U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Dental Dynamics, LLC, v. Jolly Dental Group, LLC, Docket No. 18-6107

Personal Jurisdiction

Specific Jurisdiction

Bill of Sale

Opinion Letter Sent from an Out-of-State Law Firm

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

Oklahoma Law

This case presents a question of personal jurisdiction. Namely, whether a federal court sitting in Oklahoma has specific personal jurisdiction over Dr. Scott Jolly—a dentist and Arkansas resident—and the limited liability company through which he runs his dentistry practice, Jolly Dental Group, LLC. The plaintiff below, Dental Dynamics, LLC, argues that three isolated business interactions and an allegedly fraudulent contract suffice to establish federal court jurisdiction over its breach of contract and fraud claims.

We disagree. With respect to Dental Dynamics’s breach of contract claim, Jolly Dental’s contacts with Oklahoma are too random, fortuitous, and attenuated to establish personal jurisdiction there. With respect to Dental Dynamics’s fraud claim, we conclude that Dental Dynamics fails to show Dr. Jolly’s allegedly tortious conduct sufficiently targeted Oklahoma to establish personal jurisdiction there. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Dental Dynamics’s claims for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Since 2008, Dr. Jolly has inquired into prospective business transactions with Dental Dynamics on three occasions. First, in 2008, Dr. Jolly contacted Dental Dynamics regarding the potential sale of a pre-owned piece of equipment he owned. Haller informed Dr. Jolly that she could not sell the machine. Next, in May 2017, Dr. Jolly engaged Dental Dynamics to broker the sale of a 2014 Planmex Promax MID X-Ray Unit (X-Ray unit) that is the subject of the present lawsuit. Third, in June 2017, Dr. Jolly contacted Dental Dynamics regarding the purchase of a separate X-Ray unit. Jolly Dental paid Dental Dynamics the purchase price for this unit. But after a defect was discovered with the machine, Dental Dynamics returned the purchase price to Jolly Dental.1 The parties prepared and executed these transactions through telephonic, email, and text communications.

Dental Dynamics’s present claims arise out of the second transaction. On or around May 20, 2017, Dental Dynamics secured the sale of the X-Ray unit from Jolly Dental to Dr. Joiner, a dentist practicing in California. On May 26, 2017, Jolly Dental, through Dr. Jolly, executed a bill of sale selling the X-Ray unit to Dental Dynamics. The bill of sale represents that the X-Ray unit is in “perfect working condition” and that the sale includes the X-Ray unit’s hardware, software, manuals, and “all accessories and any other items pertaining” to the X- Ray unit. Id. at 14–15. The negotiations pertaining to the bill of sale were conducted through text messages and email. To pay for the X-Ray unit and associated items, “Dr. Joiner tendered the sales price to Dental Dynamics in Oklahoma, and Dental Dynamics subsequently mailed a check . . . to Dr. Jolly.” Id. at 36.

The bill of sale notes that “disassembly, packaging, and shipment” would be handled by an independent support company. Id. at 14. Dental Dynamics does not dispute that the X-Ray unit was shipped directly from Dr. Jolly’s offices in Arkansas to Dr. Joiner’s offices in California without ever entering Oklahoma. After receipt of the X-Ray unit, Dr. Joiner discovered that it was not in perfect working condition as represented. Due to certain defects and missing hardware and software, the X-Ray unit Dr. Joiner received was “worthless” in that it would “cost more to repair than to purchase a brand new unit.” Id. at 9–10. Dr. Joiner notified Dental Dynamics of the X-Ray unit’s unsatisfactory condition.

In turn, Dental Dynamics brought the present action in federal court in Oklahoma, alleging breach of contract against Jolly Dental and fraud against Dr. Jolly. Dental Dynamics alleges Jolly Dental breached its contractual obligations outlined in the bill of sale by “failing to properly disassemble and crate the X-Ray Unit; failing to provide the software and computer hardware required . . . and materially misrepresenting the condition of the X-Ray Unit.” Id. at 10. With respect to its fraud allegations, Dental Dynamics alleges Dr. Jolly knowingly made false representations regarding the X-Ray unit’s condition and his intention to satisfactorily disassemble and crate the X-Ray unit to induce Dental Dynamics to secure the sale of the unit.

In response, Dr. Jolly and Jolly Dental (together Jolly Dental) moved to dismiss the action for lack of specific personal jurisdiction. Jolly Dental argues it lacks the requisite minimum contacts with Oklahoma to establish jurisdiction and that, even if the minimum contacts test is satisfied, exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable.

The district court granted Jolly Dental’s motion, holding Dental Dynamics failed to establish specific personal jurisdiction over either its breach of contract or fraud claim.

To show personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in a diversity action, Dental Dynamics must demonstrate that jurisdiction is proper under the laws of the forum state—in this case Oklahoma—and that the exercise of jurisdiction complies with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 282 (2014); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). This requires us to focus on state law, and particularly, the relevant state’s long-arm statute. That statute establishes the extent to which the state intends its courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents. Oklahoma’s long-arm statute authorizes courts to “exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States.” Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 12, § 2004(F). Neither party raises any objection based on the Oklahoma constitution. Accordingly, the analysis collapses into a single due process inquiry. See Old Republic, 877 F.3d at 903; Newsome v. Gallacher, 722 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th Cir. 2013).

The Due Process Clause authorizes personal jurisdiction if two elements are met. First, a defendant must have “purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum state.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Second, the assertion of personal jurisdiction must comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).

The minimum contacts test for specific personal jurisdiction has two requirements: (1) a defendant must have “purposefully directed its activities at residents of the forum state,” and (2) the plaintiff’s injuries must arise out of the defendant’s forum-related activities. Old Republic, 877 F.3d at 904. With respect to the first requirement, purposeful direction ensures that defendants will not be haled into court in foreign jurisdictions solely as a result of “random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475. The mere foreseeability of causing injury in another state is insufficient on its own to establish purposeful direction. See Old Republic, 877 F.3d at 905.

The “purposeful direction” prong of the minimum contacts test is sometimes referred to as the “purposeful availment” prong. See, e.g., Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1071 (noting the interchangeability of these terms).

If the minimum contacts test is met, we must then assess whether exercising personal jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See id. at 909. To do so, we consider the following factors: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum state’s interest in resolving the dispute;
(3) the plaintiff’s interest in receiving convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and (5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental social policies. See id.; see also Pro Axess, Inc. v. Orlux Distrib., Inc., 428 F.3d 1270, 1279–80 (10th Cir. 2005).

