California Court of Appeal, Bartel v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., Docket No. H052083

Statute of Limitations

 

Equitable Tolling

 

Insurance Law

 

Duty to Defend

 

California Law

 

 

 

(…) Chicago Title contends the trial court erred in applying equitable tolling to reject its statute of limitations defense and deciding Bartel’s title insurance action was timely. Bartel counters that the interim judgment properly rejected Chicago Title’s statute of limitations defense and applied equitable tolling consistent with the California Supreme Court’s decision in Lambert, 53 Cal.3d 1072, and with the primary right doctrine. Bartel asserts in the alternative that, even assuming equitable tolling paused upon the dismissals of Composti I and Composti II, it resumed when Bartel timely reasserted tender of defense based on Composti III.

 

 

(Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1191(Aryeh).) “A plaintiff must bring a claim within the limitations period after accrual of the cause of action.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806; see Code Civ. Proc., § 312.) A cause of action typically “accrues at ‘the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.’” (Fox, at p. 806.) “Actions on title insurance policies are subject to a two-year statute of limitation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 339, subd. (1).)” (Lee v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 583, 599.) Accrual of a cause of action upon a contract or policy of title insurance does not occur “until the discovery of the loss or damage suffered by the aggrieved party thereunder.” (Code Civ. Proc., §339, subd. (1).) Certain equitable exceptions “may alter the rules governing either the initial accrual of a claim, the subsequent running of the limitations period, or both.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p.1192.) These exceptions exist “to align the actual application of the limitations defense more closely with the policy goals animating it.”  (Ibid.) Equitable tolling, applied by the trial court here, “may suspend or extend the statute of limitations when a plaintiff has reasonably and in good faith chosen to pursue one among several remedies and the statute of limitations’ notice function has been served.” (Ibid.)

 

In Lambert, our Supreme Court examined whether a cause of action under a title insurance policy alleging a failure to defend accrues when the insurer refuses to defend or when the underlying action is terminated by final judgment. (Lambert, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p.1074.) After considering the statutory language and policies underlying the duty to defend, the court concluded that “although the statutory period commences upon the refusal to defend, it is equitably tolled until the underlying action is terminated by final judgment.” (Id. at p.1077.) While resolution of the statute of limitations is normally a question for the trier of fact, the application of the statute of limitations on undisputed facts is a purely legal question that we review de novo. (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p.1191; see Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1112.)

 

 

We agree with the parties that Lambert guides our resolution of the application of the statute of limitations here. In that decision, our Supreme Court explained, “The duty to defend in a title insurance case is governed by the same principles which govern the duty to defend under general liability policies. The duty commences upon tender of the defense, and continues until the underlying lawsuit is concluded.”  (Lambert, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p.1077.) In rejecting a prior appellate decision that had held that the statute of limitations begins to run upon the rejection of tender, the court stated that such a rule “would allow expiration of the statute of limitations on a lawsuit to vindicate the duty to defend even before the duty itself expires. This grim result is untenable. The insured must be allowed the option of waiting until the duty to defend has expired before filing suit to vindicate that duty.” (Ibid.) The Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations begins to run “upon accrual, which in this case occurs upon the refusal to defend.” (Lambert, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p.1078.) It further decided that the statute of limitation should be equitably tolled between accrual and a final judgment. It reasoned, “the duty to defend is a continuing duty. It is equitable and consistent with the legislative intent to toll the limitations period in which this duty continues from the date of accrual of a cause of action to final judgment.” (Id. at p.1079.)

 

 

The Supreme Court emphasized that its decision was grounded in equitable principles: “It is harsh to require an insured—often a private homeowner—to defend the underlying action, at the homeowner’s own expense, and simultaneously to prosecute—again at the homeowner’s own expense—a separate action against the title company for failure to defend. ‘The unexpected burden of defending an action may itself make it impractical to immediately bear the additional cost and hardship of prosecuting a collateral action against an insurer.’” (Lambert, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p.1078.) The court reasoned that this rule would not prejudice the insurer. “By tendering defense of a third party action to an insurer, the insured will have put the insurer on notice that it may be required under the policy to defend the action. Thus, the insured [sic] will be aware that it must take the steps necessary to prepare and preserve a defense to an action by its insured.” (Id. at p. 1079.) Moreover, an insured has the option of bringing suit against the insurer prior to the entry of final judgment in the underlying litigation. Nothing “prohibits the insured from commencing an action once the insurer has refused a tender of defense. We merely conclude that the insured is not required to do so.” (Id. at p.1080.)

