U.S. Supreme Court, Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P., Docket No. 20-915

Copyright

 

Registration Application

 

Inaccurate Information in a Registration

 

Copyright Infringement

 

Safe Harbor, Validity of Certificate of Registration

 

“Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse.”?

 

 

 

 

To obtain registration, the author of a work must submit to the Register of Copyrights a copy of the work and an application. §§408, 409. The application must provide information about the work. §409. Some of this information is purely factual, but some of it incorporates legal conclusions. Ibid. If the Register determines that the work is copyrightable and meets other statutory requirements, she will issue a certificate of registration. §410(a). The information on this certificate reflects the information that the copyright holder provided on the application.Ibid.

 

Naturally, the information provided on the application for registration should be accurate. Nevertheless, the Copyright Act provides a safe harbor. It says that a certificate of registration is valid 

“regardless of whether the certificate contains any inaccurate information, unless— 

“(A) the inaccurate information was included on the application for copyright registration with knowledge that it was inaccurate; and 

“(B) the inaccuracy of the information, if known, would have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse registration.” §411(b)(1) (emphasis added).

 

The important point for our purposes is that a certificate of registration is valid even though it contains inaccurate information, as long as the copyright holder lacked “knowledge that it was inaccurate.” §411(b)(1)(A).

 

The question before us concerns the scope of the phrase “with knowledge that it was inaccurate.” The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit believed that a copyright holder cannot benefit from the safe harbor and save its copyright registration from invalidation if its lack of knowledge stems from a failure to understand the law rather than a failure to understand the facts. In our view, however, §411(b) does not distinguish between a mistake of law and a mistake of fact. Lack of knowledge of either fact or law can excuse an inaccuracy in a copyright registration. We therefore vacate the Court of Appeals’ contrary holding.

 

Our reasons are straightforward. For one thing, we follow the text of the statute. See Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U. S. 242, 251 (2010). Section 411(b)(1) says that Unicolors’ registration is valid “regardless of whether the registration certificate contains any inaccurate information, unless . . . the inaccurate information was included on the application for copyright registration with knowledge that it was inaccurate.” Both case law and the dictionary tell us that “knowledge” has historically “meant and still means ‘the fact or condition of being aware of something.’” Intel Corp. Investment Policy Comm. v. Sulyma, 589 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 6) (quoting Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 469 (1967)); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 888 (8th ed. 2004); New Oxford American Dictionary 938 (def. 2) (2d ed. 2005); Webster’s New College Dictionary 625 (3d ed. 2008).

 

Unicolors says that, when it submitted its registration application, it was not aware (as the Ninth Circuit would later hold) that the 31 designs it was registering together did not satisfy the “single unit of publication” requirement. If Unicolors was not aware of the legal requirement that rendered the information in its application inaccurate, it did not include that information in its application “with knowledge that it was inaccurate.” §411(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Nothing in the statutory language suggests that this straightforward conclusion should be any different simply because there was a mistake of law as opposed to a mistake of fact.

 

To the contrary, nearby statutory provisions help confirm that here “knowledge” refers to knowledge of the law as well as the facts. Registration applications call for information that requires both legal and factual knowledge. See, e.g., §409(4) (whether a work was made “for hire”); §409(8) (when and where the work was “published”); §409(9) (whether the work is “a compilation or derivative work”). Inaccurate information in a registration is therefore equally (or more) likely to arise from a mistake of law as a mistake of fact. That is especially true because applicants include novelists, poets, painters, designers, and others without legal training. Nothing in the statutory language suggests that Congress wanted to forgive those applicants’ factual but not their (often esoteric) legal mistakes.

 

Further, those who consider legislative history will find that history persuasive here. It indicates that Congress enacted §411(b) to make it easier, not more difficult, for nonlawyers to obtain valid copyright registrations. The House Report states that its purpose was to “improve intellectual property enforcement in the United States and abroad.” H. R. Rep. No. 110–617, p. 20 (2008). It did so in part by “eliminating loopholes that might prevent enforcement of otherwise validly registered copyrights.” Ibid. The Report specifically notes that some defendants in copyright infringement cases had “argued . . . that a mistake in the registration documents, such as checking the wrong box on the registration form, renders a registration invalid and thus forecloses the availability of statutory damages.” Id., at 24. Congress intended to deny infringers the ability to “exploit this potential loophole.” Ibid. Of course, an applicant for a copyright registration—especially one who is not a lawyer—might check the wrong box on the registration documents as a result of a legal, as well as a factual, error. Given this history, it would make no sense if §411(b) left copyright registrations exposed to invalidation based on applicants’ good-faith misunderstandings of the details of copyright law.

 

H&M also argues that our interpretation is foreclosed by the legal maxim that “ignorance of the law is no excuse.” See Brief for Respondent 41–43. This maxim “normally applies where a defendant has the requisite mental state in respect to the elements of a crime but claims to be unaware of the existence of a statute proscribing his conduct.” Rehaif v. United States, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 8) (internal quotation marks omitted). It does not apply in this civil case concerning the scope of a safe harbor that arises from ignorance of collateral legal requirements. See ibid.

 

 

 

(U.S. Supreme Court, Feb. 24, 2022, Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P., Docket No. 20-915, J. Breyer)

U.S. Supreme Court, Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., Docket No.18-956

 

Copyright

 

Computer Programs

 

Software Platform

 

Fair Use

 

Market Substitute

 

Unrealized Licensing Opportunities

 

 

 

Google’s limited copying of the Java SE Application Programming Interface allowed programmers to put their accrued talents to work in a transformative program and constituted a fair use of that material under copyright law.