Analyzing purposeful direction with respect to Dental Dynamics’s breach of contract claim requires us to look to Jolly Dental’s continuing “relationships with the forum state and its residents.” Old Republic, 877 F.3d at 905; see also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472. Although contractual obligations may create sufficient ties to establish jurisdiction, an out-of-state resident’s contract with a resident of the forum state is insufficient, standing alone, to create personal jurisdiction. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478; Benton v. Cameco Corp., 375 F.3d 1070, 1077 (10th Cir. 2004). In Burger King, the Supreme Court eschewed such “mechanical” tests in favor of looking to the “business negotiations,” “future consequences” of the contract, and the “actual course of dealing” between the parties. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478–79.

Here, the record shows that the parties’ entire business relationship comprises three transactions over nine years. None of these transactions was negotiated or executed in person. Each transaction was a discrete occurrence, unrelated to the others in any meaningful way. On only two occasions did the parties reach an agreement, and only once—in the transaction subject to this lawsuit—was that agreement substantially performed.

These contacts are insufficient to show purposeful direction. Each transaction concerned the isolated sale or prospective sale of a piece of dental equipment without any long-term or continuing obligations involving Oklahoma. See Old Republic, 877 F.3d at 910 (finding no purposeful direction even where a contract with a forum-state entity was accompanied by the parties’ contemplation of “some potentially ongoing consequences” because the record lacked evidence of “any significant course of dealing” or long-term contractual commitments associated with the forum state). Moreover, the transactions implicated Oklahoma in only an attenuated fashion, as Dental Dynamics serves as a broker in transactions between dentists located across the United States. See C5 Med. Werks, LLC v. CeramTec GMBH, 937 F.3d 1319, 1325 (10th Cir. 2019) (holding no purposeful direction established where a party attended numerous trade shows in the forum state, but the location was selected by a third-party).

Dental Dynamics analogizes to Burger King, but the comparison confirms no purposeful direction exists here. In Burger King, the Supreme Court found minimal contacts satisfied due to a heavily negotiated and “carefully structured” 20-year franchise agreement that “envisioned continuing and wide-reaching contacts” with the forum state. 471 U.S. at 478–80. But in this case none of Burger King’s persuasive factors are present. The primary contract that Dental Dynamics relies on is a two-page bill of sale negotiated over email that envisions no enduring relationship between the parties and concerns only the sale of a single piece of equipment that never physically passed through the forum state.

(…) Rambo v. Am. S. Ins. Co., 839 F.2d 1415, 1418 (10th Cir. 1988) (“Ordinarily ‘use of the mails, telephone, or other international communications simply do not qualify as purposeful activity.’” (quoting Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1262 (9th Cir. 1985))).

In sum, the contemplated and executed business transactions between the parties are too attenuated to demonstrate Jolly Dental established sufficient minimum contacts with Oklahoma.

When analyzing tort-based claims such as Dental Dynamics’s fraud claim, we look to “the harmful effects [of Dr. Jolly’s conduct] in the forum state” to assess purposeful direction. Old Republic, 877 F.3d at 905. Purposeful direction in this context has three elements: (1) an intentional action; (2) expressly aimed at the forum state; and (3) with knowledge that the brunt of the injury would be felt in the forum state. See Newsome, 722 F.3d at 1264–65; see also Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1072.

This framework for analyzing personal jurisdiction in the intentional tort context stems originally from the Supreme Court’s decision in Calder v. Jones. 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (holding personal jurisdiction in California proper in a libel suit by a California resident against a Florida reporter). In Walden v. Fiore, the Supreme Court elaborated on its holding in Calder. See 571 U.S. 277, 286–91 (2014). In Walden, a DEA agent in Georgia stopped two Nevadans who claimed to be professional gamblers returning home with approximately $97,000 in cash winnings. The DEA agent seized the currency and drafted an affidavit in conjunction with the forfeiture proceedings. The Nevadans filed suit in federal court in Nevada alleging that the DEA agent tortiously drafted a false affidavit.

A divided Ninth Circuit held personal jurisdiction existed under Calder and its progeny because the DEA agent “expressly aimed” his submission of the allegedly false affidavit at Nevada by submitting the affidavit with knowledge that it would affect persons with a significant connection to Nevada. See id. at 282.

The Supreme Court reversed. In doing so, the Court clarified that knowledge of an alleged victim’s out-of-state status, standing alone, cannot confer personal jurisdiction over a defendant engaging in allegedly tortious activity. The Court reiterated that the focus of the personal jurisdiction analysis is on the defendant’s relationship with the forum state, even in the intentional tort context. See id. at 282–83 (“The plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum.”).

Subsequent case law from this court confirms a defendant’s interaction with a plaintiff—even when allegedly tortious—is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. See Rockwood Select Asset Fund XI (6)-1, LLC v. Devine, 750 F.3d 1178, 1180 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding alleged falsehoods in an opinion letter sent from an out-of-state law firm defendant to a plaintiff in the forum state failed to establish jurisdiction).

These principles dictate the outcome here. As discussed above, Dental Dynamics fails to show Dr. Jolly had any connections with Oklahoma outside of the allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations and isolated incidents of outreach to Dental Dynamics. These communications into the forum-state are insufficient to establish Dr. Jolly “expressly aimed” his allegedly tortious misrepresentations at Oklahoma. See Rockwood, 750 F.3d at 1180. Nor does the fact that Dr. Jolly knew Dental Dynamics was an Oklahoma entity change this analysis. See C5 Med. Werks, 937 F.3d at 1324.

Secondary sources: Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Adam N. Steinman, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1069.7 (4th ed. 2015).

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, January 9, 2020, Dental Dynamics, LLC, v. Jolly Dental Group, LLC, Docket No. 18-6107, For Publication)

Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Halyard Health, Inc., v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., B294567, Order Modifying Opinion and Certifying Opinion for Publication

Jurisdiction

Personal Jurisdiction

Specific Jurisdiction

California’s Long-Arm Statute

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

Motion to Quash Service of Summons

California Law

Kimberly-Clark is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Texas. Approximately 350 of its 42,000 employees work in California, and approximately six percent of its global net sales in 2017 were in California. Its consumer brands include Kleenex, Scott, and Huggies diapers. Until October 2014, Kimberly-Clark also had a healthcare division that produced, among other things, surgical gowns.

In October 2014, Kimberly-Clark’s healthcare division was spun off into Halyard, “a newly created, standalone, publicly traded entity.” Halyard is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Georgia. The terms of the spinoff transaction were memorialized in a “Distribution Agreement” negotiated and executed in Texas. The Distribution Agreement contains a Delaware choice of law provision and further provides that both parties agreed to submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of state and federal courts in Delaware.

The Distribution Agreement requires Halyard to indemnify Kimberly-Clark for specified liabilities related to its former healthcare division. Section 6.11(a) of the Distribution Agreement provides, with certain exceptions we need not describe, that “[Halyard] shall assume and pay all Liabilities that may result from the Assumed Actions and all fees and costs relating to the defense of the Assumed Actions.” An accompanying schedule of “Assumed Actions” lists 27 litigation matters, including a complaint filed by Dr. Hrayr Hrayr Shahinian against Kimberly-Clark in the Central District of California two days before Halyard and Kimberly-Clark executed the Distribution Agreement.

