U.S. Supreme Court, CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., 605 U.S. 223

Foreign Sovereign Immunity

 

Personal Jurisdiction over a Foreign Sovereign

 

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

 

Immunity Exception Applies and Service of Process

 

Minimum Contacts?

 

 

 

 

Held: Personal jurisdiction exists under the FSIA when an immunity exception applies and service is proper. The FSIA does not require proof of “minimum contacts” over and above the contacts already required by the Act's enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.

 

 

Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U. S. C. §§ 1330, 1602 et seq., foreign states are generally immune from suit in United States courts, but the Act creates several exceptions. See §§ 1604, 1605–1607. And when an exception applies, § 1330(a) of the FSIA vests federal courts with “original jurisdiction” over such claims.

 

 

This suit concerns the FSIA's neighboring personal-jurisdiction provision. It provides that “personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist” whenever (1) an exception to foreign sovereign immunity applies, and (2) the foreign defendant has been properly served. § 1330(b). In the decision below, however, the Ninth Circuit imposed a third requirement: a plaintiff must also prove that the foreign state has made “minimum contacts” with the United States sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional test set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316 (1945), and its progeny. Because the Ninth Circuit's additional requirement goes beyond the text of the FSIA, we reverse.

 

 

For much of American history, foreign states and their instrumentalities enjoyed near total immunity from suit in our courts. See Hungary v. Simon, 604 U. S. 115, 118–119 (2025). This posture reflected the venerable international law principle that states are independent sovereign entities, and it encouraged others to respect the sovereignty of the United States in their courts. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling Co., 581 U. S. 170, 179 (2017). Notably, this immunity was not statutorily or constitutionally required. Instead, we have long understood foreign sovereign immunity as “a matter of grace and comity,” so judges historically “`deferred to the decisions of the political branches—in particular, those of the Executive Branch—on whether to take jurisdiction' over particular actions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities.” Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U. S. 677, 689 (2004) (quoting Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 486 (1983)). In practice, that usually entailed the State Department filing a case-specific “`suggestion of immunity’” whenever a foreign sovereign was sued, and when that occurred, the court would abide by the suggestion. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U. S. 305, 311 (2010) (quoting Ex parte Peru, 318 U. S. 578, 581 (1943)).

 

 

The Act also waives immunity for suits to confirm arbitration awards. §1605(a)(6). The arbitration exception applies in four statutorily defined contexts, including where the “agreement or award” is “governed by a treaty or other international agreement in force for the United States calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.” §1605(a)(6)(B). The United States, for instance, has acceded to the New York Convention, which requires it to enforce certain awards issued abroad. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U. S. T. 2517, T. I. A. S. No. 6997;

9 U. S. C. §§ 201–208. In such instances, and when the FSIA is otherwise satisfied, the arbitration exception would also apply.

Whenever an FSIA immunity exception applies, jurisdiction usually follows.

 

 

(…) To the extent that some or all FSIA exceptions satisfy International Shoe, it is only because the exceptions Congress wrote happen to meet that standard, not because § 1330(b) secretly incorporated our jurisdictional due-process cases.

 

 

(…) See Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 587 U. S. 1, 4–5, 8–13 (2019) (discussing § 1608's specialized service-of-process rules).

 

 

28 U. S. C. § 1330(b) provides:

 

“Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under section 1608 of this title.”

 

 

Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 451, Comment b (2017).

 

 

 

 

(U.S. Supreme Court, June 5, 2025, CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., 605 U.S. 223, J. Alito, Unanimous)

U.S. Supreme Court, CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., 605 U.S. 223

Remand

 

Forfeiture

 

Waiver

 

 

 

(…) We decline to answer those questions today. The Ninth Circuit relied exclusively on its interpretation of the FSIA's personal-jurisdiction provision, so that court has not yet addressed Antrix's alternative arguments. “And, for that reason, neither shall we.” F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S. A., 542 U. S. 155, 175 (2004); accord, United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 532 U. S. 483, 494 (2001). Of course, Antrix is welcome to litigate these contentions on remand consistent with principles of forfeiture and waiver.

 

 

 

(U.S. Supreme Court, June 5, 2025, CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., 605 U.S. 223, J. Alito, Unanimous)

 

 

 

 

U.S. Supreme Court, Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic Int’l, Inc., Docket No. 21-1043, 600 U.S. 412

Extraterritoriality

 

Presumption Against Extraterritoriality

 

Conflict of Laws

 

Foreign Law

 

International Relations

 

Trademark Infringement

 

Circuit Split

 

 

 

 

This case requires us to decide the foreign reach of 15 U.S.C. §1114(1)(a) and §1125(a)(1), two provisions of the Lanham Act that prohibit trademark infringement. Applying the presumption against extraterritoriality, we hold that these provisions are not extraterritorial and that they extend only to claims where the claimed infringing use in commerce is domestic. 

 

§1114(1)(a) prohibits the unauthorized “use in commerce of any reproduction . . . of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services” when “such use is likely to cause confusion.” 

 

§1125(a)(1) prohibits the “use in commerce” of a protected mark, whether registered or not, that “is likely to cause confusion.”

 

We granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit split over the extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act. 598 U.S. ––– (2023).

 

“It is a `longstanding principle of American law “that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” '” Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010). We have repeatedly explained that this principle, which we call the presumption against extraterritoriality, refers to a “presumption against application to conduct in the territory of another sovereign.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 119 (2013) (citing Morrison, 561 U.S., at 265). In other words, exclusively “`foreign conduct is generally the domain of foreign law.'” Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455 (2007) (alteration omitted). The presumption “serves to avoid the international discord that can result when U.S. law is applied to conduct in foreign countries” and reflects the “`commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.'” RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U.S. 325, 335–336 (2016).

 

Applying the presumption against extraterritoriality involves “a two-step framework.” Id., at 337. At step one, we determine whether a provision is extraterritorial, and that determination turns on whether “Congress has affirmatively and unmistakably instructed that” the provision at issue should “apply to foreign conduct.” Id., at 335, 337; accord, Kiobel, 569 U.S., at 117 (asking whether Congress “intends federal law to apply to conduct occurring abroad”); Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 593 U.S. –––, ––– (2021). If Congress has provided an unmistakable instruction that the provision is extraterritorial, then claims alleging exclusively foreign conduct may proceed, subject to “the limits Congress has (or has not) imposed on the statute's foreign application.” RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S., at 337–338.