 

 

Appendix A: Computer System Diagram:  Some readers might find it helpful to start with an explanation of what a “software platform” is. Put simply, a software platform collects all of the software tools that a programmer may need to build computer programs. The Android platform, for instance, includes an “operating system,” “core libraries,” and a “virtual machine,” among other tools. App. 197–198.

 

 

Oracle America, Inc., owns a copyright in Java SE, a computer platform that uses the popular Java computer programming language. In 2005, Google acquired Android and sought to build a new software platform for mobile devices. To allow the millions of programmers familiar with the Java programming language to work with its new Android platform, Google copied roughly 11,500 lines of code from the Java SE program. The copied lines are part of a tool called an Application Programming Interface (API). An API allows programmers to call upon prewritten computing tasks for use in their own programs. Over the course of protracted litigation, the lower courts have considered (1) whether Java SE’s owner could copyright the copied lines from the API, and (2) if so, whether Google’s copying constituted a permissible“fair use” of that material freeing Google from copyright liability. In the proceedings below, the Federal Circuit held that the copied lines are copyrightable. After a jury then found for Google on fair use, the Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that Google’s copying was not a fair use as a matter of law. Prior to remand for a trial on damages, the Court agreed to review the Federal Circuit’s determinations as to both copyrightability and fair use.

 

 

Held: Google’s copying of the Java SE API, which included only those lines of code that were needed to allow programmers to put their accrued talents to work in a new and transformative program, was a fair use of that material as a matter of law.

 

 

To decide no more than is necessary to resolve this case, the Court assumes for argument’s sake that the copied lines can be copyrighted, and focuses on whether Google’s use of those lines was a “fair use.”

 

 

To determine whether Google’s limited copying of the API here constitutes fair use, the Court examines the four guiding factors set forth in the Copyright Act’s fair use provision: the purpose and character of the use; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The Court has recognized that some factors may prove more important in some contexts than in others.

 

 

The nature of the work at issue favors fair use. The copied lines of code are part of a “user interface” that provides a way for programmers to access prewritten computer code through the use of simple commands. As a result, this code is different from many other types of code, such as the code that actually instructs the computer to execute a task. As part of an interface, the copied lines are inherently bound together with uncopyrightable ideas (the overall organization of the API) and the creation of new creative expression (the code independently written by Google). Unlike many other computer programs, the value of the copied lines is in significant part derived from the investment of users (here computer programmers) who have learned the API’s system. Given these differences, application of fair use here is unlikely to undermine the general copyright protection that Congress provided for computer programs.

 

 

The inquiry into the “the purpose and character” of the use turns in large measure on whether the copying at issue was “transformative,” i.e., whether it “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character.” Campbell, 510 U. S., at 579. Google’s limited copying of the API is a transformative use. Google copied only what was needed to allow programmers to work in a different computing environment without discarding a portion of a familiar programming language. Google’s purpose was to create a different task-related system for a different computing environment (smartphones) and to create a platform—the Android platform—that would help achieve and popularize that objective. The record demonstrates numerous ways in which reimplementing an interface can further the development of computer programs. Google’s purpose was therefore consistent with that creative progress that is the basic constitutional objective of copyright itself.

 

 

Google copied approximately 11,500 lines of declaring code from the API, which amounts to virtually all the declaring code needed to call up hundreds of different tasks. Those 11,500 lines, however, are only 0.4 percent of the entire API at issue, which consists of 2.86 million total lines. In considering “the amount and substantiality of the portion used” in this case, the 11,500 lines of code should be viewed as one small part of the considerably greater whole. As part of an interface, the copied lines of code are inextricably bound to other lines of code that are accessed by programmers. Google copied these lines not because of their creativity or beauty but because they would allow programmers to bring their skills to a new smartphone computing environment. The “substantiality” factor will generally weigh in favor of fair use where, as here, the amount of copying was tethered to a valid, and transformative, purpose.

 

 

The fourth statutory factor focuses upon the “effect” of the copying in the “market for or value of the copyrighted work.” §107(4). Here the record showed that Google’s new smartphone platform is not a market substitute for Java SE. The record also showed that Java SE’s copyright holder would benefit from the reimplementation of its interface into a different market.

 

 

(…) The Court does not overturn or modify its earlier cases involving fair use.

 

 

(…) Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F. 2d 1510, 1521–1527 (CA9 1992) (holding that wholesale copying of copyrighted code as a preliminary step to develop a competing product was a fair use).

 

 

(…) See also Brief for American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae (“Copyright on largely functional elements of software that have become an industry standard gives a copyright holder anticompetitive power”).

 

 

(…) Several features of Google’s copying suggest that the better way to look at the numbers is to take into account the several million lines that Google did not copy. For one thing, the Sun Java API is inseparably bound to those task-implementing lines. Its purpose is to call them up. For another, Google copied those lines not because of their creativity, their beauty, or even (in a sense) because of their purpose. It copied them because programmers had already learned to work with the Sun Java API’s system, and it would have been difficult, perhaps prohibitively so, to attract programmers to build its Android smartphone system without them. Further, Google’s basic purpose was to create a different task-related system for a different computing environment (smartphones) and to create a platform—the Android platform—that would help achieve and popularize that objective. The “substantiality” factor will generally weigh in favor of fair use where, as here, the amount of copying was tethered to a valid, and transformative, purpose.

