California Court of Appeal, Gutierrez v. Tostado, Docket No. H049983

Personal Injury Claims

 

Statute of Limitations

 

Personal Injury Action for Negligence: Two Years

 

Suits Against Health Care Providers for Professional Negligence: One Year

 

Does MICRA Applies Where the Plaintiff Is Injured During the Provision of Professional Services, as a Result of Those Services, But Was Not the Recipient of the Services?

 

(Action Against an Attorney for a Wrongful Act or Omission, Other Than for Actual Fraud: One Year)

 

Claims Time-Barred

 

 

Procedure:

 

Notice of Appeal

 

Appeal premature

 

Order to Show Cause

 

Dismissal

 

Judgment Filed

 

Notice of Submission of Judgment

 

Order to Show Cause Discharged

 

 

California Law

 

 

 

(Santa Clara County

Super. Ct. No. 20CV361400)

 

 

Francisco Gutierrez appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of respondents Uriel Tostado and ProTransport-1, LLC, on the basis that Gutierrez’s personal injury claims were time-barred under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA). Gutierrez contends that the trial court erred when it found MICRA’s one-year statute of limitations for professional negligence applicable. We conclude that because Tostado was a medical provider rendering professional services at the time the alleged negligence occurred, MICRA’s statute of limitations bars Gutierrez’s claims. We thus affirm the judgment.

 

 

Gutierrez was driving on Interstate 280 when he was forced to stop. Shortly after Gutierrez stopped, Tostado, who was driving an ambulance, rear-ended him.  At the time of the accident, Tostado was an emergency medical technician (EMT) employed by ProTransport-1, LLC and was transporting a patient from one medical facility to another. While Tostado drove, his partner attended to the patient in the rear of the ambulance.

 

 

Gutierrez was injured in the collision and visited a chiropractor for treatment within ten days of the incident. Almost two years later, Gutierrez filed a complaint against Tostado and ProTransport-1, alleging various personal injury claims. The respondents filed a motion for summary judgment on the sole ground that Gutierrez’s claims were time barred under MICRA’s one-year statute of limitations. The trial court agreed that MICRA applied and granted the motion. The trial court concluded that because Tostado was transporting a patient at the time of the accident, he was rendering professional services. The trial court held that Gutierrez’s claims against the defendants were time-barred under the statute. Gutierrez timely appealed from the judgment.

 

 

(Gutierrez filed his notice of appeal on April 19, 2022, after the trial court had granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants but prior to judgment being entered. We issued an order to show cause as to why Gutierrez’s appeal should not be dismissed as premature. After the trial court filed the judgment and Gutierrez submitted a notice of submission of judgment, we discharged the order to show cause and deemed Gutierrez’s notice of appeal filed on July 11, 2022, the date judgment was entered. Fn. 1).

 

 

In this case, the trial court granted summary judgment based on its statutory construction of MICRA. We review issues of statutory construction de novo. (Aldana v. Stillwagon (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1, 6 (Aldana).)

 

 

The trial court granted summary judgment on the sole ground that Gutierrez’s action was barred by the statute of limitations set forth in MICRA. Gutierrez contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his claims because MICRA does not apply to his personal injury claims. A personal injury action for negligence must generally be filed within two years of the date on which the injury occurred. (Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1.)

 

 

However, suits against health care providers for professional negligence must be filed within one year. (§ 340.5.) Gutierrez argues that the one-year statute of limitations does not apply to his action because his claims are for general negligence not professional negligence, and the duty that Tostado violated by crashing into his car was a duty of care generally owed to the public, not a professional duty owed by a medical provider to a patient.

 

 

MICRA defines professional negligence as “a negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services.” (§ 340.5, subd. (2).) The parties do not dispute that an EMT transporting a patient in an ambulance is providing medical care to the patient for purposes of the statute. (Lopez, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 347; Canister v. Emergency Ambulance Service, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 388, 407 (Canister).) However, only actions “alleging injury suffered as a result of. . .the provision of medical care to patients” are covered. (Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital (2016) 63 Cal.4th 75, 88, (Flores).) In this appeal we must decide whether a driver in a separate vehicle, injured in a collision with an ambulance transporting a patient, was injured as a result of the provision of medical care, such that MICRA’s one year statute applies. Gutierrez urges us to find that any injury here was caused by ordinary negligence. He argues that where a medical provider owes no professional duty to the plaintiff and allegedly breaches only a duty owed to the general public, a claim for personal injuries should be governed by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to ordinary negligence. Conversely, respondent suggests that the critical question is not whether defendant owed plaintiff a professional duty, but simply whether plaintiff was injured as a result of the provision of medical services by defendant; in other words, was plaintiff’s injury a foreseeable consequence of defendant’s act of providing medical care?