 

 

Applying the principles articulated in Lambert to the facts here, we decide that Bartel’s title insurance action against Chicago Title was timely. Composti filed Composti I, which asserted a right-of-way easement benefiting Composti’s parcel over Bartel’s parcel, on May 25, 2010. Bartel tendered defense to Chicago Title in Composti I on March 18, 2011, triggering Chicago Title’s duty to defend. (See Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, 46 (Buss) [stating the duty to defend “arises as soon as tender is made”].)

 

 

On July 27, 2011, Chicago Title declined (in connection with Composti II) to accept tender. Bartel’s claim against Chicago Title therefore accrued on July 27, 2011. Under the principles articulated in Lambert, the claim was equitably tolled until October 16, 2012, the date on which Composti II was dismissed without prejudice. Beginning on that date, Bartel had two years—that is, until October 16, 2014—to bring a claim against Chicago Title for violation of its duty to defend in Composti I and Composti II.

 

 

We reject Bartel’s contention that equitable tolling continues after a dismissal without prejudice. The duty to defend is bound to the pendency of the underlying action and terminates upon its conclusion. Once dismissed, there is no pending action on that claim, regardless of whether a future action arises. (See Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 650, 666 [“Claims that have been dismissed, whether with or without prejudice, are not ‘pending.’”].) (Fn. 10).

 

 

On September 5, 2014 (over one month before the running of the statute of limitations from the dismissal of Composti II), Bartel again tendered defense to Chicago Title. Under the Supreme Court’s analysis in Lambert, this tender of defense triggered Chicago Title’s duty to defend.  (See Lambert, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p.1077 [“The duty commences upon tender of the defense, and continues until the underlying lawsuit is concluded.”].) We decide that, on these facts, Bartel’s tender of the defense equitably tolled the statute of limitations for bringing suit against Chicago Title as of the date of the tender.  

 

 

 

(California Court of Appeal, Bartel v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., May 30, 2025, Docket No. H052083, Certified for Publication)

 

 

 

 

 

Artis v. District of Columbia, J. Gorsuch, with whom JJ. Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito join, dissenting, Docket No. 16-460

Common law: Statute of limitations: Grace periods: Equitable tolling:

(…) Indeed, grace periods appear to find their roots in a common law rule known as the “journey’s account” that expressly sought to account for and afford to a dismissed party “the number of days which he must spend in jour­neying to the court” to refile his claim. 37 C. J., Limita­tions of Actions §526, p. 1082 (1925); see E. Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 567 (1642) (reprint 1797) (“The common law set downe the certaine time of 15 dayes,” because “a dayes journey is accounted in law 20 miles,” as “a reasonable time . . . within which time wheresoever the court of justice sate in England, the party . . . wheresoever he dwelt in England . . . might . . . by the said account of dayes journies ap­peare in court”); Spencer’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 267,267–268 (1603) (party has “the benefit of a new writ by journeys accompts” after first writ “abated”); Elstob v. Thorowgood, 91 Eng. Rep. 1086, 1087 (1697) (party has 30 days to bring an action “by journeys account” to avoid “the Statute of Limitations”).

(…) Fn. 4: The “principle of journeys account became definitely fixed and somewhat enlarged in England by an early statute. . . . This statute, with varying changes, has been enacted in nearly all of the states of the Union.” 19 American and English Encyclopaedia of Law 262 (2d ed. 1901); Cox, 47 S. E., at 915 (explaining that, “in lieu” of the journey’s account, the colonial act of 1767 permitted “a new action within one year” of dismissal, and then the act of 1847 allowed a new action within six months of dismissal “notwithstanding the intervening bar of the statute”); Denton v. Atchison, 90 P. 764, 765 (Kan. 1907) (statute adopted “the common-law rule of ‘journeys account’ ”); English v. T.H. Rogers Lumber Co., 173 P. 1046, 1048 (Okla. 1918) (“Statutes such as ours are said to have their origin in the common law rule of ‘journeys account’ ”); Baker v. Cohn, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 765, 767 (1943) (“Historically, the extension of one year’s time . . . is said to be an outgrowth of the ancient common law rule of ‘journey’s account’ ”); Sorensen v. Overland Corp., 142 F. Supp. 354, 362 (Del. 1956) (“The statute of ‘journeys’ account’ is one founded under English law, and enacted in most juris­dictions today”); Wilt v. Smack, 147 F. Supp. 700, 702 (ED Pa. 1957) (“Statutes of Journey’s Account originated in England and have long existed, in varying forms, among the states”).

