California Court of Appeal, Bartel v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., Docket No. H052083

Insurance Law

 

Coverage

 

Genuine Dispute Doctrine

 

Third Party Duty to Defend

 

Bad Faith

 

California Law

 

 

 

(…)

 

(Chateau Chamberay, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 346; see Century Surety Co. v. Polisso (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 922, 949 [genuine dispute doctrine “holds that an insurer does not act in bad faith when it mistakenly withholds policy benefits, if the mistake is reasonable or is based on a legitimate dispute as to the insurer’s liability”].) Numerous state and federal decisions have recognized the genuine dispute doctrine is not compatible with the principles that govern third party duty to defend cases, in which the possibility of coverage triggers the duty. (See, e.g., Mt. Hawley, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p.1424; Howard, supra,187 Cal.App.4th at p. 530; Harbison v. American Motorists Ins. Co. (E.D. Cal. 2009) 636 F.Supp.2d 1030, 1040.)

 

 

 

(California Court of Appeal, Bartel v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., May 30, 2025, Docket No. H052083, Certified for Publication)

 

California Court of Appeal, 11640 Woodbridge Condominium Homeowners’ Association v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, B333848

First Party Property Insurance

 

“Named Perils” or “Specific Perils” Policies

 

“Specified-Risk” Coverage

 

“All-Risk” Policies

 

Marine Insurance

 

California Law

 

 

Sec. Sources: Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J.; Couch on Insurance; New Appleman on Insurance Law Library Edition (2023).

 

 

 

First party property insurance indemnifies property owners against loss to property. (Another Planet Entertainment, LLC v. Vigilant Ins. Co. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1106, 1122 (Another Planet), citing 10A Couch on Insurance (3d ed. 2005) § 148:1.) There are two general categories of first-party property insurance. “Named perils” or “specific perils” policies provide coverage only for the specific risks enumerated in the policy and exclude all other risks. (7 Couch on Insurance, supra, § 101:7.) “All-risk” policies provide coverage for all risks unless the specific risk is excluded.  (Ibid.; Another Planet, at p. 1122.) “‘Historically, property insurance grew out of the insurance against the risk of fire which became available for ships, buildings, and some commercial property at a time when most of the structures in use were made wholly or primarily of wood.’ (10A Couch on Insurance, supra, § 148:1.) ‘On this side of the Atlantic, fire insurance first developed in the middle of the eighteenth century. . . . This was insurance against only one cause of loss, or peril—fire. Over time other insured perils, such as wind and hail, were added. These insured perils were each specified in the insurance policy. For this reason, such insurance came to be known as “specified-risk” coverage. It insured property against the risk of damage or destruction resulting from specified causes of loss.’ (Abraham, Peril & Fortuity in Property & Liability Insurance (2001) 36 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J. 777, 782–783, fn. omitted.) By contrast, marine insurance developed ‘standardized forms that insured an ocean-going vessel and its cargo against “perils of the high seas.” Whereas the development of fire insurance for property on land focused on the danger presented by a specified cause of loss, marine insurance typically provided coverage for all risks associated with a particular shipment or voyage.’ (5 New Appleman on Insurance Law Library Edition (2023) § 41.01[1], fn. omitted.) ‘By the middle of the twentieth century, insurers adopted the marine insurance approach by offering all-risk commercial and homeowners’ property insurance. The operative phrase in such policies is contained in the section labeled “Perils Insured Against,” and provides coverage against the risk of “direct physical loss” to covered property.’ (Abraham, at p. 783, fn. omitted.)“ ‘As with any insurance, property insurance coverage is “triggered” by some threshold concept of injury to the insured property. Under narrow coverages like theft, the theft is itself the trigger. Under most coverages, however, the policy specifically ties the insurer’s liability to the covered peril having some specific effect on the property. In modern policies, especially of the all-risk type, this trigger is frequently “physical loss or damage” . . . .’ (10A Couch on Insurance, supra, § 148:46.)” (Another Planet, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 1122–1123.)