 

 

(…) Google’s economic expert told the jury that Android was not a market substitute for Java’s software. As he explained, “the two products are on very different devices,” and the Android platform, which offers “an entire mobile operating stack,” is a “very different type of product” than Java SE, which is “just an applications programming framework.” App. 256. Taken together, the evidence showed that Sun’s mobile phone business was declining, while the market increasingly demanded a new form of smartphone technology that Sun was never able to offer. Finally, the jury also heard evidence that Sun foresaw a benefit from the broader use of the Java programming language in a new platform like Android, as it would further expand the network of Java-trained programmers. Id., at 131–133; see also id., at 153 (“Once an API starts getting reimplemented, you know it has succeeded”). In other words, the jury could have understood Android and Java SE as operating in two distinct markets. And because there are two markets at issue, programmers learning the Java language to work in one market (smartphones) are then able to bring those talents to the other market (laptops). See 4 Nimmer on Copyright §13.05[A][4] (explaining that factor four asks what the impact of “widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant” would be on the market for the present work). Sun presented evidence to the contrary. Indeed, the Federal Circuit held that the “market effects” factor militated against fair use in part because Sun had tried to enter the Android market. 886 F. 3d, at 1209 (Sun sought licensing agreement with Google). But those licensing negotiations concerned much more than 37 packages of declaring code, covering topics like “the implementation of Java’s code” and “branding and cooperation” between the firms. App. 245; see also 4 Nimmer on Copyright §13.05[A][4] (cautioning against the “danger of circularity posed” by considering unrealized licensing opportunities because “it is a given in every fair use case that plaintiff suffers a loss of a potential market if that potential is defined as the theoretical market for licensing the very use at bar”). In any event, the jury’s fair use determination means that neither Sun’s effort to obtain a license nor Oracle’s conflicting evidence can overcome evidence indicating that, at a minimum, it would have been difficult for Sun to enter the smartphone market, even had Google not used portions of the Sun Java API.

 

 

 

(U.S. Supreme Court, April 5, 2021, Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., Docket No.18-956, Justice Breyer, revised April 6, 2021)

 

(BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined. BARRETT, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case)

 

 

Class v. United States, Docket No. 16-424

Plea agreement: Waiver: Appeal (direct): Constitutional claims: Harlan, J.: Ames, J.:

Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U. S. 21 (1974)

Menna v. New York, 423 U. S. 61 (1975) (per curiam)

United States v. Broce, 488 U. S. 563 (1989)

A guilty plea, by itself, does not bar a federal criminal defendant from challenging the constitutionality of his statute of conviction on direct appeal.

In this case, Class neither expressly nor implicitly waived his constitutional claims by pleading guilty. As this Court understands them, the claims at issue here do not contradict the terms of the in­dictment or the written plea agreement and they can be resolved “on the basis of the existing record.” Broce, supra, at 575. Class chal­lenges the Government’s power to criminalize his (admitted) conduct and thereby calls into question the Government’s power to “constitu­tionally prosecute” him. Ibid. (quoting Menna, supra, at 61–62, n. 2). A guilty plea does not bar a direct appeal in these circumstances.

Fifty years ago this Court directly addressed a similar claim (a claim that the statute of conviction was unconsti­tutional). And the Court stated that a defendant’s “plea of guilty did not . . . waive his previous constitutional claim.” Haynes v. United States, 390 U. S. 85, 87, n. 2 (1968). Though Justice Harlan’s opinion for the Court in Haynes offered little explanation for this statement, sub­sequent decisions offered a rationale that applies here.

(…) The Court noted that a guilty plea bars appeal of many claims, including some “antecedent constitutional viola­tions” related to events (say, grand jury proceedings) that had “occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U. S. 258, 266– 267 (1973)). While Tollett claims were “of constitutional dimension,” the Court explained that “the nature of the underlying constitutional infirmity is markedly different” from a claim of vindictive prosecution, which implicates “the very power of the State” to prosecute the defendant. Blackledge, 417 U. S., at 30. Accordingly, the Court wrote that “the right” Perry “asserts and that we today accept is the right not to be haled into court at all upon the felony charge” since “the very initiation of the proceedings” against Perry “operated to deprive him due process of law.” Id., at 30–31.

(…) The Court held that “a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that—judged on its face—the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.” Menna, 423 U. S., at 63, and n. 2. Menna’s claim amounted to a claim that “the State may not convict” him “no matter how validly his factual guilt is established.” Ibid. Menna’s “guilty plea, therefore, did not bar the claim.”

Ibid.

These holdings reflect an understanding of the nature of guilty pleas which, in broad outline, stretches back nearly 150 years. In 1869 Justice Ames wrote for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: “The plea of guilty is, of course, a confession of all the facts charged in the indictment, and also of the evil intent imputed to the defendant. It is a waiver also of all merely technical and formal objections of which the defendant could have availed himself by any other plea or motion. But if the facts alleged and admitted do not constitute a crime against the laws of the Commonwealth, the defendant is entitled to be dis­charged.” Commonwealth v. Hinds, 101 Mass. 209, 210.

(…) As an initial matter, a valid guilty plea “forgoes not only a fair trial, but also other accompanying constitutional guarantees.” Ruiz, 536 U. S., at 628–629. While those “simultaneously” relinquished rights include the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the jury trial right, and the right to confront accusers, McCarthy v. United States, 394 U. S. 459, 466 (1969), they do not include “a waiver of the privileges which exist beyond the confines of the trial.” Mitchell v. United States, 526 U. S. 314, 324 (1999). Here, Class’ statutory right directly to appeal his conviction “cannot in any way be characterized as part of the trial.” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U. S. 156, 165 (2012).