 

 

The Supreme Court in Flores examined what it means for a health care provider to render professional services under MICRA. There, a hospital patient sued the hospital for negligence after the latch on her bedrail broke, causing her to fall and injure herself. (Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 89.) The court considered the difference between regular negligence arising out of the duty owed to the general public, the negligence in the maintenance of equipment and premises that are merely convenient for, or incidental to, the provision of medical care to a patient, and the negligence that arises from the duty owed to patients in the rendering of professional services. (Id. at pp. 88-89.) The court found that “Even those parts of a hospital dedicated primarily to patient care typically contain numerous items of furniture and equipment—tables, televisions, toilets, and so on—that are provided primarily for the comfort and convenience of patients and visitors, but generally play no part in the patient’s medical diagnosis or treatment. Although a defect in such equipment may injure patients as well as visitors or staff, a hospital’s general duty to keep such items in good repair generally overlaps with the ‘obligations that all persons subject to California’s laws have.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

 

 

(Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1237 (Lee): In Lee, the Court considered “section 340.5’s neighboring provision imposing a one-year statute of limitations for ‘an action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission, other than for actual fraud, arising in the performance of professional services.’ [Citation.]” (Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 87.) The court decided «that section 340.6(a) is properly read to apply to claims that ‘depend on proof that an attorney violated a professional obligation in the course of providing professional services.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Explaining that the statute excludes services unrelated to the law or matters that entail violations of professional obligations that may overlap with obligations that all persons have, the court emphasized that the statute applies when an attorney violates a professional obligation as opposed to some generally applicable nonprofessional obligation. (Id. at pp. 87-88.)

 

 

(…) The court concluded that the hospital’s alleged negligence in the maintenance of plaintiff’s bedrail did not overlap with its general duty owed to the public because it was “integrally related to plaintiff’s medical diagnosis and treatment,” and was therefore professional negligence encompassed by MICRA. (Id. at p. 89.)

 

 

Flores and Lee both considered whether the injury to the patient or client was caused by negligence in the provision of professional services or whether the injury was the result of the breach of some broader overlapping duty owed to the public. Gutierrez asks us to conclude that the contrast drawn in those cases, between a professional duty and the general duty owed to the public, means that MICRA only applies where the defendant owes a professional duty to the plaintiff. However, neither Flores nor Lee considered whether MICRA applies where the plaintiff is injured during the provision of professional services, as a result of those services, but was not the recipient of the services. In both of those cases, the plaintiff was either the client or the patient. Multiple courts have considered injuries to third parties who were not patients and have concluded that MICRA applied to their claims.

 

 

(…) The Flores court concluded that by providing the bedrail the hospital was providing medical care, not just a convenience incidental to care. The question before the Flores court was what duty was owed to its patient, not to whom their professional duty of care extended.

 

 

(…) Because Gutierrez was not the recipient of the medical care, the question here is different from the one raised in Flores. It is not whether the injuries alleged were the result of general or professional negligence.  Instead, the question here is whether an injury to a third party, who is not a patient, is subject to MICRA’s statute of limitations because the injury occurred during, and as a result of, the provision of medical care by a medical provider.

 

 

(…) Because neither Flores nor Lee considered MICRA’s applicability to nonpatients, we must agree with Canister and Lopez and conclude that MICRA is not limited to suits by patients or to recipients of medical services as long as the plaintiff is injured due to negligence in the rendering of professional services and his injuries were foreseeable.

 

 

The provision of ambulance services involves driving on the road, sometimes at a very high speed. Getting a patient to the hospital quickly is often as integral to the provision of this medical service as performing CPR or administering medication intravenously. It is, therefore, entirely foreseeable that collisions may occur where third parties are injured. The fact that Tostado was not driving quickly here or that Gutierrez was in a separate vehicle rather than in the ambulance does not change the analysis or our conclusion that third parties injured in a collision with an ambulance when it is rendering medical care are subject to MICRA.

 

 

(…) Fundamental intent of MICRA to “reduce the cost of medical malpractice insurance ‘by limiting the amount and timing of recovery in cases of professional negligence.’ [Citations.]” (Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p.81.)

 

 

Even though Tostado may owe a duty to the public to drive the ambulance safely when not in use for medical care, the injury to Gutierrez occurred while Tostado, a medical provider, was performing the integral function of transporting a patient by ambulance. The trial court correctly concluded that MICRA’s one-year statute of limitations applied to Gutierrez’s negligence claims.

 

 

 

 

 

(California Court of Appeal, Dec. 1^st, 2023, Gutierrez v. Tostado, Docket No. H049983, Certified for Publication)

 

 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Corby Kuciemba v. Victory Woodworks, Inc., Docket No. 21-15963

Labor Law

 

Tort Law

 

Negligence

 

Duty of Care

 

Failure to Protect Employees

 

California’s Derivative Injury Doctrine

 

California Workers’ Compensation Act

 

California Law

 

 

If an employee contracts COVID-19 at his workplace and brings the virus home to his spouse, does California’s derivative injury doctrine bar the spouse’s claim against the employer?

 

Under California law, does an employer owe a duty to the households of its employees to exercise ordinary care to prevent the spread of COVID-19?

 

 

 

 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.