Limitations periods for state law claims fall well within the peculiar province of state sovereign authority. As Chancellor Kent ex­plained, “‘the period sufficient to constitute a bar to the litigation of stale demands, is a question of municipal policy and regulation, and one which belongs to the discre­tion of every government, consulting its own interest and convenience.’” Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U. S. 717, 726 (1988) (quoting 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 462–463 (2d ed. 1832)). Described as “laws for ad­ministering justice,” time bars are “one of the most sacred and important of sovereign rights and duties.” Hawkins v. Barney’s Lessee, 5 Pet. 457, 466 (1831). And “from a re­mote antiquity,” they have been the province of the sover­eign “by which it exercises its legislation for all persons and property within its jurisdiction.” McElmoyle ex rel. Bailey v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 327 (1839). Our States have long “exercised this right in virtue of their sovereignty.”

Ibid.

(…) The propriety of a legal tool in one area does not establish its propriety in all; while stop clock tolling may be standard and off-the-shelf in other contexts (such as for equitable tolling) that doesn’t mean it is necessary and proper here. Indeed, and as we’ve seen, the “standard” and “off-the-shelf” solution to the problem of dismissal and the need to refile is the one adopted at common law and by state law: a grace period. If we’re interested in looking for the right shelf, that’s the one.

(U.S.S.C., Jan 22, 2018, Artis v. District of Columbia, J. Gorsuch, with whom JJ. Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito join, dissenting, Docket No. 16-460)

Les sources de la Common law en matière de suspension de délai et en matière de délai de grâce, citées dans une dissenting opinion du Juge Gorsuch. Cette opinion conteste la décision de la Cour qui applique une suspension de délai pour ouvrir action devant la cour d'un état. Seul un délai de grâce devrait s'appliquer selon le Juge Gorsuch, rejoint en cela par les Juges Kennedy, Alito et Thomas. La dissenting opinion ne remet toutefois pas en cause les principes applicables en matière d'"equitable tolling".

California Public Employees' Retirement System v. ANZ Securities, Inc., Docket 16-373

Repose: Statute of repose: Statute of limitations: Tolling: Equitable tolling: Common law: Dismissal: Class action:

The Securities Act of 1933 “protects investors by ensur­ing that companies issuing securities . . . make a ‘full and fair disclosure of information’ relevant to a public offer­ing.” Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Industry Pension Fund, 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 1) (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U. S. 622, 646 (1988)); see 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §77a et seq. Com­panies may offer securities to the public only after filing a registration statement, which must contain information about the company and the security for sale. Omnicare, 575 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 1–2). Section 11 of the Securities Act “promotes compliance with these disclosure provisions by giving purchasers a right of action against an issuer or designated individuals,” including securities underwriters, for any material misstatements or omis­sions in a registration statement. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 2); see 15 U. S. C. §77k(a).

The Act provides time limits for §11 suits. These time limits are set forth in a two-sentence section of the Act, §13. It provides as follows:

“No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under [§11] unless brought within one year af­ter the discovery of the untrue statement or the omis­sion, or after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence . . . . In no event shall any such action be brought to enforce a li­ability created under [§11] more than three years after the security was bona fide offered to the public . . . .” 15 U. S. C. §77m.

So there are two time bars in the quoted provision; and the second one, the 3-year bar, is central to this case.

The question then is whether §13 permits the filing of an individual complaint more than three years after the relevant securities offering, when a class-action complaint was timely filed, and the plaintiff filing the individual complaint would have been a member of the class but for opting out of it. The answer turns on the nature and purpose of the 3-year bar and of the tolling rule that peti­tioner seeks to invoke.

As the Court explained in CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U. S. ___ (2014), statutory time bars can be divided into two categories: statutes of limitations and statutes of repose. Both “are mechanisms used to limit the temporal extent or duration of liability for tortious acts,” but “each has a distinct purpose.” Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 5–6).

Statutes of limitations are designed to encourage plain­tiffs “to pursue diligent prosecution of known claims.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 6). In accord with that objective, limitations periods begin to run “when the cause of action accrues”—that is, “when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 5). In a personal-injury or property-damage action, for example, more often than not this will be “‘when the injury occurred or was discovered.’” Ibid.

In contrast, statutes of repose are enacted to give more explicit and certain protection to defendants. These stat­utes “effect a legislative judgment that a defendant should be free from liability after the legislatively determined period of time.” Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 6–7). For this reason, statutes of repose begin to run on “the date of the last culpable act or omission of the defendant.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 6).