 

If a provision is not extraterritorial, we move to step two, which resolves whether the suit seeks a (permissible) domestic or (impermissible) foreign application of the provision. To make that determination, courts must start by identifying the “` “focus” of congressional concern' ” underlying the provision at issue. Id., at 336. “The focus of a statute is `the object of its solicitude,' which can include the conduct it `seeks to “regulate,”' as well as the parties and interests it `seeks to “protect” ' or vindicate.” WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 585 U.S. –––, ––– (2018) (alterations omitted).

 

Step two does not end with identifying statutory focus. We have repeatedly and explicitly held that courts must “identify `the statute's “focus” ' and ask whether the conduct relevant to that focus occurred in United States territory.” Id., at ––– (emphasis added); accord, e.g., RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S., at 337. Thus, to prove that a claim involves a domestic application of a statute, “plaintiffs must establish that `the conduct relevant to the statute's focus occurred in the United States.'” Nestlé, 593 U.S., at ––– – ––– (emphasis added); see, e.g., WesternGeco, 585 U.S., at ––––––– (holding that a claim was a domestic application of the Patent Act because the infringing acts—the conduct relevant to the focus of the provisions at issue—were committed in the United States); Morrison, 561 U.S., at 266–267, 271–273 (concluding that a claim was a foreign application of the Securities and Exchange Act because the “purchase-and-sale transactions” at issue occurred outside of the United States).

 

Step two is designed to apply the presumption against extraterritoriality to claims that involve both domestic and foreign activity, separating the activity that matters from the activity that does not. After all, we have long recognized that the presumption would be meaningless if any domestic conduct could defeat it. See Morrison, 561 U.S., at 266. Thus, “`if the conduct relevant to the statute's focus occurred in the United States, then the case involves a permissible domestic application' of the statute, `even if other conduct occurred abroad.'” WesternGeco, 585 U.S., at ––– (quoting RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S., at 337). And “if the relevant conduct occurred in another country, `then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial application regardless of any other conduct that occurred in U.S. territory.'” WesternGeco, 585 U.S., at ––– (quoting RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S., at 337). Of course, if all the conduct “`regarding the violations `took place outside the United States,'” then courts do “not need to determine . . . the statute's `focus'” at all. Id., at 337. In that circumstance, there would be no domestic conduct that could be relevant to any focus, so the focus test has no filtering role to play. See, e.g., Nestlé, 593 U.S., at –––; Kiobel, 569 U.S., at 124.

 

With this well-established framework in mind, the first question is whether the relevant provisions of the Lanham Act, see §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1), provide “a clear, affirmative indication” that they apply extraterritorially, RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S., at 337. They do not.

 

(…) When applying the presumption, “`we have repeatedly held that even statutes . . . that expressly refer to “foreign commerce” '” when defining “commerce” are not extraterritorial. Morrison, 561 U.S., at 262–263; see also RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S., at 344.

 

See Kiobel, 569 U. S., at 118 (“It is well established that generic terms like `any' or `every' do not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality”). And the mere fact that the Lanham Act contains a substantively similar definition that departs from the so-called “boilerplate” definitions used in other statutes cannot justify a different conclusion either.

 

In other words, Congress proscribed the use of a mark in commerce under certain conditions. This conduct, to be sure, must create a sufficient risk of confusion, but confusion is not a separate requirement; rather, it is simply a necessary characteristic of an offending use.5 Because Congress has premised liability on a specific action (a particular sort of use in commerce), that specific action would be the conduct relevant to any focus on offer today. See, e.g., WesternGeco, 585 U.S., at ––– – –––.

 

In sum, as this case comes to us, “use in commerce” is the conduct relevant to any potential focus of §1114(1)(a) and §1125(a)(1) because Congress deemed a violation of either provision to occur each time a mark is used in commerce in the way Congress described, with no need for any actual confusion. Under step two of our extraterritoriality standard, then, “use in commerce” provides the dividing line between foreign and domestic applications of these Lanham Act provisions. 

 

5 Both provisions “refer to a `likelihood' of harm, rather than a completed harm.” Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432 (2003). In other words, “actual confusion is not necessary in order to prove infringement.” Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §23, at 250, Comment b (1993); accord, id., §23, at 251, Comment d; 4 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23:12, at 23–157 (5th ed. 2023) (McCarthy) (“ `It is black letter law that actual confusion need not be shown to prevail under the Lanham Act, since . . . the Act requires only a likelihood of confusion' ”). Instead, the provisions treat confusion as a means to limit liability to only certain “bona fide use[s] of a mark in the ordinary course of trade.” 15 U. S. C. § 1127 (defining “use in commerce”); see Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B. V., 591 U.S. –––, ––– (2020) (“A competitor's use does not infringe a mark [under §1114(1)(a) and § 1125(a)(1)] unless it is likely to confuse consumers”).

 

When a claim involves both domestic and foreign activity, the question is whether “`the conduct relevant to the statute's focus occurred in the United States.'” Nestlé, 593 U.S., at ––– – –––. If that “`conduct . . . occurred in the United States, then the case involves a permissible domestic application' of the statute `even if other conduct occurred abroad.’” WesternGeco, 585 U.S., at –––. But “if the conduct relevant to the focus occurred in a foreign country, then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial application regardless of any other conduct that occurred in U.S. territory.” RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S., at 337; see, e.g., WesternGeco, 585 U.S., at –––; Nestlé, 593 U.S., at ––– – –––; Morrison, 561 U.S., at 266–267, 271–273.

 

In nearly all countries, including the United States, trademark law is territorial—i.e., “a trademark is recognized as having a separate existence in each sovereign territory in which it is registered or legally recognized as a mark.” 5 McCarthy §29:1, at 29–4 to 29–5. Thus, each country is empowered to grant trademark rights and police infringement within its borders. See, e.g., ibid.; Ingenohl v. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S. 541, 544 (1927); A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 692 (1923).

 

This principle has long been enshrined in international law. Under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21 U. S. T. 1583, T. I. A. S. No. 6923, a “mark duly registered in a country of the Union shall be regarded as independent of marks registered in other countries of the Union,” and the seizure of infringing goods is authorized “on importation” to a country “where such mark or trade name is entitled to legal protection.” Arts. 6(3), 9(1), id., at 1639, 1647.

 

Because of the territorial nature of trademarks, the “probability of incompatibility with the applicable laws of other counties is so obvious that if Congress intended such foreign application `it would have addressed the subject of conflicts with foreign laws and procedures.'” Morrison, 561 U.S., at 269.

 

Secondary Sources: McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23:12, at 23–157 (5th ed. 2023).

 

 

(U.S. Supreme Court, June 29, 2023, Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic Int’l, Inc., Docket No. 21-1043, 600 U.S. 412, J. Alito)

 

 

U.S. Supreme Court, Dutra Group v. Batterton, Docket No. 18-266

Admiralty Law

Maritime Law

Common Law

Equity

Jones Act

Punitive Damages

Exemplary Damages

Unseaworthiness Actions

Maritime Claim of Maintenance and Cure.