In more recent years, we have reaffirmed the Menna-Blackledge doctrine and refined its scope.

In sum, the claims at issue here do not fall within any of the categories of claims that Class’ plea agreement forbids him to raise on direct appeal. They challenge the Gov­ernment’s power to criminalize Class’ (admitted) conduct. They thereby call into question the Government’s power to “constitutionally prosecute” him. Broce, supra, at 575 (quoting Menna, supra, at 61–62, n. 2). A guilty plea does not bar a direct appeal in these circumstances.

We hold that Rodney Class may pursue his constitutional claims on direct appeal.

(U.S.S.C., Feb. 21, 2018, Class v. United States, Docket No. 16-424, J. Breyer)

L'appel direct n'est pas d'emblée exclu à l'encontre d'un "plea agreement" : le condamné pour une infraction fédérale peut faire valoir de la sorte l'inconstitutionnalité (fédérale) de sa condamnation (sauf renonciation, intégrée au "plea", à ces moyens de rang constitutionnel).

Toutefois, même de rang constitutionnel, certains moyens pourront être considérés comme indisponibles du fait du "plea" (comme p. ex. le droit à une procédure par le biais de l'intervention du Grand Jury, le droit de ne pas s'incriminer soi-même, le droit au Jury, le droit de confronter ceux qui déposent contre soi). Mais le "plea" n'empêchera pas le condamné de faire valoir des moyens qui contestent la compétence de l'état de poursuivre pénalement en l'espèce, donc sa compétence d'initier la poursuite pénale (laquelle serait ainsi contraire au principe de "due process of law"). L'accusé ne peut donc pas renoncer valablement à des droits qui se situent au-delà des limites du procès lui-même.

Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, Docket 16-348

Debt collection: Statute of limitations: Unfair collection:

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 91 Stat. 874, 15 U. S. C. §1692 et seq., prohibits a debt collector from asserting any “false, deceptive, or misleading representation,” or using any “unfair or unconscionable means” to collect, or attempt to collect, a debt, §§1692e, 1692f.

(…) Whether Midland’s assertion of an obviously time-barred claim is “unfair” or “unconscionable” (within the terms of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) presents a closer question. First, Johnson points out that several lower courts have found or indicated that, in the context of an ordinary civil action to collect a debt, a debt collector’s assertion of a claim known to be time barred is “unfair.” See, e.g., Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F. 3d 1076, 1079 (CA7 2013) (holding as much); Kimber v. Federal Financial Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480, 1487 (MD Ala. 1987) (same); Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Management, 641 F. 3d 28, 32–33 (CA3 2011) (indicating as much); Castro v. Collecto, Inc., 634 F. 3d 779, 783 (CA5 2011) (same); Freyermuth v. Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 248 F. 3d 767, 771 (CA8 2001) (same).

We are not convinced, however, by this precedent. It considers a debt collector’s assertion in a civil suit of a claim known to be stale. We assume, for argument’s sake, that the precedent is correct in that context (a matter this Court itself has not decided and does not now decide). But the context of a civil suit differs significantly from the present context, that of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. The lower courts rested their conclusions upon their concern that a consumer might unwittingly repay a time-barred debt. Thus the Seventh Circuit pointed out that “few unsophisticated consumers would be aware that a statute of limitations could be used to defend against lawsuits based on stale debts.” Phillips, supra, at 1079 (quoting Kimber, supra, at 1487). The “passage of time,” the Circuit wrote, “dulls the consumer’s memory of the circumstances and validity of the debt” and the consumer may no longer have “personal records.” 736 F. 3d, at 1079 (quoting Kimber, supra, at 1487). Moreover, a consumer might pay a stale debt simply to avoid the cost and embarrassment of suit. 736 F. 3d, at 1079.

(U.S.S.C., May 15, 2017, Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, Docket 16-348, J. Breyer).

Poursuivre une créance prescrite peut être déloyal et contrevenir à la loi fédérale sur le recouvrement équitable des créances (15 U. S. C. §1692 et seq.). Cette jurisprudence ne semble toutefois s'appliquer qu'aux sociétés de recouvrement qui ne sont pas titulaires originaires de la créance.

Shaw v. United States, Docket 15-5991

Bank account: Property rights: Bailment: Common law:

When a customer deposits funds, the bank ordinarily becomes the owner of the funds and consequently has the right to use the funds as a source of loans that help the bank earn profits (though the customer retains the right, for example, to withdraw funds). Michie, Banks and Banking, ch. 9, §1, pp. 1–7 (2014) (Michie); id., §4b, at 54– 58; id., §38, at 162; Phoenix Bank v. Risley, 111 U. S. 125, 127 (1884). Sometimes, the contract between the customer and the bank provides that the customer retains owner­ship of the funds and the bank merely assumes possession. Michie, ch. 9, §38, at 162; Phoenix Bank, supra, at 127. But even then the bank is like a bailee, say, a garage that stores a customer’s car. Michie, ch. 9, §38, at 162. And as bailee, the bank can assert the right to possess the depos­ited funds against all the world but for the bailor (or, say, the bailor’s authorized agent).  Am. Jur. 2d, Bailment §166, pp. 685–686 (2009). This right, too, is a property right.  W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 452–454 (1766) (referring to a bailee’s right in a bailment as a “special qualified property”).

Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 21–25 (1999) (bank fraud statute’s definition of fraud reflects the common law).