The 3-year time bar in §13 reflects the legislative objec­tive to give a defendant a complete defense to any suit after a certain period. From the structure of §13, and the language of its second sentence, it is evident that the 3 ­year bar is a statute of repose. In fact, this Court has already described the provision as establishing “a period of repose,” which “‘imposes an outside limit’” on temporal liability. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U. S. 350, 363 (1991).

(…) Confirmed by the two-sentence structure of §13. In addition to the 3-year time bar, §13 contains a 1­ year statute of limitations. The limitations statute runs from the time when the plaintiff discovers (or should have discovered) the securities-law violation. The pairing of a shorter statute of limitations and a longer statute of re­pose is a common feature of statutory time limits. See, e.g., Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U. S. 442, 453 (2013) (“Statutes applying a discovery rule . . . often couple that rule with an absolute provision for repose”). The two periods work together: The discovery rule gives leeway to a plaintiff who has not yet learned of a violation, while the rule of repose protects the defendant from an interminable threat of liability. Cf. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U. S. 633, 650 (2010) (reasoning that 2-year discovery rule would not “subject defendants to liability for acts taken long ago,” because the statute also included an “unqualified bar on actions instituted ‘5 years after such violation’”).

The determination that the 3-year period is a statute of repose is critical in this case, for the question whether a tolling rule applies to a given statutory time bar is one “of statutory intent.” Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U. S. 1, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 8). The purpose of a statute of repose is to create “an absolute bar on a defendant’s tem­poral liability,” CTS, 573 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6); and that purpose informs the assessment of whether, and when, tolling rules may apply.

In light of the purpose of a statute of repose, the provi­sion is in general not subject to tolling. Tolling is permis­sible only where there is a particular indication that the legislature did not intend the statute to provide complete repose but instead anticipated the extension of the statu­tory period under certain circumstances.

For example, if the statute of repose itself contains an express exception, this demonstrates the requisite intent to alter the operation of the statutory period. See 1 C. Corman, Limitation of Actions §1.1, pp. 4–5 (1991) (Corman); see, e.g., 29 U. S. C. §1113 (establishing a 6-year statute of repose, but stipulating that, in case of fraud, the 6-year period runs from the plaintiff ’s discovery of the violation). In contrast, where the legislature enacts a general tolling rule in a different part of the code—e.g., a rule that suspends time limits until the plaintiff reaches the age of majority—courts must analyze the nature and relation of the legislative purpose of each provision to determine which controls. See 2 Corman §10.2.1, at 108.

Of course, not all tolling rules derive from legislative enactments. Some derive from the traditional power of the courts to “‘apply the principles . . . of equity jurispru­dence.’” Young v. United States, 535 U. S. 43, 50 (2002). The classic example is the doctrine of equitable tolling, which permits a court to pause a statutory time limit “when a litigant has pursued his rights diligently but some extraordinary circumstance prevents him from bringing a timely action.” Lozano, 572 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7). Tolling rules of that kind often apply to statutes of limitations based on the presumption that Congress “‘legislates against a background of common-law adjudicatory principles.’” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8).

The purpose and effect of a statute of repose, by con­trast, is to override customary tolling rules arising from the equitable powers of courts. By establishing a fixed limit, a statute of repose implements a “‘legislative deci­sion that as a matter of policy there should be a specific time beyond which a defendant should no longer be sub­jected to protracted liability.’” CTS, 573 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7). The unqualified nature of that determination supersedes the courts’ residual authority and forecloses the extension of the statutory period based on equitable principles. For this reason, the Court repeatedly has stated in broad terms that statutes of repose are not sub­ject to equitable tolling. See, e.g., id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 7–8); Lampf, Pleva, 501 U. S., at 363.

Petitioner makes an alternative argument that does not depend on tolling. Petitioner submits its individual suit was timely in any event. Section 13 provides that an “action” must be “brought” within three years of the rele­vant securities offering. See 15 U. S. C. §77m. Petitioner argues that requirement is met here because the filing of the class-action complaint “brought” petitioner’s individual “action” within the statutory time period. This argument rests on the premise that an “action” is “brought” when substantive claims are presented to any court, rather than when a particular complaint is filed in a particular court. The term “action,” however, refers to a judicial “proceeding,” or perhaps to a “suit”—not to the general content of claims. See Black’s Law Dictionary 41 (3d ed. 1933) (defining “action” as, inter alia, “an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice”); see also id., at 43 (“The terms ‘action’ and ‘suit’ are . . . nearly, if not entirely, synonymous”). Whether or not petitioner’s individual complaint alleged the same securities law violations as the class-action complaint, it defies ordinary understanding to suggest that its filing—in a separate forum, on a separate date, by a separate named party—was the same “action,” “proceeding,” or “suit.”