By granting federal courts jurisdiction over maritime and admiralty cases, the Constitution implicitly directs federal courts sitting in admiralty to proceed “in the man­ner of a common law court.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U. S. 471, 489–490 (2008). Thus, where Congress has not prescribed specific rules, federal courts must develop the “amalgam of traditional common-law rules, modifica­tions of those rules, and newly created rules” that forms the general maritime law. East River S. S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U. S. 858, 864–865 (1986). But maritime law is no longer solely the province of the Federal Judiciary. “Congress and the States have legis­lated extensively in these areas.” Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U. S. 19, 27 (1990). When exercising its inher­ent common-law authority, “an admiralty court should look primarily to these legislative enactments for policy guidance.” Ibid. We may depart from the policies found in the statutory scheme in discrete instances based on long-established history, see, e.g., Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U. S. 404, 424–425 (2009), but we do so cautiously in light of Congress’s persistent pursuit of “uniformity in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction.” Miles, supra, at 26 (quoting Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U. S. 375, 401 (1970)).

This case asks whether a mariner may recover punitive damages on a claim that he was injured as a result of the unseaworthy condition of the vessel. We have twice con­fronted similar questions in the past several decades, and our holdings in both cases were based on the particular claims involved. In Miles, which concerned a wrongful-death claim under the general maritime law, we held that recovery was limited to pecuniary damages, which did not include loss of society. 498 U. S., at 23. And in Atlantic Sounding, after examining centuries of relevant case law, we held that punitive damages are not categorically barred as part of the award on the traditional maritime claim of maintenance and cure. 557 U. S., at 407. Here, because there is no historical basis for allowing punitive damages in unseaworthiness actions, and in order to promote uniformity with the way courts have applied parallel statutory causes of action, we hold that punitive damages remain unavailable in unseaworthiness actions.

The seaman’s right to recover damages for personal injury on a claim of unseaworthiness originates in the admiralty court decisions of the 19th century. At the time, “seamen led miserable lives.” D. Robertson, S. Friedell, & M. Sturley, Admiralty and Maritime Law in the United States 163 (2d ed. 2008). Maritime law was largely judge­made, and seamen were viewed as “emphatically the wards of the admiralty.” Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 485 (No. 6,047) (CC Me. 1823). In that era, the pri­mary responsibility for protecting seamen lay in the courts, which saw mariners as “peculiarly entitled to”—and particularly in need of—judicial protection “against the effects of the superior skill and shrewdness of masters and owners of ships.” Brown v. Lull, 4 F. Cas. 407, 409 (No. 2,018) (CC Mass. 1836) (Story, J.).

Courts of admiralty saw it as their duty not to be “con­fined to the mere dry and positive rules of the common law” but to “act upon the enlarged and liberal jurispru­dence of courts of equity; and, in short, so far as their powers extended, they acted as courts of equity.” This Court interpreted the Constitution’s grant of admi­ralty jurisdiction to the Federal Judiciary as “the power to . . . dispose of a case as justice may require.” The Reso­lute, 168 U. S. 437, 439 (1897).

Courts used this power to protect seamen from injury primarily through two causes of action. The first, mainte­nance and cure, has its roots in the medieval and renaissance law codes that form the ancient foundation of mari­time common law.

The duty of maintenance and cure requires a ship’s master “to provide food, lodging, and medical services to a seaman injured while serving the ship.” Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U. S. 438, 441 (2001). This duty, “which arises from the contract of employment, does not rest upon negligence or culpability on the part of the owner or master, nor is it restricted to those cases where the seaman’s employment is the cause of the injury or illness.” Calmar S. S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U. S. 525, 527 (1938).

The second claim, unseaworthiness, is a much more recent development and grew out of causes of action unre­lated to personal injury. In its earliest forms, an unsea­worthiness claim gave sailors under contract to sail on a ship the right to collect their wages even if they had re­fused to board an unsafe vessel after discovering its condi­tion. See, e.g., Dixon v. The Cyrus, 7 F. Cas. 755, 757 (No. 3,930) (Pa. 1789); Rice v. The Polly & Kitty, 20 F. Cas. 666, 667 (No. 11,754) (Pa. 1789). Similarly, unseaworthiness was a defense to criminal charges against seamen who refused to obey a ship master’s orders. See, e.g., United States v. Nye, 27 F. Cas. 210, 211 (No. 15,906) (CC Mass. 1855); United States v. Ashton, 24 F. Cas. 873, 874–875 (No. 14,470) (CC Mass. 1834). A claim of unseaworthiness could also be asserted by a shipper to recover damages or by an insurer to deny coverage when the poor condition of the ship resulted in damage to or loss of the cargo. See The Caledonia, 157 U. S. 124, 132–136 (1895) (cataloging cases).

Only in the latter years of the 19th century did unsea­worthiness begin a long and gradual evolution toward remedying personal injury. Courts began to extend the cases about refusals to serve to allow recovery for mari­ners who were injured because of the unseaworthy condi­tion of the vessel on which they had served. These early cases were sparse, and they generally allowed recovery only when a vessel’s owner failed to exercise due diligence to ensure that the ship left port in a seaworthy condition (…) Because a claimant had to show that he was injured by some aspect of the ship’s condition that rendered the vessel unseawor­thy, a claim could not prevail based on “the negligence of the master, or any member of the crew.” (…) Instead, a seaman had to show that the owner of the vessel had failed to exercise due diligence in ensuring the ship was in seaworthy condi­tion. See generally Dixon v. United States, 219 F. 2d 10, 12–14 (CA2 1955) (Harlan, J.) (cataloging evolution of the claim).

(It was only after the passage of the Jones Act that negligence by a fellow mariner provided a reliable basis for recovery (fn. 4)).

Tremendous shifts in mariners’ rights took place be­tween 1920 and 1950. First, during and after the First World War, Congress enacted a series of laws regulating maritime liability culminating in the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, §33, 41 Stat. 1007 (Jones Act), which codified the rights of injured mariners and created new statutory claims that were freed from many of the common-law limitations on recovery. The Jones Act provides injured seamen with a cause of action and a right to a jury. 46 U. S. C. §30104. Rather than create a new structure of substantive rights, the Jones Act incorporated the rights provided to railway workers under the Federal Employers’ liability Act (FELA), 45 U. S. C. §51 et seq. 46 U. S. C. §30104. In the 30 years after the Jones Act’s passage, “the Act was the vehicle for almost all seamen’s personal injury and death actions.” Gilmore & Black §6–20, at 327.