(…) The trial court in this case heard argument on a motion Kimberly-Clark filed to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction. Halyard conceded California courts do not have general jurisdiction over Kimberly-Clark, but the parties disagreed over whether there is a proper basis for specific jurisdiction.

(…) The United States Supreme Court recently set the ground rules for our resolution of the key issue presented in this appeal: “In order for a state court to exercise specific jurisdiction, ‘the suit’ must ‘arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum’”; in other words, there must be “a connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.” (Bristol- Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court (2017) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [137 S.Ct. 1773, 1780-1781] (Bristol-Myers).) That is easier said than applied because personal jurisdiction does not turn on “‘mechanical’ tests” (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 478 (Burger King)) and there is room for reasonable disagreement about what it means for one thing to arise out of or relate to another.

Ultimately, we are convinced Kimberly-Clark has the better view of the limits of due process as most recently described by the high court. Halyard identifies two respects in which, it says, Kimberly-Clark purposefully availed itself of California as a forum: first, by selling surgical gowns in this state, and second, by executing the Distribution Agreement, which Halyard characterizes as a “California-directed contract.” These theories of purposeful availment define the universe of relevant contacts with California, which are insufficient to confer jurisdiction here. As to the former, Kimberly-Clark’s gown sales are not sufficiently connected to the gist of this declaratory relief action, namely, the meaning and enforceability of the Distribution Agreement. The connection is too attenuated because we cannot presume, when undertaking our jurisdictional analysis, that California substantive law (e.g., the asserted rule against indemnification of punitive damages) will apply when resolving the merits of the dispute. (Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. (1984) 465 U.S. 770, 778 (Keeton).) Second, listing the California action in the Distribution Agreement as one among a number of others to be indemnified does not suffice to make the agreement “California- directed” in any meaningful sense.

California’s long-arm statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10) authorizes California courts to exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of California. “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment constrains a State’s authority to bind a nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts. [Citation.] Although a nonresident’s physical presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the court is not required, the nonresident generally must have ‘certain minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”’ International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316 (International Shoe) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer (1940) 311 U.S. 457, 463).” (Walden v. Fiore (2014) 571 U.S. 277, 283.).

Personal jurisdiction may be had on either a general (all-purpose) or specific (case-linked) basis. (Bristol-Myers, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [137 S.Ct. at pp. 1779-1780].) A nonresident defendant is subject to the general jurisdiction of the forum if the defendant is “‘essentially at home in the forum State,’” which, for corporations, is commonly the place of incorporation or where the corporation maintains its principal place of business. (Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 137-139.) It is obvious California courts do not have general jurisdiction over Kimberly- Clark under this standard and Halyard does not contend otherwise.

“Specific jurisdiction is very different. In order for a state court to exercise specific jurisdiction, ‘the suit’ must ‘arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.’ [Citations.] In other words, there must be ‘an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, an activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.’ [Citation.] For this reason, ‘specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.’ [Citation.]” (Bristol-Myers, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [137 S.Ct. at p. 1780].)

When determining whether specific jurisdiction exists, courts consider the ‘“relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”’ [Citations.] A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if: (1) ‘the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits’ [citation]; (2) ‘the “controversy is related to or ‘arises out of’ the defendant’s contacts with the forum”’ [citations]; and (3) ‘“the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice’”’ [citations].” (Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 269; see also Gilmore Bank v. AsiaTrust New Zealand Ltd. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1558, 1568; Greenwell v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 783, 792.)

(…) This Litigation Does Not Arise Out of or Relate to Kimberly-Clark’s Medical Gown Sales and Marketing in California.

(…) Here (…) Kimberly-Clark’s sales of surgical gowns in California did not create the indemnification relationship between it and Halyard. A separate act—the two non-California companies’ execution of the Distribution Agreement in Texas—created that relationship.

The bottom line is that Kimberly-Clark’s gown sales in California are insufficiently connected to the specific claim in this lawsuit, namely whether the Distribution Agreement’s indemnity obligation is enforceable. Personal jurisdiction therefore may not be had insofar as Halyard relies on the gown sales as the relevant purposeful availment.

(…)  Whether enforceability is governed by California law has nothing to do with whether enforceability may be determined by a California court. The required relationship among Kimberly-Clark, California, and this litigation cannot be based on what Halyard’s argument assumes, i.e., that California substantive law applies. (…) We do not make choice of law assumptions (…).

(…) Kimberly-Clark did not “purposefully avail itself” of the benefits of California law by defending a lawsuit here. (Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 475 [“the ‘purposeful availment’ requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of . . . the ‘unilateral activity of another party or a third person’”].)

(…) (See, e.g., Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California (1987) 480 U.S. 102, 114-115 [personal jurisdiction lacking in part because California had only a slight interest in a dispute that was “primarily about indemnification rather than safety standards”].)

(…) Identify a relationship between forum contacts and the specific claims at issue, which is what the high court’s most recent personal jurisdiction cases require.

(…) A defendant need not ever “physically enter the forum state” to be subject to personal jurisdiction. (Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 476.) “So long as a commercial actor’s efforts are ‘purposefully directed’ toward residents of another State, [the Supreme Court] has consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)

(Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Five, January 2, 2020, Halyard Health, Inc., v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., B294567, Order Modifying Opinion and Certifying Opinion for Publication (No Change in Judgment))

Williams v. Pennsylvania, Docket 15-5040

Ethics: recusal of a judge: Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: Fourteenth Amendment: Bias: in this case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania vacated the decision of a postconviction court, which had granted relief to a prisoner convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. One of the justices on the State Su­preme Court had been the district attorney who gave his official approval to seek the death penalty in the prisoner’s case. The justice in question denied the prisoner’s motion for recusal and participated in the decision to deny relief. The question presented is whether the justice’s denial of the recusal motion and his subsequent judicial participa­tion violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

This Court’s precedents set forth an objective standard that requires recusal when the likelihood of bias on the part of the judge “‘is too high to be constitutionally tolera­ble.’” Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U. S. 868, 872 (2009) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S. 35, 47 (1975)). Applying this standard, the Court concludes that due process compelled the justice’s recusal.

(…) During the trial, the prosecutor requested permission from her supervisors in the district attorney’s office to seek the death penalty against W. To support the request, she prepared a memorandum setting forth the details of the crime, information supporting two statutory aggravating factors, and facts in mitigation. After review­ing the memorandum, the then-district attorney of Phila­delphia, Ronald Castille, wrote this note at the bottom of the document: “Approved to proceed on the death penalty.”

(…) Over a period of 26 years, W.’s conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal, state postconviction review, and federal habeas review.

