U.S. Supreme Court, Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty CO., LLC, Docket No. 22-500

Maritime Insurance Contract

 

Maritime Law

 

Choice-of-Law Provisions in Maritime Contracts

 

Federal Common Law Court

 

Circuit Split

 

 

 

“Federalism in admiralty and the scope of application of state law in maritime cases is one of the most perplexing issues in the law”.

 

 

 

 

 

This Court granted certiorari to resolve a split in the Courts of Appeals regarding the enforceability of choice-of law provisions in maritime contracts.

 

 

Maritime contracts often contain choice-of-law provisions that designate the law of a particular jurisdiction to control future disputes. The enforceability of those choice-of-law provisions is governed by federal maritime law. Applying federal maritime law in this case, we conclude that choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable, with certain narrow exceptions not applicable here.

 

 

Under the Constitution, federal courts possess authority to create and apply maritime law. Article III of the Constitution extends the federal judicial power to “all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.” U. S. Const., Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. That grant of jurisdiction contemplates a system of maritime law “‘coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country.’” Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., 543 U. S. 14, 28 (2004) (quoting American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U. S. 443, 451 (1994)). The purposes of that uniform system include promoting “the great interests of navigation and commerce” and maintaining the United States’ “diplomatic relations.” 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §1666, p. 533 (1st ed. 1833); see also Norfolk Southern, 543 U. S., at 28; Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U. S. 603, 608 (1991). To maintain that uniform system, federal courts “make decisional law” for maritime cases. Norfolk Southern, 543 U. S., at 23. When a federal court decides a maritime case, it acts as a “federal common law court, much as state courts do in state common-law cases.” Air & Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries, 586 U. S. 446, 452 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Dutra Group v. Batterton, 588 U. S. 358, 360 (2019). “Subject to direction from Congress,” the federal courts fashion maritime rules based on, among other sources, “judicial opinions, legislation, treatises, and scholarly writings.” Air & Liquid Systems, 586 U. S., at 452; see also Exxon Co., U. S. A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U. S. 830, 839 (1996); East River S. S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U. S. 858, 864 (1986). Exercising that authority, federal courts follow previously “established” maritime rules. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U. S. 310, 314 (1955).

 

 

No bright line exists for determining when a federal maritime rule is “established,” but a body of judicial decisions can suffice. See Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U. S. 85, 89–90 (1955). In the absence of an established rule, federal courts may create uniform maritime rules. See, e.g., Norfolk Southern, 543 U. S., at 23. When no established rule exists, and when the federal courts decline to create a new rule, federal courts apply state law. See Wilburn Boat, 348 U. S., at 320–321. For purposes of this general overview, we will stop there, as the “issue of federalism in admiralty and the scope of application of state law in maritime cases is one of the most perplexing issues in the law.” 1 T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law §4:4, p. 268 (6th ed. 2018).

 

 

The initial question here is whether there is an established federal maritime rule regarding the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions. The answer is yes. Longstanding precedent establishes a federal maritime rule: Choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable. As a leading treatise says, it is “well established in admiralty that choice of law clauses” will “normally be enforced.” 1 Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law §5:19, at 427; see also id., §4:4, at 275; 2 id., §19:6, at 431–432 (similar).

 

 

The Court has pronounced that forum-selection clauses in maritime contracts are “prima facie valid” under federal maritime law and “should be enforced unless” doing so would be “‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.” The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U. S. 1, 10 (1972); see also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U. S. 585, 593–594 (1991).

 

 

(…) Moreover, by supplying some advance assurance about the governing law, choice-of-law provisions help maritime shippers decide on the front end “what precautions to take” on their boats, American Dredging, 510 U. S., at 454, and enable marine insurers to better assess risk, see Brief for American Institute of Marine Underwriters et al. as Amici Curiae 12–13. Choice-of-law provisions therefore can lower the price and expand the availability of marine insurance. In those ways, choice-of-law provisions advance a fundamental purpose of federal maritime law: the “‘protection of maritime commerce.’” Exxon Corp., 500 U. S., at 608 (quoting Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U. S. 358, 367 (1990)).

 

 

Rather, the Wilburn Boat Court simply determined what substantive rule applied when a party breached a warranty in a marine insurance contract. See id., at 311–316. The Court concluded that no “established federal admiralty rule” governed the warranty issue. Id., at 314; see also id., at 314–316. And the Court declined to create a federal maritime rule on that question, both because States historically regulated insurance and because federal courts were poorly positioned to “unify insurance law on a nationwide basis.” Id., at 319; see also id., at 316–320. The Court therefore ordered that the warranty issue be tried “under appropriate state law.” Id., at 321.

 

 

(…) Moreover, Wilburn Boat held only that state law applied as a gap-filler in the absence of a uniform federal maritime rule on a warranty issue. 348 U. S., at 314–316. Here, however, no gap exists because a uniform federal rule governs the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime contracts.

 

 

After Wilburn Boat, maritime actors realized that a lot would depend on which State’s law governed each individual maritime dispute—a question that would be unclear in advance. See 2 Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law §19:9. Choice-of-law provisions soon emerged as a ready answer to that problem. See W. von Bittner, The Validity and Effect of Choice of Law Clauses in Marine Insurance Contracts, 53 Ins. Counsel J. 573, 573, 578–579 (1986).

 

 

(…) The bottom line: As a matter of federal maritime law, choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable.

 

Of course, to say that choice-of-law clauses are presumptively enforceable as a matter of federal maritime law means that there are exceptions when the clauses are not enforceable. The parties agree that the exceptions are narrow—indeed, Raiders “freely concedes that in most every instance, a choice-of-law provision contained in a maritime insurance contract will be effective.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 54. In particular, the parties agree that courts should disregard choice-of-law clauses in otherwise valid maritime contracts when the chosen law would contravene a controlling federal statute, see Knott v. Botany Mills, 179 U. S. 69, 77 (1900), or conflict with an established federal maritime policy, see The Kensington, 183 U. S. 263, 269–271 (1902). For example, The Kensington declined to enforce a choice-of-law clause because the chosen law would have released a carrier from liability for negligence—a result that federal maritime law forbids. See ibid. The parties further agree that, as a matter of federal maritime law, courts may disregard choice-of-law clauses when parties can furnish no reasonable basis for the chosen jurisdiction. Cf. Carnival Cruise, 499 U. S., at 594–595; The Bremen, 407 U. S., at 10, 16–17. For example, it would be unreasonable to pick the law of a distant foreign country without some rational basis for doing so. That said, the “no reasonable basis” exception must be applied with substantial deference to the contracting parties, recognizing that maritime actors may sometimes choose the law of a specific jurisdiction because, for example, that jurisdiction’s law is “well developed, well known, and well regarded.” Brief for American Institute of Marine Underwriters et al. as Amici Curiae 17.