 

 

 

(California Court of Appeal, March 28, 2025, 11640 Woodbridge Condominium Homeowners’ Association v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, B333848, Certified for Publication)

 

Merger - Insurance Companies

Swiss Competition Commission Opinion (in German): Competition: Unfair Competition: Antitrust:

Assessment of Concentrations

Merger

Insurance Companies

Thresholds

Information the notification shall contain

Art. 10 Swiss Cartel Act: Assessment of concentrations

Concentrations that have to be notified shall be investigated by the Competition Commission if a preliminary assessment (Art. 32 para. 1) reveals that they create or strengthen a dominant position.

Art. 32 Swiss Cartel Act: Review of concentrations of undertakings: Opening an investigation:

On receiving a notification of a planned concentration of undertakings (Art. 9), the Competition Commission decides if there are grounds for conducting an investigation. The Competition Commission notifies the undertakings concerned of the opening of an investigation within one month of receiving the notification. If no such notice is given within that time period, the concentration may be implemented without reservation.

Art. 9 Swiss Cartel Act: Notification of planned concentrations: Planned concentrations of undertakings must be notified to the Competition Commission before their implementation if in the financial year preceding the concentration:

The undertakings concerned together reported a turnover of at least 2 billion Swiss francs, or a turnover in Switzerland of at least 500 million Swiss francs, and at least two of the undertakings concerned each reported a turnover in Switzerland of at least 100 million Swiss francs.

In the case of insurance companies, "turnover" is replaced by "annual gross insurance premium income", and in the case of banks and other financial intermediaries that are subject to the accounting regulations set out in the Banking Act of 8 November 1934 by "gross income".

Ordinance on the Control of Concentrations of Undertakings (Merger Control Ordinance, MCO):

Art. 16 al. 1: Permission for implementation: The undertakings concerned may implement the concentration prior to the expiry of the period of one month in accordance with Article 32 paragraph 2 Cartel Act provided the Competition Commission notifies them that it regards the concentration as unobjectionable.

Art. 11 al. 1: The notification shall contain the following information:

a.

name, domicile and a brief description of the business activities of the undertakings that are to be taken into account to ascertain whether the thresholds are met in accordance with Articles 4-8, and of the seller of the shares;

b.

a description of the planned concentration, of the relevant facts and circumstances, and of the goals that are being pursued by the planned concentration;

c.

the turnover, balance sheet totals or gross premium income of the undertakings concerned calculated in accordance with Articles 4-8, and the amounts apportioned to Switzerland;

d.

information on all product and geographic markets that are affected by the concentration and in which two or more of the undertakings concerned jointly hold a market share of 20 per cent or more in Switzerland or in which one of the undertakings concerned holds a market share of 30 per cent or more in Switzerland, and a description of these markets containing at least information on the distribution and demand structures and on the importance of research and development;

e.

with regard to the markets referred to under letter d, the market shares of the undertakings concerned for the preceding three years and, if known, for each of the three principal competitors as well as an explanation of the basis used for calculating the market shares;

f.

for the markets referred to under letter d, information regarding undertakings that have newly entered the market in the preceding five years and undertakings that might enter these markets within the next three years and, if possible, the costs that would arise from an entry into the market.

Art. 6:   Calculation of gross premium income of insurance companies

Gross annual premium income shall include all premiums received and receivable from any direct insurance or reinsurance business in the previous business year, including all amounts for which reinsurance cover is being sought and after the deduction of any taxes or other duties levied on direct insurance premiums. In calculating the amount to be apportioned to Switzerland, the gross premium income paid by persons resident in Switzerland shall be taken into account.

Unternehmenszusammenschlüsse

AXA SA/XL Group Ltd

Vorläufige Prüfung; Art. 4 Abs. 3, Art. 10 und Art. 32 Abs. 1 KG

Stellungnahme der Wettbewerbskommission vom 18. Juni 2018

Mitteilung gemäss Art. 16 Abs. 1 VKU vom 14. August 2018

Am 18. Juli 2018 hat die Wettbewerbskommission (nachfolgend: WEKO) die Meldung über ein Zusammenschlussvorhaben erhalten. Danach beabsichtigt gemäss Bestimmungen des Fusionsvertrags Camelot Holdings Ltd, eine hundertprozentige Tochtergesellschaft der AXA, mit XL zu fusionieren. XL wird die überlebende Gesellschaft sein und zu einer hundertprozentigen Tochtergesellschaft von AXA werden. Das Zusammenschlussvorhaben besteht im Erwerb alleiniger Kontrolle durch AXA über XL. Eine Verkäuferin besteht indes nicht, da die Aktien der XL öffentlich gehandelt werden und breit gestreut sind.

