New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, Docket 17-340

Employment Agreements

Labor Law

Contract of employment - Definition

Arbitration

Exceptions

Transportation Workers (Seamen, Railroad Employees, or any other Class of Work­ers Engaged in Foreign or Interstate Commerce)

The Federal Arbitration Act requires courts to enforce private arbitration agreements. But like most laws, this one bears its qualifications. Among other things, §1 says that “nothing herein” may be used to compel arbitration in dis­putes involving the “contracts of employment” of certain transportation workers. 9 U. S. C. §1.

A court should determine whether a §1 exclusion applies before ordering arbitration. A court’s authority to compel arbitration under the Act does not extend to all private contracts, no matter how em­phatically they may express a preference for arbitration. Instead, an­tecedent statutory provisions limit the scope of a court’s §§3 and 4 powers to stay litigation and compel arbitration “according to the terms” of the parties’ agreement. Section 2 provides that the Act ap­plies only when the agreement is set forth as “a written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction in­volving commerce.” And §1 helps define §2’s terms, warning, as rele­vant here, that “nothing” in the Act “shall apply” to “contracts of em­ployment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of work­ers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” For a court to invoke its statutory authority under §§3 and 4, it must first know if the par­ties’ agreement is excluded from the Act’s coverage by the terms of §§1 and 2. This sequencing is significant.

Petitioner New Prime Inc. is an interstate trucking company, and re­spondent Dominic Oliveira is one of its drivers. Mr. Oliveira works under an operating agreement that calls him an independent con­tractor and contains a mandatory arbitration provision.

Because the Act’s term “contract of employment” refers to any agreement to perform work, Mr. Oliveira’s agreement with New Prime falls within §1’s exception.

At the time of the Act’s adoption in 1925, the phrase “contract of employment” was not a term of art, and dictionaries tended to treat “employment” more or less as a synonym for “work.” Contemporaneous legal authorities provide no evidence that a “contract of employment” necessarily sig­naled a formal employer-employee relationship. Evidence that Con­gress used the term “contracts of employment” broadly can be found in its choice of the neighboring term “workers,” a term that easily embraces independent contractors.

Secondary authorities: N. Singer & J. Singer, Suth­erland on Statutes and Statutory Construction §56A:3 (rev. 7th ed. 2012).

(U.S. Supreme Court, Jan. 15, 2019, New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, Docket 17-340, J. Gorsuch)

South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., Docket No. 17-494

Sales of goods: Tax: Sales tax: Use tax: Commerce clause: Interstate commerce: E-commerce: Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement: Stare decisis: Fortas, J.: Gorsuch, J.:

When a consumer purchases goods or services, the consumer’s State often imposes a sales tax. This case requires the Court to determine when an out-of-state seller can be required to collect and remit that tax. All concede that taxing the sales in question here is lawful. The question is whether the out-of-state seller can be held responsible for its payment, and this turns on a proper interpretation of the Commerce Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3.

In two earlier cases the Court held that an out-of-state seller’s liability to collect and remit the tax to the consumer’s State depended on whether the seller had a physical presence in that State, but that mere shipment of goods into the consumer’s State, following an order from a catalog, did not satisfy the physical presence requirement. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U. S. 753 (1967); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298 (1992). The Court granted certiorari here to reconsider the scope and validity of the physical presence rule mandated by those cases.

Under this Court’s decisions in Bellas Hess and Quill, South Dakota may not require a business to collect its sales tax if the business lacks a physical presence in the State. Without that physical presence, South Dakota instead must rely on its residents to pay the use tax owed on their purchases from out-of-state sellers. “The impracticability of this collection from the multitude of individual purchasers is obvious.” National Geographic Soc. v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U. S. 551, 555 (1977). And consumer compliance rates are notoriously low.

(…) This Court’s doctrine has developed further with time. Modern precedents rest upon two primary principles that mark the boundaries of a State’s authority to regulate interstate commerce. First, state regulations may not discriminate against interstate commerce; and second, States may not impose undue burdens on interstate commerce. State laws that discriminate against interstate commerce face “a virtually per se rule of invalidity.” Granholm v. Heald, 544 U. S. 460, 476 (2005). State laws that “regulate even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest . . . will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970). Although subject to exceptions and variations, see, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794 (1976); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U. S. 573 (1986), these two principles guide the courts in adjudicating cases challenging state laws under the Commerce Clause.