 

 

Unable to successfully invoke those exceptions, Raiders says that federal maritime law should recognize an additional exception when enforcing the law of the State designated by the contract would contravene the fundamental public policy of the State with the greatest interest in the dispute. We disagree with that argument. Indeed, Raiders’ request for that novel maritime exception is essentially a repackaged version of its initial argument that the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts should be determined by state law. The argument fares no better here, for essentially the same reasons.

 

 

(…) We disagree with Raiders’ related suggestion that we adopt the choice-of-law approach set forth in §187(2)(b) of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws. In relevant part, that subsection says that choice-of-law provisions are enforceable unless they conflict with “a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §187(2)(b). As the commentary to the Restatement carefully explains, however, that rule arose out of interstate cases and does not deal directly with federal-state conflicts, including those that arise in federal enclaves like maritime law. See id. §2, Comment c; §3, Comment d; §10, Comment a.

 

 

 

 

Secondary sources: T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law §4:4, p. 268 (6th ed. 2018); J. Coyle, The Canons of Construction for Choice-of-Law Clauses, 92 Wash. L. Rev. 631, 633, n. 6 (2017); M. Sturley, Restating the Law of Marine Insurance: A Workable Solution to the Wilburn Boat Problem, 29 J. Mar. L. & Com. 41, 45 (1998); G. Gilmore & C. Black, Law of Admiralty §§1–17, 2–8 (2d ed. 1975); W. von Bittner, The Validity and Effect of Choice of Law Clauses in Marine Insurance Contracts, 53 Ins. Counsel J. 573, 573, 578–579 (1986); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §187, Comment f, p. 567 (1969).

 

 

 

 

(U.S. Supreme Court, Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty CO., LLC, Feb. 21, 2024, Docket No. 22-500, J. Kavanaugh, Unanimous)

 

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., Docket 16-466

Specific Jurisdiction: Due Process Clause: Fourteenth Amendment: Fifth Amendment: Federalism:

Reverses and remands 1Cal. 5th 783, 377 P. 3d 874 (S221038, August 29, 2016, Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of San Francisco County).

(…) We granted certiorari to decide whether the California courts’ exercise of jurisdiction in this case violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 580 U. S. ___ (2017).

(California law provides that its courts may exercise jurisdiction “on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution . . . of the United States,” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. §410.10 (West 2004)).

(…) Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which “limits the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant,” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 291 (1980).

(…) The Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism.

Our settled principles regarding specific jurisdiction control this case. In order for a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a claim, there must be an “affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, prin­cipally, an activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U. S. 915, 919 (2011).

(…) Even regu­larly occurring sales of a product in a State do not justify the exercise of jurisdiction over a claim unrelated to those sales.

(…) What is needed—and what is missing here—is a connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.

(…) Walden, 571 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8): In that case, Nevada plaintiffs sued an out-of-state defendant for conducting an allegedly unlawful search of the plaintiffs while they were in Georgia preparing to board a plane bound for Nevada. We held that the Nevada courts lacked specific jurisdiction even though the plain­tiffs were Nevada residents and “suffered foreseeable harm in Nevada.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 11). Because the “relevant conduct occurred entirely in Georgia . . . the mere fact that this conduct affected plaintiffs with con­nections to the forum State did not suffice to authorize jurisdiction.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14).

In today’s case, the connection between the nonresi­dents’ claims and the forum is even weaker. The relevant plaintiffs are not California residents and do not claim to have suffered harm in that State. In addition, as in Wal­den, all the conduct giving rise to the nonresidents’ claims occurred elsewhere. It follows that the California courts cannot claim specific jurisdiction.

(…) (Keeton held that there was jurisdiction in New Hampshire to consider the full measure of the plaintiff ’s claim, but whether she could actually recover out-of-state damages was a merits question governed by New Hampshire libel law).

(Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U. S. 320, 332 (1980); see Walden, 571 U. S., at ___ (slip op, at 8) (“A defendant’s relationship with a . . . third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction”)).

(…) In addition, since our decision concerns the due process limits on the exer­cise of specific jurisdiction by a State, we leave open the question whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court. See Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U. S. 97, 102, n. 5 (1987).

(U.S.S.C., June 19, 2017, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., Docket 16-466, J. Alito (only J. Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion)).

Notion de "specific jurisdiction", telle que limitée par la Clause "Due Process" du Quatorzième Amendement, en cas de procédure devant le Tribunal d'un état, impliquant plusieurs demandeurs, certains domiciliés hors de l'état du for.

La Cour rappelle sa jurisprudence : un Tribunal est compétent s'il existe un lien entre le for et la prétention déduite en justice, par exemple suite à une activité ou à un événement qui s'est produit dans l'état du for. (En l'espèce, action de classe en Californie contre un fabricant de médicament. Les demandeurs californiens peuvent invoquer un dommage subi en Californie, suite à un achat du produit en Californie. Ces éléments ne peuvent pas être invoqués par les demandeurs domiciliés dans un autre état).

Des ventes régulières dans un état ne suffisent pas à fonder la compétence des Tribunaux de cet état si la prétention n'est pas liée aux ventes.

Dans une décision Walden, des demandeurs domiciliés au Nevada avaient agi devant le Tribunal du Nevada contre un défendeur domicilié en Géorgie. Les prétentions en dommages-intérêts découlaient d'une fouille prétendument illégale subie en Géorgie juste avant d'embarquer un vol à destination du Nevada. La Cour a jugé que les Tribunaux du Nevada n'étaient pas compétents (absence de "specific jurisdiction"), même si les demandeurs étaient résidents du Nevada et même s'ils subissaient un dommage dans cet état. La conduite relevante s'était en effet produite entièrement en Géorgie.

