New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, Docket 17-340

Employment Agreements

Labor Law

Contract of employment - Definition

Arbitration

Exceptions

Transportation Workers (Seamen, Railroad Employees, or any other Class of Work­ers Engaged in Foreign or Interstate Commerce)

The Federal Arbitration Act requires courts to enforce private arbitration agreements. But like most laws, this one bears its qualifications. Among other things, §1 says that “nothing herein” may be used to compel arbitration in dis­putes involving the “contracts of employment” of certain transportation workers. 9 U. S. C. §1.

A court should determine whether a §1 exclusion applies before ordering arbitration. A court’s authority to compel arbitration under the Act does not extend to all private contracts, no matter how em­phatically they may express a preference for arbitration. Instead, an­tecedent statutory provisions limit the scope of a court’s §§3 and 4 powers to stay litigation and compel arbitration “according to the terms” of the parties’ agreement. Section 2 provides that the Act ap­plies only when the agreement is set forth as “a written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction in­volving commerce.” And §1 helps define §2’s terms, warning, as rele­vant here, that “nothing” in the Act “shall apply” to “contracts of em­ployment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of work­ers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” For a court to invoke its statutory authority under §§3 and 4, it must first know if the par­ties’ agreement is excluded from the Act’s coverage by the terms of §§1 and 2. This sequencing is significant.

Petitioner New Prime Inc. is an interstate trucking company, and re­spondent Dominic Oliveira is one of its drivers. Mr. Oliveira works under an operating agreement that calls him an independent con­tractor and contains a mandatory arbitration provision.

Because the Act’s term “contract of employment” refers to any agreement to perform work, Mr. Oliveira’s agreement with New Prime falls within §1’s exception.

At the time of the Act’s adoption in 1925, the phrase “contract of employment” was not a term of art, and dictionaries tended to treat “employment” more or less as a synonym for “work.” Contemporaneous legal authorities provide no evidence that a “contract of employment” necessarily sig­naled a formal employer-employee relationship. Evidence that Con­gress used the term “contracts of employment” broadly can be found in its choice of the neighboring term “workers,” a term that easily embraces independent contractors.

Secondary authorities: N. Singer & J. Singer, Suth­erland on Statutes and Statutory Construction §56A:3 (rev. 7th ed. 2012).

(U.S. Supreme Court, Jan. 15, 2019, New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, Docket 17-340, J. Gorsuch)

New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, Docket 17-340

Social Security

Labor Law

Workers’ Compensation

Employee: definition

(…) See Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How It Ought To Stop Trying, Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 295, 309 (2001) (discussing the “historical baggage” of the term “servant”); Broden, General Rules Determining the Employment Relationship Under Social Security Laws: After Twenty Years an Unsolved Problem, 33 Temp. L. Q. 307, 327 (1960) (describing use of the term “employer-employee,” in contradistinction to “master-servant,” in the Social Security laws). Legislators searched to find a term that fully encompassed the broad protections they sought to provide and considered an “assortment of vague and uncertain terms,” including “‘servant,’ . . . ‘employee,’ . . . ‘workman,’ ‘laborer,’ ‘wage earner,’ ‘opera­tive,’ or ‘hireling.’” Carlson, Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L., at 308. Eventually “‘employee’ prevailed, if only by default, and the choice was confirmed by the next wave of protective legislation—workers’ compen­sation laws in the early years of the Twentieth Century.” Id., at 309. (Op., fn. 7).

(U.S. Supreme Court, Jan. 15, 2019, New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, Docket 17-340, J. Gorsuch)

South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., Docket No. 17-494

Sales of goods: Tax: Sales tax: Use tax: Commerce clause: Interstate commerce: E-commerce: Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement: Stare decisis: Fortas, J.: Gorsuch, J.:

When a consumer purchases goods or services, the consumer’s State often imposes a sales tax. This case requires the Court to determine when an out-of-state seller can be required to collect and remit that tax. All concede that taxing the sales in question here is lawful. The question is whether the out-of-state seller can be held responsible for its payment, and this turns on a proper interpretation of the Commerce Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3.

In two earlier cases the Court held that an out-of-state seller’s liability to collect and remit the tax to the consumer’s State depended on whether the seller had a physical presence in that State, but that mere shipment of goods into the consumer’s State, following an order from a catalog, did not satisfy the physical presence requirement. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U. S. 753 (1967); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298 (1992). The Court granted certiorari here to reconsider the scope and validity of the physical presence rule mandated by those cases.

Under this Court’s decisions in Bellas Hess and Quill, South Dakota may not require a business to collect its sales tax if the business lacks a physical presence in the State. Without that physical presence, South Dakota instead must rely on its residents to pay the use tax owed on their purchases from out-of-state sellers. “The impracticability of this collection from the multitude of individual purchasers is obvious.” National Geographic Soc. v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U. S. 551, 555 (1977). And consumer compliance rates are notoriously low.

(…) This Court’s doctrine has developed further with time. Modern precedents rest upon two primary principles that mark the boundaries of a State’s authority to regulate interstate commerce. First, state regulations may not discriminate against interstate commerce; and second, States may not impose undue burdens on interstate commerce. State laws that discriminate against interstate commerce face “a virtually per se rule of invalidity.” Granholm v. Heald, 544 U. S. 460, 476 (2005). State laws that “regulate even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest . . . will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970). Although subject to exceptions and variations, see, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794 (1976); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U. S. 573 (1986), these two principles guide the courts in adjudicating cases challenging state laws under the Commerce Clause.

These principles also animate the Court’s Commerce Clause precedents addressing the validity of state taxes. The Court explained the now-accepted framework for state taxation in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274 (1977). The Court held that a State “may tax exclusively interstate commerce so long as the tax does not create any effect forbidden by the Commerce Clause.” Id., at 285. After all, “interstate commerce may be required to pay its fair share of state taxes.” D. H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U. S. 24, 31 (1988). The Court will sustain a tax so long as it (1) applies to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the services the State provides. See Complete Auto, supra, at 279.