 

 

 

 

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a diversity action brought by Robert Kuciemba and his wife Corby Kuciemba against Mr. Kuciemba’s employer Victory Woodworks, alleging that Mrs. Kuciemba contracted a severe case of COVID-19 from Mr. Kuciemba as a result of Victory’s negligent failure to protect its employees from the virus. The panel certified two questions to the Supreme Court of California, which accepted certification and held that (1) California’s derivative injury doctrine—under which workers’ compensation benefits generally provide the exclusive remedy for third party claims if the asserted claims are collateral to or derivative of the employee’s workplace injury—did not bar Mrs. Kuciemba’s tort claims against Victory; but (2) an employer does not owe a duty of care under California law to prevent the spread of COVID-19 to employees’ household members. Because Victory owed no duty of care to Mrs. Kuciemba, the panel affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the complaint.

 

 

The Kuciembas sued Victory in Superior Court in California. They alleged that Victory’s violations of federal, state, and municipal regulations and its failure to protect its employees from COVID-19 substantially caused Mrs. Kuciemba’s severe infection. Mrs. Kuciemba brought claims for negligence, negligence per se, and premises liability, and Mr. Kuciemba brought a claim for loss of consortium. Victory removed the case to federal court and filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted Victory’s motion, holding that California’s derivative injury doctrine barred the Kuciembas’ claims and that an employer’s duty to provide a safe workplace to employees does not extend to nonemployees sickened by a virus outside of the employer’s premises.

 

 

Following briefing and argument, we concluded that no controlling precedent resolved whether the derivative injury doctrine barred Mrs. Kuciemba’s claims and whether Victory owed Mrs. Kuciemba a duty of care. We further determined that a decision by the Supreme Court of California could control the outcome and that this appeal presents issues of significant importance for the State of California, including the scope of an employer’s tort liability for the spread of COVID-19. We requested that the Supreme Court of California decide two certified questions:

 

If an employee contracts COVID-19 at his workplace and brings the virus home to his spouse, does California’s derivative injury doctrine bar the spouse’s claim against the employer?

 

Under California law, does an employer owe a duty to the households of its employees to exercise ordinary care to prevent the spread of COVID-19? 

 

 

The Supreme Court of California granted our request and has now issued its decision.

 

 

As to the first question, the Supreme Court of California held that California’s derivative injury doctrine—under which workers’ compensation benefits generally “provide the exclusive remedy for third party claims if the asserted claims are ‘collateral to or derivative of’ the employee’s workplace injury”—does not bar Mrs. Kuciemba’s tort claims. Kuciemba v. Victory Woodworks, Inc., No. S274191, 2023 WL 4360826, at *3– 9 (Cal. July 6, 2023). The court explained that most derivative injury claims seek recovery for losses sustained because of “a loved one’s disability or death, rather than for the plaintiff’s own physical injuries or death.” Id. at *6. Mrs. Kuciemba’s negligence claims, however, “are not legally or logically dependent” on an injury Mr. Kuciemba sustained at work. Id. at *9. The “‘but for’ causal link” between Mrs. Kuciemba’s injury and Mr. Kuciemba’s COVID-19 exposure is therefore “insufficient, on its own, to render the claims derivative.” Id. Thus, the claims are not barred by the exclusivity provisions of the California Workers’ Compensation Act. Id. The Supreme Court of California held as to the second question that “an employer does not owe a duty of care under California law to prevent the spread of COVID-19 to employees’ household members.” Id. at *21. The analysis of the court is detailed and bears reading with respect to California tort law. To begin, the court held that “the default rule of duty applies in the COVID-19 context as well where plaintiffs have alleged that the defendant, through its own actions, created an unreasonable risk of the disease’s transmission.” Id. at *12.

 

 

Although California “Civil Code section 1714 articulates a general duty of care,” compelling policy considerations can support exceptions. Id. at *13. The court pointed to Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (1968), as identifying “several considerations that may, on balance, justify a departure from Civil Code section 1714’s default rule of duty.” Id. Such considerations include, among others, the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, and the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach. Id. The court identified foreseeability as “the most important factor to consider in determining whether to create an exception to the general duty to exercise ordinary care” under section 1714. Id. at *14 (quoting Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283, 291 (Cal. 2016)). On this point, the court concluded that “it is plainly foreseeable that an employee who is exposed to the virus through his employer’s negligence will pass the virus to a household member.” Id. at *16. The court also concluded that the “moral blame factor weighs in favor of establishing a duty” primarily because Victory had greater access to knowledge and control to prevent the spread of COVID-19 on its premises than did the plaintiffs. Id. at *17. Despite its conclusions with respect to foreseeability and moral blame, the court wrote that “while the foreseeability factors and the policy factor of moral blame largely tilt in favor of finding a duty of care, the policy factors of preventing future harm and the anticipated burdens on defendants and the community weigh against imposing such a duty.” Id. at *20. Important to this analysis of the Rowland factors was the recognition that “some factors may be so weighty as to tip the balance one way or the other.” Id. The court went on to conclude: Here, the significant and unpredictable burden that recognizing a duty of care would impose on California businesses, the court system, and the community at large counsels in favor of an exception to the general rule of Civil Code section 1714. Imposing on employers a tort duty to each employee’s household members to prevent the spread of this highly transmissible virus would throw open the courthouse doors to a deluge of lawsuits that would be both hard to prove and difficult to cull early in the proceedings. Id. With these considerations in mind, the court concluded that “‘the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community’ weigh against imposing a duty of care” here. Id. at *19. As a consequence, because Victory owed no duty to Mrs. Kuciemba, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the Kuciembas’ First Amended Complaint.