(…) The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, identified in the proceedings below as the PCRA court, held an eviden­tiary hearing on W.’s claims (…) These documents included the trial prosecutor’s sentencing memorandum, bearing then-District Attorney Castille’s authorization to pursue the death penalty. Based on the Commonwealth’s files and the evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court found that the trial prosecutor had suppressed material, excul­patory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), and engaged in “prosecutorial gamesman­ship.” App. 168a. The court stayed W.’s execution and ordered a new sentencing hearing.

Seeking to vacate the stay of execution, the Common­wealth submitted an emergency application to the Penn­sylvania Supreme Court. By this time, almost three dec­ades had passed since W.’s prosecution. Castille had been elected to a seat on the State Supreme Court and was serving as its chief justice. W. filed a response to the Commonwealth’s application. The disclosure of the trial prosecutor’s sentencing memorandum in the PCRA proceedings had alerted W. to Chief Justice Cas­tille’s involvement in the decision to seek a death sentence in his case. For this reason, W. also filed a motion asking Chief Justice Castille to recuse himself or, if he declined to do so, to refer the recusal motion to the full court for decision. The Commonwealth opposed Williams’s recusal motion. Without explanation, Chief Justice Cas­tille denied the motion for recusal and the request for its referral. Two days later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the application to vacate the stay and ordered full briefing on the issues raised in the appeal. The State Supreme Court then vacated the PCRA court’s order granting penalty-phase relief and reinstated Williams’s death sentence. Chief Justice Castille and Justices Baer and Stevens joined the majority opinion written by Justice Eakin. Justices Saylor and Todd concurred in the result without issuing a separate opinion. See ___ Pa. ___, ___, 105 A. 3d 1234, 1245 (2014).

Two weeks after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Williams’s case, Chief Justice Castille retired from the bench. This Court granted Williams’s petition for certiorari. 576 U. S. ___ (2015).

The Court now holds that under the Due Process Clause there is an impermissible risk of actual bias when a judge earlier had significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision regard­ing the defendant’s case.

Due process guarantees “an absence of actual bias” on the part of a judge. In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 136 (1955). Bias is easy to attribute to others and difficult to discern in oneself. To establish an enforceable and workable framework, the Court’s precedents apply an objective standard that, in the usual case, avoids having to deter­mine whether actual bias is present. The Court asks not whether a judge harbors an actual, subjective bias, but instead whether, as an objective matter, “the average judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’” Caperton, 556 U. S., at 881. Of particular relevance to the in­stant case, the Court has determined that an unconstitu­tional potential for bias exists when the same person serves as both accuser and adjudicator in a case. See Murchison, 349 U. S., at 136–137. This objective risk of bias is reflected in the due process maxim that “no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome.” Id., at 136.

The due process guarantee that “no man can be a judge in his own case” would have little substance if it did not disqualify a former prosecutor from sitting in judgment of a prosecution in which he or she had made a critical deci­sion. (…) the judge’s “own personal knowledge and impression” of the case, acquired through his or her role in the prosecution, may carry far more weight with the judge than the parties’ arguments to the court. (…) a judge who had an earlier involvement in a prosecution might have been just one of several prosecutors working on the case at each stage of the proceedings; the prosecu­tor’s immediate role might have been limited to a particu­lar aspect of the prosecution; and decades might have passed before the former prosecutor, now a judge, is called upon to adjudicate a claim in the case. These factual differences notwithstanding, the constitu­tional principles explained in Murchison are fully applica­ble where a judge had a direct, personal role in the de­fendant’s prosecution. The involvement of other actors and the passage of time are consequences of a complex criminal justice system, in which a single case may be litigated through multiple proceedings taking place over a period of years. This context only heightens the need for objective rules preventing the operation of bias that oth­erwise might be obscured.

This leads to the question whether Chief Justice Cas­tille’s authorization to seek the death penalty against W. amounts to significant, personal involvement in a critical trial decision. The Court now concludes that it was a significant, personal involvement; and, as a result, Chief Justice Castille’s failure to recuse from Williams’s case presented an unconstitutional risk of bias. As an initial matter, there can be no doubt that the decision to pursue the death penalty is a critical choice in the adversary process. Indeed, after a defendant is charged with a death-eligible crime, whether to ask a jury to end the defendant’s life is one of the most serious dis­cretionary decisions a prosecutor can be called upon to make. Nor is there any doubt that Chief Justice Castille had a significant role in this decision. Without his express authorization, the Commonwealth would not have been able to pursue a death sentence against W.

The potential conflict of interest posed by the PCRA court’s findings illustrates the utility of statutes and professional codes of conduct that “provide more protection than due process requires.” Caperton, 556 U. S., at 890.

Most ques­tions of recusal are addressed by more stringent and detailed ethical rules, which in many jurisdictions already require disqualification under the circumstances of this case. See Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae 5, 11–14; see also ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rules 2.11(A)(1), (A)(6)(b) (2011) (no judge may participate “in any proceeding in which the judge’s impar­tiality might reasonably be questioned,” including where the judge “served in governmental employment, and in such capacity participated personally and substantially as a lawyer or public official concerning the proceeding”); ABA Center for Professional Responsibility Policy Imple­mentation Comm., Comparison of ABA Model Judicial Code and State Variations (Dec. 14, 2015), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/2_11.authcheckdam.pdf (as last visited June 7, 2016) (28 States have adopted language similar to ABA Model Judicial Code Rule 2.11); 28 U. S. C. §455(b)(3) (recusal required where judge “has served in governmental employment and in such capacity partici­pated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding”).

Both the appearance and reality of impartial justice are necessary to the public legitimacy of judicial pronouncements and thus to the rule of law itself. When the objective risk of actual bias on the part of a judge rises to an unconstitutional level, the fail­ure to recuse cannot be deemed harmless.

(U.S.S.C., June 9, 2016, Williams v. Pennsylvania, Docket 15-5040, J. Kennedy, opinion in which J.J. Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, joined. C.J. Roberts and JJ. Alito and Thomas dissenting).

Règles d’éthique, récusation d’un juge dans une affaire où il avait antérieurement officié comme procureur. En l’espèce, la cour suprême de l’état de Pennsylvanie annula une décision rendue par une cour inférieure, laquelle avait statué en faveur d’un prisonnier condamné à mort (dite condamnation résultant d’un Jugement rendu 26 ans plus tôt par une cour de l’état). L’un des Juges de la cour suprême de l’état était l’un des Procureurs qui avait officiellement autorisé son adjoint en charge du dossier de requérir la peine capitale dans la procédure conduite 26 ans plus tôt. Ce Juge rejeta la requête de récusation déposée par le prisonnier, et participa à la décision au fond rendue par la cour suprême. La question juridique consiste à déterminer si le refus de récusation et la participation ultérieure au procès en tant que Juge portait ou non atteinte à la Clause du droit à un procès équitable au sens du Quatorzième Amendement de la Constitution fédérale.