These principles also animate the Court’s Commerce Clause precedents addressing the validity of state taxes. The Court explained the now-accepted framework for state taxation in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274 (1977). The Court held that a State “may tax exclusively interstate commerce so long as the tax does not create any effect forbidden by the Commerce Clause.” Id., at 285. After all, “interstate commerce may be required to pay its fair share of state taxes.” D. H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U. S. 24, 31 (1988). The Court will sustain a tax so long as it (1) applies to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the services the State provides. See Complete Auto, supra, at 279.

Before Complete Auto, the Court had addressed a challenge to an Illinois tax that required out-of-state retailers to collect and remit taxes on sales made to consumers who purchased goods for use within Illinois. Bellas Hess, 386 U. S., at 754–755. The Court held that a mail-order company “whose only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier or the United States mail” lacked the requisite minimum contacts with the State required by both the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause. Id., at 758. Unless the retailer maintained a physical presence such as “retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a State,” the State lacked the power to require that retailer to collect a local use tax. Ibid. The dissent disagreed: “There should be no doubt that this large-scale, systematic, continuous solicitation and exploitation of the Illinois consumer market is a sufficient ‘nexus’ to require Bellas Hess to collect from Illinois customers and to remit the use tax.” Id., at 761–762 (opinion of Fortas, J., joined by Black and Douglas, JJ.).

In 1992, the Court reexamined the physical presence rule in Quill. That case presented a challenge to North Dakota’s “attempt to require an out-of-state mail-order house that has neither outlets nor sales representatives in the State to collect and pay a use tax on goods purchased for use within the State.” 504 U. S., at 301. Despite the fact that Bellas Hess linked due process and the Commerce Clause together, the Court in Quill overruled the due process holding, but not the Commerce Clause holding; and it thus reaffirmed the physical presence rule. 504 U. S., at 307–308, 317–318.

The physical presence rule has “been the target of criticism over many years from many quarters.” Direct Mar­keting Assn. v. Brohl, 814 F. 3d 1129, 1148, 1150–1151 (CA10 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Quill, it has been said, was “premised on assumptions that are unfounded” and “riddled with internal inconsistencies.” Rothfeld, Quill: Confusing the Commerce Clause, 56 Tax Notes 487, 488 (1992). Quill created an inefficient “online sales tax loophole” that gives out-of-state businesses an advantage. A. Laffer & D. Arduin, Pro-Growth Tax Reform and E-Fairness 1, 4 (July 2013). And “while nexus rules are clearly necessary,” the Court “should focus on rules that are appropriate to the twenty-first century, not the nineteenth.” Hellerstein, Deconstructing the Debate Over State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 13 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 549, 553 (2000). Each year, the physical presence rule becomes further removed from economic reality and results in significant revenue losses to the States. These critiques underscore that the physical presence rule, both as first formulated and as applied today, is an incorrect interpretation of the Commerce Clause.

Quill is flawed on its own terms. First, the physical presence rule is not a necessary interpretation of the requirement that a state tax must be “applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State.” Com­plete Auto, 430 U. S., at 279. Second, Quill creates rather than resolves market distortions. And third, Quill imposes the sort of arbitrary, formalistic distinction that the Court’s modern Commerce Clause precedents disavow.

(…) For example, a company with a website accessible in South Dakota may be said to have a physical presence in the State via the customers’ computers. A website may leave cookies saved to the customers’ hard drives, or customers may download the company’s app onto their phones. Or a company may lease data storage that is permanently, or even occasionally, located in South Dakota. Cf. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 584 U. S. ___ (2018) (per curiam).

(…) The physical presence rule as defined and enforced in Bellas Hess and Quill is not just a technical legal problem—it is an extraordinary imposition by the Judiciary on States’ authority to collect taxes and perform critical public functions. Forty-one States, two Territories, and the District of Columbia now ask this Court to reject the test formulated in Quill.

(…) Yet the physical presence rule undermines that necessary confidence by giving some online retailers an arbitrary advantage over their competitors who collect state sales taxes.

(…) “Although we approach the reconsideration of our decisions with the utmost caution, stare decisis is not an inexorable command.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 233 (2009) (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U. S. 3, 20 (1997)). Here, stare decisis can no longer support the Court’s prohibition of a valid exercise of the States’ sovereign power.