Before Complete Auto, the Court had addressed a challenge to an Illinois tax that required out-of-state retailers to collect and remit taxes on sales made to consumers who purchased goods for use within Illinois. Bellas Hess, 386 U. S., at 754–755. The Court held that a mail-order company “whose only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier or the United States mail” lacked the requisite minimum contacts with the State required by both the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause. Id., at 758. Unless the retailer maintained a physical presence such as “retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a State,” the State lacked the power to require that retailer to collect a local use tax. Ibid. The dissent disagreed: “There should be no doubt that this large-scale, systematic, continuous solicitation and exploitation of the Illinois consumer market is a sufficient ‘nexus’ to require Bellas Hess to collect from Illinois customers and to remit the use tax.” Id., at 761–762 (opinion of Fortas, J., joined by Black and Douglas, JJ.).

In 1992, the Court reexamined the physical presence rule in Quill. That case presented a challenge to North Dakota’s “attempt to require an out-of-state mail-order house that has neither outlets nor sales representatives in the State to collect and pay a use tax on goods purchased for use within the State.” 504 U. S., at 301. Despite the fact that Bellas Hess linked due process and the Commerce Clause together, the Court in Quill overruled the due process holding, but not the Commerce Clause holding; and it thus reaffirmed the physical presence rule. 504 U. S., at 307–308, 317–318.

The physical presence rule has “been the target of criticism over many years from many quarters.” Direct Mar­keting Assn. v. Brohl, 814 F. 3d 1129, 1148, 1150–1151 (CA10 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Quill, it has been said, was “premised on assumptions that are unfounded” and “riddled with internal inconsistencies.” Rothfeld, Quill: Confusing the Commerce Clause, 56 Tax Notes 487, 488 (1992). Quill created an inefficient “online sales tax loophole” that gives out-of-state businesses an advantage. A. Laffer & D. Arduin, Pro-Growth Tax Reform and E-Fairness 1, 4 (July 2013). And “while nexus rules are clearly necessary,” the Court “should focus on rules that are appropriate to the twenty-first century, not the nineteenth.” Hellerstein, Deconstructing the Debate Over State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 13 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 549, 553 (2000). Each year, the physical presence rule becomes further removed from economic reality and results in significant revenue losses to the States. These critiques underscore that the physical presence rule, both as first formulated and as applied today, is an incorrect interpretation of the Commerce Clause.

Quill is flawed on its own terms. First, the physical presence rule is not a necessary interpretation of the requirement that a state tax must be “applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State.” Com­plete Auto, 430 U. S., at 279. Second, Quill creates rather than resolves market distortions. And third, Quill imposes the sort of arbitrary, formalistic distinction that the Court’s modern Commerce Clause precedents disavow.

(…) For example, a company with a website accessible in South Dakota may be said to have a physical presence in the State via the customers’ computers. A website may leave cookies saved to the customers’ hard drives, or customers may download the company’s app onto their phones. Or a company may lease data storage that is permanently, or even occasionally, located in South Dakota. Cf. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 584 U. S. ___ (2018) (per curiam).

(…) The physical presence rule as defined and enforced in Bellas Hess and Quill is not just a technical legal problem—it is an extraordinary imposition by the Judiciary on States’ authority to collect taxes and perform critical public functions. Forty-one States, two Territories, and the District of Columbia now ask this Court to reject the test formulated in Quill.

(…) Yet the physical presence rule undermines that necessary confidence by giving some online retailers an arbitrary advantage over their competitors who collect state sales taxes.

(…) “Although we approach the reconsideration of our decisions with the utmost caution, stare decisis is not an inexorable command.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 233 (2009) (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U. S. 3, 20 (1997)). Here, stare decisis can no longer support the Court’s prohibition of a valid exercise of the States’ sovereign power.

(…) Further, the real world implementation of Commerce Clause doctrines now makes it manifest that the physical presence rule as defined by Quill must give way to the “far-reaching systemic and structural changes in the economy” and “many other societal dimensions” caused by the Cyber Age. Direct Marketing, 575 U. S., at ___ (KENNEDY, J., concurring) (slip op., at 3). Though Quill was wrong on its own terms when it was decided in 1992, since then the Internet revolution has made its earlier error all the more egregious and harmful.

(…) For these reasons, the Court concludes that the physical presence rule of Quill is unsound and incorrect. The Court’s decisions in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298 (1992), and National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U. S. 753 (1967), should be, and now are, overruled.

In the absence of Quill and Bellas Hess, the first prong of the Complete Auto test simply asks whether the tax applies to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State. 430 U. S., at 279. “Such a nexus is established when the taxpayer [or collector] ‘avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business’ in that jurisdiction.” Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U. S. 1, 11 (2009). Here, the nexus is clearly sufficient based on both the economic and virtual contacts respondents have with the State. The Act applies only to sellers that deliver more than $100,000 of goods or services into South Dakota or engage in 200 or more separate transactions for the delivery of goods and services into the State on an annual basis. S. B. 106, §1. This quantity of business could not have occurred unless the seller availed itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business in South Dakota. And respondents are large, national companies that undoubtedly maintain an extensive virtual presence. Thus, the substantial nexus requirement of Complete Auto is satisfied in this case.