Die Schwellenwerte gemäss Art. 9 Abs. 1 und 2 KG i.V.m. Art. 11 Abs. 1 Bst. c VKU berechnen sich bei Versicherungsunternehmen anhand der Bruttoprämienein-nahmen im letzten Geschäftsjahr vor dem Zusammenschluss. Die beteiligten Unternehmen erzielten im Jahr 2017 einen weltweiten Gesamtumsatz von mehr als CHF 2 Mrd. und in der Schweiz einen Umsatz von je über CHF 100 Mio. Somit ist der Zusammenschluss meldepflichtig.

Der Zusammenschluss fügt sich in AXAs Strategie ein, den Schwerpunkt der Geschäftstätigkeit vom Bereich Lebensversicherung und Vorsorge auf den Bereich Sach- und Schadenversicherung zu verschieben. XL bietet zum einen spezialisierte Produkte an, die AXAs bestehendes Versicherungsportfolio für Unternehmen ergänzen und diversifizieren. Zum anderen verfügt XL über Rückversicherungsmöglichkeiten, die AXA den Zugang zu weiterer Diversifizierung und alternativem Kapital ermöglichen werden.

Räumlich werden die Märkte für Erstversicherung (Lebens- und Nicht-Lebensversicherung) grundsätzlich national und der Markt für Rückversicherung global abgegrenzt. Gemäss Praxis der WEKO wird der Markt für Asset Management national oder weiter abgegrenzt. Da es bzgl. Asset Management aber auch bei einer engen, nur auf die Schweiz bezogenen räumlichen Marktabgrenzung, zu keiner Marktanteilsaddition kommt und kein betroffener Markt vorliegt, kann die Marktabgrenzung offengelassen werden.

Die gemeinsamen Marktanteile übersteigen in keinem der Märkte, in welchem das Zusammenschlussvorhaben zu Marktanteilsadditionen führt, die Schwelle von 20 %. Zudem betragen die Marktanteilsadditionen nirgends mehr als 2,5 %. Auch wenn der zukünftige Marktanteil von AXA im Markt Haftpflichtversicherung nahe bei 20 % zu liegen kommt, sind weiterhin andere starke Konkurrenten auf dem Markt. Auf nationaler und internationaler Ebene sind zahlreiche Unternehmen tätig, ins-besondere Zurich Insurance Group, Helvetia, Mobiliar, Swiss Life, Basler Versicherungen und Allianz.

Der Zusammenschluss führt demnach zu keinen betroffenen Märkten i.S.v. Art. 11 Abs. 1 Bst. d VKU. Die vorläufige Prüfung ergibt somit keine Anhaltspunkte, dass der Zusammenschluss eine marktbeherrschende Stellung begründet oder verstärken wird. Die Voraussetzungen für eine Prüfung des Zusammenschlusses nach Art. 10 KG sind daher nicht gegeben.

(Stellungnahme der Wettbewerbskommission vom 18. Juni 2018, RPW 2018/3, 597-598)