(…) Further, the real world implementation of Commerce Clause doctrines now makes it manifest that the physical presence rule as defined by Quill must give way to the “far-reaching systemic and structural changes in the economy” and “many other societal dimensions” caused by the Cyber Age. Direct Marketing, 575 U. S., at ___ (KENNEDY, J., concurring) (slip op., at 3). Though Quill was wrong on its own terms when it was decided in 1992, since then the Internet revolution has made its earlier error all the more egregious and harmful.

(…) For these reasons, the Court concludes that the physical presence rule of Quill is unsound and incorrect. The Court’s decisions in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298 (1992), and National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U. S. 753 (1967), should be, and now are, overruled.

In the absence of Quill and Bellas Hess, the first prong of the Complete Auto test simply asks whether the tax applies to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State. 430 U. S., at 279. “Such a nexus is established when the taxpayer [or collector] ‘avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business’ in that jurisdiction.” Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U. S. 1, 11 (2009). Here, the nexus is clearly sufficient based on both the economic and virtual contacts respondents have with the State. The Act applies only to sellers that deliver more than $100,000 of goods or services into South Dakota or engage in 200 or more separate transactions for the delivery of goods and services into the State on an annual basis. S. B. 106, §1. This quantity of business could not have occurred unless the seller availed itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business in South Dakota. And respondents are large, national companies that undoubtedly maintain an extensive virtual presence. Thus, the substantial nexus requirement of Complete Auto is satisfied in this case.

The question remains whether some other principle in the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine might invalidate the Act. Because the Quill physical presence rule was an obvious barrier to the Act’s validity, these issues have not yet been litigated or briefed, and so the Court need not resolve them here. That said, South Dakota’s tax system includes several features that appear designed to prevent discrimination against or undue burdens upon interstate commerce. First, the Act applies a safe harbor to those who transact only limited business in South Dakota. Second, the Act ensures that no obligation to remit the sales tax may be applied retroactively. S. B. 106, §5. Third, South Dakota is one of more than 20 States that have adopted the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement. This system standardizes taxes to reduce administrative and compliance costs: It requires a single, state level tax administration, uniform definitions of products and services, simplified tax rate structures, and other uniform rules. It also provides sellers access to sales tax administration software paid for by the State. Sellers who choose to use such software are immune from audit liability. Any remaining claims regarding the application of the Commerce Clause in the absence of Quill and Bellas Hess may be addressed in the first instance on remand.

(U.S.S.C., June 21, 2018, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., Docket No. 17-494, J. Kennedy)

A la lumière de la « Commerce Clause », U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3, un état, domicile de l’acheteur, peut-il exiger d’un vendeur sis en un autre état de percevoir et de régler la taxe de vente ?

Dans deux décisions précédentes (Bellas Hess et Quill), la Cour a répondu par l’affirmative, mais à la condition que le vendeur dispose d’une présence physique dans l’état de l’acheteur. La simple expédition des biens, après un achat sur catalogue, ne satisfaisait pas à la condition de la présence physique.

Sans présence physique du vendeur sur son sol, l’état de l’acheteur devait récupérer la « sales tax » auprès de chaque acheteur individuel, un système qualifié d’impraticable.

Dans sa décision « Complete Auto » rendue en 1977, la Cour a jugé qu’un état était compétent pour taxer le commerce entre états (et lui seul), à condition de ne pas créer d’effets interdits par la « Commerce Clause ». De la sorte, une telle taxe doit s’appliquer à une activité en lien substantiel avec l’état de perception, doit être répartie équitablement entre les débiteurs, ne doit pas discriminer le commerce entre états à l’avantage du commerce local, et doit être équitablement liée aux services apportés par l’état de perception.

La jurisprudence Bellas Hess et Quill a fait l’objet de nombreuses critiques, auxquelles se sont joints les Juges Fortas et Gorsuch dans diverses opinions. Elle a été vue comme créant un avantage concurrentiel en faveur du commerce électronique provenant d’un autre état que celui de l’acheteur. Ces critiques soutiennent que la règle de la présence physique résulte d’une interprétation incorrecte de la Commerce Clause.

Par exemple, une entreprise qui maintient un site Internet peut être qualifiée d’entreprise avec présence physique dans un autre état que celui de son siège, par le biais des ordinateurs des clients.