 

 

 

 

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, July 25, 2023, Corby Kuciemba v. Victory Woodworks, Inc., Docket No. 21-15963, For Publication)

T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, S233898

Misrepresentation (California law): Duty of care: Warning: Product warning: Failure to warn: Strict liability: Negligence: Sophisticated user & intermediary defenses: Tort:

Under our state’s law, there is no per se requirement in negligent misrepresentation actions that the misrepresentation be made by the product

manufacturer. Consider Hanberry v. Hearst Corp. (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 680, where the plaintiff alleged that defective shoes caused her injuries. (Id. at p. 682.) The Court of Appeal allowed the negligent misrepresentation claims to go forward against a nonmanufacturer — the publisher of Good Housekeeping magazine, which had given the shoes its renowned seal of approval. (Id. at p. 683.) This seal appeared not only in the pages of its own magazine, but was used by the shoe manufacturer in its advertising as well as on the product and its packaging. (Ibid.) The court acknowledged that the defendant publisher was neither the seller nor the manufacturer of the shoes, but nonetheless recognized a duty of care because of the allegations that the publisher “held itself out as a disinterested third party which had examined the shoes, found them satisfactory, and gave its endorsement”; and the plaintiff reasonably relied on the endorsement and “purchased the shoes because of it.” (Id. at pp. 686, 683.) As to the plaintiff’s claim under strict liability, however, the court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal — declining to extend strict liability “to a general endorser who makes no representation it has examined or tested each item marketed.” (Id. at p. 688; see also Conte, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 101-102 [similarly distinguishing between strict liability and negligent misrepresentation theories].)

Novartis suggests that we recently conflated strict liability and negligence in Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167 when we observed that "there is little functional difference between the two theories in the failure to warn context." (Id. at p. 187.) Not so. Webb’s observation was merely that the sophisticated user and sophisticated intermediary defenses applied to both theories of liability. (Ibid.) We did not categorically alter our longstanding recognition that “California law recognizes the differences between negligence and strict liability causes of action.” (Johnson v. American Standard , Inc. (2008) 43 Cal. 4th 56, 71; see Saller v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1239 ["Negligence and strict products liability are separate and distinct bases for liability that do not automatically collapse into each other because the plaintiff might allege both when a product warning contributes to her injury"].)

We likewise discount decisions from those jurisdictions that differ from California by categorically excluding from liability certain defendants (see, e.g., Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d at p. 371 (plur. opn. of Waterman, J.) [“the tort of negligent misrepresentation does not apply to sellers of products but rather is limited to those in the business or profession of supplying information for the guidance of others”]) or certain injuries (see, e.g., Flynn v. American Home Products Corp. (Minn.Ct.App. 2001) 627 N.W.2d 342, 351 [“the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized negligent misrepresentation involving damages only for pecuniary loss, and has expressly declined to recognize the tort of negligent misrepresentation involving the risk of physical harm”]) from the tort of negligent misrepresentation. And we find unhelpful the views of those jurisdictions that (federal courts predict) will recharacterize under their product liability act or similar rule all claims against a product manufacturer, no matter the theory, as product liability actions, which can be asserted only against the manufacturer of the product. (See, e.g., Germain, 756 F.3d at pp. 941-954 [construing the laws of Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia]; Phelps v. Wyeth, Inc. (D.Or. 2012) 857 F.Supp.2d 1114, 1121 [Oregon law]; Stanley v. Wyeth, Inc. (La.Ct.App. 2008) 991 So.2d 31, 33-34 [noting the “numerous cases where the negligent misrepresentation claims were . . . preempted by . . . a state’s enactment of products liability law”].)

We find that brand-name drug manufacturers have a duty to use ordinary care in warning about the safety risks of their drugs, regardless of whether the injured party (in reliance on the brand-name manufacturer’s warning) was dispensed the brand-name or generic version of the drug. We also conclude that a brand-name manufacturer’s sale of the rights to a drug does not, as a matter of law, terminate its liability for injuries foreseeably and proximately caused by deficiencies present in the warning label prior to the sale.

(Cal. S.C., Dec. 21, 2017, T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, S233898).