But the Jones Act was overtaken in the 1950s by the second fundamental change in personal injury maritime claims—and it was this Court, not Congress, that played the leading role. In a pair of decisions in the late 1940s, the Court transformed the old claim of unseaworthiness, which had demanded only due diligence by the vessel owner, into a strict-liability claim. In Mahnich v. South­ern S. S. Co., 321 U. S. 96 (1944), the Court stated that “the exercise of due diligence does not relieve the owner of his obligation” to provide a seaworthy ship and, in the same ruling, held that the fellow-servant doctrine did not provide a defense. Id., at 100, 101.

(…) Less than two years later, we affirmed that the duty of seaworthiness was “essentially a species of liability without fault . . . neither limited by conceptions of negligence nor contrac­tual in character. It is a form of absolute duty owing to all within the range of its humanitarian policy.” Seas Ship­ping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85, 94–95 (1946).

From Mahnich forward, “the decisions of this Court have undeviatingly reflected an understanding that the owner’s duty to furnish a seaworthy ship is absolute and completely independent of his duty under the Jones Act to exercise reasonable care.” Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U. S. 539, 549 (1960). As a result of Mah­nich and Sieracki, between the 1950s and 1970s “the unseaworthiness count was the essential basis for recov­ery with the Jones Act count preserved merely as a jury-getting device.”

(…) The shifts in plaintiff preferences between Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims were possible because of the significant overlap between the two causes of action. One leading treatise goes so far as to describe the two claims as “alternative ‘grounds’ of recov­ery for a single cause of action.” 2 R. Force & M. Norris, The Law of Seamen §30:90, p. 30–369 (5th ed. 2003). The two claims are so similar that, immediately after the Jones Act’s passage, we held that plaintiffs could not submit both to a jury. Plamals, supra, at 156–157 (“Sea­men may invoke, at their election, the relief accorded by the old rules against the ship, or that provided by the new against the employer. But they may not have the benefit of both”). We no longer require such election. See McAl­lister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U. S. 221, 222, n. 2 (1958). But a plaintiff still cannot duplicate his recovery by collecting full damages on both claims because, “whether or not the seaman’s injuries were occasioned by the un­seaworthiness of the vessel or by the negligence of the master or members of the crew, . . . there is but a single wrongful invasion of his primary right of bodily safety and but a single legal wrong.” Peterson, 278 U. S., at 138.

(The decline of Jones Act claims was arrested, although not reversed, by our holding that some negligent actions on a vessel may create Jones Act liability without rendering the vessel unseaworthy. See Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U. S. 494 (1971); see also 1B Benedict on Admiralty §23, p. 3–35 (7th rev. ed. 2018) (fn. 5)).

For claims of unseaworthiness, the overwhelming his­torical evidence suggests that punitive damages are not available.

(…) The lack of punitive damages in traditional maritime law cases is practically dispositive. By the time the claim of unseaworthiness evolved to remedy personal injury, punitive damages were a well-established part of the common law. Exxon Shipping, 554 U. S., at 491. Ameri­can courts had awarded punitive (or exemplary) damages from the Republic’s earliest days. See, e.g., Genay v. Nor­ris, 1 S. C. L. 6, 7 (1784); Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N. J. L. 77, 78 (1791). And yet, beyond the decisions discussed above, Batterton presents no decisions from the formative years of the personal injury unseaworthiness claim in which exemplary damages were awarded. From this we conclude that, unlike maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness did not traditionally allow recovery of punitive damages.

In light of this overwhelming historical evidence, we cannot sanction a novel remedy here unless it is required to maintain uniformity with Congress’s clearly expressed policies. Therefore, we must consider the remedies typi­cally recognized for Jones Act claims.

The Jones Act adopts the remedial provisions of FELA, and by the time of the Jones Act’s passage, this Court and others had repeatedly interpreted the scope of damages available to FELA plaintiffs. These early decisions held that “the damages recoverable under FELA are limited. . . strictly to the financial loss . . . sustained.”

(We also note that Congress declined to allow punitive damages when it enacted the Death on the High Seas Act. 46 U. S. C. §30303 (allowing “fair compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained” for a death on the high seas) (fn. 8)).

(…) Because unseaworthiness in its current strict-liability form is our own invention and came after passage of the Jones Act, it would exceed our current role to introduce novel remedies contradictory to those Congress has provided in similar areas. ((…) Declining to create remedy “that goes well beyond the limits of Congress’ ordered system of recovery”).

(…) The duty of mainte­nance and cure requires the master to provide medical care and wages to an injured mariner in the period after the injury has occurred. Calmar S. S. Corp., 303 U. S., at 527–528. By contrast, both the Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims compensate for the injury itself and for the losses resulting from the injury. Peterson, supra, at 138. In such circumstances, we are particularly mindful of the rule that requires us to promote uniformity between mari­time statutory law and maritime common law.

(…) Unseaworthiness claims run against the owner of the vessel (…) See Sieracki, 328 U. S., at 100 (The duty of seaworthiness is “peculiarly and exclusively the obligation of the owner. It is one he cannot delegate”).

Finally, because “noncompensatory damages are not part of the civil-code tradition and thus unavailable in such countries,” Exxon Shipping, 554 U. S., at 497, allow­ing punitive damages would place American shippers at a significant competitive disadvantage and would discour­age foreign-owned vessels from employing American sea­men. See Gotanda, Punitive Damages: A Comparative Analysis, 42 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 391, 396, n. 24 (2004) (listing civil-law nations that restrict private plaintiffs to compensatory damages).

(…) In light of these changes and of the roles now played by the Judiciary and the political branches in protecting sailors, the special solicitude to sailors has only a small role to play in contemporary maritime law.

Secondary sources: Benedict on Admiralty (7th rev. ed. 2018); R. Force & M. Norris, The Law of Seamen (5th ed. 2003).

(U.S. Supreme Court, June 24, 2019, Dutra Group v. Batterton, Docket No. 18-266, J. Alito)

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., Docket 16-466

Specific Jurisdiction: Due Process Clause: Fourteenth Amendment: Fifth Amendment: Federalism:

Reverses and remands 1Cal. 5th 783, 377 P. 3d 874 (S221038, August 29, 2016, Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of San Francisco County).

(…) We granted certiorari to decide whether the California courts’ exercise of jurisdiction in this case violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 580 U. S. ___ (2017).

(California law provides that its courts may exercise jurisdiction “on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution . . . of the United States,” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. §410.10 (West 2004)).

(…) Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which “limits the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant,” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 291 (1980).

(…) The Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism.