Secondary sources: Michie, Banks and Banking, ch. 9, §1, pp. 1–7, ch. 9, §38, at 162 (2014); Am. Jur. 2d, Bailment §166, pp. 685–686 (2009); W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 452–454 (1766); O. Holmes, The Common Law 132 (1881).

(U.S.S.C., December 12, 2016, Shaw v. United States, Docket 15-5991, J. Breyer, unanimous).

Les notions de droit de propriété et de "bailment" en rapport avec un compte bancaire. Même si le contrat entre la banque et son client dispose que le client conserve la propriété des fonds tandis que la banque n'est au bénéfice que d'un droit possessoire, la banque sera tout de même assimilée à un "bailee", tout comme l'est par exemple un garagiste qui entrepose le véhicule d'un client. Comme "bailee", la banque peut invoquer son droit possessoire erga omnes, sauf envers le propriétaire des fonds déposés. Ce droit est un des droits de propriété.

Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, Docket 15-274

Res judicata: Claim preclusion:

The doctrine of claim preclusion (the here-relevant aspect of res judicata) prohibits “successive litigation of the very same claim” by the same parties. New Hamp­shire v. Maine, 532 U. S. 742, 748 (2001). Petitioners’ postenforcement as-applied challenge is not “the very same claim” as their preenforcement facial challenge. The Restatement of Judgments notes that development of new material facts can mean that a new case and an otherwise similar previous case do not present the same claim. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments §24, Comment f (1980) (“Material operative facts occurring after the deci­sion of an action with respect to the same subject matter may in themselves, or taken in conjunction with the ante­cedent facts, comprise a transaction which may be made the basis of a second action not precluded by the first”); cf. id., §20(2) (“A valid and final personal judgment for the defendant, which rests on the prematurity of the action or on the plaintiff ’s failure to satisfy a precondition to suit, does not bar another action by the plaintiff instituted after the claim has matured, or the precondition has been satis­fied”); id., §20, Comment k (discussing relationship of this rule with §24, Comment f). The Courts of Appeals have used similar rules to determine the contours of a new claim for purposes of preclusion. See, e.g., Morgan v. Covington, 648 F. 3d 172, 178 (CA3 2011) (“Res judicata does not bar claims that are predicated on events that postdate the filing of the initial complaint”); Ellis v. CCA of Tenn. LLC, 650 F. 3d 640, 652 (CA7 2011); Bank of N. Y. v. First Millennium, Inc., 607 F. 3d 905, 919 (CA2 2010); Smith v. Potter, 513 F. 3d 781, 783 (CA7 2008); Rawe v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 462 F. 3d 521, 529 (CA6 2006); Manning v. Auburn, 953 F. 2d 1355, 1360 (CA11 1992). The Restatement adds that, where “im­portant human values—such as the lawfulness of continu­ing personal disability or restraint—are at stake, even a slight change of circumstances may afford a sufficient basis for concluding that a second action may be brought.” §24, Comment f; see Bucklew v. Lombardi, 783 F. 3d 1120, 1127 (CA8 2015) (allowing as-applied challenge to exe­cution method to proceed notwithstanding prior facial challenge).

Secondary sources: C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4408, p. 52 (2d ed. 2002, Supp. 2015); Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1980).

(U.S.S.C., June 27, 2016, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, Docket 15-274, J. Breyer).

Chose jugée : la doctrine de la « claim preclusion », qui découle du principe de l’autorité de la chose jugée, prohibe une nouvelle action fondée sur les mêmes conclusions et entre les mêmes parties. N’est pas prohibée par ce principe l’action fondée sur une loi entrée en force, alors qu’antérieurement une action de droit constitutionnel avait été déposée pour tenter de faire constater l’inconstitutionnalité de la loi avant son entrée en vigueur. Selon le Restatement (Second) of Judgments §24, Comment f (1980), un fait matériel relevant, qui se produit après la décision rendue dans le cadre d’une première action qui portait sur le même objet qu’une seconde action, peut constituer la base de la seconde action. Cela que ce fait soit considéré pour lui-même dans le cadre de la seconde action, ou qu’il soit considéré en conjonction avec une situation déjà relevée dans la première action. La première action ne fait donc pas obstacle à la seconde.

Un jugement final et exécutoire en faveur du défendeur, fondé sur une demande prématurée ou sur une précondition qui n’était pas encore remplie, n’empêche nullement une nouvelle action ouverte par le même demandeur, initiée après maturité des fondements de la demande, ou après la réalisation de la condition.

La force de chose jugée n’empêche pas une action fondée sur des événements postérieurs au dépôt de la première demande.

Et le Restatement poursuit en indiquant que lorsque « d’importantes valeurs humaines » sont en jeu, telles que des questions de légalité d’une invalidité qui se prolonge, même un changement de circonstances peu important peut constituer une base suffisante pour permettre le dépôt d’une seconde action.

Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, Docket 15-446

Patents (reexamination of claims): Chevron deference: Rulemaking authority: Judicial review (in general): The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U. S. C. §100 et seq., creates a process called “inter partes review.” That review process allows a third party to ask the U. S. Patent and Trademark Office to reexamine the claims in an already-issued patent and to cancel any claim that the agency finds to be unpatentable in light of prior art. See §102 (requiring “novelty”); §103 (disqualifying claims that are “obvious”).

We consider two provisions of the Act. The first says:

“No Appeal.—The determination by the Director of the Patent Office whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and non­appealable.” 35 U. S. C. §314(d).

