U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, In Re: Google LLC, Docket No. 2023-101

Motion to Transfer

 

Venue

 

Jurisdiction

 

Federal Law

 

 

 

 

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas in No. 6:21-cv-00985-ADA

 

 

 

Google LLC (“Google”) petitions for a writ of mandamus directing the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas to vacate its order denying Google’s motion to transfer and to transfer the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. (…) For the following reasons, we grant the petition and direct transfer.

 

 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district court where the action might have been brought for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice.

 

 

In re Planned Parenthood Fed. of Am., Inc., 52 F.4th 625, 629 (5th Cir. 2022), when a movant “demonstrates that the transferee venue is clearly more convenient” the district court “should” grant transfer, In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc); see also Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 629 (“The ultimate inquiry is whether the destination venue is ‘clearly more convenient than the venue chosen by the plaintiff.’”) (quoting Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315).

 

 

The Fifth Circuit has identified “private and public interest factors,” which are “not necessarily exhaustive or exclusive,” to be evaluated in connection with determining whether a case should be transferred. Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 630 (internal quotation marks omitted). The private interest factors are: (1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. Id. The public interest factors are: (1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws or in the application of foreign law. Id.

 

 

The district court held that the “administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion” factor weighed slightly against transfer. While we defer to the district court’s assessment of the average time to trial data, see Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 631; In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“We do not disturb the district court’s suggestion that it could dispose of the case more quickly than if the case was transferred to the Northern District of California.”), in this case it was a clear abuse of discretion to accord this factor any weight, see Juniper, 14 F.4th at 1322 (discounting time-to-trial difference because there was no “need of a quick resolution” where patentee lacked “position in the market . . . being threatened”). It appears undisputed that Jawbone (unlike its predecessor owners of the patents) is not engaged in product competition in the marketplace and is not threatened in the market in a way that, in other patent cases, might add urgency to case resolution and give some significance to the time-to-trial difference. Nor does the record reveal any other basis on which to accord significance to whatever greater speed the district court speculates it could reach trial as compared to Northern California. See Genentech, 566 F.3d at 1347 (describing this factor as “most speculative”). This factor, then, is neutral.

 

 

By contrast, the events giving rise to this patent infringement suit clearly have a particularized connection with Northern California. The patented technology was invented in, and the patents prosecuted from, that forum. Additionally, the district court found that Google developed the accused products in the Northern District, notwithstanding Google’s separate office in Austin. Appx932; see also Def. Distributed v. Bruck, 30 F.4th 414, 435 (5th Cir. 2022) (“The local interest in having localized interests decided at home, ‘most notably regards not merely the parties’ significant connections to each forum writ large, but rather the significant connections between a particular venue and the events that gave rise to a suit.’”) (quoting In re Apple Inc., 979 F.3d 1332, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2020)). It was clear error not to find that the local interest factor favors transfer.

 

 

We agree with the district court, and both parties, that the “familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case” and the “problems associated with conflicts of law” are neutral.

 

 

In sum, on the record before us, four factors favor transfer and four factors are neutral. No factor weighs against transfer. The center of gravity of this action, focusing on the Volkswagen factors and the overriding convenience inquiry, is clearly in the Northern District of California, not in the Western District of Texas. The district court clearly erred in finding otherwise and its decision to deny Google’s motion to transfer was a clear abuse of discretion.

 

 

 

 

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Feb. 1^st, 2023, In Re: Google LLC, Docket No. 2023-101)

Gelboim v. Bank of America Corp., Docket 13-1174

Civil Procedure: immediate ap­peal:  transfer of civil actions:  Title 28 U. S. C. §1291gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction over appeals from “all final decisions of the district courts of the United States,” and its core ap­plication is to rulings that terminate an action. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) permits district courts to authorize immediate ap­peal of dispositive rulings on separate claims in a civil action raising multiple claims. And 28 U. S. C. §1407 authorizes the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) to transfer civil actions “involving one or more common questions of fact . . . to any district for coordi­nated or consolidated pretrial proceedings” in order to “promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions,” §1407(a).

The London InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is a reference point in determining interest rates for financial instruments in the United States and globally. The JPML established a multidistrict litigation (LIBOR MDL) for cases involving allegations that defendant-banks understated their borrowing costs, thereby depressing LIBOR and enabling the banks to pay lower interest rates on financial instru­ments sold to investors. Over 60 actions were consolidated for pretri­al proceedings in the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, including a class action filed by petitioners Ellen Gelboim and Linda Zacher, who raised the single claim that several banks, acting in concert, had violated federal antitrust law.

Determining that no plaintiff could assert a cognizable antitrust injury, the Dis­trict Court granted the banks’ motion to dismiss all antitrust claims, including the Gelboim-Zacher complaint’s sole claim. The District Court thus dismissed the Gelboim-Zacher complaint, denied leave to amend, and dismissed the case in its entirety.

Assuming that the Gelboim-Zacher plaintiffs were entitled to an immediate appeal of right under §1291, the District Court granted Rule 54(b) certifications authorizing the plaintiffs in some of the multiple-claim actions to appeal the dismis­sal of their antitrust claims.

Held: The order dismissing their case in its entirety removed Gelboim and Zacher from the consolidated proceeding, thereby triggering their right to appeal under §1291.