En conséquence, Bellas Hess et Quill sont ici reconsidérés, et « overruled », ce que n’empêche pas le principe « stare decisis ». Reste donc essentiellement applicable le premier élément du test posé par la décision Complete Auto, à savoir la condition que la taxe soit imposée à une activité présentant un lien substantiel avec l’état qui taxe. Un tel lien est établi quand le débiteur de la taxe profite des conditions que l’état met à sa disposition pour permettre son activité commerciale. En l’espèce, ce lien est clairement suffisant considérant les contacts économiques et virtuels avec l’état de l’acheteur : la loi qui prévoit la taxe ne s’applique qu’aux vendeurs qui délivrent plus de 100'000 dollars dans l’état de l’acheteur, ou qui participent à plus de 200 transactions individuelles par année dans dit état.

(L’espèce mentionne encore le « Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement », adopté par plus de 20 états. Ce système standardise les taxes pour réduire les coûts administratifs. Il ne requiert au niveau de l’état qu’une seule administration fiscale, prévoit des définitions uniformes de produits et services, et prévoit d’autres règles de simplification).

L’affaire est renvoyée à l’autorité inférieure pour déterminer si d’autres principes découlant de la Commerce Clause sont susceptibles d’annuler la loi qui prévoit la taxe litigieuse.

Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, Docket 13-485

The Commerce Clause grants Congress power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. These “few simple words . . . reflected a central concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.” Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322, 325–326 (1979). Although the Clause is framed as a positive grant of power to Congress, “we have consistently held this language to contain a further, negative command, known as the dormant Commerce Clause, prohibiting certain state taxation even when Congress has failed to legislate on the subject.” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n  v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U. S. 175, 179 (1995).

This interpretation of the Commerce Clause has been disputed. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U. S. 564, 609–620 (1997) (THOMAS, J., dissenting); Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U. S. 232, 259–265 (1987) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); License Cases, 5 How. 504, 578–579 (1847) (Taney, C. J.). But it also has deep roots. See, e.g., Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232, 279–280 (1873); Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia ex rel. Soc. for Relief of Distressed Pilots, 12 How. 299, 318–319 (1852); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 209 (1824) (Marshall, C. J.). By prohibiting States from discriminating against or imposing excessive burdens on interstate commerce without congressional approval, it strikes at one of the chief evils that led to the adoption of the Constitution, namely, state tariffs and other laws that burdened interstate commerce. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U. S. 325, 330–331 (1996); Hughes, supra, at 325; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 280 (1876); see also The Federalist Nos. 7, 11 (A. Hamilton), and 42 (J. Madison).

Under our precedents, the dormant Commerce Clause precludes States from “discriminating between transactions on the basis of some interstate element.” Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U. S. 318, 332,

n. 12 (1977). This means, among other things, that a State “may not tax a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the State.” Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U. S. 638, 642 (1984). “Nor may a State impose a tax which discriminates against interstate commerce either by providing a direct commercial advantage to local business, or by subjecting interstate commerce to the burden of ‘multiple taxation.’” Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U. S. 450, 458 (1959).

The discarded distinction between taxes on gross receipts and net income was based on the notion, endorsed in some early cases, that a tax on gross receipts is an impermissible “direct and immediate burden” on interstate commerce, whereas a tax on net income is merely an “indirect and incidental” burden. United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321, 328–329 (1918); see also Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37, 57 (1920). This arid distinction between direct and indirect burdens allowed “very little coherent, trustworthy guidance as to tax validity.” 2 Trost §9:1, at 212. And so, beginning with Justice Stone’s seminal opinion in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250 (1938), and continuing through cases like J. D. Adams and Gwin, White, the direct-indirect burdens test was replaced with a more practical approach that looked to the economic impact of the tax. These cases worked “a substantial judicial reinterpretation of the power of the States to levy taxes on gross income from interstate commerce.” 1 Trost §2:20, at 175. After a temporary reversion to our earlier formalism, see Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U. S. 602 a wide arc, recently reaching the place where taxation of gross receipts from interstate commerce is placed on an equal footing with receipts from local business, in Com­plete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, 2 Trost §9:1, at 212. And we have now squarely rejected the argument that the Commerce Clause distinguishes between taxes on net and gross income. See Jefferson Lines, 514 U. S., at 190 (explaining that the Court in Central Greyhound “understood the gross receipts tax to be simply a variety of tax on income”); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S. 267, 280 (1978) (rejecting a suggestion that the Commerce Clause distinguishes between gross receipts taxes and net income taxes); id., at 281 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the Court that, for purposes of constitutional review, there is no distinction between a corporate income tax and a gross-receipts tax”); Complete Auto, supra, at 280 (upholding a gross receipts tax and rejecting the notion that the Commerce Clause places “a blanket prohibition against any state taxation imposed directly on an interstate transaction”). The principal dissent mischaracterizes the import of the Court’s statement in Moorman that a gross receipts tax is “ ‘more burdensome’ ” than a net income tax. Post, at 13. This was a statement about the relative economic impact of the taxes (a gross receipts tax applies regardless of whether the corporation makes a profit). It was not, as Justice Brennan confirmed in dissent, a suggestion that net income taxes are subject to lesser constitutional scrutiny than gross receipts taxes. Indeed, we noted in Moorman that “the actual burden on interstate commerce would have been the same had Iowa imposed a plainly valid gross-receipts tax instead of the challenged net income tax.” Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S. 267, 280–281 (1978).