Does this provision bar a court from considering whether the Patent Office wrongly “determined . . . to institute an inter partes review,” when it did so on grounds not specifically mentioned in a third party’s review request?

The second provision grants the Patent Office the au­thority to issue “regulations . . . establishing and governing inter partes review under this chapter.” §316(a)(4).

Does this provision authorize the Patent Office to issue a regulation stating that the agency, in inter partes review, “shall construe a patent claim according to its broad­est reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears”? 37 CFR §42.100(b)(2015).

We conclude that the first provision, though it may not bar consideration of a constitutional question, for example, does bar judicial review of the kind of mine-run claim at issue here, involving the Patent Office’s decision to insti­tute inter partes review. We also conclude that the second provision authorizes the Patent Office to issue the regula­tion before us. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 229 (2001); Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842 (1984).

35 U. S. C. §314(d) : The text of §314(d) expressly states that the Patent Office’s determinations whether to institute inter partes review “shall be fi­nal and nonappealable.” Moreover, construing §314(d) to permit ju­dicial review of the Patent Office’s preliminary decision to institute inter partes review undercuts the important congressional objective of giving the agency significant power to revisit and revise earlier pa­tent grants. Past practice in respect to related proceedings, including the predecessor to inter partes review, also supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend for courts to review these initial deter­minations.

The “strong presumption” favoring judicial review, Mach Min­ing, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U. S. ___, ___, is overcome here by these “ ‘clear and convincing’ ” indications that Congress intended to bar re­view, Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 349. Given that presumption, however, the interpretation adopted here applies to cases in which the challenge is to the Patent Office’s de­termination “to initiate an inter partes review under this section,” or where the challenge consists of questions closely tied to the applica­tion and interpretation of statutes related to that determination. C.’s claim does not implicate a constitutional question, nor does it present other questions of interpretation that reach well beyond “this section” in terms of scope and impact.

The Patent Office regulation requiring the Board to apply the broadest reasonable construction standard to interpret patent claims is a reasonable exercise of the rulemaking authority granted to the Patent Office by statute. Where a statute leaves a gap or is ambiguous, this Court typ­ically interprets a congressional grant of rulemaking authority as giv­ing the agency leeway to enact rules that are reasonable in light of the text, nature, and purpose of the statute. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 229; Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842–843. Here, the statute grants the Patent Office the authority to issue regulations “governing inter partes review,” and no statutory provision unambiguously mandates a particular claim construction standard.

(U.S.S.C., June 20, 2016, Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, Docket 15-446, J. Breyer).

Brevets (nouvel examen du droit à un brevet après avoir reconnu ce droit dans un premier temps) : une loi fédérale (Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U. S. C. §100 et seq.) institue une procédure connue sous le nom de « inter partes review », qui permet à un tiers de saisir le Bureau fédéral des brevets et des marques, concluant à un nouvel examen de certaines revendications protégées par un brevet déjà octroyé, en vue d’obtenir l’annulation de la reconnaissance de ces revendications au motif qu’elles ne remplissent pas les conditions posées à l’octroi d’un brevet (absence de nouveauté, caractère évident, etc.).

La décision de mettre en œuvre, ou non, la procédure « inter partes » relève de la discrétion du Directeur du Bureau. Il s’agit d’une décision finale sans voie de recours. La Cour juge ici que telle est la volonté clairement exprimée par le Congrès. Est toutefois réservée la saisine des cours fédérales pour violations alléguées de la Constitution fédérale. Le principe de la forte présomption en faveur de l’existence d’une voie de recours ne s’applique pas lorsque le Congrès s’est prononcé de manière claire et convaincante.

En outre, dite loi fédérale attribue au Bureau des brevets la compétence d’édicter les règles de procédure applicables à une révision « inter partes ». Le Bureau agit dans le cadre de sa compétence en adoptant une règle précisant que le Bureau, dans la procédure de révision, appliquera à une revendication l’interprétation raisonnablement la plus large possible, à la lumière des spécificités du brevet lié à la revendication (déférence selon la jurisprudence « Chevron », le Bureau a procédé ici à un exercice raisonnable de son autorité législative conférée par une loi fédérale ; en cas d’ambiguïté dans la loi ou en cas d’attribution de compétence prévue par la loi, l’administration peut édicter des règles, qui doivent être raisonnables à la lumière du texte, de la nature et du but de la loi, cf. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842–843).

Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, Docket 14-1175

Conflict of laws (interstate): Full faith and credit Clause: Sovereignty: Immunity law:  U.S. Const., Art. IV, §1: Balancing-of-interests test: California (…) asks us to reverse the Nevada court’s decision insofar as it awards the private citizen greater damages than Nevada law would permit a private citizen to obtain in a similar suit against Nevada’s own agencies. We agree that Nevada’s application of its damages law in this case reflects a special, and constitutionally forbidden, “‘policy of hostility to the public Acts’ of a sister State,” namely, California. U. S. Const., Art. IV, §1 (Full Faith and Credit Clause); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U. S. 488, 499 (2003) (quoting Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U. S. 408, 413 (1955)). We set aside the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision accordingly.

California petitioned for certiorari. We agreed to decide (…) whether the Constitution per­mits Nevada to award Hyatt damages against a California state agency that are greater than those that Nevada would award in a similar suit against its own state agencies. We conclude that it does not. The Nevada Supreme Court has ignored both Nevada’s typical rules of immunity and California’s immunity-related statutes (insofar as Califor­nia’s statutes would prohibit a monetary recovery that is greater in amount than the maximum recovery that Ne­vada law would permit in similar circumstances). Instead, it has applied a special rule of law that evinces a “ ‘policy of hostility’” toward California. Franchise Tax Bd., supra, at 499 (quoting Carroll v. Lanza, supra, at 413). Doing so violates the Constitution’s requirement that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” Art. IV, §1.

