U.S. Supreme Court, Amina Bouarfa v. Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, Docket No. 23-583

Judicial Review

 

Discretionary Agency Decisions

 

After Chevron Deference

 

Circuit Split

 

 

 

 

 

8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars judicial review of decisions “made discretionary by legislation.” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 246–247.

 

 

 

(…) Nor is it unreasonable to suggest that Congress created a system in which a sham-marriage determination is subject to judicial review when an agency denies a visa petition but not when the agency revokes a prior approval. That distinction “reflects Congress’ choice to provide reduced procedural protection for discretionary relief.” Patel v. Garland, 596 U. S. 328, 345.

 

 

(…) Because the presumption that administrative action is subject to judicial review may be overcome by “‘clear and convincing evidence’ of congressional intent to preclude judicial review,” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221, 229, there is no need to resort to the presumption of reviewability where, as here, “the statute is clear,” Patel, 596 U. S., at 347.

 

 

The Secretary points to 8 U. S. C. §1155 as the source of the agency’s revocation authority; that provision states that the Secretary “may, at any time,” revoke approval of a visa petition “for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause.” The issue we address today is whether revocation under §1155 qualifies as a decision “in the discretion of” the Secretary such that it falls within the purview of a separate statute §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)—that strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain discretionary actions. We hold that it does.

 

 

Through §1252(a)(2)(B), Congress stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to review two categories of discretionary agency decisions. First, Congress precluded review of “any judgment regarding the granting of relief under” five listed statutory provisions that empower the Attorney General to grant certain relief to noncitizens. §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Second, in the provision at issue here, Congress barred review of “any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary.” §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).

 

 

We granted certiorari to resolve a question that has split the courts of appeals: Whether federal courts have jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s revocation of the agency’s prior approval of a visa petition.

 

 

It is clear on the face of §1155 that the revocation provision is a quintessential grant of discretion to the Secretary. Once again, that provision provides that the Secretary “may, at any time, for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause, revoke the approval of any visa petition.” §1155. As “this Court has ‘repeatedly observed,’” “‘the word “may” clearly connotes discretion.’” Biden v. Texas, 597 U. S. 785, 802 (2022) (quoting Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 590 U. S. 418, 428 (2020)). Moreover, here, Congress has in no way prescribed how that discretion must be exercised. There are no conditions that the Secretary must satisfy before he can revoke the agency’s approval; he may do so “at any time,” for whatever reason “he deems to be good and sufficient cause.” That broad grant of authority “fairly exudes deference” to the Secretary and is similar to other statutes that we have held “‘commit’” a decision “‘to agency discretion.’” Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592, 600 (1988) (holding that a statute permitting the agency to terminate an employee whenever it “‘deems such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States’” was discretionary).

 

 

That discretion is a two-way street. By granting the Secretary discretion to revoke the agency’s approval of visa petitions, Congress has also vested the Secretary with discretion to decline to revoke an approval the agency previously gave. So, if the Secretary determines that the agency’s approval of a visa petition was erroneous, he can revoke that approval—or he can let the error stand. As a general matter, then, this discretion may work to the benefit of visa-petition beneficiaries, since rather than tying the agency’s hands by forcing revocation, Congress created “room for mercy.” Patel v. Garland, 596 U. S. 328, 331 (2022).

 

 

Nor is it unreasonable, as Bouarfa protests, to suppose that Congress created a system in which a sham-marriage determination is reviewable if it is the reason for the agency’s denial of a petition, but not if it is the reason for the agency’s revocation. That distinction “reflects Congress’ choice to provide reduced procedural protection for discretionary relief.” Patel, 596 U. S., at 345. In the interest of finality, Congress vested the Secretary with the discretion to allow the agency’s mistakes to inure to the benefit of the noncitizen. At the same time, Congress did not want this discretion to open up a new source of litigation. Cf. Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221, 230 (2020) (observing Congress’s goal of “‘consolidating judicial review of immigration proceedings into one action’” (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 313 (2001)). “The context in which” the agency makes the sham-marriage determination thus “explains the difference in protection afforded.” Patel, 596 U. S., at 345.

