
protection accordée au « work product » est plus large que la
protection accordée par l’ »attorney-client privilege », en ce
qu’elle n’est pas restreinte seulement aux communications confidentielles entre
un avocat et son client. Elle est cependant plus restreinte en ce qu’elle ne
protège que le travail entrepris en anticipation d’un procès ou entrepris pour le
procès lui-même. Un document préparé en tant que « work product »
pour une procédure conservera par la suite son statut protégé, même dans le
cadre d’une procédure ultérieure sans rapport avec la procédure antérieure.
Quand
un document dont la production est requise expose le processus de réflexion
d’un avocat et les théories juridiques qu’il envisage, il peut être approprié
de traiter ce document comme relevant de l’ »opinion work product »,
même si ce document ne contient que des faits. A un certain point, la sélection
des faits opérée par l’avocat reflète ses centres de réflexion. Mais la
protection de l’ »opinion work product » ne sera accordée que si le
document requis reflète de manière significative les points d’intérêts que
l’avocat a retenu dans sa réflexion.
La
jurisprudence de la présente Cour a précisé que les notes de l’avocat relatives
à des entretiens préliminaires avec un témoin ne relevaient pas nécessairement
de l’ »opinion work product ». Pour être ainsi protégées, les notes
doivent contenir une indication que l’avocat accorde une importance
particulière à ce qu’il a écrit.
Quand
les notes de l’avocat reflètent les réflexions qu’un profane lui-même aurait pu
mener dans des circonstances semblables, et que ces notes ne méritent pas la
qualification de théorie juridique, elles ne sauraient être protégées par la
notion d’ »opinion work product ».
De
manière générale, une partie doit procéder à une démonstration extraordinaire
de nécessité pour obtenir des pièces relevant de l’ »opinion work
product ». Une jurisprudence a même indiqué que l’ »opinion work
product » était pour ainsi dire hors d’atteinte en procédure de
« discovery ». Par contraste, dans la mesure où le « work
product » contient des faits relevants et non privilégiés, la doctrine du
« work product » renverse la présomption standard en faveur de la
production et exige de la partie qui la demande de démontrer des raisons
adéquates justifiant la production. Ce test des raisons adéquates correspond à
la Règle 26(b)(3), adoptée en 1970, exigeant d’une partie qui demande la
production de « fact work product » la démonstration d’un besoin
substantiel des pièces visées pour la préparation de la procédure, et la
démonstration que des moyens de preuves équivalents ne peuvent être obtenus par
ailleurs sans la mise en œuvre de procédés hors proportion.
Il
est à remarquer que la notion de » besoin substantiel » posée par la
Règle 26(b)(3) n’est pas claire à la lecture de son texte seul. Une
contribution doctrinale de 1983 relève que la condition de besoin substantiel
constitue la notion bénéficiant de la
considération la moins uniforme de la part des Tribunaux. Mais les remarques de
l’ »Advisory Committee » sur la Règle procurent un éclairage utile,
surtout considérant que la Règle a été édictée telle que proposé par ce Comité.
Selon
les notes de l’ »Advisory Committee », les exigences de « besoin
substantiel » et de « procédés hors proportion » ont été ajoutées
à la Règle 26(b)(3) comme un moyen de clarifier et de codifier les tests
développés par la Cour Suprême fédérale dans sa décision Hickman et par les
cours inférieures dans leurs interprétations de la notion de « bonnes
raisons » stipulées dans l’ancienne Règle 34. Le Comité a exposé que le
but de ces amendements était de provoquer une instruction portant sur
l’importance et le besoin des « fact work product »sollicités et
portant sur l’existence de moyens alternatifs permettant de se procurer ces
preuves. Cependant, le « Committee » n’a pas défini davantage les
concepts de « besoin substantiel » et de « procédés hors
proportion ».
Mais
le « Committee » a toutefois apporté quelques lumières sur ces concepts
en se référant à cinq décisions de justice qui avaient demandé une
démonstration spéciale pour obtenir des pièces établies en préparation de la
procédure. Il a précisé que les deux concepts précités étaient définis par ces
décisions.
Par
amendements de 1970 aux Règles, la distinction entre le produit du travail de
l’avocat et le produit du travail d’un assistant qui n’est pas avocat a été
abolie (cf. Règle fédérale de procédure civile 26(b)(3)(A)).
Les
cinq jurisprudences précitées indiquent que celui qui sollicite la production
des pièces obtiendra généralement gain de cause s’il démontre que ces pièces
sont relevantes pour son dossier, qu’elles ont une valeur unique que n’a pas
les pièces déjà en sa possession, et que des circonstances spéciales excusent
l’échec du requérant à les obtenir par lui-même. Par exemple, la production de
la déposition d’un témoin adverse a été ordonnée quand le témoin refusait de
déposer devant le requérant.
Chacune
de ces jurisprudences a mentionné la relevance comme l’un des critères
permettant la production. Aucune d’elles n’impose que la pièce sollicitées soient
essentielles à la prétention déduite en justice. Aucune d’elles n’impose une
valeur probante particulière de la pièce requise.
Bien
entendu, cette conception libérale de la pratique de la procédure de
« discovery » doit être balancée avec le but de la protection des
« fact work product » : chaque partie doit entreprendre ses
propres investigations portant sur les faits relevants, et ne peut simplement
se reposer sur le travail de l’adversaire. La condition de « besoin
substantiel » exige d’examiner attentivement si la non-production aurait
pour conséquence de porter atteinte à la fonction de recherche de la vérité,
fonction qui est celle de la procédure de « discovery ».