The question remains whether some other principle in the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine might invalidate the Act. Because the Quill physical presence rule was an obvious barrier to the Act’s validity, these issues have not yet been litigated or briefed, and so the Court need not resolve them here. That said, South Dakota’s tax system includes several features that appear designed to prevent discrimination against or undue burdens upon interstate commerce. First, the Act applies a safe harbor to those who transact only limited business in South Dakota. Second, the Act ensures that no obligation to remit the sales tax may be applied retroactively. S. B. 106, §5. Third, South Dakota is one of more than 20 States that have adopted the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement. This system standardizes taxes to reduce administrative and compliance costs: It requires a single, state level tax administration, uniform definitions of products and services, simplified tax rate structures, and other uniform rules. It also provides sellers access to sales tax administration software paid for by the State. Sellers who choose to use such software are immune from audit liability. Any remaining claims regarding the application of the Commerce Clause in the absence of Quill and Bellas Hess may be addressed in the first instance on remand.

(U.S.S.C., June 21, 2018, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., Docket No. 17-494, J. Kennedy)

A la lumière de la « Commerce Clause », U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3, un état, domicile de l’acheteur, peut-il exiger d’un vendeur sis en un autre état de percevoir et de régler la taxe de vente ?

Dans deux décisions précédentes (Bellas Hess et Quill), la Cour a répondu par l’affirmative, mais à la condition que le vendeur dispose d’une présence physique dans l’état de l’acheteur. La simple expédition des biens, après un achat sur catalogue, ne satisfaisait pas à la condition de la présence physique.

Sans présence physique du vendeur sur son sol, l’état de l’acheteur devait récupérer la « sales tax » auprès de chaque acheteur individuel, un système qualifié d’impraticable.

Dans sa décision « Complete Auto » rendue en 1977, la Cour a jugé qu’un état était compétent pour taxer le commerce entre états (et lui seul), à condition de ne pas créer d’effets interdits par la « Commerce Clause ». De la sorte, une telle taxe doit s’appliquer à une activité en lien substantiel avec l’état de perception, doit être répartie équitablement entre les débiteurs, ne doit pas discriminer le commerce entre états à l’avantage du commerce local, et doit être équitablement liée aux services apportés par l’état de perception.

La jurisprudence Bellas Hess et Quill a fait l’objet de nombreuses critiques, auxquelles se sont joints les Juges Fortas et Gorsuch dans diverses opinions. Elle a été vue comme créant un avantage concurrentiel en faveur du commerce électronique provenant d’un autre état que celui de l’acheteur. Ces critiques soutiennent que la règle de la présence physique résulte d’une interprétation incorrecte de la Commerce Clause.

Par exemple, une entreprise qui maintient un site Internet peut être qualifiée d’entreprise avec présence physique dans un autre état que celui de son siège, par le biais des ordinateurs des clients.

En conséquence, Bellas Hess et Quill sont ici reconsidérés, et « overruled », ce que n’empêche pas le principe « stare decisis ». Reste donc essentiellement applicable le premier élément du test posé par la décision Complete Auto, à savoir la condition que la taxe soit imposée à une activité présentant un lien substantiel avec l’état qui taxe. Un tel lien est établi quand le débiteur de la taxe profite des conditions que l’état met à sa disposition pour permettre son activité commerciale. En l’espèce, ce lien est clairement suffisant considérant les contacts économiques et virtuels avec l’état de l’acheteur : la loi qui prévoit la taxe ne s’applique qu’aux vendeurs qui délivrent plus de 100'000 dollars dans l’état de l’acheteur, ou qui participent à plus de 200 transactions individuelles par année dans dit état.

(L’espèce mentionne encore le « Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement », adopté par plus de 20 états. Ce système standardise les taxes pour réduire les coûts administratifs. Il ne requiert au niveau de l’état qu’une seule administration fiscale, prévoit des définitions uniformes de produits et services, et prévoit d’autres règles de simplification).

L’affaire est renvoyée à l’autorité inférieure pour déterminer si d’autres principes découlant de la Commerce Clause sont susceptibles d’annuler la loi qui prévoit la taxe litigieuse.

Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, Docket No. 16-285

Labor law: Arbitration: Saving clause: Class actions:

Should employees and employers be allowed to agree that any disputes between them will be resolved through one-on-one arbitration? Or should employees always be permitted to bring their claims in class or collective ac­tions, no matter what they agreed with their employers?

As a matter of policy these questions are surely debatable. But as a matter of law the answer is clear. In the Federal Arbitration Act, Congress has instructed federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms—including terms providing for individualized pro­ceedings. Nor can we agree with the employees’ sugges­tion that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) offers a conflicting command. It is this Court’s duty to interpret Congress’s statutes as a harmonious whole rather than at war with one another. And abiding that duty here leads to an unmistakable conclusion. The NLRA secures to em­ployees rights to organize unions and bargain collectively, but it says nothing about how judges and arbitrators must try legal disputes that leave the workplace and enter the courtroom or arbitral forum. This Court has never read a right to class actions into the NLRA—and for three quar­ters of a century neither did the National Labor Relations Board. Far from conflicting, the Arbitration Act and the NLRA have long enjoyed separate spheres of influence and neither permits this Court to declare the parties’ agree­ments unlawful.

(…) Still, the employees suggest the Arbitration Act’s saving clause creates an exception for cases like theirs. By its terms, the saving clause allows courts to refuse to enforce arbitration agreements “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” §2. That provision applies here, the employees tell us, because the NLRA renders their particular class and collective action waivers illegal. In their view, illegality under the NLRA is a “ground” that “exists at law . . . for the revocation” of their arbitration agreements, at least to the extent those agreements prohibit class or collective action proceedings (…) The saving clause still can’t save their cause.