Our settled principles regarding specific jurisdiction control this case. In order for a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a claim, there must be an “affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, prin­cipally, an activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U. S. 915, 919 (2011).

(…) Even regu­larly occurring sales of a product in a State do not justify the exercise of jurisdiction over a claim unrelated to those sales.

(…) What is needed—and what is missing here—is a connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.

(…) Walden, 571 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8): In that case, Nevada plaintiffs sued an out-of-state defendant for conducting an allegedly unlawful search of the plaintiffs while they were in Georgia preparing to board a plane bound for Nevada. We held that the Nevada courts lacked specific jurisdiction even though the plain­tiffs were Nevada residents and “suffered foreseeable harm in Nevada.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 11). Because the “relevant conduct occurred entirely in Georgia . . . the mere fact that this conduct affected plaintiffs with con­nections to the forum State did not suffice to authorize jurisdiction.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14).

In today’s case, the connection between the nonresi­dents’ claims and the forum is even weaker. The relevant plaintiffs are not California residents and do not claim to have suffered harm in that State. In addition, as in Wal­den, all the conduct giving rise to the nonresidents’ claims occurred elsewhere. It follows that the California courts cannot claim specific jurisdiction.

(…) (Keeton held that there was jurisdiction in New Hampshire to consider the full measure of the plaintiff ’s claim, but whether she could actually recover out-of-state damages was a merits question governed by New Hampshire libel law).

(Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U. S. 320, 332 (1980); see Walden, 571 U. S., at ___ (slip op, at 8) (“A defendant’s relationship with a . . . third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction”)).

(…) In addition, since our decision concerns the due process limits on the exer­cise of specific jurisdiction by a State, we leave open the question whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court. See Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U. S. 97, 102, n. 5 (1987).

(U.S.S.C., June 19, 2017, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., Docket 16-466, J. Alito (only J. Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion)).

Notion de "specific jurisdiction", telle que limitée par la Clause "Due Process" du Quatorzième Amendement, en cas de procédure devant le Tribunal d'un état, impliquant plusieurs demandeurs, certains domiciliés hors de l'état du for.

La Cour rappelle sa jurisprudence : un Tribunal est compétent s'il existe un lien entre le for et la prétention déduite en justice, par exemple suite à une activité ou à un événement qui s'est produit dans l'état du for. (En l'espèce, action de classe en Californie contre un fabricant de médicament. Les demandeurs californiens peuvent invoquer un dommage subi en Californie, suite à un achat du produit en Californie. Ces éléments ne peuvent pas être invoqués par les demandeurs domiciliés dans un autre état).

Des ventes régulières dans un état ne suffisent pas à fonder la compétence des Tribunaux de cet état si la prétention n'est pas liée aux ventes.

Dans une décision Walden, des demandeurs domiciliés au Nevada avaient agi devant le Tribunal du Nevada contre un défendeur domicilié en Géorgie. Les prétentions en dommages-intérêts découlaient d'une fouille prétendument illégale subie en Géorgie juste avant d'embarquer un vol à destination du Nevada. La Cour a jugé que les Tribunaux du Nevada n'étaient pas compétents (absence de "specific jurisdiction"), même si les demandeurs étaient résidents du Nevada et même s'ils subissaient un dommage dans cet état. La conduite relevante s'était en effet produite entièrement en Géorgie.

En l'espèce, la connexion entre les prétentions des demandeurs hors de l'état du for et le for lui-même est encore plus ténue que dans Walden. Ces demandeurs ne résident pas en Californie et n'ont pas subi de dommage dans cet état. En outre, comme dans Walden, la conduite à la base des prétentions s'est entièrement déroulée hors de l'état du for. Dès lors, les cours californiennes ne sont pas compétentes au sens de la "specific jurisdiction".

(Si la compétence est admise s'agissant de prétentions de parties demanderesses domiciliées hors de l'état du for, la question de savoir si ces demanderesses peuvent récupérer la totalité de leur préjudice subi hors de cet état est une question qui se juge à la lumière du droit de l'état du for, cf. décision Keeton).

(Les relations du défendeur avec un tiers, domicilié, lui, dans l'état du for, sont insuffisantes à conférer compétence spécifique).

La Cour laisse ouverte la question de savoir si le Cinquième Amendement impose à la compétence d'une cour fédérale les mêmes limites que celles décrites ci-dessus, qui ne concernent que la compétence spécifique des cours d'un état sous l'angle du Quatorzième Amendement.

Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, Docket 16-254

Service abroad of documents: Hague Service Convention: Jurisdiction:

This case concerns the scope of the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965 (Hague Service Convention), 20 U. S. T. 361, T. I. A. S. No. 6638. The purpose of that multilateral treaty is to simplify, standardize, and generally improve the process of serving documents abroad. Preamble, ibid.; see Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U. S. 694, 698 (1988). To that end, the Hague Service Convention specifies certain approved methods of service and “pre-empts inconsistent methods of service” wherever it applies. Id., at 699. Today we address a question that has divided the lower courts: whether the Convention prohibits service by mail. We hold that it does not.

In 2013, Water Splash sued Menon in state court in Texas (…) Because Menon resided in Canada, Water Splash sought and obtained permission to effect service by mail. After Menon declined to answer or otherwise enter an appearance, the trial court issued a default judgment in favor of Water Splash. Menon moved to set aside the judgment on the ground that she had not been properly served, but the trial court denied the motion.

((…) Service of process (which we have defined as “a formal delivery of documents that is legally sufficient to charge the defendant with notice of a pending action”).

(…) Article 10 permits direct service by mail . . . unless the receiving state objects to such service.

Dept. of State, Legal Considerations: International Judicial Assistance: Service of Process (stating that “service by registered . . . mail . . . is an option in many countries in the world,” but that it “should . . . not be used in the countries party to the Hague Service Convention that objected to the method described in Article 10(a) (postal channels)”), online at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legalconsiderations/judicial/service-of-process.html (all Internet materials as last visited May 19, 2017).

In short, the traditional tools of treaty interpretation unmistakably demonstrate that Article 10(a) encompasses service by mail. To be clear, this does not mean that the Convention affirmatively authorizes service by mail. Article 10(a) simply provides that, as long as the receiving state does not object, the Convention does not “interfere with . . . the freedom” to serve documents through postal channels. In other words, in cases governed by the Hague Service Convention, service by mail is permissible if two conditions are met: first, the receiving state has not objected to service by mail; and second, service by mail is authorized under otherwise-applicable law. See Brockmeyer, 383 F. 3d, at 803–804.

Secondary sources: B. Ristau, International Judicial Assistance §4–1–4(2), p. 112 (1990 rev. ed.); Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, Practical Handbook on the Operation of the Service Convention ¶279, p. 91 (4th ed. 2016).