En l'espèce, la connexion entre les prétentions des demandeurs hors de l'état du for et le for lui-même est encore plus ténue que dans Walden. Ces demandeurs ne résident pas en Californie et n'ont pas subi de dommage dans cet état. En outre, comme dans Walden, la conduite à la base des prétentions s'est entièrement déroulée hors de l'état du for. Dès lors, les cours californiennes ne sont pas compétentes au sens de la "specific jurisdiction".

(Si la compétence est admise s'agissant de prétentions de parties demanderesses domiciliées hors de l'état du for, la question de savoir si ces demanderesses peuvent récupérer la totalité de leur préjudice subi hors de cet état est une question qui se juge à la lumière du droit de l'état du for, cf. décision Keeton).

(Les relations du défendeur avec un tiers, domicilié, lui, dans l'état du for, sont insuffisantes à conférer compétence spécifique).

La Cour laisse ouverte la question de savoir si le Cinquième Amendement impose à la compétence d'une cour fédérale les mêmes limites que celles décrites ci-dessus, qui ne concernent que la compétence spécifique des cours d'un état sous l'angle du Quatorzième Amendement.

North Carolina Bd. Of Dental Examiners v. FTC, Docket 13-534

Antitrust: federal antitrust law is a central safeguard for the Nation’s free market structures. In this regard it is “as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.” United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U. S. 596, 610 (1972). The antitrust laws declare a considered and decisive prohibition by the Federal Government of cartels, price fixing, and other combinations or practices that undermine the free market. The Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §1 et seq., serves to promote robust competition, which in turn empowers the States and provides their citizens with opportunities to pursue their own and the public’s welfare. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U. S. 621, 632 (1992). The States, however, when acting in their respective realm, need not adhere in all contexts to a model of unfettered competition. While “the States regulate their economies in many ways not inconsistent with the antitrust laws,” id., at 635–636, in some spheres they impose restrictions on occupations, confer exclusive or shared rights to dominate a market, or otherwise limit competition to achieve public objectives. If every duly enacted state law or policy were required to conform to the mandates of the Sherman Act, thus promoting competition at the expense of other values a State may deem fundamental, federal antitrust law would impose an impermissible burden on the States’ power to regulate. See Exxon Corp. v. Gover­nor of Maryland, 437 U. S. 117, 133 (1978); see also Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. Law & Econ. 23, 24 (1983). For these reasons, the Court in Parker v. Brown interpreted the antitrust laws to confer immunity on anticompetitive conduct by the States when acting in their sovereign capacity. See 317 U. S., at 350–351. That ruling recognized Congress’ purpose to respect the federal balance and to “embody in the Sherman Act the federalism principle that the States possess a significant measure of sovereignty under our Constitution.” Community Com­munications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U. S. 40, 53 (1982). Since 1943, the Court has reaffirmed the importance of Parker’s central holding. See, e.g., Ticor, supra, at 632–637; Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U. S. 558, 568 (1984); Lafayette v. Louisi­ana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 394–400 (1978).

Because a controlling number of the Board’s decisionmakers are active market participants in the occupation the Board regulates, the Board can invoke state-action antitrust immunity only if it was sub­ject to active supervision by the State, and here that requirement is not met.

Federal antitrust law is a central safeguard for the Nation’s free market structures. However, requiring States to conform to the mandates of the Sherman Act at the expense of other values a State may deem fundamental would impose an impermissible burden on the States’ power to regulate. Therefore, beginning with Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341, this Court interpreted the antitrust laws to confer immunity on the anticompetitive conduct of States acting in their sovereign capacity.

The Board’s actions are not cloaked with Parker immunity. A nonsovereign actor controlled by active market participants—such as the Board—enjoys Parker immunity only if “ ‘the challenged restraint . . . is clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state poli­cy,’ and . . . ‘the policy . . . is actively supervised by the State.’ ” FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., 568 U. S. ___, ___ (quoting California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97, 105). Here, the Board did not receive active supervision of its anticompetitive conduct.

An entity may not invoke Parker immunity unless its actions are an exercise of the State’s sovereign power. See Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U. S. 365, 374. Thus, where a State delegates control over a market to a nonsovereign actor the Sherman Act confers immunity only if the State accepts political accountability for the anticompetitive conduct it permits and controls. Limits on state-action immunity are most essential when a State seeks to dele­gate its regulatory power to active market participants, for dual alle­giances are not always apparent to an actor and prohibitions against anticompetitive self-regulation by active market participants are an axiom of federal antitrust policy. Accordingly, Parker immunity re­quires that the anticompetitive conduct of nonsovereign actors, espe­cially those authorized by the State to regulate their own profession, result from procedures that suffice to make it the State’s own. Midcal’s two-part test provides a proper analytical framework to re­solve the ultimate question whether an anticompetitive policy is in­deed the policy of a State. The first requirement—clear articula­tion—rarely will achieve that goal by itself, for entities purporting to act under state authority might diverge from the State’s considered definition of the public good and engage in private self-dealing. The second Midcal requirement—active supervision—seeks to avoid this harm by requiring the State to review and approve interstitial poli­cies made by the entity claiming immunity.

There are instances in which an actor can be excused from Midcal’s active supervision requirement. Municipalities, which are electorally accountable, have general regulatory powers, and have no private price-fixing agenda, are subject exclusively to the clear articu­lation requirement. See Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U. S. 34, 35. That Hallie excused municipalities from Midcal’s supervision rule for these reasons, however, all but confirms the rule’s applicability to ac­tors controlled by active market participants. Further, in light of Omni’s holding that an otherwise immune entity will not lose im­munity based on ad hoc and ex post questioning of its motives for making particular decisions, 499 U. S., at 374, it is all the more nec­essary to ensure the conditions for granting immunity are met in the first place, see FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U. S. 621, 633, and Phoebe Putney, supra, at ___. The clear lesson of precedent is that Midcal’s active supervision test is an essential prerequisite of Parker immunity for any nonsovereign entity—public or private—controlled by active market participants.