State of Cal. v. Continental Insurance, S170560

Insurance law: interpretation, all sums, stacking, excess liability insurance: excess liability insurance is coverage “whereby, under the terms of the policy, liability attaches only after a predetermined amount of primary insurance has been exhausted.”  (2 Cal. Insurance Law & Practice (Matthew Bender 1986) The Insurance Contract, § 14.02[1], p. 14-4.)  Frequently there are several layers of secondary coverage, sometimes referred to as “excess insurance.”  (Ibid.; see Ins. Code, § 676.6, subd. (b); in general, interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law that is decided under settled rules of contract interpretation.  (E.M.M.I. Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 465, 470; Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 18.)  “ ‘While insurance contracts have special features, they are still contracts to which the ordinary rules of contractual interpretation apply.’  (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1264; see AIU [Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1990)] 51 Cal.3d [807,] at pp. 821-822.)”  (Foster-Gardner, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 857, 868.)  “The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties.”  (Bank of the West v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1264; Civ. Code, § 1636.)  “Such intent is to be inferred, if possible, solely from the written provisions of the contract.”  (AIU, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 822; Civ. Code, § 1639.)  “If contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs.”  (Bank of the West v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1264.)  “ ‘The “clear and explicit” meaning of these provisions, interpreted in their “ordinary and popular sense,” unless “used by the parties in a technical sense or a special meaning is given to them by usage” ([Civ. Code,] § 1644), controls judicial interpretation.  (Id., § 1638.)’ ”  (Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc., supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 18.)

“A policy provision will be considered ambiguous when it is capable of two or more constructions, both of which are reasonable.”  (Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 18, citing Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers’ Mutual Ins. Co. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 854, 867.)  A term is not ambiguous merely because the policies do not define it.  (Bay Cities Paving, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 866; Bank of the West v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 1264-1265; Castro v. Fireman’s Fund American Life Ins. Co. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1114, 1120.); ‘Language in a contract must be construed in the context of that instrument as a whole, and in the circumstances of that case, and cannot be found to be ambiguous in the abstract.’ ”  (Bank of the West v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1265, quoting Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 903, 916, fn. 7.)  “If an asserted ambiguity is not eliminated by the language and context of the policy, courts then invoke the principle that ambiguities are generally construed against the party who caused the uncertainty to exist (i.e., the insurer) in order to protect the insured’s reasonable expectation of coverage.”  (La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indemnity Co. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 27, 37.); it is often “virtually impossible” for an insured to prove what specific damage occurred during each of the multiple consecutive policy periods in a progressive property damage case; (Montrose, supra,10 Cal.4th at p. 655, fn. 2.)  In Montrose, we held that in the context of a third party liability policy “property damage that is continuous or progressively deteriorating throughout several policy periods is potentially covered by all policies in effect during those periods.”  (Id. at p. 655.); we noted that “the ‘settled rule’ of the case law” is that “ ‘an insurer on the risk when continuous or progressively deteriorating property damage or bodily injury first manifests itself remains obligated to indemnify the insured for the entirety of the ensuing damage or injury.’ ”  (Aerojet, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 57, fn. 10, italics added by the Aerojet court.)  Although Aerojet, like Montrose, principally involved the duty to defend, the issue the court addressed included the question whether the insurers could require the insured to pay any part of the defense costs.  (Id. at pp. 55-56.)  Aerojet reasoned that the insurers would be liable to indemnify the insured against all claims that resulted from some triggering harm during the respective policy periods, even if the claims arose after the policy period expired.  (Id. at p. 71.)  Therefore, the insurers were responsible for defending the insured for all claims that involved the triggering damage.  (Ibid.)  Aerojet understood Montrose as extending insurers’ indemnity obligations beyond the expiration of the policy period where there has been a continuous loss.  In other words, under Aerojet, as long as the property is insured at some point during the continuing damage period, the insurers’ indemnity obligations persist until the loss is complete, or terminates.  (Ibid.); the fact that all policies were covering the risk at some point during the property loss is enough to trigger the insurers’ indemnity obligation; as the Court of Appeal observed, each insurer is severally liable on its own policy up to its policy limits; although some states have concluded, as the insurers urge in this case, that pro rata coverage would be more fair and equitable when compared to all sums allocation, we are constrained by the language of the applicable policies here (as noted ante, at p. 4), which supports adoption of the all sums coverage principles, as it does not differ in any meaningful way from the Montrose and Aerojet policies.  (Aerojet, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 49.)  Under the CGL policies here, the plain “all sums” language of the agreement compels the insurers to pay “all sums which the insured shall become obligated to pay . . . for damages . . . because of injury to or destruction of property . . . .”  (Ante, at p. 4.)  As the State observes, “this grant of coverage does not limit the policies’ promise to pay ‘all sums’ of the policyholder’s liability solely to sums or damage ‘during the policy period.’ ”