(U.S.S.C., May 22, 2017, Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, Docket 16-254, J. Alito. All other Members joined, except J. Gorsuch, who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case).

Notifications à l'étranger. La notification par poste peut être admise. Application de la Convention de La Haye.

L'affaire débute devant une cour de l'état du Texas. La demande est signifiée par voie postale à la défenderesse, laquelle réside au Canada. Elle ne dépose pas de réponse et ne comparaît pas. Un jugement par défaut est rendu en faveur du demandeur. La défenderesse dépose une demande de relief, invoquant une notification affectée d'un vice. La demande de relief est rejetée.

La Cour juge en l'espèce que la Convention de La Haye permet une notification directe et par poste à une partie, pour autant que l'état de dite partie permette une telle notification. Le Département d'état s'est prononcé dans le même sens. Encore faut-il que l'état du for le permette aussi, car la Convention se limite à prévoir qu'elle n'interfère pas avec une notification postale si l'état du défendeur permet l'usage de la voie postale.

Birchfield v. North Dakota, Docket 14-1468

Fourth Amendment (unreasonable search): Probable cause: Search incident to arrest doctrine: Drunk-driving: Warrant: Exigent circumstances exception: Blood and breath tests: Common law: The cases now before us involve laws that (…) make it a crime for a motorist to refuse to be tested after being lawfully arrested for driving while impaired. The question presented is whether such laws violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches.

(And in practice all breath testing machines used for evidentiary purposes must be approved by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. See 1 H. Cohen & J. Green, Apprehending and Prosecuting the Drunk Driver §7.04[7] (LexisNexis 2015)).

(Today, “all 50 States have adopted implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC (blood alcohol concentration) testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense.” Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 18)).

We granted certiorari (…), in order to decide whether motorists lawfully arrested for drunk driving may be convicted of a crime or otherwise penalized for refusing to take a warrantless test measuring the alcohol in their bloodstream.

We (…) begin by considering whether the searches demanded in these cases were consistent with the Fourth Amendment.

The Amendment (…) prohibits “unreasonable searches,” and our cases establish that the taking of a blood sample or the administration of a breath test is a search. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U. S. 602, 616–617 (1989); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 767–768 (1966). The question, then, is whether the warrantless searches at issue here were reasonable. See Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U. S. 646, 652 (1995) (“As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is ‘reasonableness’”).

The exigent circumstances exception allows a warrantless search when an emergency leaves police insufficient time to seek a warrant. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978). It permits, for instance, the warrantless entry of private property when there is a need to provide urgent aid to those inside, when police are in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect, and when police fear the imminent destruction of evidence. King, at 460.

In Schmerber v. California, we held that drunk driving may present such an exigency. There, an officer directed hospital personnel to take a blood sample from a driver who was receiving treatment for car crash injuries. 384 U. S., at 758. The Court concluded that the officer “might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency” that left no time to seek a warrant because “the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops.” Id., at 770. On the specific facts of that case, where time had already been lost taking the driver to the hospital and investigating the accident, the Court found no Fourth Amendment violation even though the warrantless blood draw took place over the driver’s objection. Id., at 770–772. More recently, though, we have held that the natural dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream does not al­ways constitute an exigency justifying the warrantless taking of a blood sample. That was the holding of Mis­souri v. McNeely, 569 U. S. ___, where the State of Missouri was seeking a per se rule that “whenever an officer has probable cause to believe an individual has been driving under the influence of alcohol, exigent circumstances will necessarily exist because BAC evidence is inherently evanescent.” Id., at ___ (opinion of the Court) (slip op., at 8). We disagreed, emphasizing that Schmerber had adopted a case-specific analysis depending on “all of the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” 569 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8). We refused to “depart from careful case-by-case assessment of exigency and adopt the categorical rule proposed by the State.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 9).

We (…) consider how the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine applies to breath and blood tests incident to such arrests.

(…) A search may be made of the person of the arrestee by virtue of the lawful arrest. (…) A search may be made of the area within the control of the arrestee. 414 U. S., at 224. After a thorough review of the relevant common law history, we repudiated “case-by-case adjudication” of the question whether an arresting officer had the authority to carry out a search of the arrestee’s person. Id., at 235. The permissibility of such searches, we held, does not depend on whether a search of a particular arrestee is likely to protect officer safety or evidence: “The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect.” Ibid. Instead, the mere “fact of the lawful arrest” justifies “a full search of the person.” Ibid. In Robinson itself, that meant that police had acted permissibly in searching inside a package of cigarettes found on the man they arrested. Id., at 236. Our decision two Terms ago in Riley v. California, 573 U. S. ___ (2014), reaffirmed “Robinson’s categorical rule” and explained how the rule should be applied in situations that could not have been envisioned when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 9). Riley concerned a search of data contained in the memory of a modern cell phone. “Absent more precise guidance from the founding era,” the Court wrote, “we generally determine whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’” Ibid.

Blood and breath tests to measure blood alcohol concentration are not as new as searches of cell phones, but here, as in Riley, the founding era does not provide any definitive guidance as to whether they should be allowed incident to arrest. Lacking such guidance, we engage in the same mode of analysis as in Riley: we examine “the degree to which they intrude upon an individual’s privacy and . . . the degree to which they are needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’” Ibid.

Years ago we said that breath tests do not “implicate significant privacy concerns.” Skinner, 489 U. S., at 626. That remains so today. (…) Humans have never been known to assert a possessory interest in or any emotional attachment to any of the air in their lungs. The air that humans exhale is not part of their bodies. Exhalation is a natural process—indeed, one that is necessary for life. Humans cannot hold their breath for more than a few minutes, and all the air that is breathed into a breath analyzing machine, including deep lung air, sooner or later would be exhaled even without the test. See generally J. Hall, Guyton and Hall Textbook of Medical Physiology 519–520 (13th ed. 2016).

Blood tests are a different matter. They “require piercing the skin” and extract a part of the subject’s body. Skinner, supra, at 625; see also McNeely, 569 U. S., at ___ (opinion of the Court) (slip op., at 4) (blood draws are “a compelled physical intrusion beneath the defendant’s skin and into his veins”); id., at ___ (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.) (slip op., at 9) (blood draws are “significant bodily intrusions”). And while humans exhale air from their lungs many times per minute, humans do not continually shed blood. In addition, a blood test, unlike a breath test, places in the hands of law enforcement authorities a sample that can be preserved and from which it is possible to extract information beyond a simple BAC reading. Even if the law enforcement agency is precluded from testing the blood for any purpose other than to measure BAC, the potential remains and may result in anxiety for the person tested.