It can’t because the saving clause recognizes only de­fenses that apply to “any” contract. In this way the clause establishes a sort of “equal-treatment” rule for arbitration contracts. Kindred Nursing Centers L. P. v. Clark, 581 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 4). The clause “permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.’” Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 339. At the same time, the clause offers no refuge for “defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.” Ibid. Under our precedent, this means the saving clause does not save defenses that target arbitration either by name or by more subtle methods, such as by “interfering with fundamental attributes of arbitration.” Id., at 344; see Kindred Nursing, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 5). This is where the employees’ argument stumbles. They don’t suggest that their arbitration agreements were extracted, say, by an act of fraud or duress or in some other unconscionable way that would render any contract unenforceable. Instead, they object to their agreements precisely because they require individualized arbitration proceedings instead of class or collective ones. And by attacking (only) the individualized nature of the arbitra­tion proceedings, the employees’ argument seeks to inter­fere with one of arbitration’s fundamental attributes.

(…) The Court recog­nized that parties remain free to alter arbitration proce­dures to suit their tastes, and in recent years some parties have sometimes chosen to arbitrate on a classwide basis. Id., at 351. But Concepcion’s essential insight remains: courts may not allow a contract defense to reshape tradi­tional individualized arbitration by mandating classwide arbitration procedures without the parties’ consent.

(U.S.S.C., May 21, 2018, Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, Docket No. 16-285, J. Gorsuch)

Si un contrat de travail prévoit une clause d’arbitrage, cette clause doit être respectée en cas de litige, sauf à pouvoir alléguer utilement sa nullité en invoquant les motifs de nullité contractuels (illicéité, dol, contrainte notamment). Par ailleurs, si le contrat de travail prévoit une telle clause d’arbitrage, le droit fédéral ne permet pas à l’employé de participer à une procédure de classe. En particulier, la Cour n’a jamais jugé qu’un tel droit pouvait être déduit de la loi fédérale « National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) ». De la sorte, cette loi s’harmonise sans conflit avec la loi fédérale sur l’arbitrage. La récente opinion contraire du « National Labor Relations Board” est ici rejetée. La Cour précise en outre que dite opinion contraire ne mérite pas de déférence au sens de la jurisprudence Chevron, cette problématique n’étant pas laissée par le Congrès à l’appréciation de l’administration.

La Cour dispose ainsi que seuls les moyens permettant d’invoquer la nullité de tous types de contrats peuvent être invoqués pour tenter d’obtenir la nullité d’une clause d’arbitrage. De la sorte, un moyen de nullité qui n’est invocable que contre une clause d’arbitrage est dépourvu d’efficacité. C’est pourquoi en l’espèce les employés ne sont pas parvenus à obtenir la nullité de la clause d’arbitrage de leurs contrats de travail : le moyen de nullité invoqué (une disposition du droit fédéral qui prévoit l’action de classe dans les rapports de travail, et qui ne pourrait être écartée par une clause d’arbitrage 1 :1) n’est pas un motif susceptible d’être invoqué dans tous les litiges contractuels.

Par leur clause d’arbitrage, les parties peuvent moduler la procédure et choisir par exemple la possibilité d’un arbitrage de classe. Celui-ci ne peut cependant pas être imposé s’il n’a pas été choisi.

Cette décision a provoqué une opinion dissidente virulente.

SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, Docket No. 16-969

Patent: Inter partes review:

A few years ago Congress created “inter partes review.” The new procedure allows private parties to challenge previously issued patent claims in an adversarial process before the Patent Office that mimics civil litigation. Re­cently, the Court upheld the inter partes review statute against a constitutional challenge. Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, ante, p. ___. Now we take up a question concerning the statute’s opera­tion. When the Patent Office initiates an inter partes review, must it resolve all of the claims in the case, or may it choose to limit its review to only some of them? The statute, we find, supplies a clear answer: the Patent Office must “issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the peti­tioner.” 35 U. S. C. §318(a). In this context, as in so many others, “any” means “every.” The agency cannot curate the claims at issue but must decide them all.

Because SAS challenged all 16 claims of Comple­ment Soft’s patent, the Board in its final written decision had to address the patentability of all 16 claims. Much as in the civil litigation system it mimics, in an inter partes review the petitioner is master of its complaint and nor­mally entitled to judgment on all of the claims it raises, not just those the decisionmaker might wish to address.

(U.S.S.C., April 24, 2018, SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, Docket No. 16-969, J. Gorsuch)

Cette décision complète l'affaire Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC (2018). La présente précise que le PTO doit rendre une décision qui se prononce sur toutes les contestations de revendications, sans pouvoir choisir de se prononcer sur certaines seulement.

Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC, Docket No. 16-712

Common law: Privy Council: Court of Chancery: Patent: Inter partes review:

(…) History does not establish that patent validity is a matter that, “from its nature,” must be decided by a court (…) There was another means of canceling a patent in 18th-century England, which more closely resembles inter partes review: a petition to the Privy Council to vacate a patent. See Lemley, infra, at 1681–1682; Hulme, Privy Council Law and Practice of Letters Patent for Invention From the Restoration to 1794, 33 L. Q. Rev. 63 (1917). The Privy Council was composed of the Crown’s advisers. Lemley, infra, at 1681. From the 17th through the 20th centuries, English patents had a standard revocation clause that permitted six or more Privy Counsellors to declare a patent void if they determined the invention was contrary to law, “prejudicial” or “inconvenient,” not new, or not invented by the patent owner. See 11 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 426–427, and n. 6 (1938); Davies, The Early History of the Patent Specification, 50 L. Q. Rev. 86, 102–106 (1934). Individuals could petition the Council to revoke a patent, and the petition was referred to the Attorney General. The Attorney General examined the petition, considered affidavits from the petitioner and patent owner, and heard from counsel. See, e.g., Bull v. Lydall, PC2/81, pp. 180–181 (1706). Depending on the Attorney General’s conclusion, the Council would either void the patent or dismiss the petition. See, e.g., Darby v. Betton, PC2/99, pp. 358–359 (1745–1746) (voiding the patent); Baker v. James, PC2/103, pp. 320–321, 346–347 (1752) (dismissing the petition).