Responsabilité civile et contractuelle (droit californien), déclaration inexacte ("misrepresentation") :

En droit californien, une action en dommages-intérêts fondée sur une déclaration inexacte peut être déposée contre d'autres défendeurs que le seul fabricant du produit. Par exemple, dans une procédure où le demandeur soutenait que des chaussures lui avaient causé un préjudice corporel, la cour a accepté comme défendeur un magazine très connu qui avait fait l'éloge de ces chaussures dans l'un de ses articles. La cour a reconnu que le magazine n'était ni le fabricant ni le vendeur des chaussures, mais qu'il était tout de même tenu par un devoir de diligence du fait qu'il s'était présenté comme une tierce partie désintéressée qui avait examiné les chaussures, les avait jugées satisfaisantes, et en avait fait ainsi la promotion. En outre, le demandeur s'était raisonnablement fié à dite promotion, et, du fait de celle-ci, avait acheté les chaussures. Une telle action reste une action en responsabilité pour faute, et non une action en responsabilité causale : le magazine n'a pas suggéré qu'il avait examiné ou testé chacune des chaussures mises sur le marché.

La responsabilité pour faute ("negligence") doit toujours être distinguée des cas de responsabilité objective ("strict liability"), même si un demandeur qui agit en responsabilité du fait des produits invoque ces deux notions juridiques.

La Cour rejette par ailleurs la jurisprudence d'autres états qui exclut catégoriquement la responsabilité pour déclaration inexacte de certains défendeurs (est citée comme exemple une décision d'un autre état qui exclut le vendeur des défendeurs possibles dans le cadre d'une action en responsabilité pour faute du fait d'une déclaration inexacte, et qui ne retient comme défendeurs possibles que ceux dont le métier en lui-même consiste à donner des informations) ou qui limites dite responsabilité à certains types de dommages (par exemple la jurisprudence de certains autres états qui limite au dommage matériel la responsabilité pour déclaration inexacte, et la prohibe s'agissant du préjudice corporel).

Dans la présente espèce, la Cour juge que le fabricant d'un produit pharmaceutique doit aviser des risques de ses produits. Il peut être recherché à cet égard en responsabilité même par un demandeur à qui le générique a été prescrit. Ce devoir d'avis des risques se prolonge même si le fabricant cède ses droits sur le produit.

T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, S233898

Duty of care: Negligence: Tort:

Duty is indeed the cornerstone of every negligence claim. In California, the general rule governing duty is codified in Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a): “Everyone is responsible . . . for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person . . . .” Thus, “each person has a duty to use ordinary care and ‘is liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the circumstances . . . .’” (Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 456, 472.) Whether a party has a duty of care in a particular case is a question of law for the court, which we review independently on appeal. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142 (Kesner).)

The conclusion that a duty exists in a particular case “‘is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.’” (Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 734, quoting Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964) pp. 332-333.) We invoke the concept of duty to limit “‘the otherwise potentially infinite liability which would follow from every negligent act,’” yet we do so only where public policy clearly supports (or a statutory provision establishes) an exception to the general rule of Civil Code section 1714. (Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1143.) When considering whether to depart from the general rule, we balance a number of considerations, including “the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113 (Rowland).)

In the context of prescription drugs, a manufacturer’s duty is to warn physicians about the risks known or reasonably known to the manufacturer. (Carlin v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1104, 1112 (Carlin); see generally Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 691, 699-700.) The manufacturer has no duty to warn of risks that are “merely speculative or conjectural, or so remote and insignificant as to be negligible.” (Carlin, at p. 1116.) If the manufacturer provides an adequate warning to the prescribing physician, the manufacturer need not communicate a warning directly to the patient who uses the drug. (Ibid.)

(Cal. S.C., Dec. 21, 2017, T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, S233898).

Le devoir de diligence est une des conditions centrales de l'obligation de réparer un dommage en responsabilité civile. La Californie l'a codifié à la Section 1714(a) de son Code civil. Le critère est l'exercice d'un devoir de diligence raisonnable compte tenu des circonstances. Déterminer si une partie est tenue par un devoir de diligence dans une situation particulière est une question de droit, que la Cour Suprême de l'état revoit de manière indépendante. Pour résoudre cette question de droit, dite Cour examine les notions de la prévisibilité du dommage causé, de la preuve du dommage, du lien de causalité entre l'acte et le dommage, du reproche moral attaché à l'acte, de la prévention d'un dommage futur, du fardeau qu'une responsabilité ferait porter à l'auteur, des conséquences pour l'ensemble de la communauté qui découleraient d'un jugement reconnaissant une responsabilité, ainsi que de la disponibilité et du coût d'une assurance couvrant le risque examiné.

Dans le domaine des produits pharmaceutiques, le devoir du fabricant est d'avertir la communauté médicale des risques connus ou qui doivent raisonnablement être connus. Si l'avertissement est donné aux médecins, il n'a pas à être donné directement aux patients.

T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, S233898

Foreseeability (California law), Negligence, Tort:

California law places greater weight on the element of foreseeability in the duty analysis than does Maryland law. Indeed, this state treats foreseeability as “the most important factor” (Kesner, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1145), and we do not narrowly circumscribe the kinds of relationships that must exist between the plaintiff and the defendant as a predicate to imposing a duty on the defendant to prevent injuries arising from its own conduct. (Id. at p. 1163; see Randi W., 14 Cal.4th at p. 1077 [one who negligently provides false information to another can owe a duty of care to a third person “who did not receive the information and who has no special relationship with the provider”].)