Search warrants protect privacy in two main ways. First, they ensure that a search is not carried out unless a neutral magistrate makes an independent determination that there is probable cause to believe that evidence will be found. See, e.g., Riley, 573 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5). Second, if the magistrate finds probable cause, the warrant limits the intrusion on privacy by specifying the scope of the search—that is, the area that can be searched and the items that can be sought. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 9 (1977), abrogated on other grounds, Acevedo, 500 U. S. 565.

Having assessed the effect of BAC tests on privacy interests and the need for such tests, we conclude that the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving. The impact of breath tests on privacy is slight, and the need for BAC testing is great.

We reach a different conclusion with respect to blood tests. Blood tests are significantly more intrusive, and their reasonableness must be judged in light of the availability of the less invasive alternative of a breath test. Respondents have offered no satisfactory justification for demanding the more intrusive alternative without a warrant.

Nothing prevents the police from seeking a warrant for a blood test when there is sufficient time to do so in the particular circumstances or from relying on the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement when there is not. See McNeely, 569 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 22–23).

(it is possible to extract a blood sample from a subject who forcibly resists, but many States reasonably prefer not to take this step. See, e.g., Neville, 459 U. S., at 559–560. North Dakota, for example, tells us that it generally opposes this practice because of the risk of dangerous altercations between police officers and arrestees in rural areas where the arresting officer may not have backup. Brief for Respondent in No. 14–1468, p. 29. Under current North Dakota law, only in cases involving an accident that results in death or serious injury may blood be taken from arrestees who resist. Compare N. D. Cent. Code Ann.§§39–20–04(1), 39–20–01, with §39–20–01.1.).

(A breath test may also be ineffective if an arrestee deliberately attempts to prevent an accurate reading by failing to blow into the tube for the requisite length of time or with the necessary force. But courts have held that such conduct qualifies as a refusal to undergo testing, e.g., Andrews v. Turner, 52 Ohio St. 2d 31, 36–37, 368 N. E. 2d 1253, 1256–1257 (1977); In re Kunneman, 501 P. 2d 910, 910–911 (Okla. Civ. App. 1972); see generally 1 Erwin §4.08[2] (collecting cases), and it may be prosecuted as such. And again, a warrant for a blood test may be sought).

Because breath tests are significantly less intrusive than blood tests and in most cases amply serve law enforcement interests, we conclude that a breath test, but not a blood test, may be administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving. As in all cases involving reasonable searches incident to arrest, a warrant is not needed in this situation.

Secondary sources: R. Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases §§17.03–17.04 (3d ed. 2015) (Erwin); H. Cohen & J. Green, Apprehending and Prosecuting the Drunk Driver §7.04[7] (LexisNexis 2015); W. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning: 602–1791, p. 420 (2009).

(U.S.S.C., June 23, 2016, Birchfield v. North Dakota, Docket 14-1468, J. Alito).

Quatrième Amendement (unreasonable search) : en relation avec les tests d’haleine et de sang effectués par la Police après avoir arrêté un conducteur de véhicule automobile qui présente des signes d’ébriété :

La présente espèce pose la question de savoir ce qu’il en est de la constitutionnalité (sous l’angle du Quatrième Amendement) d’une loi qui qualifie de crime le refus d’un conducteur de refuser l’un de ces tests après avoir été arrêté – conformément au droit – pour avoir conduit sous influence.

(Aujourd’hui, les 50 états ont adopté des lois de consentement implicite qui imposent aux conducteurs, comme condition permettant de conduire un véhicule à moteur à l’intérieur des frontières de l’état, de consentir à un test mesurant le taux d’alcool dans le sang en cas d’arrestation pour suspicion de conduite en état d’ébriété).

La Cour doit donc décider en l’espèce si une personne arrêtée conformément au droit pour avoir conduit en état d’ébriété peut être pénalement condamnée ou autrement pénalisée pour avoir refusé de se soumettre à un test mesurant la concentration d’alcool dans le sang, test ordonné sans Warrant.

La première question à se poser consiste à se demander si les « searches » sollicités en l’espèce sont de celles contemplées par le Quatrième Amendement.

Cet Amendement prohibe les « searches » qui ne sont pas raisonnables, et la Cour a déjà jugé qu’une prise de sang ou l’administration d’un test d’haleine constitue une « search ». Ainsi la question déterminante revient à se demander si les « searches » sans Warrants conduits en l’espèce étaient ou non raisonnables. En effet, comme l’indique le texte du Quatrième Amendement, la mesure ultime de la constitutionnalité d’une « search » d’un officier public est son caractère raisonnable ou non.

L’exception des circonstances exigeantes permet une « search » sans Warrant quand une urgence ne laisse pas à la Police un temps suffisant pour requérir un Warrant. L’exception permet par exemple à la Police d’entrer sans Warrant dans une propriété privée en cas de besoin d’apporter une aide urgente à ceux restés à l’intérieur. Elle permet aussi à la Police d’intervenir en cas de poursuite d’un suspect en fuite (« hot pursuit »), ou encore quand la Police craint la destruction imminente de moyens de preuves.

Dans sa décision Schmerber v. California,( 384 U. S., at 758) la Cour jugea que conduire en état d’ébriété pouvait impliquer l’exception de circonstances exigeantes. Dans cette affaire, un officier de Police avait requis le personnel de l’Hôpital de prélever du sang d’un automobiliste en traitement suite à un accident de circulation. La Cour observa que l’Officier pouvait raisonnablement avoir cru qu’il était confronté à une urgence qui ne laissait pas le temps de solliciter un Warrant parce que le pourcentage d’alcool dans le sang commence à diminuer peu après la fin de la consommation d’alcool. Considérant les faits spécifiques de l’affaire, quand du temps à déjà été perdu pour conduire le conducteur à l’Hôpital et pour procéder à des investigations sur le lieu de l’accident, la Cour ne trouva nulle violation du Quatrième Amendement même si la prise de sang sans Warrant avait été faite malgré l’opposition du conducteur.

Plus récemment, cependant, la Cour a jugé que la dissipation naturelle de l’alcool dans le sang ne constituait pas dans tous les cas une situation qui justifiait une prise de sang sans Warrant. Ainsi, dans la décision Missouri v. McNeely, l’état du Missouri a conclu à l’adoption d’une « per se rule » selon laquelle chaque fois qu’un officier de Police disposait d’une cause suffisante (« probable cause ») de croire qu’une personne conduisait sous l’influence de l’alcool, le principe des circonstances exigeantes existera nécessairement du fait que la preuve du taux d’alcool dans le sang est de manière inhérente évanescente. La Cour refusa de faire siennes les conclusions de l’état du Missouri à cet égard, remarquant que la décision Schmerber avait adopté une analyse au cas par cas qui dépendait de tous les faits et circonstances de l’espèce. La Cour refuse donc ici de se départir du principe d’une analyse soigneuse au cas par cas dans le cadre de l’exception des circonstances exigeantes, et refuse ainsi d’adopter la règle catégorique proposée par l’état du Missouri.