The Court’s precedents strongly support this conclusion. A statute is a “public Act” within the meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See, e.g., Carroll v. Lanza, supra, at 411; see also 28 U. S. C. §1738 (referring to “the Acts of the legislature” in the full faith and credit context). We have said that the Clause “does not require a State to substitute for its own statute, applicable to persons and events within it, the statute of another State reflecting a conflicting and opposed policy.” Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U. S., at 412. But when affirming a State’s decision to decline to apply another State’s statute on this ground, we have consistently emphasized that the State had “not adopted any policy of hostility to the public Acts” of that other State. Id., at 413.

In Carroll v. Lanza, the Court considered a negligence action brought by a Missouri worker in Arkansas’ courts. We held that the Arkansas courts need not apply a time limitation contained in Missouri’s (but not in Arkansas’) workman’s compensation law. Id., at 413–414. In doing so, we emphasized both that (1) Missouri law (compared with Arkansas law) embodied “a conflicting and opposed policy,” and (2) Arkansas law did not embody “any policy of hostility to the public Acts of Missouri.” Id., at 412–413. This second requirement was well established in earlier law. See, e.g., Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 642–643 (1935) (New Jersey may not enforce a jurisdictional stat­ute that would permit enforcement of certain claims under New Jersey law but “deny the enforcement” of similar, valid claims under New York law); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U. S. 609, 611–612 (1951) (invalidating a Wisconsin stat­ute that “closed the doors of its courts” to an Illinois cause of action while permitting adjudication of similar Wisconsin claims).

The Nevada decision before us embodies a critical de­parture from its earlier approach. Nevada has not applied the principles of Nevada law ordinarily applicable to suits against Nevada’s own agencies. Rather, it has applied a special rule of law applicable only in lawsuits against its sister States, such as California. With respect to damages awards greater than $50,000, the ordinary principles of Nevada law do not “conflict” with California law, for both laws would grant immunity. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U. S., at 412. Similarly, in respect to such amounts, the “policies” underlying California law and Nevada’s usual approach are not “opposed”; they are consistent. Id., at 412–413.

But that is not so in respect to Nevada’s special rule. That rule, allowing damages awards greater than $50,000, is not only “opposed” to California law, ibid.; it is also inconsistent with the general principles of Nevada immun­ity law, see Franchise Tax Bd., supra, at 499. The Nevada Supreme Court explained its departure from those general principles by describing California’s system of controlling its own agencies as failing to provide “adequate” recourse to Nevada’s citizens. 130 Nev., at ___, 335 P. 3d, at 147. It expressed concerns about the fact that California’s agencies “‘operate outside’” the systems of “‘legislative control, administrative oversight, and public accountabil­ity’” that Nevada applies to its own agencies. Ibid. (quot­ing Faulkner v. University of Tenn., 627 So. 2d 362 (Ala. 1992)). Such an explanation, which amounts to little more than a conclusory statement disparaging California’s own legislative, judicial, and administrative controls, cannot justify the application of a special and discriminatory rule. Rather, viewed through a full faith and credit lens, a State that disregards its own ordinary legal principles on this ground is hostile to another State. A constitutional rule that would permit this kind of discriminatory hostility is likely to cause chaotic interference by some States into the internal, legislative affairs of others.

In light of the “constitutional equality” among the States, Coyle v. Smith, 221 U. S. 559, 580 (1911), Nevada has not offered “sufficient policy considerations” to justify the application of a special rule of Nevada law that discrimi­nates against its sister States, Carroll v. Lanza, supra, at 413. In our view, Nevada’s rule lacks the “healthy regard for California’s sovereign status” that was the hallmark of its earlier decision, and it reflects a constitutionally im­permissible “policy of hostility to the public Acts’ of a sister State.” Franchise Tax Bd., supra, at 499 (quoting Carroll v. Lanza, supra, at 413).

In so holding we need not, and do not, intend to return to a complex “balancing-of-interests approach to conflicts of law under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.” Franchise Tax Bd., 538 U. S., at 496. Long ago this Court’s efforts to apply that kind of analysis led to results that seemed to differ depending, for example, upon whether the case involved commercial law, a shareholders’ action, insurance claims, or workman’s compensation statutes. See, e.g., Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 157– 159 (1932); Carroll v. Lanza, supra, at 414–420 (Frankfur­ter, J., dissenting) (listing, and trying to classify, nearly 50 cases). We have since abandoned that approach, and we continue to recognize that a State need not “‘substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.’” Franchise Tax Bd., supra, at 496 (quoting Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 306 U. S. 493, 501 (1939)).

For these reasons, insofar as the Nevada Supreme Court has declined to apply California law in favor of a special rule of Nevada law that is hostile to its sister States, we find its decision unconstitutional. We vacate its judgment and remand the case for further proceedings not incon­sistent with this opinion.

(U.S.S.C., Apr. 19, 2016, Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, Docket 14-1175, J. Breyer, JJ. Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, joined. J. Alito concurred in the judgment. C.J. Roberts filed a dissenting opinion, in which J. Thomas joined).