 

 

 

 

 

(U.S. Supreme Court, Dec. 10, 2024, Amina Bouarfa v. Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, Docket No. 23-583, J. Jackson, Unanimous)

Kucana v. Holder

Judicial review: proscription of judicial review: 8 U.S.C. section 1252(a)(2)(B)’s proscription of judicial review applies only to Attorney General determinations made discretionary by statute, not to determinations declared discretionary by the Attorney General himself through regulation (here administrative decisions denying motions to reopen removal proceedings); examining the provision at issue in statutory context, the parties’ position stands on firmer ground. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) is far from IIRIRA’s only jurisdictional limitation. It is sandwiched between two subsections, §1252(a)(2)(A) and §1252(a)(2)(C), both dependent on statutory provisions, not on any regulation, to define their scope. Given §1252(a)(2)(B)’s statutory placement, one would expect that it, too, would cover statutory provisions alone; Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) places within the no-judicial-review category “any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255.” Each of the referenced statutory provisions addresses a different form of discretionary relief from removal and contains language indicating that the decision is entrusted to the Attorney General’s discretion. Clause (i) does not refer to any regulatory provision. The proximity of clause (i) and the clause (ii) catchall, and the words linking them—“any other decision”—suggests that Congress had in mind decisions of the same genre, i.e., those made discretionary by legislation. Read harmoniously, both clauses convey that Congress barred court review of discretionary decisions only when Congress itself set out the Attorney General’s discretionary authority in the statute; had Congress wanted the jurisdictional bar to encompass decisions specified as discretionary by regulation as well as by statute, moreover, Congress could easily have said so, as it did in provisions enacted simultaneously with §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); the history of the relevant statutory provisions corroborates this determination: Congress did not codify the regulation delegating to the BIA discretion to grant or deny reopening motions. This legislative silence indicates that Congress left the matter where it was pre-IIRIRA (U.S.S.Ct., 20.01.10, Kucana v. Holder, J. Ginsburg).

Compétence de la cour : pas de recours judiciaire : la loi ici en question, votée par le Congrès (« Statute »), qui proscrit le recours judiciaire, ne s’applique qu’aux décisions de l’Attorney General rendues discrétionnaires par le texte d’une loi votée par le Congrès, mais ne s’applique pas aux décisions rendues discrétionnaires par l’Attorney General lui-même par le biais d’une « Regulation » (en l’espèce : décision administrative rejetant une requête en réouverture de la procédure d’expulsion dans le domaine de l’asile) ; examen de dite loi ici en question dans son contexte statutaire : dite loi n’est pas la seule à limiter l’accès à la juridiction : elle est en effet positionnée entre deux autres dispositions d’effet semblable. Toutes deux ne s’appliquent que si une loi votée par le Congrès le prévoit, et non si seule une « Regulation » le prévoit. Considérant la position systématique de la loi ici discutée, on peut s’attendre à ce qu’elle ne couvre que des situations prévues par un « Statute » (…). La clause (i) ne se réfère à aucune « Regulation ». La proximité de la clause (i) et de la clause subsidiaire (ii), ainsi que les mots qui les lient (« toute autre décision ») suggèrent que le Congrès avait à l’esprit des décisions du même genre, à savoir celles rendues discrétionnaires par le Congrès, et non celles rendues discrétionnaires par l’Attorney General. Si le Congrès avait souhaité adopter une autre solution, il aurait facilement pu le dire, comme il l’a d’ailleurs fait dans d’autres dispositions adoptées à la même époque. L’interprétation historique confirme ce qui précède. Le Congrès n’a pas codifié les « Regulations » qui délèguent à l’Attorney General et aux autorités administratives de recours la discrétion d’accorder ou de refuser des requêtes en réouverture de procédures. Ce silence législatif indique que le Congrès a laissé la matière dans son état avant l’adoption des dernières dispositions légales.