For its part, petitioner distinguishes J. D. Adams, Gwin, White, and Central Greyhound on the ground that they concerned the taxation of corporations, not individuals. But it is hard to see why the dormant Commerce Clause should treat individuals less favorably than corporations. See Camps Newfound, 520 U. S., at 574 (“A tax on real estate, like any other tax, may impermissibly burden interstate commerce”). In addition, the distinction between individuals and corporations cannot stand because the taxes invalidated in J. D. Adams and Gwin, White applied to the income of both individuals and corporations. See Ind. Stat. Ann., ch. 26, §64–2602 (Burns 1933) (tax in J. D. Adams); 1935 Wash. Sess. Laws ch.180, Tit. II, §4(e), pp. 710–711 (tax in Gwin, White).

(…) This argument confuses what a State may do without violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment with what it may do without violating the Commerce Clause. The Due Process Clause allows a State to tax “all the income of its residents, even income earned outside the taxing jurisdiction.” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U. S. 450, 462–463 (1995). But “while a State may, consistent with the Due Process Clause, have the authority to tax a particular taxpayer, imposition of the tax may nonetheless violate the Commerce Clause.” Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298, 305 (1992) (rejecting a due process challenge to a tax before sustaining a Commerce Clause challenge to that tax).

There is no merit to petitioner’s argument that Maryland is free to adopt any tax scheme that is not actually intended to discriminate against interstate commerce. Reply Brief 7. The Commerce Clause regulates effects, not motives, and it does not require courts to inquire into voters’ or legislators’ reasons for enacting a law that has a discriminatory effect. See, e.g., Associated Industries of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U. S. 641, 653 (1994); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617, 626– 627 (1978); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U. S. 333, 352–353 (1977).

Our cases have held that tax schemes may be invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause even absent a showing of actual double taxation. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vt., 445 U. S. 425, 444 (1980); Gwin, White, 305 U. S., at 439. We note, however, that petitioner does not dispute that respondents have been subject to actual multiple taxation in this case.

Books: 14 A W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations (rev. ed. 2008 and Cum. Supp. 2014–2015); The Federalist Nos. 7, 11 (A. Hamilton), and 42 (J. Madison); 2 C. Trost & P. Hartman, Federal Limitations on State and Local Taxation 2d (2003); 2 J. Hellerstein & W. Hellerstein, State Taxation (3d ed. 2003); Mason, Made in America for European Tax: The Internal Consistency Test, 49 Boston College L. Rev. 1277, 1310 (2008); R. Blakey, State Income Taxation 1 (1930).

(U.S.S.Ct., May 18, 2015, Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, Docket 13-485, J. Alito).

La Clause du Commerce de la Constitution fédérale attribue au Congrès la compétence de réglementer le commerce entre les différents états. Cette clause reflète une préoccupation centrale des rédacteurs de la Constitution, et elle constitue la raison directe de la convocation de la constituante. Elle résulte de la conviction que pour perdurer, la nouvelle Union devait se donner les moyens d’éviter tout dérapage en direction d’une balkanisation économique, laquelle avait déjà porté préjudice aux relations entre les Colonies et plus tard entre les états sous l’autorité des « Articles of Confederation ». Bien que la Clause soit formulée en termes d’attribution positive de compétence en faveur du Congrès, la présente Cour a jugé de manière constante que le langage de la Clause contient une directive négative, connue sous le nom de Clause du Commerce dormante, interdisant aux états de procéder à certains prélèvements fiscaux, même lorsque le Congrès n’a pas légiféré dans le domaine concerné par la taxation.