Conflits de lois entre états de l’Union : Art. IV, § 1 de la Constitution fédérale (Full faith and credit Clause) : dans la présente affaire, la Cour Suprême fédérale doit décider si la Constitution fédérale autorise la Cour Suprême du Nevada à accorder à un particulier résidant sur son sol, dénommé H., des dommages-intérêts à payer par une administration de Californie, alors que le droit de l’état du Nevada ne permettrait pas d’accorder une indemnisation d’un montant aussi élevé si l’action avait été intentée contre une administration du Nevada. La Cour juge que tel n’est pas le cas. La Cour Suprême du Nevada a ignoré aussi bien les règles d’immunité de son propre état que les règles d’immunité de Californie. A la place de ces règles, la Cour du Nevada a appliqué une règle de droit toute spéciale, qui manifeste une politique d’hostilité envers la Californie. Ce faisant, est violée l’exigence posée par la Constitution fédérale que complète déférence soit donnée, dans chaque état, aux actes et dossiers publics, ainsi qu’aux décisions de justice des autres états de l’Union (Art. IV, § 1).

La jurisprudence de la Cour a déjà eu l’occasion de juger qu’une loi étatique au sens formel constituait un « acte public » au sens de l’Art. IV, § 1. La Cour a en outre jugé que dite clause n’impose pas à un état de substituer à sa loi, applicable à une personne ou à un événement sur son sol, la loi d’un autre état qui prévoirait une politique en conflit avec celle du premier état. Il faut toutefois que le refus d’appliquer la loi du second état ne soit pas l’expression d’une politique hostile envers lui.

A titre d’exemple, la jurisprudence Carroll v. Lanza a jugé le sort d’une action en responsabilité déposée devant une cour de l’état de l’Arkansas par un travailleur de l’état du Missouri : la cour de l’Arkansas n’est pas tenue d’appliquer une règle de prescription contenue dans le droit du travail du Missouri mais non dans le droit du travail de l’Arkansas. En jugeant de la sorte, la Cour a mis en évidence que (1) le droit du Missouri reflète en l’occurrence une politique opposée à celle de l’Arkansas, et que (2) le droit de l’Arkansas ne reflète aucune hostilité envers le droit de l’état du Missouri. Dans une affaire plus ancienne, de 1935, la Cour avait déjà jugé que l’état du New Jersey ne pouvait à la fois accepter l’exécution d’une règle juridictionnelle permettant l’exécution de certaines prétentions déduites du droit du New jersey, et à la fois exclure l’exécution de certaines prétentions, valides et similaires, déduites du droit de l’état de New York. En outre, dans une décision rendue en 1951, la Cour Suprême a invalidé une loi de l’état du Wisconsin qui ne permettait pas à ses Tribunaux de connaître de certaines prétentions déduites du droit de l’état de l’Illinois, tout en permettant la recevabilité de prétentions similaires déduites de son propre droit.

Plus précisément, dans la présente affaire, la Cour Suprême du Nevada n’a pas appliqué les principes juridiques qu’elle applique ordinairement aux actions contre des administrations du Nevada. Elle a appliqué une règle de droit spéciale, destinée uniquement à être retenue dans le cas d’actions présentées devant une cour du Nevada et dirigées contre des administrations d’autres états de l’Union. Tout d’abord, s’agissant de l’allocation de dommages-intérêts d’un montant supérieur à $50,000, les principes ordinaires du droit du Nevada ne sont pas en conflit avec le droit californien : les deux ordres juridiques accordent l’immunité. La ratio legis de ces dispositions est par ailleurs la même dans les deux états.

Il en va différemment s’agissant de la règle spéciale contenue dans le droit du Nevada. Cette règle spéciale permet l’attribution d’un dédommagement plus important que $50,000 à certaines conditions, lesquelles sont en contradiction avec les principes généraux du droit de l’immunité du Nevada, ainsi qu’avec le droit d’un autre état, ici la Californie. La Cour Suprême du Nevada a justifié l’application de dite règle spéciale en soutenant que le système californien de contrôle de ses administrations était déficient en ce qu’il ne permettrait pas aux résidents du Nevada de faire valoir leurs droits de manière adéquate. Elle a en outre soutenu que les administrations de Californie fonctionneraient en dehors du type de système de contrôle législatif, exécutif et public que le Nevada a instauré pour ses propres administrations. De telles explications ne constituent rien de plus qu’un dénigrement du contrôle législatif, administratif et judiciaire pratiqué en Californie, et ne sauraient justifier l’application d’une règle spéciale et discriminatoire. Bien plutôt, sous l’angle de la « Full faith and credit Clause », un état qui s’écarte de ses propres principes juridiques au motif exposés par la Cour du Nevada doit être regardé comme hostile envers un autre état de l’Union. Une règle constitutionnelle qui permettrait ce type de comportement hostile et discriminatoire ne manquerait pas de causer des interférences chaotiques dans les affaires législatives de l’état discriminé.

A la lumière de l’égalité constitutionnelle entre les états, le Nevada n’a pas offert d’explications suffisantes permettant de justifier l’application d’une règle spéciale discriminant un autre état. Par conséquent, la Cour Suprême fédérale juge ici que dite règle spéciale ne respecte pas le statut d’état souverain de la Californie, statut que les Tribunaux du Nevada ont toujours respecté dans le passé. Dite règle reflète une politique hostile inconstitutionnelle dirigée contre la législation d’un autre état de l’Union. En décidant de la sorte, la Cour Suprême fédérale n’entend pas revenir à la notion complexe de « balance des intérêts » dans le cadre de conflits de lois sous l’angle de la « Full faith and credit Clause ».