U.S. Supreme Court, CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., 605 U.S. 223

Foreign Sovereign Immunity

 

Personal Jurisdiction over a Foreign Sovereign

 

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

 

Immunity Exception Applies and Service of Process

 

Minimum Contacts?

 

 

 

 

Held: Personal jurisdiction exists under the FSIA when an immunity exception applies and service is proper. The FSIA does not require proof of “minimum contacts” over and above the contacts already required by the Act's enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.

 

 

Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U. S. C. §§ 1330, 1602 et seq., foreign states are generally immune from suit in United States courts, but the Act creates several exceptions. See §§ 1604, 1605–1607. And when an exception applies, § 1330(a) of the FSIA vests federal courts with “original jurisdiction” over such claims.

 

 

This suit concerns the FSIA's neighboring personal-jurisdiction provision. It provides that “personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist” whenever (1) an exception to foreign sovereign immunity applies, and (2) the foreign defendant has been properly served. § 1330(b). In the decision below, however, the Ninth Circuit imposed a third requirement: a plaintiff must also prove that the foreign state has made “minimum contacts” with the United States sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional test set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316 (1945), and its progeny. Because the Ninth Circuit's additional requirement goes beyond the text of the FSIA, we reverse.

 

 

For much of American history, foreign states and their instrumentalities enjoyed near total immunity from suit in our courts. See Hungary v. Simon, 604 U. S. 115, 118–119 (2025). This posture reflected the venerable international law principle that states are independent sovereign entities, and it encouraged others to respect the sovereignty of the United States in their courts. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling Co., 581 U. S. 170, 179 (2017). Notably, this immunity was not statutorily or constitutionally required. Instead, we have long understood foreign sovereign immunity as “a matter of grace and comity,” so judges historically “`deferred to the decisions of the political branches—in particular, those of the Executive Branch—on whether to take jurisdiction' over particular actions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities.” Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U. S. 677, 689 (2004) (quoting Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 486 (1983)). In practice, that usually entailed the State Department filing a case-specific “`suggestion of immunity’” whenever a foreign sovereign was sued, and when that occurred, the court would abide by the suggestion. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U. S. 305, 311 (2010) (quoting Ex parte Peru, 318 U. S. 578, 581 (1943)).

 

 

The Act also waives immunity for suits to confirm arbitration awards. §1605(a)(6). The arbitration exception applies in four statutorily defined contexts, including where the “agreement or award” is “governed by a treaty or other international agreement in force for the United States calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.” §1605(a)(6)(B). The United States, for instance, has acceded to the New York Convention, which requires it to enforce certain awards issued abroad. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U. S. T. 2517, T. I. A. S. No. 6997;

9 U. S. C. §§ 201–208. In such instances, and when the FSIA is otherwise satisfied, the arbitration exception would also apply.

Whenever an FSIA immunity exception applies, jurisdiction usually follows.

 

 

(…) To the extent that some or all FSIA exceptions satisfy International Shoe, it is only because the exceptions Congress wrote happen to meet that standard, not because § 1330(b) secretly incorporated our jurisdictional due-process cases.

 

 

(…) See Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 587 U. S. 1, 4–5, 8–13 (2019) (discussing § 1608's specialized service-of-process rules).

 

 

28 U. S. C. § 1330(b) provides:

 

“Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under section 1608 of this title.”

 

 

Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 451, Comment b (2017).

 

 

 

 

(U.S. Supreme Court, June 5, 2025, CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., 605 U.S. 223, J. Alito, Unanimous)

Rhode Island Supreme Court, Vermont Mutual Insurance Comp. v. New England Property Services Group, LLC, Docket No. 2023-335

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

 

Jurisdiction

 

Rhode Island Law

 

 

 

(…) We first turn our attention to NEPSG’s argument as to subject matter jurisdiction. This Court has long acknowledged that a “challenge to subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived by any party and may be raised at any time in the proceedings.” E.T. Investments, LLC v. Riley, 262 A.3d 673, 676 (R.I. 2021) (quoting Federal National Mortgage Association v. Malinou, 101 A.3d 860, 866 (R.I. 2014)). We would note at the outset that it is our view that in actuality NEPSG is not genuinely contesting the Superior Court’s jurisdiction over this matter. It is clear that the Superior Court had jurisdiction under G.L. 1956 § 8-2-14 and the Arbitration Act. Rather, NEPSG is actually questioning the nature of the appraisal process and, more specifically, whether it should be considered arbitration. Thus, it appears to us that NEPSG is questioning the authority of the Superior Court to decide this particular issue and not the court’s jurisdiction as such. Simply put, NEPSG is contending that the Superior Court improperly exercised its jurisdiction. See Cronan v. Cronan, 307 A.3d 183, 191 (R.I. 2024) (“This Court has noted* * * that the term subject-matter jurisdiction is often misused; when properly used, it refers only to a court’s power to hear and to decide a particular case, and not to whether a court, having the power to adjudicate, should exercise that power.”) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and deletion omitted); see also Pollard v. Acer Group, 870 A.2d 429, 433 (R.I. 2005) (“The term ‘lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter’ means quite simply that a given court lacks judicial power to decide a particular controversy.”).