The Board’s argument that entities designated by the States as agencies are exempt from Midcal’s second requirement cannot be reconciled with the Court’s repeated conclusion that the need for su­pervision turns not on the formal designation given by States to regu­lators but on the risk that active market participants will pursue pri­vate interests in restraining trade. State agencies controlled by active market participants pose the very risk of self-dealing Midcal’s supervision requirement was created to address. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773, 791. This conclusion does not question the good faith of state officers but rather is an assessment of the structural risk of market participants’ confusing their own inter­ests with the State’s policy goals. While Hallie stated “it is likely that active state supervision would also not be required” for agencies, 471 U. S., at 46, n. 10, the entity there was more like prototypical state agencies, not specialized boards dominated by active market participants. The latter are similar to private trade associations vested by States with regulatory authority, which must satisfy Midcal’s active supervision standard. 445 U. S., at 105–106. The similarities between agencies controlled by active market partici­pants and such associations are not eliminated simply because the former are given a formal designation by the State, vested with a measure of government power, and required to follow some procedur­al rules. See Hallie, supra, at 39. When a State empowers a group of active market participants to decide who can participate in its mar­ket, and on what terms, the need for supervision is manifest. Thus, the Court holds today that a state board on which a controlling num­ber of decisionmakers are active market participants in the occupa­tion the board regulates must satisfy Midcal’s active supervision re­quirement in order to invoke state-action antitrust immunity.

Here, where there are no specific supervisory systems to be re­viewed, it suffices to note that the inquiry regarding active supervi­sion is flexible and context-dependent. The question is whether the State’s review mechanisms provide “realistic assurance” that a non-sovereign actor’s anticompetitive conduct “promotes state policy, ra­ther than merely the party’s individual interests.” Patrick, 486 U. S., 100–101. The Court has identified only a few constant requirements of active supervision: the supervisor must review the substance of the anticompetitive decision, see id., at 102–103; the supervisor must have the power to veto or modify particular decisions to ensure they accord with state policy, see ibid.; and the “mere potential for state supervision is not an adequate substitute for a decision by the State,” Ticor, supra, at 638. Further, the state supervisor may not itself be an active market participant. In general, however, the adequacy of supervision otherwise will depend on all the circumstances of a case.

The Sherman Act protects competition while also respecting federalism. It does not authorize the States to abandon markets to the unsupervised control of active market participants, whether trade associations or hybrid agencies. If a State wants to rely on active market participants as regulators, it must provide active supervision if state-action immunity under Parker is to be invoked. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is affirmed.

Books: Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. Law & Econ. 23, 24 (1983).

(U.S.S.Ct., Feb. 25, 2015, North Carolina Bd. Of Dental Examiners v. FTC, Docket 13-534, J. Kennedy).

Le droit fédéral contre les cartels constitue une sauvegarde centrale des structures de libre marché du pays. A cet égard, il est aussi important à la préservation de la liberté économique et à notre système de libre entreprise que l’importance du Bill of Rights pour ce qui est de la protection de nos libertés personnelles fondamentales. Le droit des cartels postule comme principe l’interdiction, promulguée par le Gouvernement, desdits cartels, de la fixation des prix, et d’autres combinaisons ou pratiques qui portent atteinte au libre marché. Le Sherman Act, sert à promouvoir une robuste compétition, avec comme conséquence la promotion du bien-être des états et de leurs citoyens. Cependant, lorsqu’ils agissent dans leurs propres domaines de compétence, les états ne sont pas contraints d’adhérer à tous égards à un modèle de concurrence sans aucune restriction. Les états peuvent ainsi réglementer leurs économies de multiples façons, compatibles avec le droit fédéral des cartels, en imposant des restrictions à certaines activités, en conférant des droits exclusifs ou partagés de dominer un marché, ou en limitant d’autres manières la compétition pour accomplir des objectifs publics. Si chaque loi ou politique d’un état, dûment promulguée, devait respecter strictement toutes les exigences du Sherman Act, en promouvant la compétition au détriment d’autres valeurs qu’un état peut considérer comme fondamentales, le droit fédéral des cartels imposerait une charge inacceptable sur la compétence des états de légiférer.

Pour ces raisons, la jurisprudence Parker v. Brown a interprété le droit des cartels comme conférant immunité aux conduites anticompétitives des états agissant en tant que souverain. Cette jurisprudence reconnaît le but du Congrès de respecter l’équilibre fédéral et d’incorporer dans le Sherman Act le principe fédéraliste selon lequel les états détiennent une mesure significative de souveraineté garantie par notre Constitution.

Si une autorité régulatrice d’un état est constituée de membres avec pouvoir de décision susceptible de former une majorité et que ces membres sont en outre des participants actifs sur le marché dans le domaine que l’autorité réglemente, l’autorité régulatrice ne peut invoquer l’immunité en droit des cartels (immunité liée à une action de l’état) que si la conduite litigieuse est clairement articulée et expressément affirmée comme politique de l’état, et que si dite autorité est sujette à une supervision active par l’état. Une telle supervision des actes anticoncurrentiels n’est pas donnée dans la présente affaire.

Une entité ne peut pas invoquer l’immunité découlant de la jurisprudence Parker à moins que son action ne constitue un exercice du pouvoir souverain de l’état. Ainsi, lorsqu’un état délègue le contrôle d’un marché à une entité dépourvue de souveraineté, le Sherman Act n’attribue immunité que si l’état accepte sa responsabilité politique pour la conduite contraire à la concurrence qu’il permet et contrôle. La limitation de l’octroi de l’immunité conférée à un acte de nature étatique est particulièrement importante lorsqu’un état cherche à déléguer son pouvoir régulateur à des participants actifs sur le marché. En effet, une telle double allégeance n’est pas toujours apparente et de manière générale l’interdiction de l’autorégulation de la concurrence par les participants actifs sur le marché en question constitue un axiome de la politique cartellaire fédérale. Dès lors, l’octroi de l’immunité au sens de la jurisprudence Parker implique que la conduite contraire à la concurrence de la part d’acteurs dépourvus de souveraineté, tout spécialement ceux autorisés par l’état à réguler leur propre profession, résulte de procédures suffisantes à rendre dite conduite comme constituant la conduite de l’état lui-même. La jurisprudence Midcal prévoit un test en deux parties et constitue ainsi un cadre d’analyse approprié pour résoudre l’ultime question, soit savoir si une politique anticoncurrentielle donnée est effectivement voulue par l’état lui-même. La première partie du test – une articulation claire -, ne parviendra que rarement à résoudre à elle seule dite ultime question, aussi vrai qu’une dichotomie peut apparaître entre la conception du bien public voulue par l’état d’une part, et les conceptions privées sous-jacentes à l’action d’une entité qui prétend agir sous l’autorité de l’état. La seconde partie de ce test – une supervision active – vise à éviter la dichotomie précitée en requérant de l’état l’examen et l’approbation de la politique mise en place par l’entité qui invoque l’immunité.