Il est vrai que cette interprétation de la Clause du Commerce a été disputée. Mais elle a aussi des racines profondes. En interdisant aux états d’établir des discriminations en matière de commerce entre états, ou en leur interdisant d’imposer des charges excessives à ce commerce, sans l’approbation du Congrès, la Clause du Commerce s’oppose à l’un des principaux préjudice qui avait conduit à l’adoption de la Constitution fédérale, à savoir l’imposition mise en place par des états et la promulgation d’autres lois par ces états ayant pour effet de freiner le commerce entre états.

Selon la jurisprudence de la Cour, la Clause du Commerce dormante interdit aux états la mise en place de mesures discriminatoires s’agissant de transactions qui présentent un caractère interétatique. Ce principe implique entre autres qu’un état ne peut pas taxer une transaction ou une autre occurrence plus lourdement en cas de composante interétatique qu’en l’absence d’une telle composante. Un état ne peut pas davantage imposer une taxe qui entraîne une discrimination dirigée contre le commerce entre états, soit en procurant un avantage commercial direct en faveur des commerçants locaux, soit en chargeant le commerce entre états de multiples taxes.

La distinction, qui n’est pas à considérer en l’espèce, entre la taxation « on gross receipts » (un impôt sur le revenu total brut d’une entreprise, quelque soit sa source. Des économistes auraient critiqué ce type d’imposition en ce qu’il favoriserait une intégration verticale des entreprises, et en ce qu’il discriminerait suivant le type d’activité commerciale) et la taxation du revenu net, était basée sur la notion, reconnue dans des jurisprudences anciennes mais rejetée depuis, qu’une taxe sur le revenu brut constitue une charge interdite, directe et immédiate, en défaveur du commerce entre états, alors qu’une taxe sur le revenu net ne constitue qu’une charge indirecte et incidente. Cette distinction, qualifiée d’aride par la Cour, entre des charges directes et indirectes, n’éclaire guère en matière de validité de l’imposition en général.

Ainsi, la jurisprudence a évolué. Le test de la charge directe respectivement indirecte a été remplacé par une approche plus pratique basée sur l’impact économique de l’impôt. La jurisprudence rendue au fil du temps a substantiellement réinterprété la notion de la compétence des états de prélever l’impôt sur le revenu brut dérivant du commerce entre états. La Cour a finalement clairement rejeté l’argument selon lequel la Clause du Commerce distinguerait entre les impôts sur le revenu brut et ceux sur le revenu net («gross receipts tax» s’analyse simplement en une variété d’impôt sur le revenu ; la Clause du Commerce ne distingue nullement entre la notion de « gross receipts tax » et la notion d’impôt sur le revenu net). Cette analyse s’applique aussi s’agissant de l’imposition des personnes morales. Dans cette affaire, la principale opinion dissidente se trompe dans sa compréhension d’un considérant tiré de la jurisprudence Moorman, qui exposait qu’un « gross receipts tax » serait plus contraignant qu’un impôt sur le revenu net. Moorman se limitait à considérer l’impact économique relatif de l’impôt (un « gross receipts tax » s’applique sans considérer si l’entreprise produit ou non un profit). La jurisprudence Moorman poursuit en soutenant que la charge effective sur le commerce interétatique aurait été la même si l’état de l’Iowa avait imposé un « gross receipts tax » (conforme au droit) au lieu d’un impôt sur le revenu net (objet d’une contestation). La Clause du Commerce dormante ne saurait traiter les personnes physiques moins favorablement que les personnes morales (un impôt foncier, comme tout autre impôt, est susceptible de contraindre illicitement le commerce entre états).

La « Due Process Clause » du Quatorzième Amendement permet à un état d’imposer l’ensemble du revenu de ses résidents, y compris le revenu gagné à l’extérieur de la juridiction de l’autorité de taxation. Mais si un état peut, conformément à la Due Process Clause, disposer de la compétence d’imposer un contribuable particulier, la décision d’imposition est susceptible cependant de porter atteinte à la Clause du Commerce.

Est dépourvu de mérite l’argument selon lequel un état serait libre d’adopter n’importe quel système d’imposition qui ne viserait pas à discriminer à l’encontre du commerce interétatique. La Clause du Commerce réglemente les effets, et non les motifs, et elle n’impose pas aux Tribunaux de considérer les raisons qui ont motivé les votants ou le législateur à promulguer une loi pourvue d’effets discriminatoires.