The Privy Council was a prominent feature of the English system. It had exclusive authority to revoke patents until 1753, and after that, it had concurrent jurisdiction with the courts. See Hulme, 33 L. Q. Rev., at 189–191, 193–194. The Privy Council continued to consider revocation claims and to revoke patents throughout the 18th century. Its last revocation was in 1779. See id., at 192–193. It considered, but did not act on, revocation claims in 1782, 1794, and 1810. See ibid.; Board of Ordinance v. Parr, PC1/3919 (1810).

The Patent Clause in our Constitution “was written against the backdrop” of the English system. Graham, 383 U. S., at 5. Based on the practice of the Privy Council, it was well understood at the founding that a patent system could include a practice of granting patents subject to potential cancellation in the executive proceeding of the Privy Council. The parties have cited nothing in the text or history of the Patent Clause or Article III to suggest that the Framers were not aware of this common practice. Nor is there any reason to think they excluded this practice during their deliberations. And this Court has recognized that, “within the scope established by the Constitution, Congress may set out conditions and tests for patentability.” Id., at 6. We conclude that inter partes review is one of those conditions.

From the dissenting opinion (J. Gorsuch):

As I read the historical record presented to us, only courts could hear patent challenges in England at the time of the founding. If facts were in dispute, the matter first had to proceed in the law courts. See, e.g., Newsham v. Gray, 2 Atk. 286, 26 Eng. Rep. 575 (Ch. 1742). If successful there, a challenger then had to obtain a writ of scire facias in the law side of the Court of Chancery. See, e.g., Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power To Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Texas L. Rev. 1433, 1446, n. 53 (2000); Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If Patents Are Valid? 99 Va. L. Rev. 1673, 1686–1687 (2013) (Lemley, Juries). The last time an executive body (the King’s Privy Council) invalidated an invention patent on an ordinary application was in 1746, in Darby v. Betton, PC2/99, pp. 358–359; and the last time the Privy Council even considered doing so was in 1753, in Baker v. James, PC2/103, pp. 320–321. After Baker v. James, the Privy Council “divested itself of its functions” in ordinary patent disputes, Hulme, Privy Council Law and Practice of Letters Patent for Invention from the Restoration to 1794 (Pt. II), 33 L. Q. Rev. 180, 194 (1917), which “thereafter were adjudicated solely by the law courts, as opposed to the crown’s prerogative courts,” Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550– 1800, 52 Hastings L. J. 1255, 1286–1287 (2001) (Mossoff, Rethinking Patents).

This shift to courts paralleled a shift in thinking. Patents began as little more than feudal favors. Id., at 1261. The crown both issued and revoked them. Lemley, Juries 1680–1681. And they often permitted the lucky recipient the exclusive right to do very ordinary things, like operate a toll bridge or run a tavern. Ibid. But by the 18th century, inventors were busy in Britain and invention patents came to be seen in a different light. They came to be viewed not as endowing accidental and anticompetitive monopolies on the fortunate few but as a procompetitive means to secure to individuals the fruits of their labor and ingenuity; encourage others to emulate them; and promote public access to new technologies that would not otherwise exist. Mossoff, Rethinking Patents 1288–1289. The Constitution itself reflects this new thinking, authorizing the issuance of patents precisely because of their contribution to the “Progress of Science and useful Arts.” Art. I, §8, cl. 8. “In essence, there was a change in perception—from viewing a patent as a contract between the crown and the patentee to viewing it as a ‘social contract’ between the patentee and society.” Waltersheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 3), 77 J. Pat. & T. Off. Soc. 771, 793 (1995). And as invention patents came to be seen so differently, it is no surprise courts came to treat them more solicitously.

See also Brief for H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui et al. as Amici Curiae 6–37; Brief for Alliacense Limited LLC as Amicus Curiae 10–11; Gómez-Arostegui & Bottomley, Privy Council and Scire Facias 1700–1883, p. 2 (Nov. 6, 2017) (Addendum), https://ssrn.com/ abstract=3054989 (all Internet materials as last visited Apr. 20, 2018); Observations on the Utility of Patents, and on the Sentiments of Lord Kenyon Respecting That Subject 23 (2d ed. 1791) (“If persons of the same trade find themselves aggrieved by Patents taken for any thing already in use, their remedy is at hand. It is by a writ of Scire Facias”); Mancius v. Lawton, 10 Johns. 23, 24 (NY Sup. Ct. 1813) (Kent, C. J.) (noting the “settled English course” that “letters-patent . . . can only be avoided in chancery, by a writ of scire facias sued out on the part of the government, or by some individual prosecuting in its name”).

Unable to dispute that judges alone resolved virtually all patent challenges by the time of the founding, the Court points to three English cases that represent the Privy Council’s dying gasp in this area: Board of Ordnance v. Wilkinson, PC2/123 (1779); Grill [Grice] v. Waters, PC2/127 (1782); and Board of Ordnance v. Parr, PC1/3919 (1810). Filed in 1779, 1782, and 1810, each involved an effort to override a patent on munitions during wartime, no doubt in an effort to increase their supply. But even then appealing to the Privy Council was seen as a last resort. The 1779 petition (the last Privy Council revocation ever) came only after the patentee twice refused instructions to litigate the patent’s validity in a court of law. Gómez-Arostegui & Bottomley, Privy Council and Scire Facias 1700–1883, p. 6 (Nov. 6, 2017) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3054989 (citing Board of Ordnance v. Wilkinson, PC2/123 (1779), and PC1/11/150 (1779)). The Council did not act on the 1782 petition but instead referred it to the Attorney General where it appears to have been abandoned. Gómez-Arostegui & Bottomley, Privy Council and Scire Facias, supra, at 17–18. Meanwhile, in response to the 1810 petition the Attorney General admitted that scire facias was the “usual manner” of revoking a patent and so directed the petitioner to proceed at law even as he suggested the Privy Council might be available in the event of a “very pressing and imminent” danger to the public. Id., at 20 (citing PC1/3919 (1810)).