Il existe par ailleurs des situations où un acteur est dispensé du test de la supervision active prévue par la jurisprudence Midcal. Les municipalités, qui répondent devant l’électeur, disposent de compétences générales de régulation, et ne suivent aucun agenda de fixation de prix. Elles sont exclusivement sujettes à l’exigence de l’articulation claire.

En l’espèce, l’argument de l’entité consistant à soutenir que les administrations publiques de toutes sortes sont exemptées de la seconde partie du test est incompatible avec la jurisprudence : le besoin de supervision ne dépend pas de la désignation formelle donnée par l’état à ses agences administratives, mais dépend du risque que des participants actifs sur le marché pourraient restreindre la concurrence pour satisfaire leurs intérêts privés. Les agences gouvernementales contrôlées par des participants actifs sur le marché posent le risque de promouvoir leurs intérêts privés, raison pour laquelle s’applique l’exigence de supervision.

Il est vrai que la jurisprudence Hallie a soutenu que vraisemblablement une supervision étatique active n’était pas demandée s’agissant des services de l’administration. Mais l’entité concernée par cette affaire ressemblait davantage à un service typique de l’administration, et ressemblait ainsi beaucoup moins à une entité spécialisée dominée par des participants actifs sur le marché. Ce dernier type est similaire à des associations commerciales privées investies par les états d’une autorité régulatrice, et il doit satisfaire le test de la supervision active au sens de la jurisprudence Midcal. Lorsqu’un état confère la compétence à un groupe de participants actifs sur le marché de décider qui peut prendre part à ce marché, et à quelles conditions, le besoin d’une supervision est manifeste. Par conséquent, la Cour juge en l’espèce qu’une entité administrative dans laquelle siège des membres actifs sur le marché concerné dont le nombre est susceptible de former une majorité décisionnelle doit satisfaire à l’exigence de la supervision active au sens de la jurisprudence Midcal pour pouvoir invoquer l’immunité anticartellaire rattachée à une action de l’état. L’investigation portant sur la question de savoir si le test de la supervision active est satisfait est flexible. Elle dépend du contexte. La Cour n’a identifié que quelques exigences constantes de supervision active : le superviseur doit revoir la substance de la décision anticoncurrentielle ; le superviseur doit disposer d’un droit de veto ou d’un droit de modifier une décision particulière pour assurer que la décision s’accorde avec la politique de l’état. En outre, le superviseur de l’état ne doit pas être lui-même un participant actif sur le marché.

Le Sherman Act protège la concurrence tout en respectant également le fédéralisme. Il n’autorise pas les états à abandonner les marchés à un contrôle dépourvu de supervision, contrôle qui serait exercé par des participants actifs sur les marchés, qu’il s’agisse d’associations commerciales ou de services administratifs hybrides.

National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius

Health care: individual mandate and Medicaid expansion: in 2010, Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in order to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of health care. One key provision is the individual mandate, which requires most Americans to maintain “minimum essential” health insurance coverage. 26 U. S. C. §5000A. For individuals who are not exempt, and who do not receive health insurance through an employer or government program, the means of satisfying the requirement is to purchase insurance from a private company. Beginning in 2014, those who do not comply with the mandate must make a “shared responsibility payment” to the Fed­eral Government. §5000A(b)(1). The Act provides that this “penalty” will be paid to the Internal Revenue Service with an individual’s tax­es, and “shall be assessed and collected in the same manner” as tax penalties. §§5000A(c), (g)(1). Another key provision of the Act is the Medicaid expansion. The current Medicaid program offers federal funding to States to assist pregnant women, children, needy families, the blind, the elderly, and the disabled in obtaining medical care. 42 U. S. C. §1396d(a). The Affordable Care Act expands the scope of the Medicaid program and increases the number of individuals the States must cover. For ex­ample, the Act requires state programs to provide Medicaid coverage by 2014 to adults with incomes up to 133 percent of the federal pov­erty level, whereas many States now cover adults with children only if their income is considerably lower, and do not cover childless adults at all. §1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII). The Act increases federal funding to cover the States’ costs in expanding Medicaid coverage. §1396d(y)(1). But if a State does not comply with the Act’s new coverage require­ments, it may lose not only the federal funding for those require­ments, but all of its federal Medicaid funds. §1396c.

Twenty-six States, several individuals, and the National Federa­tion of Independent Business brought suit in Federal District Court, challenging the constitutionality of the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the Medicaid expansion as a valid exercise of Congress’s spending power, but concluded that Congress lacked authority to en­act the individual mandate. Finding the mandate severable from the Act’s other provisions, the Eleventh Circuit left the rest of the Act in­tact.

Held: The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. 648 F. 3d 1235, affirmed in part and reversed in part.

1. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Part II, concluding that the Anti-Injunction Act does not bar this suit; 2. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS concluded in Part III–A that the indi­vidual mandate is not a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.

(a) The Constitution grants Congress the power to “regulate Commerce.” Art. I, §8, cl. 3. The power to regulate commerce presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be reg­ulated. This Court’s precedent reflects this understanding: as ex­pansive as this Court’s cases construing the scope of the commerce power have been, they uniformly describe the power as reaching “ac­tivity.” E.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 560. The individ­ual mandate, however, does not regulate existing commercial activi­ty. It instead compels individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a product, on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate commerce.

Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially vast domain to congressional authority. Con­gress already possesses expansive power to regulate what people do. Upholding the Affordable Care Act under the Commerce Clause would give Congress the same license to regulate what people do not do. The Framers knew the difference between doing something and doing nothing. They gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to compel it. Ignoring that distinction would undermine the prin­ciple that the Federal Government is a government of limited and enumerated powers. The individual mandate thus cannot be sus­tained under Congress’s power to “regulate Commerce.”

(b) Nor can the individual mandate be sustained under the Nec­essary and Proper Clause as an integral part of the Affordable Care Act’s other reforms. Each of this Court’s prior cases upholding laws under that Clause involved exercises of authority derivative of, and in service to, a granted power. E.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U. S. ___. The individual mandate, by contrast, vests Congress with the extraordinary ability to create the necessary predicate to the ex­ercise of an enumerated power and draw within its regulatory scope those who would otherwise be outside of it. Even if the individual mandate is “necessary” to the Affordable Care Act’s other reforms, such an expansion of federal power is not a “proper” means for mak­ing those reforms effective. 

3. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS concluded in Part III–B that the individ­ual mandate must be construed as imposing a tax on those who do not have health insurance, if such a construction is reasonable.

The most straightforward reading of the individual mandate is that it commands individuals to purchase insurance. But, for the reasons explained, the Commerce Clause does not give Congress that power. It is therefore necessary to turn to the Government’s alternative ar­gument: that the mandate may be upheld as within Congress’s power to “lay and collect Taxes.” Art. I, §8, cl. 1. In pressing its taxing power argument, the Government asks the Court to view the man­date as imposing a tax on those who do not buy that product. Be­cause “every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality,” Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 657, the question is whether it is “fairly possible” to inter­pret the mandate as imposing such a tax, Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62. 

4. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Part III–C, concluding that the individual mandate may be upheld as within Congress’s power under the Taxing Clause. 

(a) The Affordable Care Act describes the “shared responsibility payment” as a “penalty,” not a “tax.” That label is fatal to the appli­cation of the Anti-Injunction Act. It does not, however, control whether an exaction is within Congress’s power to tax. In answering that constitutional question, this Court follows a functional approach, “disregarding the designation of the exaction, and viewing its sub­stance and application.” United States v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287, 294. 

(b) Such an analysis suggests that the shared responsibility payment may for constitutional purposes be considered a tax. The payment is not so high that there is really no choice but to buy health insurance; the payment is not limited to willful violations, as penal­ties for unlawful acts often are; and the payment is collected solely by the IRS through the normal means of taxation. Cf. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 36–37. None of this is to say that pay­ment is not intended to induce the purchase of health insurance. But the mandate need not be read to declare that failing to do so is un­lawful. Neither the Affordable Care Act nor any other law attaches negative legal consequences to not buying health insurance, beyond requiring a payment to the IRS. And Congress’s choice of language—stating that individuals “shall” obtain insurance or pay a “penalty”—does not require reading §5000A as punishing unlawful conduct. It may also be read as imposing a tax on those who go without insur­ance. See New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 169–174. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, joined by JUSTICE BREYER and JUSTICE KAGAN, concluded in Part IV that the Medicaid expansion violates the Constitution by threatening States with the loss of their existing Medicaid funding if they decline to comply with the expansion.  

(a) The Spending Clause grants Congress the power “to pay the Debts and provide for the . . . general Welfare of the United States.” Art. I, §8, cl. 1. Congress may use this power to establish cooperative state-federal Spending Clause programs. The legitimacy of Spending Clause legislation, however, depends on whether a State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of such programs. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17. “The Constitu­tion simply does not give Congress the authority to require the States to regulate.” New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 178. When Congress threatens to terminate other grants as a means of pressur­ing the States to accept a Spending Clause program, the legislation runs counter to this Nation’s system of federalism. Cf. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U. S. 203, 211. 

(b) Section 1396c gives the Secretary of Health and Human Ser­vices the authority to penalize States that choose not to participate in the Medicaid expansion by taking away their existing Medicaid fund­ing. 42 U. S. C. §1396c. The threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget is economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion. The Government claims that the expansion is properly viewed as only a modification of the existing program, and that this modification is permissible because Congress reserved the “right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision” of Medicaid. §1304. But the expansion accom­plishes a shift in kind, not merely degree. The original program was designed to cover medical services for particular categories of vulner­able individuals. Under the Affordable Care Act, Medicaid is trans­formed into a program to meet the health care needs of the entire nonelderly population with income below 133 percent of the poverty level. A State could hardly anticipate that Congress’s reservation of the right to “alter” or “amend” the Medicaid program included the power to transform it so dramatically. The Medicaid expansion thus violates the Constitution by threatening States with the loss of their existing Medicaid funding if they decline to comply with the expan­sion. 

(c) The constitutional violation is fully remedied by precluding the Secretary from applying §1396c to withdraw existing Medicaid funds for failure to comply with the requirements set out in the ex­pansion. See §1303. The other provisions of the Affordable Care Act are not affected. Congress would have wanted the rest of the Act to stand, had it known that States would have a genuine choice whether to participate in the Medicaid expansion. In our federal system, the National Government pos­sesses only limited powers; the States and the people retain the remainder. Nearly two centuries ago, Chief Justice Marshall observed that “the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted” to the Federal Government “is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, as long as our system shall exist.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405 (1819). In this case we must again determine whether the Constitution grants Congress powers it now asserts, but which many States and individuals believe it does not possess. Resolv­ing this controversy requires us to examine both the limits of the Government’s power, and our own limited role in policing those boundaries.

The Federal Government “is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers.” Ibid. That is, rather than granting general authority to perform all the conceiv­able functions of government, the Constitution lists, or enumerates, the Federal Government’s powers. Congress may, for example, “coin Money,” “establish Post Offices,” and “raise and support Armies.” Art. I, §8, cls. 5, 7, 12. The enumeration of powers is also a limitation of pow­ers, because “the enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 195 (1824). The Constitution’s express conferral of some powers makes clear that it does not grant others. And the Federal Government “can exercise only the powers granted to it.” McCulloch, supra, at 405.

Today, the restrictions on government power foremost in many Americans’ minds are likely to be affirmative pro­hibitions, such as contained in the Bill of Rights. These affirmative prohibitions come into play, however, only where the Government possesses authority to act in the first place. If no enumerated power authorizes Congress to pass a certain law, that law may not be enacted, even if it would not violate any of the express prohibitions in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere in the Constitution.

Indeed, the Constitution did not initially include a Bill of Rights at least partly because the Framers felt the enu­meration of powers sufficed to restrain the Government. As Alexander Hamilton put it, “the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS.” The Federalist No. 84, p. 515 (C. Ros­siter ed. 1961). And when the Bill of Rights was ratified, it made express what the enumeration of powers neces­sarily implied: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution . . . are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 10. The Federal Government has expanded dramatically over the past two centuries, but it still must show that a consti­tutional grant of power authorizes each of its actions. See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U. S. ___ (2010).

The same does not apply to the States, because the Con­stitution is not the source of their power. The Consti­tution may restrict state governments—as it does, for example, by forbidding them to deny any person the equal protection of the laws. But where such prohibitions do not apply, state governments do not need constitutional au­thorization to act. The States thus can and do perform many of the vital functions of modern government—punishing street crime, running public schools, and zoning property for development, to name but a few—even though the Constitution’s text does not authorize any government to do so. Our cases refer to this general power of govern­ing, possessed by the States but not by the Federal Gov­ernment, as the “police power.” See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, 618–619 (2000).

“State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.” New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 181 (1992). Because the police power is controlled by 50 different States instead of one national sovereign, the facets of governing that touch on citizens’ daily lives are normally administered by smaller governments closer to the governed. The Framers thus ensured that powers which “in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people” were held by gov­ernments more local and more accountable than a distant federal bureaucracy. The Federalist No. 45, at 293 (J. Madison). The independent power of the States also serves as a check on the power of the Federal Government: “By denying any one government complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power.” Bond v. United States, 564 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 9–10).

Our permissive reading of these powers is explained in part by a general reticence to invalidate the acts of the Nation’s elected leaders. “Proper respect for a co-ordinate branch of the government” requires that we strike down an Act of Congress only if “the lack of constitutional authority to pass the act in question is clearly demon­strated.” United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 635 (1883). Members of this Court are vested with the authority to interpret the law; we possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make policy judgments. Those decisions are entrusted to our Nation’s elected leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the people disagree with them. It is not our job to protect the people from the consequences of their political choices.

Our deference in matters of policy cannot, however, become abdication in matters of law. “The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176 (1803). Our respect for Congress’s policy judgments thus can never extend so far as to disavow restraints on federal power that the Constitution carefully constructed. “The peculiar circumstances of the moment may render a measure more or less wise, but cannot render it more or less constitutional.” Chief Justice John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution No. V, Alexandria Gazette, July 5, 1819, in John Marshall’s Defense of McCulloch v. Mary­land 190–191 (G. Gunther ed. 1969). And there can be no question that it is the responsibility of this Court to en­force the limits on federal power by striking down acts of Congress that transgress those limits. Marbury v. Madi­son, supra, at 175–176 (U.S.S.Ct., 28.06.12, National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, C.J. Roberts).

Droit de la santé et assurance maladie : notion d’obligation individuelle : en 2010, le Congrès fédéral a promulgué une loi fédérale en vue d’augmenter le nombre d’Américains couverts par une assurance maladie et en vue de diminuer les coûts de la santé. Une des dispositions essentielles de la loi est dite « obligation individuelle », qui impose à la plupart des Américains de maintenir une couverture d’assurance minimum couvrant les soins essentiels. Pour les personnes qui ne sont pas exemptées et qui ne sont pas assurées par l’intermédiaire de leur employeur ou par l’intermédiaire du Gouvernement, le moyen de satisfaire à cette obligation est de souscrire une assurance maladie privée. Dès l’année 2014, ceux qui ne satisfont pas à cette obligation sont tenus de procéder à un « paiement de responsabilité partagée » à verser au Gouvernement fédéral, par l’IRS, en même temps que le règlement de la créance fiscale. Cette somme sera recouvrée de la même manière qu’une amende fiscale.

Une autre disposition essentielle de la nouvelle loi fédérale est l’expansion du régime Medicaid. Le programme Medicaid antérieur offre des subventions fédérales aux états pour aider à obtenir des soins médicaux les femmes enceintes, les enfants, les familles dans le besoin, les mal voyants, les personnes âgées, et les invalides. La nouvelle loi étend le cadre du programme Medicaid et augmente le nombre de personnes que l’état doit couvrir. Par exemple, la nouvelle loi impose aux programmes des états de couvrir par Medicaid, dès l’année 2014, les adultes disposant d’un revenu jusqu’à 133% du niveau fédéral de pauvreté. Sous l’ancien régime, de nombreux états ne couvrent que les adultes avec des enfants et que si leur revenu est considérablement plus bas. La loi nouvelle augmente les subventions fédérales en vue de couvrir les frais encourus par les états du fait de l’extension de la couverture offerte par Medicaid. Mais si un état ne se conforme pas aux nouvelles conditions de couverture prévues par la nouvelle loi fédérale, il pourra perdre non seulement les subventions fédérales liées à ces nouvelles conditions, mais aussi l’ensemble des subventions liées à Medicaid.

Sont contestées en l’espèce l’obligation individuelle et l’extension du régime Medicaid.

Dans son opinion, le Juge Roberts conclut que l’obligation individuelle telle que prévue dans la nouvelle loi ne peut pas être avalisée sous l’angle de la Clause de commerce de la Constitution fédérale, qui n’autorise pas le Congrès fédéral a prévoir une telle obligation individuelle. La Necessary and Proper clause ne saurait elle non plus autoriser la promulgation de l’obligation individuelle.

S’agissant de la clause de commerce, le Juge Roberts rappelle que la Constitution fédérale accorde au Congrès la compétence de réguler le commerce. La compétence de réguler le commerce présuppose l’existence d’une activité commerciale à réguler. La jurisprudence de la Cour est le reflet de ce principe. Même si dite jurisprudence a interprété la Clause de commerce de manière extensive, ces décisions décrivent la compétence du Congrès à ce niveau comme portant sur une « activité ». Or l’obligation individuelle objet du présent litige ne régule pas d’une activité commerciale existante. Au contraire, elle contraint les personnes à devenir commercialement actives en achetant un produit d’assurance, basée sur le fait que l’omission d’achat affecte le commerce entre états. Dès lors, interpréter la Clause de commerce comme attribuant au Congrès la compétence de réglementer la conduite des personnes précisément parce que ces personnes ne font rien est de nature à attribuer de nouvelles et potentiellement vastes compétences au Congrès. Le Congrès détient déjà de vastes compétences de régler ce que les personnes font. Confirmer la conformité à la Constitution de la loi fédérale en question sous l’angle de la Clause de commerce reviendrait à attribuer au Congrès la même liberté de réglementer ce que les personnes ne font pas. Les Fondateurs de la Constitution connaissaient la différence entre faire quelque chose et ne rien faire. Ils ont attribué au Congrès la compétence de régler le commerce, non de le contraindre. Ignorer cette distinction porterait préjudice au principe selon lequel le Gouvernement fédéral est un Gouvernement de compétences limitées et énumérées.

L’obligation individuelle ne peut pas non plus être jugée conforme à la Constitution sous l’angle de la Necessary and Proper Clause. La jurisprudence de la Cour portant sur dite Clause a toujours précisé que pour être conforme à la Clause, l’action du Congrès devait dériver d’une compétence déjà attribuée, ce qui n’est pas le cas ici.

Le Juge Roberts conclut ensuite que l’obligation individuelle s’analyse en une taxe imposée à ceux qui sont dépourvus d’assurance-maladie. Le Congrès dispose en effet de la compétence de lever l’impôt, et l’argument du Gouvernement dans cette affaire était que le Congrès disposait de la compétence d’imposer l’achat d’une assurance maladie sous l’angle de la compétence de taxer attribuée au Congrès. Le Juge Roberts rappelle que la Cour doit recourir à toutes les interprétations raisonnables possibles  pour éviter de déclarer une loi comme étant contraire à la Constitution fédérale. La question est donc de savoir s’il est de bonne foi possible d’interpréter l’obligation individuelle comme imposant une taxe. La réponse est affirmative, et l’obligation individuelle prévue par la nouvelle loi fédérale est conforme à la Constitution fédérale. De même, le paiement d’une pénalité par ceux qui n’achèteraient pas d’assurance maladie s’analyse en une taxe, et non une peine d’une autre nature que fiscale, nonobstant l’usage du terme « pénalité », qui doit être analysé selon sa substance et selon son application, indépendamment de son libellé. A ce niveau, il convient de considérer que la « pénalité » n’est pas élevée au point de contraindre l’achat d’une assurance. La pénalité n’est en outre pas limitée aux cas de violations intentionnelles, comme les pénalités le sont usuellement. Et son paiement relève de la compétence de l’IRS par les voies habituelles de recouvrement de l’impôt.

Les Juges Roberts, Breyer et Kagan concluent que l’extension du régime Medicaid est contraire à la Constitution en ce qu’il menace les états de perdre leurs subventions liées à Medicaid en cas de refus de se conformer à l’extension du régime.

Quant à la Clause de la dépense (Spending Clause), elle attribue au Congrès la compétence de payer les dettes et d’accomplir le bien-être général des Etats-Unis. Le Congrès fédéral peut se fonder sur cette Clause pour accorder des subventions aux états coopérants avec le programme de subventions. Mais la Constitution n’accorde pas au Congrès l’autorité d’imposer aux états de légiférer. Lorsque le Congrès menace de mettre fin à d’autres subventions comme moyen d’imposer à l’état d’accepter un programme de subvention déterminé, le Congrès agit contrairement au système fédéral des Etats-Unis, donc contrairement à la Constitution. Le système d’expansion de Medicaid prévu par la loi nouvelle dispose précisément que les états qui n’accepteraient pas de se conformer au nouveau programme perdraient leurs subventions résultant de l’ancien programme. Une telle réglementation est comme indiqué précédemment contraire à la Constitution, de sorte que la partie de la loi nouvelle qui régit l’extension du régime Medicaid est annulée par la Cour.

La Cour rappelle que le Gouvernement fédéral dispose des compétences que la Constitution fédérale lui attribue. Les autres compétences restent aux états et au peuple. Les limites de compétences prévues par le Bill of Rights ne s’appliquent que lorsqu’elles se rapportent à une compétence déjà attribuée au Gouvernement fédéral. Le Bill of Rights limite cette compétence. Mais si aucune compétence n’est attribuée au Gouvernement fédéral, il ne peut pas légiférer. L’expansion du Gouvernement fédéral fut certes considérable pendant les 200 dernières années, mais il doit toujours démontrer qu’une attribution de compétence constitutionnelle autorise chacune de ses actions.

Sont ensuite rappelées les notions de fédéralisme à la base de la Constitution des Etats-Unis, qui sont les mêmes que les principes à la base de la Constitution suisse (fédéralisme, attributions de compétences au Gouvernement fédéral, compétences non attribuées qui restent en main des états et du peuple, les états et leur entités décentralisées  étant par ailleurs plus proches de la population, ce qui est vu comme un principe important).

S’agissant de ses propres compétences, la Cour Suprême fédérale rappelle sa réticence générale à invalider les actes du Congrès, composés des élus de la nation. La Cour n’annulera un acte du Congrès que si son inconstitutionnalité est clairement démontrée. Les Juges de la Cour sont investis de l’autorité d’interpréter la loi. Ils ne détiennent ni l’expertise ni la compétence de procéder à des jugements de nature politique. Ce dernier type de jugements compète aux membres du Congrès, qui peuvent ne pas être élus à nouveau si leurs actions déplaisent aux électeurs. Il n’appartient pas à la Cour de protéger la population des conséquences de leurs choix politiques. Le respect de la Cour pour les jugements politiques du Congrès ne saurait toutefois dépasser le cadre des compétences fédérales que la Constitution a déterminées avec soin.