The limitless nature of petitioner’s argument, further­more, reveals its implausibility. It appears that, in peti­tioner’s view, the bringing of the class action would make any subsequent action raising the same claims timely. Taken to its logical limit, an individual action would be timely even if it were filed decades after the original secu­rities offering—provided a class-action complaint had been filed at some point within the initial 3-year period. Con­gress would not have intended this result.

Secondary authorities: C. Corman, Limitation of Actions §1.1, pp. 4–5 (1991); Black’s Law Dictionary 41 (3d ed. 1933).

(U.S.S.C., June 26, 2017, California Public Employees' Retirement System v. ANZ Securities, Inc., Docket 16-373, J. Kennedy).

Péremption et prescription, suspension d'un délai :

L'émetteur de papiers-valeurs engage sa responsabilité pour ses déclarations inexactes ou pour ses omissions, au sens de la Section 11 du Securities Act de 1933.

Les délais sont régis par la Section 13 : un délai d'une année pour ouvrir action, à partir de la connaissance de la déclaration inexacte ou de l'omission, ou à partir du jour où dite connaissance aurait dû raisonnablement survenir. En aucun cas l'action ne peut-elle être déposée plus de trois ans après la mise à disposition publique, de bonne foi, des papiers-valeurs.

La question est de savoir si le second de ces deux délais est de péremption, et s'il peut être judiciairement suspendu en équité.

Dans la présente affaire, un demandeur était partie à une action de classe déposée dans le délai d'un an. Par la suite, dit demandeur s'est retiré de la procédure et a ouvert action individuellement, mais hors du délai de trois ans précité.

Les délais de prescription visent à encourager les demandeurs à agir de manière diligente dans un certain délai. De la sorte, le dies a quo par exemple en matière de dommage corporel ou matériel est le plus souvent le jour de la survenance du préjudice, ou le jour de la connaissance par la victime de son préjudice.

Par contraste, les délais de péremption visent la protection des défendeurs. Ils sont le résultat de la réflexion du législateur portant sur la période de temps après laquelle un défendeur échappe à toute responsabilité. De la sorte, le dies a quo de ces délais est le jour du dernier acte ou omission illicite du défendeur.

Le délai de trois ans de la Section 13, de par la structure et le texte de dite loi (cf. sa seconde phrase ci-dessus), reflète l'intention du législateur d'immuniser le défendeur de toute responsabilité après complet écoulement. Il s'agit ici d'un délai de péremption.

La structure de la loi – un délai de prescription plus court suivi d'un délai de péremption plus long – est typique s'agissant de l'ordonnancement des deux types de délai.

Seuls les délais de prescription peuvent être suspendus, notamment par le Juge statuant en équité (cependant, l'intention du législateur est décisive à cet égard, de sorte que le législateur peut prévoir un délai de péremption susceptible d'être suspendu, à des conditions bien définies).

Par exemple, si le délai de péremption tel que stipulé prévoit lui-même une exception expresse, l'intention du législateur est claire.

Toutes les règles régissant la suspension d'un délai ne dérivent pas d'une décision du législateur. Certaines de ces règles proviennent de la compétence traditionnelle des Tribunaux d'appliquer les principes jurisprudentiels de l'"equity". L'exemple classique est la doctrine de la suspension équitable, qui permet à un Tribunal de suspendre un délai quand une partie a procédé avec diligence, mais qu'une circonstance extraordinaire l'a empêchée d'agir judiciairement dans le délai. Ce type de règle est basé sur la présomption que le Congrès légifère en conformité avec la jurisprudence découlant de la Common law.

Par contraste, le but et l'effet d'un délai de péremption est de se substituer aux règles habituelles de suspension des délais établies par la jurisprudence statuant en équité. En établissant un tel délai de péremption, le législateur estime d'intérêt public de fixer une limite au-delà de laquelle la responsabilité du défendeur ne peut plus être engagée.

De manière alternative, le recourant soutient que dans la mesure où sa participation à l'action de classe est intervenue pendant le délai de 3 ans, son action individuelle, déposée après l'échéance de ce délai, ne serait pas tardive. C'est à tort. Les deux actions, déposées auprès de Tribunaux différents, à des dates différentes, par des parties nommées différemment, doivent être considérées comme deux actions différentes. Considérer ces deux actions comme équivalentes reviendrait à juger recevable le dépôt d'une action individuelle des dizaines d'années après le dépôt de l'action de classe, dans l'hypothèse où cette dernière aurait été déposée dans le délai de trois ans. Le Congrès n'a jamais prévu un tel résultat.