La jurisprudence de la Cour a considéré que des systèmes d’imposition peuvent être invalides sous l’angle de la Clause du Commerce dormante, même en l’absence de l’établissement d’une double imposition effective. La présente espèce porte pour sa part sur une telle double imposition.

Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett

Supremacy Clause: the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) requires manufac­turers to gain Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval before marketing any brand-name or generic drug in interstate commerce. 21 U. S. C. §355(a). Once a drug is approved, a manufacturer is pro­hibited from making any major changes to the “qualitative or quanti­tative formulation of the drug product, including active ingredients, or in the specifications provided in the approved application.” 21 CFR §314.70(b)(2)(i). Generic manufacturers are also prohibited from making any unilateral changes to a drug’s label. See §§314.94(a)(8)(iii), 314.150(b)(10). Held: State-law design-defect claims that turn on the adequacy of a drug’s warnings are pre-empted by federal law under PLIVA.

Under the Supremacy Clause, state laws that conflict with fed­eral law are “without effect.” Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 746. Even in the absence of an express pre-emption provision, a state law may be impliedly pre-empted where it is “impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements.” English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U. S. 72, 79. Here, it is impossible for Mu­tual to comply with both its federal-law duty not to alter sulindac’s label or composition and its state-law duty to either strengthen the warnings on sulindac’s label or change sulindac’s design.

Increasing a drug’s “usefulness” or reducing its “risk of danger” would require redesigning the drug, since those factors are direct results of a drug’s chemical design and active ingredients. Here, however, redesign was not possible for two reasons. First, the FDCA requires a generic drug to have the same active ingredients, route of administration, dosage form, strength, and labeling as its brand-name drug equivalent. Second, because of sulindac’s simple composition, the drug is chemically incapable of be­ing redesigned. Accordingly, because redesign was impossible, Mu­tual could only ameliorate sulindac’s “risk-utility” profile by strengthening its warnings. Thus, New Hampshire’s law ultimately required Mutual to change sulindac’s labeling.

But PLIVA makes clear that federal law prevents generic drug manufacturers from changing their labels. See 564 U. S., at ___. Accordingly, Mutual was prohibited from taking the remedial action required to avoid liability under New Hampshire law.

When federal law forbids an action required by state law, the state law is “without effect.” Maryland, supra, at 746. Because it was impossible for Mutual to comply with both state and federal law, New Hampshire’s warning-based design-defect cause of action is pre­empted with respect to FDA-approved drugs sold in interstate com­merce.

The First Circuit’s rationale—that Mutual could escape the im­possibility of complying with both its federal- and state-law duties by choosing to stop selling sulindac—is incompatible with this Court’s pre-emption cases, which have presumed that an actor seeking to sat­isfy both federal- and state-law obligations is not required to cease acting altogether. 678 F. 3d 30, reversed. (U.S.S.Ct., 24.06.2013, Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, J. Alito).

Le droit fédéral l’emporte sur le droit étatique contraire (primauté du droit fédéral) : la loi fédérale sur les denrées alimentaires, les médicaments et les produits cosmétiques impose aux fabricants de ces produits d’obtenir une autorisation avant de les vendre dans le circuit commercial entre les états. Une fois approuvé, le produit ne peut plus être modifié. Ces exigences s’appliquent en particulier aux fabricants de médicaments originaux et aux fabricants de médicaments génériques. Ce corps de droit fédéral l’emporte sur des règles étatiques qui prescriraient de manière contradictoire. En l’espèce, se fondant sur des dispositions légales d’un état, la partie recourante procède contre un fabricant de médicament générique, en alléguant que la notice de ce générique omet de mettre en garde contre un risque particulier d’effet secondaire, dont elle a été victime. Dans la mesure où le produit tel qu’autorisé par l’administration fédérale ne mentionne pas dans sa notice ledit risque d’effet secondaire, la partie recourante ne peut se fonder sur des règles étatiques pour agir contre le fabricant du médicament générique, dont la commercialisation a été faite conformément au droit fédéral, lequel ici l’emporte sur des règles étatiques contraires. Peu importe que le droit fédéral mentionne expressément ou non que des règles étatiques contraires sont sans effet. Quand il est impossible pour un sujet de droit de satisfaire à la fois la règle fédérale et la règle étatique, la primauté du droit fédéral s’applique. En outre, un sujet de droit qui cherche à satisfaire à la fois le droit fédéral et le droit étatique contraire n’est pas tenu de mettre fin à ses affaires. La préemption s’applique et seul le droit fédéral doit être respecté.