We therefore do not find persuasive those out-of-state cases discounting the role of foreseeability (see, e.g., Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d at p. 376 (plur. opn. of Waterman, J.) [“‘foreseeability should not enter into the duty calculus’”]) or requiring the existence of a specific type of relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant (see, e.g., Moretti v. Wyeth, Inc. (9th Cir. 2014) 579 Fed. Appx. 563, 564 [construing negligent misrepresentation, under Nevada law, to “‘require, at a minimum, some form of relationship between the parties’”]; Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc. (10th Cir. 2013) 727 F.3d 1273, 1282 [“Oklahoma courts have also required a relationship between the defendant company and the product at issue for other theories of liability, including negligence”]).

(Cal. S.C., Dec. 21, 2017, T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, S233898).

Prévisibilité du dommage en responsabilité civile et contractuelle (droit californien) :

Face à la question de savoir si un défendeur répond envers un lésé, le droit californien accorde une importance essentielle à la notion de prévisibilité. Si le défendeur pouvait prévoir qu'un tiers quelconque, dont l'existence pouvait même lui être inconnue, risquait d'être lésé, ce défendeur pourrait être condamné à répondre (l'espèce concerne en particulier l'application de la théorie de la "misrepresentation" dans le contexte pharmaceutique).

Centinela Freeman etc. v. Health Net of California, S218497

Third parties: Negligence, Tort, Privity of contract:

Although “recognition of a duty to manage business affairs so as to prevent purely economic loss to third parties in their financial transactions is the exception, not the rule, in negligence law, privity of contract is no longer necessary to recognition of a duty in the business context and public policy may dictate the existence of a duty to third parties.” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 58 (Quelimane).) The test for determining the existence of such an exceptional duty to third parties is set forth in the seminal case of Biakanja, supra, 49 Cal.2d at page 650, as follows: “The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of various factors, among which are [1] the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, [2] the foreseeability of harm to him, [3] the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, [4] the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, [5] the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, and [6] the policy of preventing future harm.”

(Cal. S.C., November 14, 2016, Centinela Freeman etc. v. Health Net of California, S218497).

Responsabilité contractuelle en faveur d’un tiers lésé ?

Est exceptionnelle la reconnaissance d’un devoir de gérer ses affaires commerciales de manière à éviter une perte économique au détriment d’un tiers au contrat. Un tel devoir peut cependant exister, même en faveur d’un tiers sans proximité avec le contrat. En particulier, l’intérêt public peut dicter un tel devoir. Le test pour déterminer son existence découle de la jurisprudence Biakanja. Il dispose que la reconnaissance de ce devoir s’examine au cas par cas et implique d’apprécier différents facteurs, dont (1) l’intention des parties d’affecter les intérêts du demandeur, (2) la prévisibilité du dommage causé au tiers, (3) le degré de certitude du dommage allégué, (4) l’intensité de la causalité entre la conduite du défendeur et le dommage subi, (5) le reproche moral attaché à la conduite du défendeur, (6) l’intérêt à prévenir un dommage futur.

Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, S195031

Torts: duty of ordinary care: application of Primary Assumption of Risk to “Nonsport” Recreational Activities“. Although persons generally owe a duty of due care not to cause an unreasonable risk of harm to others (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a)), some activities—and, specifically, many sports—are inherently dangerous.  Imposing a duty to mitigate those inherent dangers could alter the nature of the activity or inhibit vigorous participation.  (Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1003.)  The primary assumption of risk doctrine, a rule of limited duty, developed to avoid such a chilling effect.  (Ibid.; Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 308.)  Where the doctrine applies to a recreational activity, operators, instructors and participants in the activity owe other participants only the duty not to act so as to increase the risk of injury over that inherent in the activity.  (Avila v. Citrus Community College Dist. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 148, 162; Kahn, at p. 1004.); in defendant’s view, a duty to minimize the inherent risk of injury from bumper car rides would “require amusement park operators to eliminate their existing rides and to replace them with rides that are fundamentally different,” contrary to the policy motivating this court’s primary assumption of risk decisions, that of preventing common law tort rules from undermining Californians’ recreational opportunities.  For reasons explained below, we agree with defendant; we agree with the dissenting justice below, and the court in Beninati, that the primary assumption of risk doctrine is not limited to activities classified as sports, but applies as well to other recreational activities “involving an inherent risk of injury to voluntary participants . . . where the risk cannot be eliminated without altering the fundamental nature of the activity.”  (Beninati v. Black Rock City, LLC, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 658.); the primary assumption of risk doctrine rests on a straightforward policy foundation:  the need to avoid chilling vigorous participation in or sponsorship of recreational activities by imposing a tort duty to eliminate or reduce the risks of harm inherent in those activities.  It operates on the premise that imposing such a legal duty “would work a basic alteration—or cause abandonment” of the activity.  (Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1003; see also Shin v. Ahn, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 492, quoting Dilger v. Moyles (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1455 [“ ‘Holding golfers liable for missed hits would only encourage lawsuits and deter players from enjoying the sport.’ ”]; Avila v. Citrus Community College Dist., supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 165 [in baseball, recognizing tort liability for hitting the batter with a pitch would tend to deter throwing inside, an essential part of the sport]; Ford v. Gouin, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 345 [imposing tort liability for negligence in towing water-skier might well chill participation and “have a generally deleterious effect on the nature of the sport of waterskiing as a whole”]; Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 318 [doctrine avoids chilling vigorous participation in sport].)  The doctrine’s parameters should be drawn according to that goal; the policy behind primary assumption of risk applies squarely to injuries from physical recreation, whether in sports or nonsport activities.  Allowing voluntary participants in an active recreational pursuit to sue other participants or sponsors for failing to eliminate or mitigate the activity’s inherent risks would threaten the activity’s very existence and nature.  In thus concluding, we do not “expand the doctrine to any activity with an inherent risk,” as the majority below cautioned.  While inherent risks exist, for example, in travel on the streets and highways and in many workplaces, we agree with the lower court that “the primary assumption of risk doctrine in its modern, post-Knight construction is considerably narrower in its application.”  (See Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 311-312 [primary assumption of risk inapplicable to automobile accidents or medical negligence].)  But active recreation, because it involves physical activity and is not essential to daily life, is particularly vulnerable to the chilling effects of potential tort liability for ordinary negligence.  And participation in recreational activity, however valuable to one’s health and spirit, is voluntary in a manner employment and daily transportation are not. 

The doctrine thus applies to bumper car collisions, regardless of whether or not one deems bumper cars a “sport.”  Low-speed collisions between the padded, independently operated cars are inherent in—are the whole point of—a bumper car ride.

As she did in Knight and several cases since, Justice Kennard dissents here from application of the primary assumption of risk doctrine. (Dis. opn. of Kennard, J., post, at pp. 1-2.)  In light of the dissenter’s consistent urging that we return to the traditional consent-based assumption of risk defense, it is worth reiterating some of the reasons given in Knight for abandoning that defense in favor of a limited-duty rule.  (See Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 311-313); the traditional rule, resting on a legal fiction that the plaintiff had impliedly consented to the activity’s known risks, would completely bar the plaintiff’s recovery because of his or her unreasonable conduct, putting the defense in severe tension with comparative fault principles adopted in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804.  (Knight, at p. 311.)  In theory, moreover, it could apply to risks beyond those inherent in the activity—even reckless or intentional misconduct, were it shown the plaintiff was aware of the potential for such misconduct—and apply as well to activities far beyond the realm of sports and recreation, such as automobile travel and medical treatment, that carry known risks of injury from others’ negligence.  (Id. at pp. 311-312.)  Finally, the implied-consent theory’s focus on what the individual plaintiff subjectively knew about the nature and magnitude of the risks being encountered subjected defendants to widely disparate liability for the same conduct, and made summary judgment on the basis of assumption of risk very rare, since the defense depended on proof of the particular plaintiff’s subjective knowledge and expectations.  (Id. at pp. 312-313.)  The dissenting opinion here does not persuade us these considerations have lost their force. Bumper car rides like Rue le Dodge are dissimilar to roller coasters in ways that disqualify their operators as common carriers.  “A carrier of persons for reward must use the utmost care and diligence for their safe carriage, must provide everything necessary for that purpose, and must exercise to that end a reasonable degree of skill.”  (Civ. Code, § 2100); riders on Rue le Dodge, in other words, are not passively carried or transported from one place to another.  They actively engage in a game, trying to bump others or avoid being bumped themselves.  The rationale for holding the operator of a roller coaster to the duties of a common carrier for reward—that riders, having delivered themselves into the control of the operator, are owed the highest degree of care for their safety—simply does not apply to bumper car riders’ safety from the risks inherent in bumping.  “The rule that carriers of passengers are held to the highest degree of care is based on the recognition that ‘ “to his diligence and fidelity are intrusted the lives and safety of large numbers of human beings.” ’   (Gomez, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1136.)  A bumper car rider, in contrast, does not entrust the operator with his or her safety from the risks of low-speed collisions; the undisputed facts in the summary judgment record demonstrate defendant was not a common carrier for reward in its operation of Rue le Dodge.  The public policy supporting a higher duty of care for common carriers, therefore, does not apply here and does not preclude application of the primary assumption of risk doctrine; our later decisions establish that under the primary assumption of risk doctrine, operators, sponsors and instructors in recreational activities posing inherent risks of injury have no duty to eliminate those risks, but do owe participants the duty not to unreasonably increase the risks of injury beyond those inherent in the activity.  (Avila v. Citrus Community College Dist., supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 162; Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist., supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 1003, 1005); the operator of a bumper car ride might violate its “duty to use due care not to increase the risks to a participant over and above those inherent” in the activity (Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 316) by failing to provide routine safety measures such as seat belts, functioning bumpers and appropriate speed control, but does not do so by failing to restrict the angle of bumping; conclusion: the risk of injuries from bumping was inherent in the Rue le Dodge ride, and under our precedents defendant had no duty of ordinary care to prevent injuries from such an inherent risk of the activity.  The absence of such a duty defeats plaintiff’s cause of action for negligence as a matter of law.  Plaintiff’s “willful misconduct” cause of action, which (as described by the lower court and in plaintiff’s briefing) rests on a duty to minimize head-on collisions, fails for the same reason.  Finally, in light of our conclusion defendant did not act as a common carrier for reward in operating the bumper car ride, summary judgment was also proper on the cause of action for common carrier liability (Cal. S. Ct., 31.12.2012, Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, S195031).