La jurisprudence de la Cour Suprême fédérale a institué un standard objectif qui impose récusation dès que la vraisemblance d’impartialité du Juge est trop élevée pour être constitutionnellement tolérable. Appliquant ce standard, la Cour juge en l’espèce que la Clause « Due Process » impose la récusation du magistrat concerné.

La Cour rappelle les circonstances ayant mené au premier Jugement condamnatoire, 26 ans avant la décision de la cour suprême de Pennsylvanie : pendant la procédure pénale, le Procureur directement en charge de l’accusation demanda à son supérieur, le Procureur de district, l’autorisation de requérir la peine capitale. A l’appui de sa demande, elle avait préparé un mémorandum relatant les détails du crime, relevant deux facteurs aggravants résultant de la loi, et décrivant les circonstances atténuantes. Après lecture du mémorandum, le Procureur de district inscrivit la note suivante au pied du document : « la réquisition de la peine capitale est approuvée ». Dite peine fut prononcée. Pendant la période de 26 ans qui suivit, le Jugement condamnatoire et la peine furent confirmés par les instances de recours de l’état, ainsi qu’en procédure d’Habeas fédérale.

Dans le cadre de sa dernière tentative de révision de sa condamnation et de sa peine, W. saisit la Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. Ce Tribunal a tenu une audience de preuve. Après nouvel examen du dossier, et suite à l’audience, le Tribunal jugea que le Procureur en charge du dossier lors de la première procédure condamnatoire avait éliminé des pièces et des preuves exculpatoires, en violation de la jurisprudence Brady (1963). Par conséquent, le Tribunal suspendit l’exécution de W. et ordonna une nouvelle audience de condamnation ou libération.

L’état de Pennsylvanie déposa alors une requête urgente devant la cour suprême de cet état, concluant à l’annulation de la décision de la Court of Common Pleas. Le Chief Justice de la cour suprême de l’état n’était autre que le Procureur ayant officié 26 ans auparavant comme Procureur de district, et ayant à ce titre approuvé la réquisition de la peine de mort en signant le mémorandum précité. W. déposa une réponse à la requête et demanda au Juge, ancien Procureur, de se récuser, ou, s’il n’entend pas se récuser, de soumettre la demande de récusation à la cour suprême de l’état, pour décision à ce sujet. Sans explications, le Juge concerné rejeta la requête de récusation ainsi que la requête de soumission au plenum. Deux jours plus tard, la cour suprême de Pennsylvanie rejeta la requête en annulation de la suspension de l’exécution de la peine, et ordonna aux parties la production d’argumentaires portant sur les questions soulevées dans le recours. Ultérieurement, dite cour suprême annula la décision rendue par la Court of Common Pleas en ce qu’elle faisait droit aux conclusions de W. sur la fixation de la peine, et réinstaura la condamnation de W. à la peine capitale. Le Juge concerné et deux de ses collègues rejoignirent l’opinion rendue par la majorité et rédigée par une quatrième collègue. Deux autres Juges se sont joint au dispositif, sans toutefois rédiger des considérants séparés.

Deux semaines après la décision rendue par la cour suprême de Pennsylvanie, le Juge concerné quitta ce Tribunal. Sur recours de W., la Cour Suprême fédérale accepta de se saisir de l’affaire.

En résumé, la Cour Suprême fédérale juge en l’espèce que selon la « Due Process Clause », il existe un risque inadmissible de partialité concrète lorsqu’un Juge, dans le passé, s’est personnellement et de manière significative impliqué, comme Procureur, dans la prise d’une décision essentielle s’agissant du dossier du prévenu ou condamné.

Les garanties découlant de la Clause de « Due Process » impliquent l’absence d’une partialité concrète de la part d’un Juge. La partialité est facile à attribuer à d’autres et difficile à discerner dans son propre cas. En vue d’établir un cadre utilisable, la jurisprudence de la Cour applique un standard objectif qui, dans la plupart des cas, permet d’éviter d’avoir à déterminer si une partialité concrète existe ou non. La Cour ne se demande pas si un Juge montre une partialité concrète et subjective, mais elle se demande, objectivement, si un Juge ordinaire, dans une position identique, serait vraisemblablement neutre, ou s’il existe un potentiel inconstitutionnel d’impartialité. S’agissant d’affaires analogues à la présente, la Cour a jugé qu’un potentiel inconstitutionnel de partialité existe quand la même personne officie à la fois comme procureur et comme juge. Ce risque objectif de partialité se reflète dans la maxime découlant de la Clause de « Due Process », selon laquelle personne ne peut être juge de sa propre affaire, et nul ne saurait juger des affaires dans lesquelles il dispose d’un intérêt quant au résultat.

La garantie du droit à un procès équitable stipulant que nul ne saurait être juge de sa propre affaire n’aurait que peu de substance si elle ne disqualifiait pas un ancien Procureur de siéger comme Juge dans une affaire où il était par le passé le Procureur, ayant rendu à ce titre une décision essentielle. (…) Les connaissances et impressions personnelles qu’à ce Juge de l’affaire, acquises de par son rôle dans l’accusation, peuvent peser bien davantage sur le Juge que les mémoires et plaidoiries des parties. Il est vrai qu’un Juge impliqué par la passé en tant que Procureur dans une affaire peut n’avoir été que l’un des divers Procureurs ayant travaillé le dossier durant les différentes phases de la procédure pénale. Le rôle immédiat du Procureur concerné peut avoir été limité à un aspect particulier de l’accusation. Et des dizaines d’années peuvent avoir passé avant qu’un ancien Procureur, maintenant Juge, ne soit appelé à juger une affaire. Malgré ces considérations, les principes constitutionnels déduits de la jurisprudence de la Cour sont pleinement applicables à un juge a exercé un rôle direct et personnel dans l’ancienne poursuite pénale de l’ancien prévenu. L’implication d’autres acteurs et le passage du temps sont les conséquences d’un système de justice pénale complexe, au sein duquel un cas peut faire l’objet de plusieurs procédures pendant plusieurs années. Ce contexte rend plus nécessaire encore le besoin de règles objectives, prévenant toutes inclusions de partialité, autrement difficiles à discerner.

Ces considérations conduisent à se demander si l’autorisation de requérir la peine capitale, que le Juge Castille avait donnée en tant que Procureur, équivaut à une implication significative et personnelle dans une phase critique de la procédure pénale. La Cour juge en l’espèce que tel était bien le cas. En conséquence, le refus du Juge de se récuser présentait un risque d’impartialité contraire à la Constitution fédérale. En effet, il est hors de doute que la décision de requérir la peine capitale constitue un choix critique dans une procédure contentieuse. Après qu’un prévenu ait été condamné pour des infractions susceptibles d’être sanctionnées par la peine capitale, décider ou non de requérir cette peine et demander au Jury de la prononcer est une des plus sérieuses décisions discrétionnaires qu’un Procureur soit susceptible de rendre. Et sans l’autorisation du Juge Castille de requérir dite peine, l’accusation était dépourvue d’un autre moyen de pouvoir la requérir.