The insurers contend that it would be “objectively unreasonable” to hold them liable for losses that occurred before or after their respective policy periods.  But as the State correctly points out, the “during the policy period” language that the insurers rely on to limit coverage, does not appear in the “Insuring Agreement” section of the policy and therefore is neither “logically nor grammatically related to the ‘all sums’ language in the insuring agreement.”  The insurers’ claim that their indemnity responsibility is limited to damage occurring “during the policy period” would unduly restrict their agreement to pay “all sums” the insured is obligated to pay for damages due to “injury to or destruction of property. . . .”; when the entire loss is within the limits of one policy, the insured can recover from that insurer, which may then seek contribution from the other insurers on the risk during the same loss.  Recognizing, however, that this method stops short of satisfying the coverage responsibilities of the policies covering a continuous long-tail loss, and potentially leaves the insured vastly uncovered for a significant portion of the loss, the present Court of Appeal allowed the insured to stack the consecutive policies and recover up to the policy limits of the multiple plans.  “Stacking” generally refers to the stacking of policy limits across multiple policy periods that were on a particular risk.  In other words, “Stacking policy limits means that when more than one policy is triggered by an occurrence, each policy can be called upon to respond to the claim up to the full limits of the policy.”  (Colon, Pay It Forward:  Allocating Defense and Indemnity Costs in Environmental Liability Cases in Cal. (Feb. 2002) 24 Ins. Litig. Rptr. 43, 53.)  “When the policy limits of a given insurer are exhausted, the insured is entitled to seek indemnification from any of the remaining insurers that were on the risk . . . .”  (J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 626 A.2d at p. 509 [adopting all sums allocation and serial stacking of policies in Pennsylvania for continuous bodily injuries caused by asbestos manufacturer]; see also Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (3d Cir 1996) 98 F.3d 1440 [adopting all sums and stacking for environmental cleanup liability].)  The all-sums-with-stacking indemnity principle properly incorporates the Montrose continuous injury trigger of coverage rule and the Aerojet all sums rule, and “effectively stacks the insurance coverage from different policy periods to form one giant ‘uber-policy’ with a coverage limit equal to the sum of all purchased insurance policies.  Instead of treating a long-tail injury as though it occurred in one policy period, this approach treats all the triggered insurance as though it were purchased in one policy period.  The insured has access to far more insurance than it would ever be entitled to within any one period.”  (Bratspies, supra, 1999 B.Y.U. L.Rev. at p. 1245.)  The all-sums-with-stacking rule means that the insured has immediate access to the insurance it purchased.  It does not put the insured in the position of receiving less coverage than it bought.  It also acknowledges the uniquely progressive nature of long-tail injuries that cause progressive damage throughout multiple policy periods.  (Ibid.)

In adopting the all-sums-with-stacking rule, the Court of Appeal rejected the FMC court’s antistacking ruling because it “disregarded the policy language entirely.”  The Court of Appeal noted that, as in this case, the policies in FMC did not include antistacking provisions, so the FMC court resorted to “judicial intervention” in order to avoid stacking.  As the Court of Appeal recognized, absent antistacking provisions, statutes that forbid stacking, or judicial intervention, “standard policy language permits stacking.”  We agree with the Court of Appeal, and find that the policies at issue here, which do not contain antistacking language, allow for its application.  In so holding, we disapprove FMC Corp. v. Plaisted & Companies, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th 1132. An all-sums-with-stacking rule has numerous advantages.  It resolves the question of insurance coverage as equitably as possible, given the immeasurable aspects of a long-tail injury.  It also comports with the parties’ reasonable expectations, in that the insurer reasonably expects to pay for property damage occurring during a long-tail loss it covered, but only up to its policy limits, while the insured reasonably expects indemnification for the time periods in which it purchased insurance coverage.  All-sums-with-stacking coverage allocation ascertains each insurer’s liability with a comparatively uncomplicated calculation that looks at the long-tail injury as a whole rather than artificially breaking it into distinct periods of injury.  As the Court of Appeal recognized, if an occurrence is continuous across two or more policy periods, the insured has paid two or more premiums and can recover up to the combined total of the policy limits.  There is nothing unfair or unexpected in allowing stacking in a continuous long-tail loss.  The most significant caveat to all-sums-with-stacking indemnity allocation is that it contemplates that an insurer may avoid stacking by specifically including an “antistacking” provision in its policy.  Of course, in the future, contracting parties can write into their policies whatever language they agree upon, including limitations on indemnity, equitable pro rata coverage allocation rules, and prohibitions on stacking (Cal. S. Ct., 09.08.12., State of Cal. v. Continental Insurance, S170560).