La Cour considère ensuite comment la doctrine de la « search » incidente à une arrestation s’applique aux tests d’haleine et de sang incidents à de telles arrestations.

Une « search » de la personne arrêtée peut être effectuée suite à une arrestation conforme au droit. Par ailleurs, une « search » peut être effectuée aux alentours, dans la zone de contrôle de la personne arrêtée. Après un examen complet de l’analyse de ces questions par la Common law, la Cour dans un premier temps répudie un examen au cas par cas de la question de savoir si un officier de Police qui procède à une arrestation dispose de l’autorité de procéder à une « search » de la personne arrêtée.

La légalité de telles « searches » ne dépend pas de savoir si la « fouille » de la personne arrêtée est vraisemblablement de nature à protéger la sécurité de l’officier de police ou la découverte de preuves. La Cour veut ainsi éviter que la légalité de telles « searches » ne dépende de l’appréciation ultérieure d’un Tribunal quant à la probabilité de trouver dans un cas particulier soit des armes soit des moyens de preuves. Par conséquent, le seul fait d’une arrestation justifiée autorise une fouille complète de la personne. Par exemple, la Police peut regarder ce que contient un paquet de cigarettes. La décision Riley v. California, 573 U. S. ___ (2014) concernait une “search” de données contenues dans la mémoire d’un téléphone portable moderne. La Cour a jugé qu’en l’absence d’une guidance plus précise de l’époque de la rédaction de la Constitution, il convenait généralement de dispenser de Warrant une « search » particulière en déterminant, d’une part, le degré avec lequel l’intimité de la personne est touchée, et d’autre part le degré de nécessité de la « search » à la lumière de la promotion des intérêts gouvernementaux légitimes.

Les tests de sang et d’haleine pour mesurer la concentration d’alcool dans le sang ne sont pas aussi récents que les recherches de données dans des téléphones mobiles, mais en l’espèce, comme dans la décision Riley, l’époque de l’établissement de la Constitution n’apporte pas de guidance déterminante quant à savoir si ces tests peuvent être admis de manière incidente à une arrestation. Dès lors, la Cour procède à la même analyse que dans la décision Riley (intérêts privés / intérêts gouvernementaux).

La Cour a déjà jugé, et juge en l’espèce, que les tests d’haleine n’impliquent guère d’intérêts privés significatifs. Les êtres humains ne sont pas connus pour avoir revendiqué un intérêt possessoire sur, ou pour être émotionnellement attachés à, l’air contenu dans leurs poumons. L’air expiré par les êtres humains ne fait pas partie de leur corps. L’expiration est un processus naturel, nécessaire pour vivre. Les êtres humains ne peuvent pas retenir leur respiration pendant plus de quelques minutes, et la totalité de l’air qui est expiré dans une machine, y compris l’air contenu dans les profondeurs des poumons, sera tôt ou tard expiré.

Le test de la prise de sang est une autre affaire. Il exige de percer la peau et d’extraire une partie du corps humain du sujet. Il s’agit d’une intrusion significative dans le corps humain. En outre, un échantillon de sang peut être préservé et des informations autres que le taux d’alcool peuvent être obtenues. Et même s’il est interdit à l’administration d’extraire d’autres informations de l’échantillon de sang, un potentiel d’abus demeure, pouvant générer de l’anxiété chez la personne testée.

Les Warrants protègent la sphère privée de deux manières principales : tout d’abord, ils permettent de s’assurer qu’une fouille ne sera pas conduite à moins qu’un magistrat neutre ne détermine de manière indépendante qu’il existe une « cause probable » de croire qu’un moyen de preuve sera trouvé. Ensuite, si le magistrat reconnaît l’existence d’une « cause probable », le Warrant restreint l’intrusion dans la sphère privée en spécifiant les limites de la fouille, soit en délimitant le territoire qui peut être fouillé et les objets qui peuvent être recherchés.

Après avoir analysé les effets des tests précités sur les intérêts privés, à la lumière de l’intérêt public, la Cour conclut que le Quatrième Amendement permet les tests d’haleine sans Warrant accessoires à une arrestation pour conduite en état d’ébriété. L’impact des test d’haleine sur la sphère privée est faible, et le besoin de ces tests est important.

La Cour conclut différemment s’agissant des tests de sang. Ces tests sont significativement plus intrusifs, et leur caractère raisonnable doit être examiné à la lumière de la disponibilité de l’alternative moins invasive du test d’haleine.

Rien n’empêche la Police de requérir un Warrant portant sur un test sanguin quand le temps le permet, ou de se fonder sur l’exception des circonstances exigeantes permettant de se dispenser d’un Warrant quand le temps manque.

(Il est possible de prélever un échantillon sanguin d’un sujet qui oppose résistance, mais de nombreux états préfèrent raisonnablement ne pas s’engager dans cette voie. North Dakota, par exemple, fait savoir qu’il s’oppose généralement à cette pratique en raison du risque de provoquer de dangereuses altercations entre la Police et la personne arrêtée en région rurale, où l’officier de Police obtiendra difficilement du renfort. Selon le droit du North Dakota, le sang peut être prélevé d’une personne en état d’arrestation qui résiste qu’en cas d’accident mortel ou impliquant des lésions corporelles graves).

(Un test d’haleine peut aussi être dépourvu d’effet utile si la personne arrêtée tente délibérément d’empêcher une lecture correcte du résultat en ne soufflant pas dans le tube suffisamment longtemps ou avec la force nécessaire. Mais les Tribunaux ont jugé qu’une telle conduite équivaut à un refus de se soumettre au test, refus qui peut faire l’objet d’une poursuite pénale distincte. Et, encore une fois, un Warrant portant sur un test sanguin peut être sollicité).

En conclusion, les tests d’haleine sont significativement moins intrusifs que les tests de sang et dans la plupart des cas sont largement suffisants pour être utiles aux forces de Police et à la procédure pénale, de sorte que les tests d’haleine, mais pas les tests de sang, peuvent être administrés en tant que « search » accessoire à une arrestation conforme au droit pour conduite en état d’ébriété. Comme dans tous les cas impliquant une « search » raisonnable incidente à une arrestation, un Warrant n’est pas exigé.