Cette affaire illustre en outre l’utilité des règles de conduite et d’éthique légales ou professionnelles, lesquelles présentent normalement une protection plus étendue que la « Due Process Clause ». Ainsi l’ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rules dispose qu’aucun juge ne peut participer dans une procédure, alors qu’il avait par le passé servi comme employé public dans la même procédure, et qu’en cette qualité il avait personnellement et substantiellement servi en tant qu’avocat ou en tant qu’autorité publique. 28 états ont adopté une règle d’éthique similaire. Par ailleurs, 28 U.S.C. §455(b)(3) impose récusation quand le Juge a servi en tant qu’employé public et qu’en cette capacité il a officié comme avocat, conseiller ou comme témoin matériel dans la procédure.

Le Juge dont la récusation est demandée peut essayer de l’éviter en soutenant que le résultat de la procédure aurait été le même, récusation ou non (harmless defense). Mais la Cour remarque que l’apparence et la réalité d’une justice impartiale sont nécessaires à la légitimité des jugements aux yeux du public, ainsi qu’à la légitimité de la règle de droit elle-même. Quand le risque objectif de partialité du juge s’élève à un niveau inconstitutionnel, manquer à se récuser ne saurait être qualifié de « harmless », soit d’omission n’emportant aucun dommage.

Nickerson v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co., S213873

Punitive damages: Compensatory damages: Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: Veterans (medical care at no cost): Insurance law: Attorney fees (v. insurance company): Good faith and fair dealing: Clear and convincing evidence: Jury: Bias:

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits states from imposing grossly excessive punitive damages awards on tortfeasors. (BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore (1996) 517 U.S. 559, 568 (Gore).) To determine whether a jury‘s award of punitive damages is grossly excessive, reviewing courts must consider, among other factors, whether the measure of punishment is both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff by comparing the amount of compensatory damages to the amount of punitive damages. (State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408, 426 (State Farm).) Absent special justification, ratios of punitive damages to compensatory damages that greatly exceed 9 or 10 to 1 are presumed to be excessive and therefore unconstitutional. (Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1159, 1182 (Simon).)

The question in this case concerns the proper calculation of the punitive-compensatory ratio when the parties have agreed to have the trial court determine a component of the plaintiff‘s compensatory damages — here, the attorney fees plaintiff was compelled to expend to obtain the insurance benefits to which he was entitled (see Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813, 817 (Brandt)) — after, rather than before, the jury has rendered its punitive damages verdict. The Court of Appeal in this case held that Brandt fees awarded in this manner must be excluded from the calculation in determining whether, and to what extent, the jury‘s punitive damages award exceeds constitutional limits.

We conclude that the Court of Appeal erred. In determining whether a punitive damages award is unconstitutionally excessive, Brandt fees may be included in the calculation of the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, regardless of whether the fees are awarded by the trier of fact as part of its verdict or are determined by the trial court after the verdict has been rendered. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

On February 11, 2008, plaintiff T. N., who is paralyzed from the chest down, broke his leg when he fell from the wheelchair lift on his van. He was taken to the Department of Veterans Affairs hospital in Long Beach, where, as a veteran, he was entitled to medical care at no cost.

N. was ultimately discharged from the hospital on May 30, 2008, after obtaining the needed part. He had been hospitalized for 109 days total.

Following his discharge from the hospital, N. sought benefits from defendant Stonebridge Life Insurance Company (Stonebridge) under an indemnity benefit policy that promised, as relevant here, to pay him $350 per day for each day he was confined in a hospital for the necessary care and treatment of a covered injury. Some months later, Stonebridge notified N. that it had completed processing his request for benefits. Invoking the policy‘s definition of necessary treatment, Stonebridge determined, without consulting the views of N.‘s treating physicians, that his hospitalization was medically necessary only from February 11 to 29. Stonebridge sent N. a check for $6,450, which represented payment of $150 for one visit to the emergency room and $6,300 for 18 days of hospitalization at $350 per day.

(See Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a) [in a civil case not arising from the breach of a contractual obligation, punitive damages may be awarded where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice].)

In our judicial system, although compensatory damages and punitive damages are typically awarded at the same time by the same decisionmaker, they serve distinct purposes. The former are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant‘s wrongful conduct. The latter . . . operate as private fines intended to punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing. (Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. (2001) 532 U.S. 424, 432 (Cooper Industries).)

Punitive damages have long been a part of traditional state tort law (Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip (1991) 499 U.S. 1, 15 (Haslip)), and the states have broad discretion with respect to their imposition (Cooper Industries, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 433). But because a state‘s system for awarding punitive damages may deprive a defendant of fair notice . . . of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose and  threaten arbitrary punishments, the United States Supreme Court has found that the Constitution imposes certain limits, in respect both to procedures for awarding punitive damages and to amounts forbidden as grossly excessive. (Philip Morris USA v. Williams (2007) 549 U.S. 346, 352–353 (Williams).)

The court has concluded that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to, among other things, provide for judicial review of the size of a punitive damages award. Such review, the court has explained, has been a safeguard against excessive verdicts for as long as punitive damages have been awarded, reflecting the view that a decision to punish a tortfeasor by means of an exaction of exemplary damages . . . should not be committed to the unreviewable discretion of a jury. (Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg (1994) 512 U.S. 415, 421, 434–435 (Oberg).)

In a series of cases culminating in Gore, 517 U.S. 559, the court developed a set of substantive guideposts that reviewing courts must consider in evaluating the size of punitive damages awards: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant‘s misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. (State Farm, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 418, citing Gore, at p. 575.) A trial court conducts this inquiry in the first instance; its application of the factors is subject to de novo review on appeal. (State Farm, at p. 418.)

Following the high court‘s guidance, we have explained that ratios between the punitive damages award and the plaintiff‘s actual or potential compensatory damages significantly greater than 9 or 10 to 1 are suspect and, absent special justification . . . , cannot survive appellate scrutiny under the due process clause. (Simon, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1182.)

The controversy between the parties in this case stems from a trial court‘s postverdict award of Brandt fees to the prevailing plaintiff. In Brandt, we held that when an insurance company withholds policy benefits in bad faith, attorney fees reasonably incurred to compel payment of the benefits are recoverable as an element of the plaintiff‘s damages. (Brandt, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 815.). We explained that when an insurer breaches the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to compensate the insured for a loss covered by the policy, the insurer is liable for any damages which are the proximate result of that breach. (Id. at p. 817.) When an insurer‘s tortious conduct reasonably compels the insured to retain an attorney to obtain the benefits due under a policy, it follows that the insurer should be liable in a tort action for that expense. The attorney‘s fees are an economic loss — damages — proximately caused by the tort. (Ibid.)