In the end, these cases do very little to support the Court’s holding. At most, they suggest that the Privy Council might have possessed some residual power to revoke patents to address wartime necessities. Equally, they might serve only as more unfortunate evidence of the maxim that in time of war, the laws fall silent. After all, the English statute of monopolies appeared to require the “force and validitie” of all patents to be determined only by “the Comon Lawes of this Realme & not otherwise.” 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, §2 (1624). So the Privy Council cases on which the Court relies may not reflect the best understanding of the British constitution.

Any lingering doubt about English law is resolved for me by looking to our own. While the Court is correct that the Constitution’s Patent Clause “ ‘was written against the backdrop’ ” of English practice, ante, at 14 (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U. S. 1, 5 (1966)), it’s also true that the Clause sought to reject some of early English practice. Reflecting the growing sentiment that patents shouldn’t be used for anticompetitive monopolies over “goods or businesses which had long before been enjoyed by the public,” the framers wrote the Clause to protect only procompetitive invention patents that are the product of hard work and insight and “add to the sum of useful knowledge.” Id., at 5–6. In light of the Patent Clause’s restrictions on this score, courts took the view that when the federal government “grants a patent the grantee is entitled to it as a matter of right, and does not receive it, as was originally supposed to be the case in England, as a matter of grace and favor.” James v. Campbell, 104 U. S. 356, 358 (1882). As Chief Justice Marshall explained, courts treated American invention patents as recognizing an “inchoate property” that exists “from the moment of invention.” Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (No. 4,564) (CC Va. 1813). American patent holders thus were thought to “hold a property in their inventions by as good a title as the farmer holds his farm and flock.” Hovey v. Henry, 12 F. Cas. 603, 604 (No. 6,742) (CC Mass. 1846) (Woodbury, J.). And just as with farm and flock, it was widely accepted that the government could divest patent owners of their rights only through proceedings before independent judges.

(U.S.S.C., April 24, 2018, Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC, Docket No. 16-712, J. Thomas)

Description de la compétence historique du Privy Council et de la Court of Chancery en matière d'annulation de brevets d'invention. Cela en rapport avec la question de savoir si un brevet peut être annulé par l'administration fédérale (ici le PTO) ou si, comme le soutient l'opinion dissidente, seule une cour de justice au sens de l'Art. III de la Constitution fédérale est compétente pour prononcer une telle annulation.

Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, Docket No. 16-499, J. Gorsuch, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment

Common law: Customary international law: Law of nations: Emer de Vattel

Adopting new causes of action may have been a “proper function for common-law courts,” but it is not appropriate “for federal tribunals” mindful of the limits of their constitutional authority. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 287 (2001).

The dissent claims that Congress’s decision to give federal courts “jurisdiction over claims based on ‘the law of nations,’” necessarily implies the authority to develop that law. That does not follow. Federal courts have jurisdiction over all kinds of cases—for example, those arising under the law of torts or contracts. Yet following our decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), federal courts are generally no longer permitted to promulgate new federal common law causes of action in those areas. Id., at 75. I can see no reason to treat the law of nations differently. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692, 744–746 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

You might wonder, for example, if the First Congress considered a “violation of the law of nations” to be a violation of, and thus “arise under,” federal law. But that does not seem likely. At the founding, the law of nations was considered a distinct “system of rules, deducible by natural reason, and established by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the world,” 4 Blackstone 66. While this Court has called international law “part of our law,” The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S. 677, 700 (1900), and a component of the “law of the land,” The Nereide, 9 Cranch 388, 423 (1815), that simply meant international law was no different than the law of torts or contracts—it was “part of the so-called general common law,” but not part of federal law. Sosa, 542 U. S., at 739–740 (opinion of Scalia, J.). See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815, 824, 849 850 (1997); see also Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 Va. J. Int’l L. 365, 374–375 (2002). The text of the Constitution appears to recognize just this distinction. Article I speaks of “Offences against the Law of Nations,” while both Article III and Article VI’s Supremacy Clause, which defines the scope of pre-emptive federal law, omit that phrase while referring to the “Laws of the United States.” Congress may act to bring provisions of international law into federal law, but they cannot find their way there on their own. “The law of nations is not embodied in any provision of the Constitution, nor in any treaty, act of Congress, or any authority, or commission derived from the United States.” Caperton v. Bowyer, 14 Wall. 216, 228 (1872).

(…) (As a leading treatise explained, a sovereign “ought not to suffer his subjects to molest the subjects of others, or to do them an injury, much less should he permit them audaciously to offend foreign powers.” E. de Vattel, 1 The Law of Nations, bk. II, §76, p. 145 (1760). Instead, the nation “ought to oblige the guilty to repair the damage, if that be possible, to inflict on him an exemplary punishment, or, in short, according to the nature of the case, and the circumstances attending it, to deliver him up to the offended state there to receive justice.” Ibid. A sovereign who “refuses to cause a reparation to be made of the damage caused by his subject, or to punish the guilty, or, in short, to deliver him up, renders himself in some measure an accomplice in the injury, and becomes responsible for it.” Id., §77, at 145).

(U.S.S.C., Apr. 24, 2018, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, Docket No. 16-499, J. Gorsuch, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)

Dans la présente "concurring opinion", le Juge Gorsuch expose que l'adoption de nouvelles voies de droit était l'une des fonctions des cours de Common law, mais que tel n'est pas le cas des cours fédérales : depuis la décision Erie v. Tompkins rendue en 1938, les cours fédérales ne sont de manière générale plus autorisées à établir de nouvelles voies de droit dans le domaine contractuel ou délictuel.

Suit une citation de Emer de Vattel.

Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC, Docket No. 16-712, J. Gorsuch, dissenting

Judicial independence: Declaration of Independence: Art. III Court: Common law:

We sometimes take it for granted today that independent judges will hear our cases and controversies. But it wasn’t always so. Before the Revolution, colonial judges depended on the crown for their tenure and salary and often enough their decisions followed their interests. The problem was so serious that the founders cited it in their Declaration of Independence. Once free, the framers went to great lengths to guarantee a degree of judicial independence for future generations that they themselves had not experienced. Under the Constitution, judges “hold their Offices during good Behaviour” and their “Compensation . . . shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.” Art. III, §1. The framers knew that “a fixed provision” for judges’ financial support would help secure “the independence of the judges,” be-cause “a power over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his will.” The Federalist No. 79, p. 472 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). They were convinced, too, that “periodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to the courts’ necessary independence.” The Federalist No. 78, at 471 (A. Hamilton).

“When a suit is made of the stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789 . . . and is brought within the bounds of federal jurisdiction, the responsibility for deciding that suit rests with” Article III judges endowed with the protections for their independence the framers thought so important. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U. S. 462, 484 (2011).

(U.S.S.C., April 24, 2018, Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC, Docket No. 16-712, J. Gorsuch, dissenting)

Les sources de l'indépendance de la justice, Art. III, §1 de la Constitution fédérale (The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office).

Texas v. New Mexico, On Exceptions To Report Of Special Master, Docket No. 141, Orig.

Compact clause: Congressional ratification: Original jurisdiction: Foreign affairs: Intervention (proc.):

Our analysis begins with the Constitution. Its Compact Clause provides that “no State shall, without the Con­sent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Com­pact with another State.” Art. I, §10, cl. 3. Congress’s approval serves to “prevent any compact or agreement between any two States, which might affect injuriously the interests of the others.” Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. 478, 494 (1855). It also ensures that the Legislature can “check any infringement of the rights of the national govern­ment.”  J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §1397, p. 272 (1833) (in subsequent editions, §1403). So, for example, if a proposed interstate agreement might lead to friction with a foreign country or injure the interests of another region of our own, Congress may withhold its approval. But once Congress gives its consent, a compact between States—like any other federal statute—becomes the law of the land. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U. S. 554, 564 (1983).

Our role in compact cases differs from our role in ordi­nary litigation. The Constitution endows this Court with original jurisdiction over disputes between the States. See Art. III, §2. And this Court’s role in these cases is to serve “as a substitute for the diplomatic settlement of contro­versies between sovereigns and a possible resort to force.” Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 6) (quoting North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. S. 365, 372–373 (1923)). As a result, the Court may, “in this singular sphere, . . . ‘regulate and mould the process it uses in such a manner as in its judgment will best pro­mote the purposes of justice.’” 574 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 6–7) (quoting Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 98 (1861)).

Using that special authority, we have sometimes per­mitted the federal government to participate in compact suits to defend “distinctively federal interests” that a normal litigant might not be permitted to pursue in tradi­tional litigation. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 745, n. 21 (1981). At the same time, our permission should not be confused for license. Viewed from some sufficiently abstract level of generality, almost any com­pact between the States will touch on some concern of the national government—foreign affairs, interstate com­merce, taxing and spending. No doubt that is the very reason why the Constitution requires congressional ratifi­cation of state compacts. But just because Congress en­joys a special role in approving interstate agreements, it does not necessarily follow that the United States has blanket authority to intervene in cases concerning the construction of those agreements.

(U.S.S.C., March 5, 2018, Texas v. New Mexico, On Exceptions To Report Of Special Master, Docket No. 141, Orig., J. Gorsuch, unanimous)

Les accords entre états sont soumis à la ratification du Congrès fédéral (Cst féd. Art. I, §10, cl. 3). Le but étant d'éviter l'entrée en vigueur d'accords qui porteraient atteinte aux intérêts d'états tiers, du Gouvernement fédéral, ou de nature à provoquer des frictions avec un état étranger. Une fois l'approbation du Congrès donnée, l'accord acquiert force de droit fédéral.

Les litiges relatifs à ces accords sont à porter devant la Cour Suprême fédérale, qui fonctionne ici comme instance unique avec plein pouvoir d'examen.

Dans ces affaires, la Cour peut autoriser le Gouvernement fédéral à participer à la procédure pour défendre des intérêts fédéraux distincts.

Murphy v. Smith, Docket No. 16-1067

Interpretation (shall/may):

(…) The word “shall” usually creates a mandate, not a liberty, so the verb phrase “shall be applied” tells us that the district court has some nondiscretionary duty to perform. See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U. S. 26, 35 (1998) (“The mandatory ‘shall’ . . . normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion”) (…) If Congress had wished to afford the judge more discretion in this area, it could have easily substituted “may” for “shall.”

Secondary sources: R. Huddleston & G. Pullum, Cambridge Grammar of the English Language, ch. 8, §§1, 12.2, pp. 669, 729–730 (2002); Black’s Law Dictionary 1543 (10th ed. 2014); Oxford English Dictionary 504 (2d ed. 1989); Webster’s New International Dictionary 2220 (2d ed. 1950).

(U.S.S.C., Feb. 21, 2018, Murphy v. Smith, Docket No. 16-1067, J. Gorsuch)

La signification du terme "shall" est ici encore confirmée.

Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, Docket No. 16-1276, J. Thomas, with whom JJ. Alito and Gorsuch join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment

Interpretation (statute): Senate report: Committee report: Legislative history:

I join the Court’s opinion only to the extent it relies on the text of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con­sumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 124 Stat. 1376. The question in this case is whether the term “whistleblower” in Dodd-Frank’s antiretaliation provision, 15 U. S. C.§78u–6(h)(1), includes a person who does not report infor­mation to the Securities and Exchange Commission. The answer is in the definitions section of the statute, which states that the term “whistleblower” means a person who provides “information relating to a violation of the securi­ties laws to the Commission.” §78u–6(a)(6). As the Court observes, this statutory definition “resolves the question before us.” The Court goes on, however, to discuss the supposed “purpose” of the statute, which it primarily derives from a single Senate Report. Even assuming a majority of Con­gress read the Senate Report, agreed with it, and voted for Dodd-Frank with the same intent, “we are a government of laws, not of men, and are governed by what Congress enacted rather than by what it intended.” Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U. S. 429, ___ (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 1). And “it would be a strange canon of statutory construction that would require Congress to state in committee reports . . . that which is obvious on the face of a statute.” Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 592 (1980). For these reasons, I am unable to join the portions of the Court’s opinion that venture beyond the statutory text.

(U.S.S.C, Feb. 21, 2018, Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, Docket No. 16-1276, J. Thomas, with whom JJ. Alito and Gorsuch join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

Dans son opinion concurrente, le Juge Thomas, rejoint par les Juges Gorsuch et Alito, expose que dans la mesure où le texte même de la loi répond à la question posée en l'espèce, il n'est nul besoin pour la Cour de se référer à des travaux législatifs pour éclairer la loi, qui n'a pas à l'être, étant déjà suffisamment claire. Nul besoin non plus dans ce cas de recourir à une interprétation téléologique.

Artis v. District of Columbia, J. Gorsuch, with whom JJ. Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito join, dissenting, Docket No. 16-460

Common law: Statute of limitations: Grace periods: Equitable tolling:

(…) Indeed, grace periods appear to find their roots in a common law rule known as the “journey’s account” that expressly sought to account for and afford to a dismissed party “the number of days which he must spend in jour­neying to the court” to refile his claim. 37 C. J., Limita­tions of Actions §526, p. 1082 (1925); see E. Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 567 (1642) (reprint 1797) (“The common law set downe the certaine time of 15 dayes,” because “a dayes journey is accounted in law 20 miles,” as “a reasonable time . . . within which time wheresoever the court of justice sate in England, the party . . . wheresoever he dwelt in England . . . might . . . by the said account of dayes journies ap­peare in court”); Spencer’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 267,267–268 (1603) (party has “the benefit of a new writ by journeys accompts” after first writ “abated”); Elstob v. Thorowgood, 91 Eng. Rep. 1086, 1087 (1697) (party has 30 days to bring an action “by journeys account” to avoid “the Statute of Limitations”).

(…) Fn. 4: The “principle of journeys account became definitely fixed and somewhat enlarged in England by an early statute. . . . This statute, with varying changes, has been enacted in nearly all of the states of the Union.” 19 American and English Encyclopaedia of Law 262 (2d ed. 1901); Cox, 47 S. E., at 915 (explaining that, “in lieu” of the journey’s account, the colonial act of 1767 permitted “a new action within one year” of dismissal, and then the act of 1847 allowed a new action within six months of dismissal “notwithstanding the intervening bar of the statute”); Denton v. Atchison, 90 P. 764, 765 (Kan. 1907) (statute adopted “the common-law rule of ‘journeys account’ ”); English v. T.H. Rogers Lumber Co., 173 P. 1046, 1048 (Okla. 1918) (“Statutes such as ours are said to have their origin in the common law rule of ‘journeys account’ ”); Baker v. Cohn, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 765, 767 (1943) (“Historically, the extension of one year’s time . . . is said to be an outgrowth of the ancient common law rule of ‘journey’s account’ ”); Sorensen v. Overland Corp., 142 F. Supp. 354, 362 (Del. 1956) (“The statute of ‘journeys’ account’ is one founded under English law, and enacted in most juris­dictions today”); Wilt v. Smack, 147 F. Supp. 700, 702 (ED Pa. 1957) (“Statutes of Journey’s Account originated in England and have long existed, in varying forms, among the states”).

Limitations periods for state law claims fall well within the peculiar province of state sovereign authority. As Chancellor Kent ex­plained, “‘the period sufficient to constitute a bar to the litigation of stale demands, is a question of municipal policy and regulation, and one which belongs to the discre­tion of every government, consulting its own interest and convenience.’” Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U. S. 717, 726 (1988) (quoting 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 462–463 (2d ed. 1832)). Described as “laws for ad­ministering justice,” time bars are “one of the most sacred and important of sovereign rights and duties.” Hawkins v. Barney’s Lessee, 5 Pet. 457, 466 (1831). And “from a re­mote antiquity,” they have been the province of the sover­eign “by which it exercises its legislation for all persons and property within its jurisdiction.” McElmoyle ex rel. Bailey v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 327 (1839). Our States have long “exercised this right in virtue of their sovereignty.”

Ibid.

(…) The propriety of a legal tool in one area does not establish its propriety in all; while stop clock tolling may be standard and off-the-shelf in other contexts (such as for equitable tolling) that doesn’t mean it is necessary and proper here. Indeed, and as we’ve seen, the “standard” and “off-the-shelf” solution to the problem of dismissal and the need to refile is the one adopted at common law and by state law: a grace period. If we’re interested in looking for the right shelf, that’s the one.

(U.S.S.C., Jan 22, 2018, Artis v. District of Columbia, J. Gorsuch, with whom JJ. Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito join, dissenting, Docket No. 16-460)

Les sources de la Common law en matière de suspension de délai et en matière de délai de grâce, citées dans une dissenting opinion du Juge Gorsuch. Cette opinion conteste la décision de la Cour qui applique une suspension de délai pour ouvrir action devant la cour d'un état. Seul un délai de grâce devrait s'appliquer selon le Juge Gorsuch, rejoint en cela par les Juges Kennedy, Alito et Thomas. La dissenting opinion ne remet toutefois pas en cause les principes applicables en matière d'"equitable tolling".