J.M. v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., S230510

Tolling: Equitable tolling: Equity: Equitable remedies: Deadline: Statute of limitations:

The doctrine of equitable tolling may also apply to the limitation periods imposed by the claims statutes.  Addison v. State of California (1978) 21 Cal.3d 313 (Addison) recognized “a general policy which favors relieving plaintiff from the bar of a limitations statute when, possessing several legal remedies he, reasonably and in good faith, pursues one designed to lessen the extent of his injuries or damage.”  (Id. at p. 317; see McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 100.)  In Addison, the plaintiffs presented a timely claim.  When it was rejected they filed a federal lawsuit, which was eventually dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  In these circumstances, the period for suing in state court was equitably tolled during the pendency of the federal action.  The elements of timely notice, lack of prejudice to the defendant, and reasonable good faith conduct by the plaintiff were satisfied.  (Addison, at p. 319.)

Here, the Court of Appeal rejected J.M.’s equitable tolling argument because he did not pursue an alternate remedy.  J.M. contends he did, by filing a complaint simultaneously with his petition for relief under section 946.6.  The complaint does not appear in the record, though a trial court register refers to one.  In any event, it is not “reasonable” to pursue a court action when the claims filing requirements have not been satisfied, nor did J.M. ever provide the District with “timely notice.”  (Addison, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 319; see Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363, 371 (Lantzy) [“equitable tolling should not apply if it is ‘inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute’ ”].)  More fundamentally, there was no limitation period that might have been tolled by the filing of a complaint.  The period for seeking relief from the District’s deemed denial had already expired by the time counsel acted.

We note that pursuit of an alternate remedy is not always required for equitable tolling.  The doctrine is applied flexibly to “ensure fundamental practicality and fairness.”  (Lantzy, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 370; see Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Actions, § 694 et seq., p. 914 et seq.)  But J.M. advances no sufficient basis for equitable tolling here.  “As with other general equitable principles, application of the equitable tolling doctrine requires a balancing of the injustice to the plaintiff occasioned by the bar of his claim against the effect upon the important public interest or policy expressed by the Government Claims Act limitations statute.”  (Addison, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 321.)  J.M. fails to establish an injustice.  He simply failed to comply with the claims statutes, missing an easily ascertainable deadline that has been in place for over 50 years.  (See Stats. 1965, ch. 653, § 22, p. 2016.)  If oversight of such plain rules justified equitable relief, the structure of the Government Claims Act would be substantially undermined, and its provisions for timely notice to public entities subverted.

Secondary sources: Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Actions, § 694 et seq., p. 914 et seq.

(Cal. S. C., March 6, 2017, J.M. v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., S230510).

Suspension d'un délai :

"Equitable tolling", une doctrine qui permet d'obtenir la suspension d'un délai, s'applique également dans le domaine des actions en réparation d'un préjudice, singulièrement, comme ici, quand le défendeur est une administration.

La jurisprudence reconnaît le principe général de ne pas opposer l'échéance d'un délai à une partie qui a dans un premier temps choisi de bonne foi une procédure en réparation qui s'est par la suite révélée ne pas être le bon choix. De la sorte, cette partie doit pouvoir choisir de présenter ses prétentions selon d'autres modalités sans que le délai échu ne puisse lui être opposé. A cette fin, le délai sera suspendu pendant la première procédure. Cas d'un demandeur qui saisit la cour de district fédérale, demande rejetée pour défaut de compétence matérielle. Le délai pour saisir la cour de l'état est suspendu pendant la durée de la procédure fédérale antérieure.

La suspension d'un délai ne peut pas être accordée si elle est inconsistante avec les dispositions légales applicables à l'affaire.

La conduite d'une procédure alternative n'est pas systématiquement exigée pour permettre la suspension équitable d'un délai. Dite doctrine de suspension est appliquée de manière flexible, pour assurer une solution pragmatique et équitable. Comme pour les autres théories juridiques relevant de l'équité s'agit-il de mettre en balance : ici l'injustice causée au demandeur par l'échéance d'un délai avec l'intérêt public important au respect des délais fixés par le droit des dommages-intérêts.

Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez

Child abduction: Hague Convention: statutes of limitations: equitable tolling:

when one parent abducts a child and flees to another country, the other parent may file a petition in that country for the return of the child pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Interna­tional Child Abduction (Hague Convention or Convention). If the parent files a petition within one year of the child’s removal, a court “shall order the return of the child forthwith.” But when the petition is filed after the 1-year period expires, the court “shall . . . order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment.” Respondent Montoya Alvarez and petitioner Lozano resided with their daughter in London until November 2008, when Montoya Alva­rez left with the child for a women’s shelter. In July 2009, Montoya Alvarez and the child left the United Kingdom and ultimately settled in New York. Lozano did not locate Montoya Alvarez and the child until November 2010, more than 16 months after Montoya Alvarez and the child had left the United Kingdom. At that point, Lozano filed a Petition for Return of Child pursuant to the Hague Convention in the Southern District of New York. Finding that the petition was filed more than one year after removal, the court denied the petition on the basis that the child was now settled in New York. It also held that the 1-year period could not be extended by equitable tolling. The Second Circuit affirmed.

Held: Article 12’s 1-year period is not subject to equitable tolling.

The doctrine of equitable tolling, as applied to federal statutes of limitations, extends an otherwise discrete limitations period set by Congress. Thus, whether tolling is available is fundamentally a question of statutory intent. Because Congress “legislates against a background of common-law adjudicatory principles,” Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U. S. 104, 108, including equita­ble tolling, see Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 397, equitable tolling is presumed to apply if the period in question is a statute of limitations and if tolling is consistent with the statute, Young v. United States, 535 U. S. 43, 49–50; in assessing whether equitable tolling applies to treaties, which are “ ‘compacts between independent nations,’ ” Medellín v. Texas, 552 U. S. 491, 505, this Court’s “duty is to ascertain the intent of the parties” by looking to the document’s text and context, United States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U. S. 494, 535. The parties to the Hague Convention did not intend equitable tolling to apply to Article 12’s 1-year period;

There is no general presumption that equitable tolling applies to treaties. Though part of the established backdrop of American law, equitable tolling has no proper role in the interpretation of trea­ties unless that principle is shared by the parties to the “agreement among sovereign powers,” Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516U. S. 217, 226.

Lozano has identified no such shared principle among the Convention signatories, and the courts of several signatories have explicitly rejected equitable tolling of the Convention;

Thus, the American presumption does not apply to this multilateral treaty. The International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U. S. C. §§11601–11610, which Congress enacted to implement the Conven­tion, neither addresses the availability of equitable tolling nor pur­ports to alter the Convention, and therefore does not affect this con­clusion (U.S.S.Ct., 05.03.2014, Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, Docket 12-820, J. Thomas, unanimous).

Enlèvement d’enfants : Convention de la Haie : délais : suspensions équitables des délais : lorsqu’un parent enlève un enfant et s’enfuit dans un autre pays, l’autre parent peut déposer une demande dans le pays de destination, requérant le retour de l’enfant, conformément à la Convention de la Haie sur les aspects civils de l’enlèvement international d’enfants. Si le parent lésé dépose sa demande dans le délai d’un an dès le déplacement de l’enfant, le Tribunal doit ordonner le retour de l’enfant. Mais lorsque la demande est déposée après l’expiration du délai d’un an, le Tribunal doit ordonner le retour de l’enfant, à moins qu’il ne soit démontré que l’enfant est intégré dans son nouvel environnement. Ce délai d’un an ne saurait être prolongé. Le parent qui cherche à obtenir le retour de l’enfant n’est pas lésé par l’impossibilité juridique de prolonger ce délai d’un an. En effet, l’expiration de ce délai n’entraîne aucune péremption de ses droits. L’expiration de cette période d’une année permet à d’autres intérêts, à savoir ceux de l’enfant, d’être pris en compte, par l’invocation possible d’une intégration de l’enfant dans son nouvel environnement. La doctrine de la suspension équitable  d’un délai, appliquée à du droit fédéral, peut permettre l’extension d’un délai prévu par le Congrès fédéral. Ainsi, la question de savoir si la suspension est possible est fondamentalement une question d’intention se dégageant de la loi au sens formel. La suspension équitable d’un délai sera présumée admise si elle est conforme à la loi qui l’établi. S’il est question, comme en l’espèce, de savoir si un délai établi par une Convention internationale peut être équitablement suspendu, il s’agit de consulter l’intention des parties à la Convention, en examinant le texte et le contexte de la Convention. Les parties à la présente Convention de la Haie n’ont pas eu l’intention de prévoir une suspension équitable du délai d’un an précité.  Il n’existe aucune présomption générale selon laquelle le principe de la suspension équitable d’un délai s’applique à une Convention internationale.  Nonobstant leur appartenance à l’arrière plan établi du droit américain, la notion de suspension équitable d’un délai n’a pas de rôle propre dans l’interprétation des traités internationaux à moins que ce principe de suspension équitable ne soit partagé par les parties au traité conclu par des pouvoirs souverains. Le parent lésé dans cette affaire n’est pas parvenu à établir l’existence d’un tel principe partagé par les signataires de la Convention de la Haie, et les juridictions de plusieurs états signataires ont explicitement rejeté la suspension équitable dans le cadre de l’application de la Convention. La loi fédérale d’application de la Convention de la Haie ne traite pas de la disponibilité de la suspension équitable, et n’a pas vocation à modifier la Convention sur ce point.

Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.

ERISA: Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA): statute of limitations:

While ERISA does not provide a statute of limitations, the contractual 3-year limitations period was in this case enforceable.

The courts of appeals require participants in an employee bene­fit plan covered by ERISA to exhaust the plan’s administrative reme­dies before filing suit to recover benefits. A plan participant’s cause of action under ERISA §502(a)(1)(B),  29 U. S. C.§1132(a)(1)(B), therefore, does not accrue until the plan issues a final denial. But it does not follow that a plan and its participants cannot agree to commence the limitations period be­fore that time; the rule set forth in Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U. S. 586, 608, provides that a contractual limi­tations provision is enforceable so long as the limitations period is of reasonable length and there is no controlling statute to the contrary. That is the appropriate framework for determining the enforceability of the Plan’s limitations provision. The Wolfe approach necessarily allows parties to agree both to the length of a limitations period and to its commencement; the principle that contractual limitations provisions should ordinarily be enforced as written is especially appropriate in the con­text of an ERISA plan; here the Plan’s period is not unreasonably short. Applicable regu­lations mean for mainstream claims to be resolved by plans in about one year; this Court rejects the contentions of Heimeshoff and the United States that the limitations provision is unenforceable because it will undermine ERISA’s two-tiered remedial scheme; it is also unlikely that enforcing limitations periods that begin to run before the internal review process is exhausted will en­danger judicial review. To the extent that administrators attempt to prevent judicial review by delaying the resolution of claims in bad faith, the penalty for failure to meet the regulatory deadlines is im­mediate access to judicial review for the participant; moreover, courts are well equipped to apply traditional doctrines, such as waiver or estoppel, see, e.g., Thompson v. Phenix Ins. Co., 136 U. S. 287, 298–299, and equitable tolling, see, e.g., Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95, that nevertheless may allow partic­ipants to proceed; finally, plans offering appeals or dispute resolu­tion beyond what is contemplated in the internal review regulations must agree to toll the limitations provision during that time. 29 CFR §2560.503–1(c)(3)(ii) (U.S.S.Ct., 16.12.2013, Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., Docket 12-729, J. Thomas, unanimous).

ERISA : prescription : la loi ne prévoit pas de délai de prescription. Les bénéficiaires de prestations d’un plan régi par ERISA sont tenus d’épuiser la voie administrative avant de saisir les cours fédérales. Le délai de prescription pour agir devant la cour fédérale ne commence pas à courir avant que ne soit terminée la procédure administrative. Toutefois les participants au plan et le plan peuvent convenir de faire partir le délai de prescription à une date antérieure à la fin de la procédure administrative. La jurisprudence de la Cour prévoit qu’une réglementation contractuelle de la prescription (début du délai de prescription et durée de ce délai) est admissible si le délai de prescription est d’une durée raisonnable et n’est pas contraire à une disposition légale en vigueur.

En l’espèce, un délai de prescription conventionnel de 3 ans est admissible. Il n’est pas déraisonnablement court dans la mesure où les prétentions classiques dirigées contre les plans sont réglées en environ une année selon le droit de procédure administrative applicable ici. En outre, si l’administrateur du plan tente d’empêcher la saisine de la cour fédérale en freinant de mauvaise foi la procédure, donc en ne respectant ainsi pas les délais administratifs, le requérant peut saisir la cour fédérale sans attendre. Par ailleurs, les théories traditionnelles du Waiver, de l’estoppel et de la suspension équitable du délai de prescription peuvent être appliquées si nécessaire, permettant ainsi au requérant un accès à la cour fédérale. Enfin, les plans qui prévoient des moyens de procédure administrative internes qui vont au-delà du minimum prévu par la loi doivent aussi prévoir une suspension du délai de prescription pendant le déroulement des procédés supplémentaires.