After trial, the parties stipulated that the amount of attorney fees to which N. was entitled was $12,500, and the court awarded that amount. The question is whether this amount may be included in the calculation of the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages for the purpose of determining whether, and by what amount, the jury‘s $19 million punitive damages award exceeds constitutional limits.

N. argues, and Stonebridge does not dispute, that Brandt fees ordinarily qualify as compensatory damages for purposes of applying the second Gore guidepost. We agree. That conclusion follows from Brandt itself, which held that such fees are recoverable precisely because they are an economic loss — damages — proximately caused by the tort . . . in the same way that medical fees would be part of the damages in a personal injury action. (Brandt, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 817; see Major v. Western Home Ins. Co., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 1224 (The amount of the jury‘s award of Brandt fees . . . may be properly considered . . . in determining if the ratio of punitive damages to the tort damages award is excessive)).

As noted, the due process clause imposes both procedural and substantive limitations to curb arbitrary punitive damages awards. (Williams, supra, 549 U.S. at pp. 352–353.) Relevant procedural limitations include certain constraints on the jury‘s decisionmaking process. For example, the jury must be adequately informed of the nature and purposes of punitive damages in order to reasonably accommodate the defendant‘s interest in rational decisionmaking. (Haslip, supra, 499 U.S. at p. 20.)

(See, e.g., Adams v. Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 109, 114 [holding, as a matter of state law, that evidence of a defendant‘s financial condition is a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages, and that such evidence must appear in the record on appellate review, because, among other things, absent financial evidence, a jury will be encouraged (indeed, required) to speculate as to a defendant‘s net worth in seeking to return a verdict that will appropriately punish the defendant].)

Should a reviewing court conclude that the jury‘s punitive damages award is excessive, the remedy is not to set the award aside — as the court would if it determined that the jury‘s decisionmaking process was tainted by bias or prejudice (see, e.g., Weathers v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1971) 5 Cal.3d 98, 110) or by confusion about the question to be answered (see, e.g., Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 450, 465) — but to reduce the award to constitutional limits (Simon, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1187).

Gore, supra, 517 U.S. at pp. 583–584 (reviewing the civil penalties available under the consumer protection laws of several states before concluding that the punitive damages award at issue was substantially greater than the statutory fines available in Alabama and elsewhere for similar malfeasance.)

In sum, we find no reason to exclude the amount of Brandt fees from the constitutional calculus merely because they were determined, pursuant to the parties‘ stipulation, by the trial court after the jury rendered its punitive damages verdict. On the contrary, to exclude the fees from consideration would mean overlooking a substantial and mutually acknowledged component of the insured‘s harm. The effect would be to skew the proper calculation of the punitive-compensatory ratio, and thus to impair reviewing courts‘ full consideration of whether, and to what extent, the punitive damages award exceeds constitutional bounds

(Cal. S.C., June 9, 2016, Nickerson v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co., S213873).

La Clause du droit à un procès équitable stipulé par le Quatorzième Amendement de la Constitution interdit aux états de condamner l’auteur d’un préjudice à des dommages-intérêts punitifs largement excessifs. Pour déterminer si un Jury a retenu un montant largement excessif au titre des dommages-intérêts punitifs, la juridiction supérieure doit considérer, parmi d’autres facteurs, si la mesure de la punition est à la fois raisonnable et à la fois proportionnée à la hauteur du dommage subi par le demandeur, en comparant le montant des dommages compensatoires avec le montant des dommages punitifs. En l’absence de justifications spéciales, un ratio dommages punitifs/dommages compensatoires qui excède de manière importante 9 ou 10/1 implique que les dommages punitifs sont présumés excessifs, conséquemment inconstitutionnels.

La question que pose la présente espèce porte sur la manière de calculer le ratio dommages punitifs/dommages compensatoires lorsque les parties ont convenu de laisser le Tribunal (et non le Jury) fixer – après que le Jury ait rendu son verdict condamnant au paiement de dommages punitifs - le montant d’un poste du dommage compensatoire dû au demandeur, ici les frais d’avocat que le demandeur a été contraint de dépenser pour obtenir les prestations d’assurance auxquelles il avait droit. En l’espèce, la cour d’appel a jugé que les dépens alloués de cette manière doivent être exclus du calcul visant à déterminer si, et dans quelle mesure, le montant des dommages punitifs excède les limites constitutionnelles.

La Cour Suprême de Californie renverse la décision précitée de la cour d’appel. Elle juge que les dépens doivent être inclus dans le calcul visant à déterminer si les dommages punitifs sont ou non constitutionnellement excessifs. Il n’importe pas que ces dépens soient accordés par le verdict du Jury (chargé d’établir les faits) ou par le Tribunal après le verdict du Jury.

Les faits essentiels de la présente affaire sont les suivants : le 11 février 2008, le demandeur T.N., paralysé des membres inférieurs, s’est cassé une jambe en tombant de sa chaise roulante. Il a été conduit à l’hôpital réservé aux vétérans des forces armées où, en qualité de vétéran, il a droit à des soins médicaux gratuits. N. a quitté l’hôpital le 30 mai 2008, après 109 jours. Subséquemment, il a sollicité les prestations de l’un de ses assureurs, auprès duquel il avait conclu une police prévoyant une indemnisation de $350 par jour d’hospitalisation nécessaire au traitement d’un préjudice corporel couvert. Quelques mois plus tard, l’assureur rendit sa prise de position, dans laquelle il invoquait la définition du traitement nécessaire figurant dans la police d’assurance pour déterminer, sans consulter les médecins-traitants, que l’hospitalisation n’était médicalement nécessaire que du 11 au 29 février. L’assureur envoya à N. un chèque de $6'450 représentant le paiement de $150 pour une visite en salle d’urgence et de $6'300 pour 18 jours d’hospitalisation à $350 la journée.

Excursus : selon la § 3294 subdivision a du Code civil, dans une affaire extracontractuelle de droit civil, des dommages punitifs peuvent être alloués s’il est prouvé selon le standard « clair et convaincant » que l’auteur s’est rendu coupable « d’oppression, de fraude ou de malice ».

Bien que les dommages compensatoires et les dommages punitifs sont typiquement alloués au même moment par la même autorité adjudicative, ils servent des buts différents. Les premiers tendent à compenser la perte effective subie par le demandeur suite à la conduite illicite du défendeur. Les seconds s’analysent en amendes privées visant à punir le défendeur et à prévenir une récidive.

Les dommages punitifs font de longue date partie du droit de la responsabilité civile des états, et les états disposent d’une large discrétion pour les accorder. Mais comme l’allocation de ces dommages par une cour d’un état peut priver la partie qui les doit d’un avertissement équitable relatif à la sévérité de leur montant, constituant ainsi éventuellement une punition arbitraire, la Cour Suprême fédérale a jugé que la Constitution imposait certaines limites, tant procédurales que s’agissant des montants, qui ne sauraient être « largement excessifs ».