Because cases consolidated for MDL pretrial proceedings ordinarily retain their separate identities, an order disposing of one of the dis­crete cases in its entirety should qualify under §1291 as an appeala­ble final decision. Section 1407 refers to individual “actions” trans­ferrable to a single district court, not to a monolithic multidistrict “action” created by transfer. See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Ber-shad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U. S. 26, 37. And §1407(a)’s language—“at or before the conclusion of . . . pretrial proceedings,” each transferred action must be remanded to the originating district “unless the ac­tion shall have been previously terminated”—indicates Congress’ an­ticipation that, during the pendency of pretrial proceedings, final de­cisions might be rendered in one or more of the actions consolidated pursuant to §1407. The District Court’s order dismissing the Gel­boim-Zacher complaint was a final decision. The District Court com­pleted its adjudication of petitioners’ complaint and terminated their action. Petitioners thus are no longer participants in the consolidat­ed proceedings. Nothing about the initial consolidation of their civil action with other LIBOR MDL cases renders the dismissal of their complaint tentative or incomplete.

The banks are also concerned about allowing plaintiffs with the weakest cases to appeal because their complaint states only one claim, while leaving those with stronger cases unable to appeal simultaneously because they have other pending claims. But that concern is attended to by Rule 54(b), which authorizes district courts to grant certifications to parties with multiple-claim complaints, thereby enabling plaintiffs in actions that have not been dismissed in their entirety to pursue im­mediate appellate review of discrete claims. The District Court did that in this very case. Rule 54(b), however, is of no avail to Gelboim and Zacher, who asserted only one claim. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U. S. 427, 435. Section 1292(b)—which allows district courts to designate for review certain interlocutory orders—is also inapposite here, for there is nothing “interlocutory” about the dismis­sal order in the Gelboim-Zacher action (U.S.S.Ct., Jan. 21, 2015, Gelboim v. Bank of America Corp., Docket 13-1174, J. Ginsburg, unanimous).

Procédure civile fédérale, appel immédiat contre une décision partielle, transfert d’une action civile en faveur d’un autre district à des fins de coordination avec une ou plusieurs autres actions civiles (jonction de causes) : 28 U.S.C. §1291 attribue aux cours d’appel fédérales la compétence de connaître des appels formés contre toutes décisions finales rendues par une cour de district fédérale des Etats-Unis. De son côté, la Règle 54 (b) de procédure civile fédérale permet aux cours de districts fédérales d’autoriser un appel immédiat contre des décisions partielles par elles rendues dans le cadre d’un procès portant sur plusieurs questions contentieuses. Enfin, 28 U.S.C. §1407 autorise le Panel Judiciaire sur les litiges impliquant plusieurs districts à transférer à un seul district des actions civiles impliquant une ou plusieurs questions de fait communes, aux fins de coordonner ou consolider les opérations avant procès, de manière à promouvoir une conduite juste et efficiente de telles actions.

La présente espèce concerne le LIBOR, un taux de référence pour déterminer les taux d’intérêts applicables à des instruments financiers aux Etats-Unis et dans le monde entier. Le Panel Judiciaire a déterminé l’existence d’un litige impliquant ici plusieurs districts s’agissant de plusieurs affaires contenant des allégations selon lesquelles les banques défenderesses auraient déprécié le coût de leurs emprunts, dépréciant ainsi le LIBOR et permettant à ces banques de payer des taux d’intérêt plus bas pour ce qui est d’instruments financiers vendus à des investisseurs. Quelque 60 actions ont ainsi été consolidées, pour ce qui est des opérations judiciaires avant procès, auprès de la cour de district fédérale pour le district sud de New York, parmi lesquelles une action de classe déposée par les recourants G. et Z. G. et Z. ne se plaignent que du seul fait qu’agissant en concert, plusieurs banques auraient porté atteinte au droit fédéral sur les cartels.

Déterminant qu’aucun demandeur ne pouvait valablement se prévaloir d’un dommage résultant d’une prétendue violation du droit sur les cartels, la cour de district accepta la requête des banques sollicitant le prononcé d’irrecevabilité s’agissant de toutes les actions fondées sur le droit des cartels, incluant l’action déposée par G. et Z. La cour de district a également rejeté la requête de G. et Z. demandant à pouvoir compléter leur demande, et rejeta leurs prétentions dans leur entièreté.

Partant de la prémisse que G. et Z. étaient au bénéfice d’un droit d’appel immédiat selon la §1291, la cour de district appliqua la Règle 54(b) et leur accorda le droit d’interjeter un appel contre la décision d’irrecevabilité de leur demande basée sur le droit des cartels. 

A juste titre juge la Cour Suprême fédérale, considérant qu’une décision d’irrecevabilité qui porte sur l’entier de la procédure déposée par G. et Z. a pour conséquence d’exclure G. et Z. de la procédure jointe, leur octroyant ainsi un droit d’appel au sens de la §1291. Du fait que les cas consolidés pour les opérations avant procès conservent ordinairement leurs identités séparées, une décision disposant de l’une des actions consolidées qualifie de décision finale pouvant faire l’objet d’un appel au sens de la §1291. La Section 1407 parle d’actions individuelles transférables à une seule cour de district, et non pas d’une action multi-districts monolithique qui serait créé par le transfert.

Les banques soulèvent en outre le problème que pose le fait de permettre à des demandeurs dont les conclusions sont les plus faibles de déposer un appel, parce que leur demande en justice ne se base que sur un seul grief, tandis que des demandeurs avec un dossier plus solide seraient dépourvus du droit d’appeler du seul fait que leur action en justice se base sur plusieurs moyens. Mais cette préoccupation est réglée par la Règle 54(b), qui permet aux cours de districts d’autoriser un appel sur des questions litigieuses séparées. Il est toutefois à noter que la Règle 54(b) ne saurait valablement être invoquée par G. et Z., qui ne se prévalent que d’un seul moyen dans leur demande. La Section 1292(b), qui permet aux cours de district d’autoriser l’appel contre certains ordres interlocutoires, n’est pas non plus applicable en l’espèce, considérant que la décision d’irrecevabilité de la demande de G. et Z. ne comporte rien de nature interlocutoire.