Responsabilité civile en droit californien (ses règles peuvent s'appliquer même dans le cas d'une relation contractuelle) : devoir de diligence : application de la théorie du "risque préalablement  assumé" à des activités récréatives non sportives. Précision sinon modification de la jurisprudence californienne. Bien qu'ordinairement chacun soit redevable d'un devoir de diligence qui impose de ne pas provoquer un risque déraisonnable de causer un dommage à autrui, certaines activités, et spécifiquement certains sports, sont intrinsèquement dangereux. Imposer un devoir d'atténuer ces dangers inhérents est susceptible de modifier la nature de l'activité ou d'inhiber une participation vigoureuse. La doctrine du "risque préalablement assumé", qui est une règle impliquant un devoir limité, s'est développée pour éviter de tels effets dissuasifs. Lorsque la doctrine s'applique à des activités récréatives, les opérateurs, les instructeurs et les participants ne doivent aux autres participants qu'un devoir d'agir de manière à ne pas augmenter le risque de dommage corporel au-delà du risque inhérent à l'activité. Selon le défendeur (le parc d'attraction qui met à disposition des pistes d'autos tamponneuses), un devoir à lui imposé de réduire le risque inhérent de se blesser en pratiquant l'auto tamponneuse aurait comme conséquence d'obliger les parcs d'attraction à éliminer ce type d'amusement et de les remplacer par des activités fondamentalement différentes, cela en contradiction avec le raisonnement appliqué par la Cour dans le cas de risque préalablement  assumé, ce raisonnement étant d'éviter que les règles de responsabilité civile de la Common law ne portent préjudice aux opportunité récréatives des Californiens. La Cour accepte ces arguments. La doctrine du risque préalablement  assumé n'est pas limitée aux activités dites sportives, mais s'applique également à d'autres activités récréatives qui impliquent pour les participants, qui pratiquent l'activité de leur plein gré, un risque inhérent de se blesser, cela lorsque le risque ne peut pas être éliminé sans altérer la nature fondamentale de l'activité. Par exemple, tenir un joueur de golf responsable pour un tir manqué n'aurait comme conséquences que d'encourager les procès et d'éloigner les intéressés de cette activité sportive. Cette théorie du risque préalablement assumé est d'application étroite. Elle est par exemple inapplicable en cas d'accident de la circulation ou en cas d'erreur médicale. Mais elle s'applique aux activités récréatives actives, parce que ces activités impliquent une dépense physique et ne sont pas essentielles à la vie quotidienne. L'existence de ces activités récréatives est ainsi particulièrement vulnérable en cas d'application d'une responsabilité pour négligence ordinaire. La doctrine s'applique ainsi à la pratique de l'auto tamponneuse, sans égard au fait que cette activité soit ou non considérée comme un sport. Est donc abandonné le moyen de défense du risque assumé sur une base consensuelle. Ce moyen de défense est ainsi abandonné au profit d'une obligation limitée, ici à charge de l'organisateur des activités d'autos tamponneuses. Il n'est pas opportun de maintenir une telle défense car obtenir un « summary judgment » serait en cas de maintien une tâche presque impossible, et le consentement au risque pourrait s'appliquer de manière extensive à des risques crées intentionnellement ou par négligence fautive, s'il venait à être démontré que l'usager connaissait ces risques. Par ailleurs, l'opérateur d'une activité d'autos tamponneuses ne peut pas être tenu au plus haut degré de diligence tel que celui qui s'applique aux transporteurs de personnes (a common carrier for reward), tels les compagnies aériennes ou les opérateurs de roller coaster. En effet, les participants au jeu des autos tamponneuses ne soumettent pas leurs vies à la diligence de l'opérateur. L'opérateur d'une attraction d'autos tamponneuses peut violer son devoir d'être suffisamment attentif à ne pas augmenter les risques inhérents à l'activité en n'offrant pas les mesures de sécurité de routine, telles que des ceintures de sécurité, des pare-chocs qui fonctionnent, ou un moyen de contrôle de la vitesse. Aucune faute n'est commise en ne réglementant pas l'angle de collision.