La Cour Suprême fédérale a conclu que la Clause du procès équitable prévue par le Quatorzième Amendement imposait notamment aux états de prévoir une voie de recours portant sur le montant alloué au titre des dommages punitifs. La décision de punir ainsi l’auteur d’un acte illicite ne saurait relever de la seule discrétion d’un Jury.

Dans toute une série de décisions, la Cour a développé trois critères que les Tribunaux doivent suivre en allouant des dommages punitifs : 1 ) le degré de répréhensibilité de la conduite de l’auteur, 2 ) la disparité entre le dommage effectif ou potentiel subi par la victime et le montant des dommages punitifs, 3 ) la différence entre les dommages punitifs et le montant de peines civiles autorisées ou imposées dans des affaires semblables (p.ex. en droit de la consommation). L’application de ces trois facteurs est revue de novo en appel.

A la suite des principes posés par la Cour Suprême fédérale, la Cour Suprême de Californie a exposé que le ratio entre les dommages punitifs et les dommages compensatoires effectifs ou potentiels significativement plus grand que 9 ou 10/1 est suspect et que sans une justification spéciale les dommages punitifs affectés de tels ratios seront annulés par l’autorité supérieure en application de la Clause du droit à un procès équitable.

En l’espèce, est litigieuse l’attribution de dépens, par la cour, après le verdict du Jury. Dans sa jurisprudence Brandt (Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813, 817), la Cour a jugé qu’une compagnie d’assurance qui refuse de mauvaise foi de servir ses prestations sera condamnée à payer les honoraires d’avocat de l’assuré, en tant que poste distinct de son dommage, et en tant que ces honoraires sont raisonnablement nécessaires pour contraindre l’assureur à prester. En effet, en portant ainsi atteinte à son engagement implicite d’agir de bonne foi et équitablement (implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing), l’assureur est tenu d’indemniser son client pour tous les dommages en lien de causalité adéquate avec l’atteinte à dit engagement.

Après la procédure devant le Jury, les parties ont stipulé que le montant des honoraires d’avocat dus à l’assuré s’élevaient à $12'500, et le Tribunal adjugea cette somme. La question est maintenant de savoir si dite somme peut être comprise dans le calcul du ratio dommages punitifs/dommages compensatoires dans le but de déterminer si le verdict du Jury, qui a accordé des dommages punitifs par 19 millions de dollars, est conforme à la Constitution.

La Cour juge ici que ces honoraires d’avocat constituent un poste distinct des dommages compensatoires, et qu’ils doivent ainsi être pris en compte dans le calcul du ratio dommages compensatoires/dommages punitifs.

(Comme indiqué précédemment, la Clause du droit à un procès équitable impose des contraintes procédurales et de fond lors de l’allocation de dommages punitifs. Au niveau procédural, par exemple, le Jury doit être adéquatement informé de la nature et des buts des dommages punitifs de manière à prendre raisonnablement en compte les intérêts du défendeur, dans le cadre d’un processus de décision rationnel).

(La Cour a jugé par ailleurs que la preuve de la situation financière du défendeur doit être apportée avant que ne soit rendu un jugement condamnant à des dommages punitifs, dite preuve devant ressortir du dossier d’appel parce qu’en son absence, un Jury sera encouragé, et même contraint, à spéculer sur la fortune à disposition du défendeur dans la détermination du montant qui punira le défendeur de manière appropriée).

Si la cour supérieure juge que le montant des dommages punitifs retenu par le Jury est excessif, le remède n’est pas l’annulation du Jugement inférieur, mais la réduction, dans des limites constitutionnelles, du montant desdits dommages punitifs. Un jugement sera pour sa part annulé si la procédure devant le Jury est teintée de parti pris ou par confusion s’agissant de la question à répondre.

En conclusion, la Cour ne voit pas de raison d’exclure la condamnation à payer les honoraires d’avocat du calcul constitutionnel du seul fait que la condamnation portant sur le montant est, selon l’accord des parties, le fait du Tribunal après le verdict du Jury condamnant, lui, à des dommages punitifs sur le principe.

Presley v. Georgia

Criminal procedure: right to a public trial: two different provisions of the Bill of Rights, both applicable to the States via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment directs, in relevant part, that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .” The Court in In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 273 (1948), made it clear that this right extends to the States. The Sixth Amendment right, as the quoted language makes explicit, is the right of the accused; the Court there held that the voir dire of prospective jurors must be open to the public under the First Amendment; the pretrial suppression hearing must be open to the public because “there can be little doubt that the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of the press and public.” 467 U. S., at 46; The Supreme Court of Georgia was correct in assuming that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to the voir dire of prospective jurors; “the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure; the conclusion that trial courts are required to consider alternatives to closure even when they are not offered by the parties is clear not only from this Court’s precedents but also from the premise that “the process of juror selection is itself a matter of importance, not simply to the adversaries but to the criminal justice system (U.S.S.Ct., 19.01.10, Presley v. Georgia, Per Curiam).

Procédure pénale : droit à un procès public : deux dispositions différentes du Bill of Rights, toutes les deux applicables aux états par le biais de Due Process Clause du 14è Amendement de la Constitution fédérale. Le 6è Amendement dispose que, notamment, dans toutes les procédures pénales, l’accusé a droit à un procès rapide et public. La Cour a clairement précisé que ce droit est opposable aux états. Ce droit prévu par le 6è Amendement est explicitement un droit de l’accusé. La Cour a statué que la procédure de sélection des jurés, dans la phase de « voir dire », doit être publique, en application du 1^er Amendement. L’audience de suppression avant procès doit être ouverte au public parce qu’il ne fait pas de doute que le droit explicite conféré à l’accusé par le 6è Amendement ne garantit pas moins le droit à un procès public que le droit de la presse et du public implicitement conféré par le 1^er Amendement. La cour suprême de Géorgie a statué à juste titre que le droit à un procès public déduit du 6è Amendement s’étend à la procédure dite « voir dire » de sélection des jurés. La partie qui requiert une audience à huis-clos doit invoquer un intérêt prépondérant qui sinon risquerait vraisemblablement d’être lésé ; le huis-clos ne doit pas être plus étendu que nécessaire pour protéger cet intérêt, la cour de première instance doit considérer les alternatives raisonnables à l’huis-clos, et dite cour doit rendre un considérant justifiant de manière adéquate le huis-clos. La conclusion que la cour de première instance doit considérer les alternatives à l’huis-clos même lorsque celles-ci ne sont pas suggérées par les parties découle non seulement de la jurisprudence de la Cour, mais aussi de ce que le processus de sélection des jurés est important en soi pour les parties et aussi pour le système de justice pénale.