 

 

 

(Rhode Island Supreme Court, Vermont Mutual Insurance Comp. v. New England Property Services Group, LLC, March 20, 2025, Docket No. 2023-335-Appeal)

 

 

 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Yancheng Shanda Yuanfeng Equity Investment Partnership v. Wan, Docket No. 22-1199

Recognition and Enforcement in the U.S. of a Foreign Judgment

 

Default Judgment

 

Illinois’s Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act

 

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

 

Diversity of Citizenship

 

Citizenship of a Corporation

 

Citizenship of an LLC

 

Citizenship of a Partnership

 

The Citizenship of Each Partner Must Be Established

 

 

 

 

 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois

No. 2:20-cv-02198

 

 

In May 2019, Yancheng Shanda Yuanfeng Equity Investment Partnership (“Yancheng Shanda”) filed a contract claim in a Chinese court against Kevin Wan, his company, and his brother. The Chinese court entered a default judgment against Mr. Wan after he failed to appear. In July 2020, Yancheng Shanda filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, seeking enforcement of the Chinese judgment under the Illinois foreign judgment recognition law. In that complaint, it predicated subject matter jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship.

 

 

The district court, determining that the Chinese judgment was enforceable under Illinois law, granted Yancheng Shanda’s motion for summary judgment. Mr. Wan now appeals the judgment of the district court. Because the factual predicates for the district court’s jurisdiction are not established firmly in the existing record, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 

 

Yancheng Shanda is a partnership based in Yancheng Shanda City, Jiangsu Province, People’s Republic of China. Mr. Wan is a United States citizen and the founder, owner, and chief executive officer of Zmodo Technology Shenzhen Corp., Ltd. (“Shenzhen Zmodo”), a Chinese company and global provider of security cameras.

 

 

(…) In the present action to enforce the Chinese court’s judgment, Mr. Wan maintains that he did not receive the summons mailed by the Chinese court or any other physical mail regarding the Chinese suit. He claims that he had no notice of the underlying action until August 3, 2020, when he received notice of the present attempt to enforce the judgment.

 

 

Having received a default judgment against Mr. Wan in the Chinese proceedings, Yancheng Shanda filed a complaint in the Central District of Illinois on July 13, 2020. It sought recognition and enforcement of the Chinese court’s judgment against Mr. Wan under Illinois’s Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act (“Recognition Act”), 735 ILCS 5/12-661 et seq. Invoking the district court’s diversity jurisdiction, Yancheng Shanda alleged that it was “a limited partnership organized under the laws of China” and therefore was “a citizen of a foreign state.”

 

 

The next day, the district court ordered Yancheng Shanda to make “adequate jurisdictional allegations.” The court explained that a partnership has the citizenship of all the partners and that, because Yancheng Shanda did not list its partners and their citizenships, its allegations were “insufficient to adequately establish diversity jurisdiction.” Yancheng Shanda then filed an amended complaint with an attachment alleging the Chinese citizenship of each of its four partners. Specifically, Yancheng Shanda alleged that each of its partners was a limited liability company (“LLC”) “organized under the laws of China and with its principal place of business in China.” Of particular relevance here, Yancheng Shanda alleged that one partner, Jiangsu Zhonghan Yancheng Industrial Park Investment Co., Ltd. (“Jiangsu Zhonghan”), was a Chinese LLC owned by six Chinese state or state-owned entities, each of which was “a foreign state as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).”

 

 

The information before the district court was inadequate to establish subject matter jurisdiction. Yancheng Shanda, which had the burden on this issue, failed to present “competent proof” of its citizenship. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96–97 (2010). Yancheng Shanda did not present any evidence establishing its citizenship or the citizenship of its several partners. It submitted a declaration by its employee Mei Hu who stated simply that Yancheng Shanda “is and was domiciled in Yancheng City, Jiangsu Province, People’s Republic of China.”

 

 

However, a partnership does not have a “domicile” for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Rather, to establish subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, the citizenship of each partner must be established. See Elston Inv., 731 F.2d at 439. There was no evidence in the district court record establishing the citizenship of each of Yancheng Shanda’s four Chinese LLC partners. As a result, there is no evidence to support a finding of complete diversity.

 

 

In this appeal, Yancheng Shanda presents a new declaration of employee Mei Hu. This declaration states that each of Yancheng Shanda’s partners “is a citizen of China” and further details characteristics of each partner’s business structures in an effort to establish that, as a matter of federal jurisdictional law, Yancheng Shanda’s partners are corporations and thus are considered citizens of their place of incorporation and principal place of business. Although United States LLCs are treated as partnerships for purposes of assessing diversity of citizenship, Yancheng Shanda submits that, based on our decision in BouMatic, LLC v. Idento Operations, BV, 759 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2014), Chinese LLCs should be treated as corporations for purposes of § 1332. In BouMatic, we identified factors for determining whether a foreign business entity is a “corporation” for diversity purposes, including whether the company has personhood, limited liability for shareholders, and shares that can be bought and sold subject to restrictions declared by the business. Id. at 791. The Mei Hu declaration states, albeit in summary fashion, that Chinese LLCs have these characteristics.

 

 

Classification of a foreign business entity can be difficult because other nations may use subsets of the characteristics that distinguish corporations from other business entities in the United States.” BouMatic, 759 F.3d at 791 (citation omitted). In the case of Chinese business entities, however, we already have indicated that significant care needs to be taken in determining the precise characteristics of the organization in question. See Fellowes, Inc. v. Changzhou Xinrui Fellowes Off. Equip. Co. Ltd., 759 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, in the present case, we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand the case so that the district court may explore in more depth the nature of the Chinese businesses in question and determine whether the requirements of diversity jurisdiction have been fulfilled. The district court is in a better position than this court to give the parties a plenary and even-handed opportunity to present evidence on the nature of these entities.

 

 

On remand, the district court must first address whether Yancheng Shanda’s partners can be characterized as corporations and, if so, the jurisdiction of their incorporation and of their principal place of doing business. If the district court determines that these entities do not qualify as corporations under the diversity statute, the court must treat them as partnerships. Because partnerships take the citizenship of each of their partners, the court must identify each partner’s citizenship.

 

 

Finally, the district court must address particular questions about one of the partners, Jiangsu Zhonghan, and its six state or state-owned entity owners.22

 

 

22 The exact shape of this inquiry will depend upon whether the district court determines that Jiangsu Zhonghan, as a Chinese LLC, should be treated as a corporation or a partnership under § 1332. If it is a corporation, then the district court should evaluate Jiangsu Zhonghan itself for potential status as a “foreign state” under §§ 1332(a)(4) and 1603(a). If, instead, it is a partnership, the district court will need to evaluate each of Jiangsu Zhonghan’s partners.

 

 

If this entity is directly and majority-owned by a “foreign state or political subdivision thereof,” it is itself a “foreign state” for purposes of federal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(4), 1603(a), (b)(2); Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 473–77 (2003).

 

 

 

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Jan. 31, 2023, Yancheng Shanda Yuanfeng Equity Investment Partnership v. Wan, Docket No. 22-1199)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Vincent de Fontbrune v. Alan Wofsy, Docket No. 19-16913

Recognition and Enforceability of a Foreign Judgment

 

International Diversity Case

 

Comity

 

Standing (Federal v. California Courts)

 

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

 

Service of Legal Process

 

Notice of the Proceeding

 

Mail Service

 

Summons

 

California Law

 

 

California version of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgment Recognition Act, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1713–1725

 

Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965 (“Hague Service Convention”), 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638

 

 

 

(…) Wofsy maintains that he was never served with process in the Astreinte Proceeding. Sicre de Fontbrune asserts that a huissier—a bailiff-like officer of the French court—sent the complaint and French equivalent of a summons to Wofsy through procedures consistent with the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965 (“Hague Service Convention”), 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638. The French court official requested service at addresses that the French courts already had on file: 401 China Basin Street in San Francisco, and P.O. Box 2210 in San Francisco. The U.S. process server, however, failed to effect service.

 

 

(…) Before Wofsy filed the Review Proceeding, though, Sicre de Fontbrune brought the instant action in the Superior Court of California in Alameda County in November of 2013, seeking recognition of the astreinte judgment. After Wofsy removed the action to federal court, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We reversed, holding that the astreinte was not a penalty but rather a judgment for “a sum of money” cognizable under the Recognition Act. Sicre de Fontbrune, 838 F.3d at 1007.

 

 

“In international diversity cases such as this one, ‘enforceability of judgments of courts of other countries is generally governed by the law of the state in which enforcement is sought.’” Naoko Ohno v. Yuko Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1212 (9th Cir. 2006)). In this removed action, California law—the Recognition Act—governs.

 

 

California’s Recognition Act is modeled on the 2005 version of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act. AO Alfa-Bank v. Yakovlev, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 214, 221 (Ct. App. 2018), as modified on denial of reh’g (Apr. 3, 2018); see Unif. Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act (Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on Unif. State L. 2005). Amendments to California’s Recognition Act became effective in 2018. See Alfa-Bank, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 221. But those amendments apply only to claims commenced after their effective date. Id. at 222. The district court was thus correct to apply the version of the state Recognition Act effective at the time Sicre de Fontbrune filed this action in 2013. A majority of states have adopted either the 1962 version of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, or its 2005 update. Ohno, 723 F.3d at 990 n.8. Non-California authorities that interpret the 1962 or the 2005 uniform acts, or that apply principles of comity-based recognition to foreign judgments, carry persuasive value in the application of California’s Recognition Act. Alfa-Bank, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 222–23 (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1722). “Once coverage under the Uniform Act is established,” as it has been here,7 “the presumption in favor of enforcement applies,” and the party resisting recognition must establish a ground for nonrecognition. Ohno, 723 F.3d at 991 (quoting Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1716(d)). The Recognition Act lists several grounds for nonrecognition. Some grounds, if established, preclude recognition, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1716(b), but others only confer discretion on courts to deny recognition, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1716(c).

 

 

7 Given our previous opinion, the parties no longer dispute that the 2012 Astreinte Judgment falls within the coverage of the Recognition Act. See Sicre de Fontbrune, 838 F.3d at 1007.

 

 

Public Policy

 

The California Recognition Act allows a court to decline to recognize a foreign-country money judgment if the “judgment or the cause of action or claim for relief on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of California or of the United States.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1716(c)(3). The United States undoubtedly has robust public policy favoring free expression. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (“The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine.”). But “some restriction on expression is the inherent and intended effect of every grant of copyright.” Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 327–28 (2012). The fair use defense to copyright infringement is one of the “built-in First Amendment accommodations” that ease the apparent tension between free expression and U.S. copyright law. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).

 

 

Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

 

The applicable version of the California Recognition Act provides that a court “shall not” recognize a foreign-country judgment if the “foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1716(b)(3). “Courts and commentators agree that subject matter jurisdiction must be assessed with reference to foreign law.” Tanya J. Monestier, Whose Law of Personal Jurisdiction? The Choice of Law Problem in the Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 96 B.U. L. Rev. 1729, 1747 (2016). “In determining foreign law, the court may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1; Sicre de Fontbrune, 838 F.3d at 997.

 

 

(…) The plain language of California’s Recognition Act requires a proponent of the subject matter jurisdiction defense to establish that the foreign court “did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1716(b)(3). We are aware of no authority holding that a procedural defect that produces a similar practical result can suffice.

 

 

(…) Even if we were to assess subject matter jurisdiction with reference to domestic law, we could not say that a lack of standing necessarily deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction. To be sure, a party must show the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” to vest an Article III federal court with subject matter jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). But California is one of numerous states whose judiciaries’ subject matter jurisdiction does not depend on standing. Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 426, 432 (Ct. App. 2009); Weatherford v. City of San Rafael, 395 P.3d 274, 278 (Cal. 2017) (observing that California’s “state constitution has no case or controversy requirement imposing an independent jurisdictional limitation on our standing doctrine”); Tax Found. of Hawai’i v. State, 439 P.3d 127, 143 (Haw. 2019) (collecting examples of states where “standing is a prudential concern and not an issue of subject matter jurisdiction”).

 

 

Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

 

A court applying California’s Recognition Act must refuse to recognize a foreign-country judgment if the “foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1716(b)(2). But a court shall not refuse recognition for lack of personal jurisdiction if the defendant “voluntarily appeared in the proceeding, other than for the purpose of protecting property seized or threatened with seizure in the proceeding or of contesting the jurisdiction of the court over the defendant.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1717(a)(2).

 

 

Courts applying other states’ analogues to Section 1717(a)(2) have recognized that a voluntary appearance may occur “in the proceeding” either before or after judgment. See CIBC Mellon Tr. Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp. N.V., 792 N.E.2d 155, 162 (N.Y. 2003) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 33, cmt. b) (noting that a defendant may be deemed to have submitted to a court’s jurisdiction by “taking steps in the action after judgment either in the trial court or in an appellate court”); S.C. Chimexim S.A. v. Velcro Enters. Ltd., 36 F. Supp. 2d 206, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (defense waived where one of defendant’s arguments in appellate proceedings in the foreign forum “concerned the merits of the underlying dispute”); In re Transamerica Airlines, Inc., No. CIV.A. 1039-VCP, 2007 WL 1555734, at *10 (Del. Ch. May 25, 2007) (waiver where one of defendant’s arguments on appeal went “to the merits” of the contested judgment). We have confirmed that this principle applies to California’s Recognition Act. See In re Rejuvi Lab’y, Inc., 26 F.4th 1129, 1134 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding that a defendant “waived its personal jurisdiction challenge by voluntarily appearing in the trial court that had entered a default judgment in its attempt to set aside the default judgment”).

 

 

Insufficient Notice

 

The Recognition Act provides that a court may refuse to recognize a foreign judgment if the “defendant in the proceeding in the foreign court did not receive notice of the proceeding in sufficient time to enable the defendant to defend.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1716(c)(1). The district court determined that issues of fact precluded summary judgment regarding this defense. Only Wofsy challenges that determination. The parties dispute the adequacy of two efforts at notice: a failed effort to serve the summons and complaint for the Astreinte Proceeding, and a letter that the French TGI mailed to Wofsy after the first hearing in the Astreinte Proceeding but before the TGI entered judgment.

 

 

A California Court of Appeal has held that a mere failure of actual notice does not prove the inadequate notice defense. Rather, the proponent of this defense must show the absence of notice “‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” Alfa-Bank, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 224 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). The applicable standard, in other words, aligns with the constitutional minimum for due process. See id. at 233. Under that standard, where “notice is a person’s due,” the “means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.” Id. at 225 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315).

 

 

(…) In Isack, the Court of Appeals of Michigan—interpreting the analogous provision of that state’s codification of the Uniform Act—concluded that “recognition of a judgment may be declined where the defendant was aware, or waived notice, of the litigation, but where the defendant was not notified of certain actions taken within the suit.” 733 N.W. 2d at 86–87; see also Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 484 (2018) (recognizing that “the notice requirement governs not just the initiation of a proceeding, but relevant actions taken within the suit”).

 

 

(…) We begin by considering whether the attempts to serve Wofsy before the October 2011 hearing constituted sufficient efforts at notice, despite their failure. An officer of the French TGI attempted to serve both defendants through procedures established in accordance with the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965 (“Hague Service Convention”), 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638. The Hague Service Convention was “intended to provide a simpler way to serve process abroad, to assure that defendants sued in foreign jurisdictions would receive actual and timely notice of suit, and to facilitate proof of service abroad.” Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 698 (1988). Its “primary innovation” is a requirement that each state party designate a “Central Authority” that can receive foreign requests for service of process and arrange for service on an addressee. Id. at 698–99; Hague Service Convention, 20 U.S.T. 361, art. 2.

 

 

In accordance with that procedure, the French court’s officer sent the complaint and the French equivalent of a summons to the United States’ Central Authority, and requested service on the defendants at their addresses as listed in the summons. The summons listed the address of Alan Wofsy & Associates as 401 China Basin Street in San Francisco. For Alan Wofsy himself, the summons listed Post Office Box 2210 in San Francisco. Article 6 of the Hague Convention requires the Central Authority (or another designee of the state where process is to be served) to send to the applicant for service a certificate stating the method, place, date, and recipient of service, or the reasons that have prevented service. Hague Service Convention, 20 U.S.T. 361, art. 6. Accordingly, the huissier’s requests for service also included requests for these certificates. The U.S. process server’s attempt to serve Alan Wofsy & Associates failed. The process server—a contractor of the U.S. Central Authority—issued a certificate of non-service dated August 12, 2011, attesting that service had been attempted at 401 China Basin Street; that no such address existed; and that the process server had confirmed on the U.S. Postal Service website that the address was “non deliverable.”

 

 

(The delivery trouble apparently arose from the fact that San Francisco renamed the old China Basin Street as “Terry Francois Boulevard” in the 1990s, and reassigned the name “China Basin Street” to a newly built road at some point after 2010. But it is undisputed that Wofsy continued to receive mail addressed to 401 China Basin Street for years after the Astreinte Proceeding. In any event, Sicre de Fontbrune offers no indication that Wofsy was obligated to apprise Sicre de Fontbrune or the French courts of any change of address at the time the Astreinte Proceeding commenced. Thus, there is no indication that Wofsy is to blame for the huissier’s use of an outdated address or for the process server’s failure to effect service. Cf. Alfa-Bank, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 230 (holding that a Russian court’s mail service to a defendant’s last known address was adequate notice, where the defendant was required by a surety agreement to keep his address up to date with the Russian government). (Fn. 14).)

 

 

Upon learning of a failure of notice, “deciding to take no further action is not what someone desirous of actually informing the addressee would do; such a person would take further reasonable steps if any were available.” Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 230 (2006) (internal quotation omitted). The Supreme Court accordingly held that a state failed to afford constitutionally adequate notice where the state sold a tax-delinquent property after the state’s certified-mail notice to the property owner was returned unclaimed and the state failed to take further reasonable and available steps to accomplish notice. Id. at 239. “Although the State may have made a reasonable calculation” of how to reach the property owner, the state had “good reason to suspect when the notice was returned that the addressee was ‘no better off than if the notice had never been sent.’” Id. at 230.

 

 

(…) (Quoting Malone v. Robinson, 614 A.2d 33, 37 (D.C. 1992)); see also United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 911 (9th Cir. 2003) (“When initial personal notice letters are returned undelivered, the government must make reasonable additional efforts to provide personal notice.”). Since the French huissier had requested a certificate of service in accordance with the Hague Service Convention, the absence of any confirmation of successful service signaled a problem. And the issuance of a certificate of non-service left no doubt that service had failed. It thus triggered an obligation to take any available and reasonable further steps to give notice of the proceeding to Alan Wofsy & Associates. See Jones, 547 U.S. at 230.

 

 

Before considering whether such steps were available or pursued, we turn to the process server’s attempt to inform Alan Wofsy himself. It unfolded similarly. When the Astreinte Proceeding was filed in July 2011, the U.S. Central Authority received a request to serve process at “POB 2210 San Francisco”—the address listed for Alan Wofsy on the French summons. The U.S. process server eventually issued a certificate of non-service, indicating that a server had attempted to contact Alan Wofsy at 401 China Basin Street on October 22, 2011, but had found “no such address.” The certificate of nonservice did not issue until October 31—six days after the October merits hearing in the TGI. Under these circumstances, the failed service on Alan Wofsy was as insufficient an attempt at notice as was the failed service on Alan Wofsy & Associates. The request for a certificate of service was unfulfilled at the time of the first astreinte hearing. That should have alerted the huissier that Wofsy might have lacked notice of the proceedings, and that actual notice therefore might require further reasonable efforts if any were available. Moreover, the certificate of non-service issued more than two months before the TGI entered judgment.

 

 

(…) The Supreme Court has “repeatedly recognized that mail service is an inexpensive and efficient mechanism that is reasonably calculated to provide actual notice.” Tulsa Pro. Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490 (1988). The Hague Service Convention allows mail service directly to a defendant—circumventing the Central Authority—if the receiving country has not objected to mail service and if mail service is authorized by otherwise applicable law. Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 137 S. Ct. 1504, 1513 (2017). The applicable law in California permits service via mail, with acknowledgment of receipt, at a Post Office box. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.30.

 

 

(…) 39 C.F.R.  § 265.6(d)(5)(ii) (2011) (current version at 39 C.F.R. § 265.14(d)(5)(ii)) (permitting disclosure of post office boxholder name and information to a person authorized to serve legal process).

 

 

(…) Wofsy directs us to Julen v. Larson, 101 Cal. Rptr. 796, 798 (Ct. App. 1972), for the proposition that notice, to be adequate, must be given in the “language of the jurisdiction in which the defendant is served,” among other requirements. In Julen—unlike here—the foreign legal documents were written in German, which no one argued the defendant could read. Id. And Alfa-Bank later clarified that Julen did not “define constitutional ‘requirements’ for adequate notice.” 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 232. (Fn. 16).

 

 

 

 

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, July 13, 2022, Vincent de Fontbrune v. Alan Wofsy, Docket No. 19-16913, for Publication)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Humphrey v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, Docket No. 17-3285, Precedential

RICO: Conduct committed abroad: Subject matter jurisdiction: (Jurisdiction):

(Antitrust: foreign injury, foreign entities).

(Goodwill: Property interest).

Section 1964(c) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968, creates a private right of action for a plaintiff that “is injured in his [or her] business or property” as a result of conduct that is proscribed by the statute. In RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, the Supreme Court determined that, although a litigant may file a civil suit against parties for racketeering activity committed abroad, § 1964(c)’s private right of action is only available to a litigant that can “allege and prove a domestic injury to its business or property.”

To establish liability pursuant to § 1962(c), a plaintiff must establish the existence of an enterprise that exists “separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which [the enterprise] engages.” RICO defines “enterprise” as “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” Plaintiffs can show the presence of an enterprise by pointing to a “group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.”

The Court explained that “absent clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be construed to have only domestic application.” This presumption against extraterritoriality “avoids the international discord that can result when U.S. law is applied to conduct in foreign countries.” It also ensures that Congress—rather than the judiciary—is responsible for navigating the “delicate field of international relations.” Nevertheless, the Court concluded that RICO can reach extraterritorial conduct. However, the Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) does not allow recovery for injuries suffered in foreign territories. The Court explained that “nothing in § 1964(c) provides a clear indication that Congress intended to create a private right of action for injuries suffered outside of the United States.” Thus, although RICO creates a cause of action for misconduct committed abroad, § 1964(c) requires a “domestic injury.”

(…) There is no consensus on what specific factors must be considered when deciding whether an injury is domestic or foreign.

(…) Because this case does not involve Article III standing, but rather presents an issue of statutory standing, subject matter jurisdiction is not implicated, and the parties incorrectly relied on Rule 12(b)(1).

(…) (The decision not to name GSK China as a defendant is likely an attempt to downplay ties to China.)

(…) In Cevdet Aksut Ogullari Koll. Sti. v. Cavusoglu, the district court found that a plaintiff’s principal place of business and the location of its operations were merely helpful considerations in determining whether the effects of an alleged injury were domestic or foreign. There, a Turkish corporation “asserted that its domestic business was injured because it had . . . annual sales to customers in the United States prior to transacting with the RICO enterprise.” The court held that, even if it were to assume that the plaintiff lost earnings from customers located in the United States, it nonetheless could ascertain no “domestic injury to the plaintiff’s business because its business was entirely located in and operated out of Turkey.” The “plaintiff’s injury was felt in the only place it had ever been located, in Turkey.” (245 F. Supp. 3d 650 (D.N.J. 2017).

The court’s analysis in Dandong Old N.-E. Agric. & Animal Husbandry Co. v. Hu is more analogous to our inquiry. The plaintiff there was a Chinese company that was one of the largest purchasers of soybeans produced in the United States. It alleged, inter alia, that the defendant’s RICO misconduct caused the plaintiff to lose contracts with soybean suppliers in the United States. The plaintiff claimed the loss of much of its market share and that its business operations slowed as a result of its inability to receive soybeans from U.S. suppliers at the same volume as before the defendant’s alleged misconduct. The plaintiff also alleged that it was forced to terminate 90 of its China-based employees. The court disregarded the location of the predicate acts that were alleged and instead focused only on where the plaintiff felt the effects of the alleged injury. That analysis caused the court to conclude that the plaintiff failed to establish a domestic injury. The trial court found that “any deprivation of the plaintiff’s money was felt in China. And, in sharp contrast to Elsevier, the Plaintiff was not deprived of its property in the United States because, indeed, the Plaintiff received all of the soybeans for which it contracted with U.S. suppliers.” (Dandong Old N.-E. Agric. & Animal Husbandry Co., 2017 WL 3328239 at *6). The plaintiff’s principal place of business was in China, all the terminated employees were fired in China, any expenses resulting from the alleged misconduct were paid from China, and the plaintiff’s business operated only out of China. The court found that the foreign plaintiff’s allegation that it lost prospective business opportunities from U.S. suppliers insufficient to establish that the plaintiff experienced a domestic injury because such a claim, without more, “is far too attenuated to suffice as a domestic injury under RICO.” For these reasons, the Dandong court ultimately held that “regardless of where the conspirators’ conduct took place, the plaintiff’s injury was felt in China, the only place its business had ever been located.” Although other courts have reached similar results, Dandong’s approach to determining the location of the alleged injury is particularly helpful because it is nuanced and the court considered the totality of the circumstances without relying on any single circumstance.

With this background as our guide, we must determine if Plaintiffs here have alleged a plausible domestic injury under § 1964(c). We begin with RJR Nabisco’s clear command: the analysis of whether a plaintiff has alleged a domestic injury must focus principally on where the plaintiff has suffered the alleged injury. “Nothing in § 1964(c) provides a clear indication that Congress intended to create a private right of action for injuries suffered outside of the United States.”

(…) Given the intangible nature of the alleged injuries here, our inquiry must focus primarily upon where the effects of the predicate acts were experienced. This will better allow for appropriate consideration of the nuanced nature of intangible interests.

(…) Whether an alleged injury to an intangible interest was suffered domestically is a particularly fact-sensitive question requiring consideration of multiple factors. These include, but are not limited to, where the injury itself arose; the location of the plaintiff’s residence or principal place of business; where any alleged services were provided; where the plaintiff received or expected to receive the benefits associated with providing such services; where any relevant business agreements were entered into and the laws binding such agreements; and the location of the activities giving rise to the underlying dispute.

Applying these principles to the allegations here, we have no difficulty concluding that Plaintiffs have not alleged a domestic injury. Rather, it is clear that the alleged injuries were suffered in China. As the District Court noted, at all relevant times, Plaintiffs lived in China; had their principal place of business in China; provided services in China (albeit to some American companies – but even they were operating in China); entered the Consultancy Agreement in China and agreed to have Chinese law govern it; met with Defendants’ representatives only in China.

(…) It is unclear whether an allegation of harm to goodwill constitutes a showing of “a concrete financial loss and not mere injury to a valuable intangible property interest.” Maio, 221 F.3d at 483 (fn. 101).

(…) RJR Nabisco observed that “there is good reason not to interpret § 1964(c) to cover foreign injuries just because the Clayton Act, a federal antitrust statute, does so.” RJR Nabisco, 136 S.Ct. at 2109. First, the Clayton Act explicitly authorizes foreign entities to bring suit under the statute. Id. Further, and as the Court described in F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004), the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 excludes from the reach of antitrust laws “most conduct that ‘causes only foreign injury.’” RJR Nabisco, 136 S.Ct. at 2109 (citing Empagran, 542 U.S. at 158). (Fn. 129)

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Sept. 26, 2018, Humphrey v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, Docket No. 17-3285, Precedential)

Même si le comportement illicite au sens de RICO a été commis à l’étranger, le lésé peut agir devant la cour de district fédérale. Dite cour est donc a priori compétente et la présente affaire ne pose pas de question de « jurisdiction ». Pour espérer l’emporter, le lésé doit alléguer et prouver un dommage « domestique » causé à son activité économique ou à ses biens. Si, comme en l’espèce, l’affaire présente des éléments d’extranéité, il peut être difficile de juger si le dommage est ou non « domestique ». Il le sera si, l’ensemble des circonstances ayant été considérées, nombre de ces circonstances pointent en direction des Etats-Unis et non en direction d’un état étranger. Est rappelé le principe de la présomption contre l’application extraterritoriale du droit fédéral, ladite présomption étant renversée en cas d’indication contraire du Congrès, exprimée clairement. Les circonstances importantes à considérer sont le lieu d’où le dommage est survenu, le lieu de résidence de la demanderesse, le lieu de ses activités principales, le lieu où les services ont été fournis, le lieu où la demanderesse a reçu ou devait recevoir le produit de ces services, le lieu de la conclusion du contrat, le droit applicable, et le lieu des activités à l’origine du litige.

Dans une affaire antérieure, la cour de district fédérale avait jugé que le siège de l’entreprise lésée et le lieu d’exercice de ses opérations ne sont pas dispositifs quant à déterminer si le dommage est « domestique » ou non. Dans cette affaire, une entreprise turque, au siège en Turquie, soutenait qu’une entreprise partenaire RICO avait porté préjudice à ses affaires « domestiques » (soit celles sur sol U.S.), le dommage consistant en une baisse de son chiffre d’affaires annuel aux Etats-Unis. La cour a jugé que même si tel devait être le cas, aucun dommage « domestique » n’avait été causé, du fait que les activités de l’entreprise turque étaient localisées en Turquie, menées par des opérateurs économiques en Turquie, et que le dommage avait été ressenti en Turquie uniquement.

Dans une autre affaire antérieure, la cour a considéré la totalité des circonstances et a retenu que la demanderesse RICO, une entreprise chinoise, était une des principales acheteuses de soja en provenance des U.S. La demanderesse soutenait avoir perdu des parts de marché aux Etats-Unis du fait du comportement de l’entreprise RICO, défenderesse. Elle alléguait en outre avoir en conséquence été contrainte de licencier une partie de son personnel en Chine. La cour a retenu le lieu où les effets découlant de l’illicéité ont été ressenti, soit la Chine uniquement, en précisant par ailleurs que la demanderesse avait reçu la contrepartie de tous les contrats passés avec les vendeurs U.S. L’allégation de pertes d’opportunités futures est insuffisante pour établir un dommage « domestique » au sens de RICO.

En l’espèce, la condition du dommage « domestique » n’est pas établie. Tous les points de contact sont localisés en Chine (la demanderesse est établie en Chine, lieu où elle déploie l’essentiel de ses activités commerciales, le contrat en discussion a été conclu en Chine, la loi applicable à ce contrat étant le droit chinois, et les contacts entre parties ont eu lieu en Chine).

P. v. Thomas, S185305

Venue (in California): in general, the proper venue in which to prosecute a criminal offense is the superior court of the county in which the crime was committed.  (Pen. Code, § 777.)  Penal Code section 781 provides that when a crime is committed “in part” in more than one county, or when “the acts or effects” constituting the crime or requisite to its commission occur in more than one county, the offense may be prosecuted in the superior court of any of those counties.  (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 199); defendant conceded that the Madera County Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the charges, but disputed whether Madera County was a proper venue; in general, the proper venue for the prosecution of a criminal offense is in the superior court of the county where the crime was committed.  (Pen. Code, § 777 [“Except as otherwise provided by law the jurisdiction of every public offense is in any competent court within the jurisdictional territory of which it is committed”].)  Penal Code section 691, subdivision (b) defines the “jurisdictional territory” of a superior court as “the county in which the court sits.”  The terms “venue” and “territorial jurisdiction” are synonymous, and a criminal offense generally should be prosecuted in the county in which the crime was committed.  (People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1095-1096); venue is a question of law that is governed by statute.  (People v. Posey, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 201, 209.)  “Venue does not implicate the trial court’s fundamental jurisdiction in the sense of personal jurisdiction, which is the authority of the court to proceed against a particular defendant in a criminal action.  Neither does venue implicate the trial court’s fundamental jurisdiction in the sense of subject matter jurisdiction, which is the authority of the court to consider and decide the criminal action itself.”  (Id. at p. 208.)  “ ‘If the crime is one over which California can and does exercise its legislative jurisdiction because it was committed in whole or in part within the state’s territorial borders, California courts have jurisdiction to try the defendant.  Moreover, if the charge is brought in a competent court . . . , that court, no matter where located in the state, may have subject matter jurisdiction of the offense ’ ”  (People v. Simon, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1096.)  “Venue or territorial jurisdiction establishes the proper place for trial, but . . . does not affect the power of a court to try a case.”  (Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1055.)

As past decisions recognize, venue provisions applicable to criminal proceedings serve a variety of purposes.  First, venue in the place where the crime was committed promotes the convenience of both parties in obtaining evidence and securing the presence of witnesses. Second, from the perspective of a defendant, statutory enactments that provide for trial in a county that bears a reasonable relationship to an alleged criminal offense also operate as a restriction on the discretion of the prosecution to file charges in any locale within the state that it chooses, an option that, if available, would provide the prosecution with the considerable power to choose a setting that, for whatever reason, the prosecution views as favorable to its position or hostile or burdensome to the defendant’s.  As one leading criminal treatise explains:  ‘The principal justification today for the venue requirement of trial in the vicinity of the crime is to “safeguard against the unfairness and hardship involved when an accused is prosecuted in a remote place.” ’    Finally, venue provisions also serve to protect the interests of the community in which a crime or related activity occurs, ‘vindicating the community’s right to sit in judgment on crimes committed within its territory.’ (People v. Simon, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1095.)

There are statutory exceptions to the general rule that a crime should be prosecuted in the county where it is committed.  (People v. Simon, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1094, fn. 6.)  One exception is section 781, which states:  “when a public offense is committed in part in one jurisdictional territory and in part in another, or the acts or effects thereof constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense occur in two or more jurisdictional territories, the jurisdiction of such offense is in any competent court within either jurisdictional territory”; 30 A.L.R.2d 1265, 1268 “The controlling purpose of the statute is the abrogation of the rule of the common law that when an offense was constituted by a series of acts, a part of which were done in one county and a part in another, there could be no prosecution in either, unless so much was done in the one as would constitute a complete offense”.

Section 781 is remedial and, thus, we construe the statute liberally to achieve its purpose of expanding criminal jurisdiction beyond rigid common law limits.  We therefore interpret section 781 in a commonsense manner with proper regard for the facts and circumstances of the case rather than technical niceties  (People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1118.)  The prosecution has the burden of proving the facts supporting venue by a preponderance of the evidence, and “on review, a trial court’s determination of territorial jurisdiction will be upheld as long as there is ