U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Docket No. 17-2003, Published

Facebook Page

President Trump’s Twitter Account

Governmental Social Media Page

Right of Account Owner to Suppress a Public Comment?

First Amendment

Government Speech

Public Forum

Traditional Public Forum, or Designated or Limited Public Forum

Viewpoint Discrimination

42 U.S.C. § 1983

Randall has chaired the Loudoun County Board of Supervisors since January 1, 2016. The day before she was sworn in as chair, Randall created the “Chair Phyllis J. Randall” Facebook Page (the “Chair’s Facebook Page”). According to Facebook, Inc., unlike personal Facebook profiles, which are for non-commercial use and represent individual people, Facebook “Pages”—like the Chair’s Facebook Page—“help businesses, organizations, and brands share their stories and connect with people.” J.A. 403. “Pages are managed by people who have personal profiles,” the company explains. J.A. 403. In addition to the Chair’s Facebook Page, Randall created and maintained two other Facebook profiles: a personal profile and a Page devoted to her campaign. Randall classified her campaign page as belonging to a “politician” and used no designation for her personal profile, but she designated the Chair’s Facebook Page as a “governmental official” page. J.A. 209–10.

((…) “‘Liking’ on Facebook is a way for Facebook users to share information with each other.” Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 385 (4th Cir. 2013) (Op., fn. 1, p. 7)).

(…) On November 3, 2016, Davison filed an amended complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Randall, in both her official and individual capacities, and the Loudoun Board alleging that the “banning of [Davison] from commenting on [the Chair’s Facebook Page] is viewpoint discrimination.” J.A. 31.

(…) Considering the totality of these circumstances, the district court correctly held that Randall acted under color of state law in banning Davison from the Chair’s Facebook Page.

(…) Third, Randall argues that the district court erred in ruling in Davison’s favor on his individual capacity First Amendment claim against Randall. Randall principally challenges the district court’s conclusion that the Chair’s Facebook Page constitutes a “public forum” under traditional First Amendment law. We review this legal question de novo. See Helton, 709 F.3d at 350.

Under long-established First Amendment law, governmental entities are “strictly limited” in their ability to regulate private speech in public fora. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009). The Supreme Court has recognized two categories of public fora: “traditional public forums” and “limited (or designated) public forums.” Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Mote, 423 F.3d 438, 443 (4th Cir. 2005). “Traditional” public forums—“such as streets, sidewalks, and parks”—“have the characteristics of a public thoroughfare, a purpose that is compatible with expressive conduct, as well as a tradition and history of being used for expressive public conduct.” Id. “Limited” or “designated” forums are forums that are “not traditionally public, but that the government has purposefully opened to the public, or some segment of the public, for expressive activity.” Id. Accordingly, the hallmark of both types of public fora—what renders the fora “public”—is that the government has made the space available—either by designation or long-standing custom—for “expressive public conduct” or “expressive activity,” and the space is compatible with such activity. Id. “Conversely, a non-public forum is one that has not traditionally been open to the public, where opening it to expressive conduct would ‘somehow interfere with the objective use and purpose to which the property has been dedicated.’” Id. (quoting Warren v. Fairfax Cty., 196 F.3d 186, 190–91 (4th Cir. 1999)).

Although neither the Supreme Court nor any Circuit has squarely addressed whether, and in what circumstances, a governmental social media page—like the Chair’s Facebook Page—constitutes a public forum, aspects of the Chair’s Facebook Page bear the hallmarks of a public forum. Randall “intentionally opened the public comment section of the Chair’s Facebook Page for public discourse,” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985), inviting “ANY Loudoun citizen” to make posts to the comments section of the Chair’s Facebook Page—the interactive component of the page—“on ANY issues, request, criticism, complement or just your thoughts,” J.A. 455. Randall placed no restrictions on the public’s access to the page or use of the interactive component of the Chair’s Facebook Page. And, in accordance with Randall’s invitation, the public made numerous posts on matters of public concern.

(In addition to the court below, two other district courts have considered whether a government official’s social media page constituted a public forum. Those courts reached conflicting results. Compare Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1010 (E.D. Ky. 2018) (holding that First Amendment forum analysis did not apply to restrictions on speech in the official Facebook and Twitter pages of the Governor of Kentucky), with Knight First Amend. Inst. at Colum. Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding that the interactive component of the President’s Twitter account, as opposed to the President’s tweets themselves, constituted a designated public forum), appeal docketed, No. 18-1691 (2d Cir. Oct. 24, 2018).)

(…) And the Supreme Court and lower courts have held that private property, whether tangible or intangible, constituted a public forum when, for example, the government retained substantial control over the property under regulation or by contract. See, e.g., Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 547, 555 (1975) (holding that “a privately owned Chattanooga theater under long-term lease to the city” was a “public forum designed for and dedicated to expressive activities”); Halleck v. Manhattan Community Access Corp., 882 F.3d 300, 306–07 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that public access television channels operated by a private non-profit corporation constituted public forums), cert. granted 139 S. Ct. 360 (2018) (mem.); First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Forum analysis does not require that the government have a possessory interest in or title to the underlying land. Either government ownership or regulation is sufficient for a First Amendment forum of some kind to exist.”); Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. City of Marshfield, Wis., 203 F.3d 487, 494 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that private property abutted by public park constituted public forum). 

(…) Of particular importance, Randall had complete control over the aspect of the Chair’s Facebook Page giving rise to Davison’s challenge because, as administrator of the page, Randall had authority to ban Facebook profiles or Pages from using the Chair’s Facebook Page—and, therefore, the interactive component of the page—authority she exercised in banning Davison’s Virginia SGP Page. Cf. Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566–67 (holding that the interactive component of the President’s Twitter account constituted public forum because the President and his advisors “exercise control over various aspects of the . . . account,” including the power to block other users from accessing the account).

(…) The interactive component of the Chair’s Facebook Page constitutes a public forum, even though Randall’s curation of and posts to the Chair’s Facebook Page amount to government speech. Additionally, the interactive component of the Chair’s Facebook Page does not face the same spacial limitations as those of the park in Pleasant Grove, but instead is “capable of accommodating a large number of public speakers without defeating its essential function.”

(…) Upon concluding that interactive component of the Chair’s Facebook Page amounts to a public forum, we would normally need to determine whether it constitutes a traditional public forum or designated or limited public forum. In the present case, however, we need not decide that question because Randall’s ban of Davison amounted to “viewpoint discrimination,” which is “prohibited in all forums.” See Child Evangelism Fellowship of S.C. v. Anderson Sch. Dist. Five, 470 F.3d 1062, 1067 n.2 (4th Cir. 2006). “Viewpoint discrimination . . . ‘targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject.’” Id. (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)). Viewpoint discrimination is apparent, for example, if a government official’s decision to take a challenged action was “impermissibly motivated by a desire to suppress a particular point of view.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 812–13.

(…) Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 575 (holding that the President engaged in viewpoint discrimination when he blocked individuals from his Twitter account because the individuals “posted tweets that criticized the President or his policies”).

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Jan 7, 2019, Docket No. 17-2003, Published)

Manuel v. Joliet, Docket 14-9496

§1983: Torts: Common law: Claim accrual: Fourth Amendment: Search and seizures: Malicious prosecution:

42 U. S. C. §1983 suit challenging post-legal-process pretrial detention (Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful pretrial detention).

In defining the contours and prerequisites of a §1983 claim, including its rule of accrual, courts are to look first to the common law of torts. See  Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 257–258 (1978) (explaining that tort principles “provide the appropriate starting point” in specifying the conditions for recovery under §1983); Wal­lace v. Kato, 549 U. S. 384, 388–390 (2007) (same for accrual dates in particular). Sometimes, that review of common law will lead a court to adopt wholesale the rules that would apply in a suit involving the most analogous tort. See id., at 388–390; Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 483–487 (1994). But not always. Common-law prin­ciples are meant to guide rather than to control the defini­tion of §1983 claims, serving “more as a source of inspired examples than of prefabricated components.” Hartman v. Moore, 547 U. S. 250, 258 (2006); see Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U. S. 356, 366 (2012) (noting that “§1983 is not simply a federalized amalgamation of pre-existing common-law claims”). In applying, selecting among, or adjust­ing common-law approaches, courts must closely attend to the values and purposes of the constitutional right at issue.

(We hold today that Manuel may challenge his pretrial detention on the ground that it violated the Fourth Amendment (while we leave all other issues, including one about that claim’s timeliness, to the court below)).

(U.S.S.C., March 21, 2017, Manuel v. Joliet, Docket 14-9496, J. Kagan. ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined).

Action 42 U.S.C. §1983 invoquant une violation du Quatrième Amendement dans le cadre d'une détention avant procès au fond.

Pour définir les contours et les conditions d'application d'une telle action, y compris le délai pour la déposer, les Tribunaux se référent tout d'abord à la Common law régissant l'acte illicite ("torts"). Parfois, cet examen de la Common law conduira la cour à appliquer sans modification les règles de la Common law s'appliquant à la catégorie d'actes illicites la plus proche de l'acte illicite objet de la procédure selon la Section 1983. Parfois, donc, mais pas à chaque fois. Les principes de la Common law guident davantage qu'ils n'imposent dans la recherche de la définition de l'action selon la Section 1983. 42 U.S.C. §1983 n'est pas simplement un amalgame fédéralisé des prétentions préexistantes déduites de la Common law. En sélectionnant, en ajustant, ou en appliquant les approches de la Common law, les Tribunaux sont tenus de considérer les valeurs et les buts du droit constitutionnel en cause.

James v. Boise, Docket 15-493, Per Curiam

Attorney’s fee: civil rights: 42 U.S.C. §1983: frivolous: Story, J.: under federal law, a court has discretion to “allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reason­able attorney’s fee” in a civil rights lawsuit filed under 42 U. S. C. §1983. 42 U. S. C. §1988. In Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U. S. 5 (1980) (per curiam), this Court interpreted §1988 to permit a prevailing defendant in such a suit to recover fees only if “the plaintiff ’s action was frivolous, unreason­able, or without foundation.” Id., at 14 (quoting Chris­tiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412, 421 (1978)).

In the decision below, the Idaho Supreme Court con­cluded that it was not bound by this Court’s interpretation of §1988 in Hughes. According to that court, “although the Supreme Court may have the authority to limit the discretion of lower federal courts, it does not have the authority to limit the discretion of state courts where such limitation is not contained in the statute.” 158 Idaho 713, 734, 351 P. 3d 1171, 1192 (2015). The court then pro­ceeded to award attorney’s fees under §1988 to a prevailing defendant without first determining that “the plaintiff ’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without founda­tion.” The court’s fee award rested solely on its interpreta­tion of federal law; the court explicitly refused to award fees under state law. Id., at 734–735, 351 P. 3d, at 1192– 1193. We grant certiorari, and now reverse.

Section 1988 is a federal statute. “It is this Court’s responsibility to say what a federal statute means, and once the Court has spoken, it is the duty of other courts to respect that understanding of the governing rule of law.” Nitro-Lift Technologies, L. L. C. v. Howard, 568 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (per curiam) (slip op., at 5) (quoting Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U. S. 298, 312 (1994)). And for good reason. As Jus­tice Story explained 200 years ago, if state courts were permitted to disregard this Court’s rulings on federal law, “the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the United States would be different in different states, and might, perhaps, never have precisely the same construction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two states. The public mis­chiefs that would attend such a state of things would be truly deplorable.” Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 348 (1816).

The Idaho Supreme Court, like any other state or fed­eral court, is bound by this Court’s interpretation of federal law. The state court erred in concluding otherwise. The judgment of the Idaho Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

(U.S.S.C., Jan. 25, 2016, James v. Boise, Docket 15-493, Per Curiam).

Remboursement par la partie perdante des frais d’avocat de la partie victorieuse dans les actions fondées sur la disposition 42 U.S.C. §1983 (action directe de droit civil contre un tiers, même agissant en une capacité officielle). Ce remboursement est laissé dans son principe à la discrétion du Tribunal. Le montant cas échéant alloué doit être raisonnable. Si le défendeur s’avère être la partie victorieuse, il ne pourra se voir allouer des dépens, a jugé la Cour Suprême fédérale, que si l’action du demandeur était frivole, déraisonnable, ou dépourvue de mérite. Dans la présente affaire, c’est à tort que la Cour Suprême de l’état de l’Idaho a attribué des dépens au défendeur victorieux sans déterminer si le demandeur avait procédé de manière frivole, déraisonnable, ou sans mérite. La Cour de l’Idaho a justifié sa pratique en indiquant n’être pas tenue à ce niveau par les exigences posées par la Cour Suprême fédérale, dans la mesure où le texte de la Section 1983 ne mentionne pas les conditions de « procédure frivole, déraisonnable, ou sans mérite ». La Cour Suprême de l’Idaho a encore soutenu qu’elle serait liée par ces exigences si elle était une cour fédérale. Il est encore précisé que les dépens ont été ici alloués sur la base du seul droit fédéral, la Cour de l’Idaho refusant en effet d’en allouer sur la base du droit de son état. Ce qui contraint la Cour Suprême fédérale de rappeler in casu qu’elle est seule à disposer de la compétence de dire le contenu du droit fédéral édicté par le Congrès fédéral, sous peine d’application contradictoire dudit droit fédéral d’un état à l’autre. L’affaire est ainsi renvoyée à la Cour Suprême de l’Idaho pour nouvelle décision au sens des considérants.

Mullenix v. Luna, Docket 14-1143, Per Curiam

Immunity, qualified immunity, 42 U.S.C. §1983:

42 U. S. C. §1983: Civil action for deprivation of rights: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

On the night of March 23, 2010, Sergeant R. B. of the Tulia, Texas Police Department followed I. L., Jr., to a drive-in restaurant, with a warrant for his arrest. 773 F. 3d 712, 715–716 (CA5 2014). When B. approached L.’s car and informed him that he was under arrest, L. sped off, headed for Interstate 27. 2013 WL 4017124, *1 (ND Tex., Aug. 7, 2013). B. gave chase and was quickly joined by Trooper G. R. of the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS). 773 F. 3d, at 716.

L. entered the interstate and led the officers on an18-minute chase at speeds between 85 and 110 miles per hour. Ibid. Twice during the chase, L. called the Tulia Police dispatcher, claiming to have a gun and threatening to shoot at police officers if they did not abandon their pursuit. The dispatcher relayed L.’s threats, together with a report that L. might be intoxicated, to all con­cerned officers.

As B. and R. maintained their pursuit, other law enforcement officers set up tire spikes at three loca­tions. DPS Trooper Chadrin Mullenix also responded. He drove to the Cemetery Road overpass, initially intending to set up a spike strip there. Upon learning of the other spike strip positions, however, Mullenix began to consider another tactic: shooting at L.’s car in order to disable it. 2013 WL 4017124, *1. Mullenix had not received training in this tactic and had not attempted it before. Approximately three minutes after Mullenix took up his shooting position, he spotted L.’s vehicle, with R. in pursuit. As L. approached the overpass, Mul­lenix fired six shots. It was later determined that L. had been killed by Mullenix’s shots, four of which struck his upper body. There was no evi­dence that any of Mullenix’s shots hit the car’s radiator, hood, or engine block.

Respondents sued Mullenix under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging that he had violated the Fourth Amendment by using excessive force against L. Mul­lenix moved for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity, but the District Court denied his motion, finding that “there are genuine issues of fact as to whether Trooper Mullenix acted recklessly, or acted as a reasonable, trained peace officer would have acted in the same or similar circumstances.” 2013 WL 4017124, *6.

Mullenix appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 765 F. 3d 531 (2014). The court agreed with the District Court that the “immediacy of the risk posed by L. is a disputed fact that a reasonable jury could find either in the plaintiffs’ favor or in the officer’s favor, precluding us from concluding that Mul­lenix acted objectively reasonably as a matter of law.” Id., at 538.

We address only the qualified immunity question, not whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation in the first place, and now reverse.

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct “‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (1982)). A clearly estab­lished right is one that is “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 5). “We do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. 731, 741 (2011). Put simply, qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompe­tent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 341 (1986).

“We have repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” al-Kidd, supra, at 742. The dispositive question is “whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly estab­lished.” Ibid.  This inquiry “‘must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.’” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 201 (2001)). Such specificity is espe­cially important in the Fourth Amendment context, where the Court has recognized that “it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.” 533 U. S., at 205. In this case, the Fifth Circuit held that Mullenix violated the clearly established rule that a police officer may not “‘use deadly force against a fleeing felon who does not pose a sufficient threat of harm to the officer or others.’” 773 F. 3d, at 725. Yet this Court has previously considered—and rejected—almost that exact formulation of the quali­fied immunity question in the Fourth Amendment context. The correct inquiry, the Court explained, was whether it was clearly established that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the officer’s conduct in the “‘situation she confronted’: whether to shoot a disturbed felon, set on avoiding capture through vehicular flight, when persons in the immediate area are at risk from that flight.”

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635 (1987), is also instructive on the required degree of specificity. There, the lower court had denied qualified immunity based on the clearly established “right to be free from warrantless searches of one’s home unless the searching officers have probable cause and there are exigent circumstances.” Id., at 640. This Court faulted that formulation for failing to address the actual question at issue: whether “the circum­stances with which Anderson was confronted . . . consti­tuted probable cause and exigent circumstances.” Id., at 640–641. Without answering that question, the Court explained, the conclusion that Anderson’s search was objectively unreasonable did not “follow immediately” from—and thus was not clearly established by—the prin­ciple that warrantless searches not supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances violate the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 641.

In this case, Mullenix confronted a reportedly intoxicated fugitive, set on avoiding capture through high-speed vehicular flight, who twice during his flight had threat­ened to shoot police officers, and who was moments away from encountering an officer at Cemetery Road. The relevant inquiry is whether existing precedent placed the conclusion that Mullenix acted unreasonably in these circumstances “beyond debate.” al-Kidd, supra, at 741. The general principle that deadly force requires a suffi­cient threat hardly settles this matter.

In Brosseau itself, the Court held that an officer did not violate clearly established law when she shot a fleeing suspect out of fear that he endangered “other officers on foot who she believed were in the im­mediate area,” “the occupied vehicles in his path,” and “any other citizens who might be in the area.” 543 U. S., at 197. The threat L. posed was at least as immediate as that presented by a suspect who had just begun to drive off and was headed only in the general direction of officers and bystanders. Id., at 196– 197. By the time Mullenix fired, L. had led police on a 25-mile chase at extremely high speeds, was reportedly intoxicated, had twice threatened to shoot officers, and was racing towards an officer’s location.

None of our precedents “squarely governs” the facts here. Given L.’s conduct, we cannot say that only someone “plainly incompetent” or who “knowingly violates the law” would have perceived a sufficient threat and acted as Mullenix did. Malley, 475 U. S., at 341.

The dissent repeats the Fifth Cir­cuit’s error. It defines the qualified immunity inquiry at a high level of generality—whether any governmental inter­est justified choosing one tactic over another—and then fails to consider that question in “the specific context of the case.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S., at 198.

We grant Mullenix’s petition for certiorari and reverse the Fifth Circuit’s determination that Mullenix is not entitled to qualified immunity.

(U.S.S.Ct., November 9, 2015, Mullenix v. Luna, Docket 14-1143, Per Curiam, J. Scalia concurring in the judgment, and J. Sotomayor, dissenting).

Immunité octroyée à un officier de police pour un acte entrepris dans l’exercice de ses fonctions : action au sens de 42 U.S.C. §1983 : la nuit du 23 mars 2010, le Sergent R.B. suivit I.L. jusqu’à un restaurant, muni d’un mandat permettant son arrestation. Lorsque le Sergent B. s’approcha de la voiture de L., et informa celui-ci qu’il était en état d’arrestation, L. démarra en direction de l’autoroute I-27. Le Sergent B. le prit en chasse et fut rapidement rejoint par le Trooper G.R.

L. est entré sur l’autoroute et a contraint les officiers de police à une poursuite de 18 minutes à des vitesses comprises entre 85 et 110 miles par heure. A deux reprises pendant la poursuite, L. contacta le central de la police, affirmant disposer d’une arme à feu et menaçant de tirer contre les policiers s’ils n’abandonnaient pas leur poursuite. Le central relaya aux policiers concernés les menaces de L. avec un rapport selon lequel L. pourrait être sous l’influence de substances. Tandis que les policiers B. et R. continuaient la poursuite, d’autres représentants des forces de l’ordre établirent une herse à travers la route, cela à trois endroits différents. Mullenix, Trooper pour le Département de la Sécurité Publique, participa également à l’intervention. Il se dirigea jusqu’au viaduc de Cemetery Road, avec l’intention initiale de dresser une herse à cet endroit. Mais après avoir appris le lieu de situation des autres herses, Mullenix commença à considérer une autre stratégie, soit tirer contre le véhicule de L. pour l’empêcher de poursuivre sa route. Mullenix n’avait pas été entraîné à cette tactique et ne l’avait pas pratiquée auparavant. Approximativement trois minutes après qu’il se soit positionné pour le tir, Mullenix aperçut le véhicule de L., poursuivi par l’officier R. Tandis que L. s’approchait du viaduc, Mullenix tira à six reprises. Il a été déterminé ultérieurement que L. avait été tué par les tirs de Mullenix, quatre tirs ayant atteint son buste. Aucune preuve n’a démontré que l’un des tirs aurait touché le radiateur du véhicule, son capot ou son moteur.

Des lésés ont actionné Mullenix sous l’angle de 42 U.S.C. §1983, soutenant que celui-ci avait porté atteinte au Quatrième Amendement par l’usage d’une force excessive contre L. Se prévalant de son immunité, Mullenix a requis de la cour le prononcé d’un jugement sommaire. La cour de district fédérale a rejeté sa requête, observant que l’affaire présentait des questions de fait déterminantes, à savoir 1) la question d’établir si Mullenix avait agi de manière grossièrement négligente, ou 2) la question de savoir s’il avait agi comme l’aurait fait un officier de police raisonnable et entraîné placé dans des circonstances identiques ou similaires. Cette décision a été confirmée en appel par le Cinquième Circuit fédéral. La cour d’appel précisa que l’immédiateté du risque posé par L. était une question de fait contestée qu’un jury raisonnable pourrait trancher soit en faveur des lésés, soit en faveur de l’officier de police, empêchant ainsi la cour, dans le cadre d’une procédure sommaire, de juger que Mullenix avait en droit agi objectivement d’une manière raisonnable.

La Cour Suprême fédérale ne tranche en l’espèce que la question de l’immunité de l’officier de police, et non celle de savoir si une atteinte au Quatrième Amendement avait ou non été commise préalablement. La Cour Suprême renverse la décision du Cinquième Circuit.

La doctrine de l’immunité qualifiée dont il est question ici protège les officiers de police et autres employés publics de toute responsabilité civile aussi longtemps que leur conduite ne porte pas atteinte à des droits clairement établis par une loi au sens formel ou par la Constitution, droits qui auraient été connus d’une personne raisonnable. Un droit peut être qualifié de clairement établi quand tout employé public raisonnable aurait compris qu’un acte donné portait atteinte à ce droit. La Cour n’exige pas qu’une décision de justice consacre ce caractère clairement établi pour reconnaître une telle nature à un droit, mais la jurisprudence doit avoir placé la question légale ou constitutionnelle au-delà de tout débat. Plus simplement, la doctrine de l’immunité protège « chaque employé public, sauf celui dont la conduite relève de l’incompétence manifeste ou celui qui porte consciemment atteinte à la loi ».

La Cour Suprême a répété au long de sa jurisprudence qu’un droit clairement établi ne doit pas être défini de manière générale. Il convient bien plutôt de se demander si une violation, résultant d’une conduite particulière, est clairement établie ou non. Cette question doit être élucidée à la lumière du contexte spécifique d’un cas d’espèce. Une telle spécificité est particulièrement importante dans le cadre du Quatrième Amendement : la Cour a reconnu qu’il est parfois difficile pour un officier de police de déterminer comment la théorie juridique relevante (ici l’usage d’une force excessive) s’applique à la situation de fait qu’il rencontre. Dans la présente affaire, le Cinquième circuit a jugé que Mullenix avait porté atteinte à la règle clairement établie interdisant à un officier de police d’utiliser un moyen létal contre l’auteur d’un crime en fuite qui ne pose pas de menace suffisante de préjudice à une personne. Cela sans tenir compte de ce que la présente Cour avait antérieurement considéré, et rejeté, soit presque exactement la même formulation de la question de l’immunité qualifiée dans le cadre du Quatrième Amendement.

Ainsi, selon la Cour, l’analyse correcte consiste à se demander s’il était clairement établi que le Quatrième Amendement prohibait l’ acte de l’officier de police dans la situation rencontrée, l’acte consistant ici à faire feu en direction d’un criminel perturbé, fuyant sa capture à bord d’un véhicule automobile lancé à pleine vitesse, alors que des personnes dans le voisinage immédiat se trouvent dans une situation de risque du fait du comportement du criminel.

A titre d’exemple du degré requis de spécificité, une cour inférieure a jugé dans une autre affaire que l’immunité qualifiée ne pouvait pas être accordée considérant le droit clairement établi de ne pas voir sa maison fouillée sans mandat, à moins que l’officier de police procédant à la fouille disposait d’un motif vraisemblable et que les circonstances exigeaient une intervention sans mandat. Certes, mais la Cour Suprême a critiqué l’usage fait – dans cette affaire - de cette formulation, précisant qu’il manquait d’adresser la question posée concrètement par le cas d’espèce, soit déterminer si les circonstances rencontrées par l’officier Anderson constituaient une cause suffisante pour l’intervention, et si les circonstances étaient suffisamment exigeantes pour la justifier  (Anderson v. Creighton (1987)). Sans répondre à cette question, continua la Cour, la conclusion que la fouille menée par Anderson était objectivement déraisonnable ne découle pas immédiatement du principe selon lequel les fouilles sans mandat, qui ne sont pas supportées par une cause vraisemblable ni par des circonstances exigeantes, portent atteinte au Quatrième Amendement. Dite conclusion n’était ainsi pas clairement établie par le principe précité.

En l’espèce et encore une fois, Mullenix fit face à un fugitif décrit comme sous influence, déterminé à éviter son arrestation par une fuite à haute vitesse dans un véhicule automobile, qui avait menacé par deux fois durant sa fuite de tirer contre des officiers de police, et qui était sur le point de croiser l’un de ces officiers à Cemetery Road. L’analyse relevante consiste à déterminer si la jurisprudence impose la conclusion que Mullenix avait agi, dans ces circonstances, sans l’ombre d’un doute de manière déraisonnable. Le principe général selon lequel l’usage légal de la force létale implique une menace suffisante ne répond guère à cette question.

Dans sa décision Brosseau (543 U.S. 197), la Cour a jugé qu’un officier de police ne portait pas atteinte au droit clairement établi lorsqu’il fit feu contre un suspect en fuite, craignant qu’il ne puisse mettre en danger d’autres officiers à pied supposés présents sur zone, ou des véhicules occupés qu’il aurait pu croiser, ou d’autres personnes qui auraient pu se trouver à proximité. La menace posée par L. était au moins aussi immédiate que celle posée par un suspect qui venait de se mettre au volant et qui ne se dirigeait que dans la direction générale des officiers et des passants. Au moment où Mullenix avait fait feu, L. avait déjà imposé aux forces de police une course-poursuite de 25 miles à des vitesses extrêmement élevées. Il était décrit en outre comme sous l’influence de substances. Il avait par deux fois menacé de tirer sur des officiers, et il se dirigeait à grande vitesse en direction du lieu où l’un d’eux se trouvait.

Aucune jurisprudence de la Cour ne régit clairement la situation que présente cette affaire. Considérant le comportement de L., la Cour ne peut pas dire que seul quelqu’un de manifestement incompétent, ou qui viole la loi de manière consciente, aurait perçu une menace suffisante et aurait agi comme Mullenix.

Stanton v. Sims, docket 12-1217

Warrant: Fourth Amendment: enter a home without a warrant in case of hot pursuit following a possible misdemeanor: qualified immunity (“qualified immunity because no clearly established law put him on notice that his conduct was unconstitutional”):

(…) Nicholas Patrick crossed the street about 25 yards in front of Stanton’s car and ran or quickly walked toward a residence. Nothing in the record shows that Stanton (the police officer) knew at the time whether that residence belonged to Patrick or some­one else; in fact, it belonged to Drendolyn Sims.

Stanton did not see Patrick with a baseball bat, but he considered Patrick’s behavior suspicious and decided to detain him in order to investigate. Stanton exited his patrol car, called out “police,” and ordered Patrick to stop in a voice loud enough for all in the area to hear. But Patrick did not stop. Instead, he “looked directly at Stanton, ignored his lawful orders, and quickly went through the front gate” of a fence enclosing Sims’ front yard. When the gate closed behind Patrick, the fence—which was more than six feet tall and made of wood—blocked Stanton’s view of the yard. Stanton believed that Patrick had committed a jailable misdemeanor under California Penal Code §148 by disobeying his order to stop; Stanton also “feared for his safety.” He accordingly made the “split-second decision” to kick open the gate in pursuit of Patrick. Unfortunately, and unbeknownst to Stanton, Sims herself was standing behind the gate when it flew open. The swinging gate struck Sims, cutting her forehead and injuring her shoulder. Sims filed suit against Stanton in Federal District Court under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging that Stanton unreasonably searched her home without a war­rant in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (…)  hot pursuit of a fleeing felon justifies an officer’s warrantless entry. (United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42–43 (1976)); hot pur­suit exception: immediate or contin­uous pursuit of X. from the scene of a crime 466 U. S., at 753; “the doctrine of qualified immunity protects govern­ment officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (1982)). “Qualified immunity gives government offi­cials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments,” and “protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 12) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 341 (1986)). “We do not require a case directly on point” before concluding that the law is clearly established, “but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question be­yond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9). Federal and state courts nationwide are sharply di­vided on the question whether an officer with probable cause to arrest a suspect for a misdemeanor may enter a home without a warrant while in hot pursuit of that sus­pect; in California, the law is: in both People v. Lloyd, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1425, 1430, 265 Cal. Rptr. 422, 425 (1989), and In re Lavoyne M., 221 Cal. App. 3d 154, 159, 270 Cal. Rptr. 394, 396 (1990), the California Court of Appeal refused to limit the hot pursuit exception to felony suspects. The court stated in Lloyd: “where the pursuit into the home was based on an arrest set in motion in a public place, the fact that the offenses justifying the initial detention or arrest were misdemeanors is of no significance in determining the validity of the entry without a warrant.” 216 Cal. App. 3d, at 1430, 265 Cal. Rptr., at 425; we do not express any view on whether Officer Stan­ton’s entry into Sims’ yard in pursuit of Patrick was con­stitutional. But whether or not the constitutional rule applied by the court below was correct, it was not “beyond debate.” al-Kidd, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 9). Stanton may have been mistaken in believing his actions were justified, but he was not “plainly incompetent.” Malley, 475 U. S., at 341 (U.S.S.Ct., 04.11.2013, Stanton v. Sims, Per Curiam, docket 12-1217).

Warrant : Quatrième Amendement : cas d’un policier qui entre dans le périmètre d’un domicile sans warrant suite à une poursuite ininterrompue depuis la scène d’une infraction présumée (hot pursuit) (l’infraction étant un misdemeanor et non un felony) ; immunité qualifiée dont peut se prévaloir le policier (comme tout autre employé du secteur public) parce qu’aucune règle de droit clairement établie n’était susceptible de lui faire comprendre que son comportement était contraire à la Constitution fédérale :

Il est établi qu’une entrée sans warrant est admise en cas de hot pursuit portant sur un comportement pouvant être qualifié de felony. Mais qu’en est-il si l’infraction présumée ne peut être que qualifiée de misdemeanor ? Les cours d’appels fédérales et les cours des états sont divisées à ce sujet, d’où la présente décision de la Cour Suprême fédérale. En droit californien, il est établi qu’en cas de hot pursuit, l’officier de police n’a nul besoin d’un warrant pour entrer dans le périmètre d’un domicile, cela même si l’infraction n’est qu’un misdemeanor. Il faut toutefois l’existence d’une cause probable, comme dans tous les autres cas. Dans la présente affaire, la Cour ne se prononce pas sur la constitutionalité de la conduite de l’officier de police Stanton. Elle se limite à juger que l’on ne peut pas lui reprocher d’avoir méconnu une règle de droit clairement établie, justifiant de ne pas appliquer l’immunité dont il est question plus haut. En effet, il ne pouvait pas être clair pour le policier si l’infraction en jeu, qui relevait donc d’un misdemeanor et non pas d’un felony, lui permettait ou non d’entrer sans warrant. Pour le reste, le cas est renvoyé à l’autorité précédente pour nouvelle décision dans le sens des considérants. Il reste à voir si ultérieurement la Cour Suprême reprendra la conception californienne précitée.

Reichle v. Howards

Immunity: 42 U. S. C. §1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388; Howards brought an action against petitioners and others under 42 U. S. C. §1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388. Howards claimed that he was arrested and searched without probable cause, in viola­tion of the Fourth Amendment, and that the arrest violated the First Amendment because it was made in retaliation for Howards’ criti­cism of the Vice President; petitioners are entitled to qualified immunity because, at the time of Howards’ arrest, it was not clearly established that an arrest supported by probable cause could give rise to a First Amendment vi­olation; Courts may grant qualified immunity on the ground that a pur­ported right was not “clearly established” by prior case law. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 236. To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear “that every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’ ” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. ___, ___; the “clearly established” standard is not satisfied here. This Court has never recognized a First Amendment right to be free from a retaliatory arrest that is supported by probable cause; nor was such a right otherwise clearly established at the time of Howards’ arrest (U.S.S.Ct., 04.06.12, Reichle v. Howards, J. Thomas).

Immunité, ici d’officiers de police qui ont procédé à une arrestation suivie d’une fouille. Le recourant arrêté soutient qu’il l’a été suite à ses critiques du Vice-président, donc sans cause (« probable cause »), et en violation du Premier Amendement. Il a par conséquent actionné les officiers de police sur la base de 42 U.S.C. 1983 et sur la base de la jurisprudence Bivens. La Cour juge que les officiers de police bénéficient de l’immunité parce qu’au moment de l’arrestation, il n’était pas clairement établi qu’une arrestation supportée par une « probable cause » pourrait donner lieu à une violation du Premier Amendement. Les Tribunaux peuvent en effet accorder l’immunité lorsque le droit constitutionnel dont la violation est alléguée n’est pas clairement établi par la jurisprudence de la Cour. Pour être clairement établi, un tel droit doit être clair au point que tout employé public raisonnable aurait compris qu’en adoptant un certain comportement, ce droit était violé. Tel n’est nullement le cas dans la présente espèce. Par ailleurs, la Cour n’a jamais reconnu un droit déduit du Premier Amendement de ne pas être arrêté lorsque l’arrestation est supportée par une « probable cause ».