Droit des assurances (application du droit californien) : assurance de couverture subsidiaire (excess liability insurance) : ce type d’assurance n’intervient qu’après le versement intégral des prestations d’une assurance de couverture primaire, conformément aux termes des conditions contractuelles telles que figurant dans la police d’assurance. De manière générale, une police d’assurance s’interprète selon les règles d’interprétation des contrats. L’interprétation des conditions d’assurance est une question de droit. Le but fondamental de l’interprétation des contrats est de donner effet à l’intention mutuelle des parties. Une telle intention doit être déduite, si possible, uniquement des dispositions écrites du contrat. Si les dispositions du contrat sont claires et explicites, elles contrôlent. La notion de « clair et explicite » signifie que les dispositions du contrat sont interprétées dans leur sens ordinaire, dans le sens que leur attribue une personne ordinaire non spécialisée, sauf si les parties ont utilisé des termes dans leur sens technique ou dans un sens spécial, conformément à un usage. Une disposition d’une police d’assurance est considérée comme ambigüe lorsqu’elle est capable de deux ou plusieurs interprétations, toutes raisonnables. Un terme n’est pas ambigu du seul fait que la police d’assurance ne le définit pas. Les dispositions d’un contrat doivent être interprétées dans le contexte du contrat considéré comme un tout, et dans le contexte des circonstances du cas. Elles ne peuvent être considérées comme ambigües dans l’abstrait. Si une ambigüité n’est pas éliminée par le langage et le contexte du contrat d’assurance, les Tribunaux recourent au principe selon lequel les ambiguïtés sont généralement interprétées contre la partie qui est la cause de l’incertitude (ici l’assureur) pour protéger l’assuré qui s’attend de manière raisonnable à ce qu’une couverture soit accordée.

Dans une affaire de dommage à la propriété qui se produit progressivement, il est souvent impossible pour un assuré de prouver quels dommages spécifiques se sont produits pendant la durée de chacune des diverses polices consécutives. Il est dès lors opportun de considérer qu’un tel dommage progressif ou continu est couvert par chacune des différentes polices d’assurance successives couvrant le risque. En outre, si ces diverses polices sont émises par plusieurs assureurs, chacun d’eux est responsable pour le tout, bien entendu jusqu’au maximum de la somme assurée par chacune des polices. Il parait certes plus équitable d’envisager une solution au prorata, chaque assureur participant pour une part. Cette solution ne sera adoptée que si la police d’assurance la prévoit. Si elle se contente d’indiquer que la couverture s’étend à l’ensemble du dommage (all sums), l’assureur qui libelle ainsi son contrat d’assurance est obligé pour le tout. De même, si l’assureur veut éviter d’être responsable pour la part du dommage survenue avant la conclusion de la police ou pour la part du dommage survenue après la conclusion de la police, il doit l’inscrire expressément dans la police ou dans ses conditions générales. Par ailleurs, en toute hypothèse, les assureurs ont un droit de recours les uns contre les autres. Pour ce qui le concerne, le principe du « stacking » est admis : l’assuré peut faire appel à la limite maximale de couverture de chacune de ses polices, jusqu’à ce que la totalité de sa perte soit indemnisée (exemples dans des cas de dommages à l’environnement ou à la santé (amiante)). Le contrat d’assurance peut toutefois prévoir une disposition qui écarte le « stacking », ce qui n’était pas le cas dans la présente affaire. Rien n’est inéquitable ou imprévu dans le principe du « stacking » s’appliquant aux pertes sur une longue durée. Il est utile de rappeler que cette affaire porte sur des pertes qui s’étalent dans le temps.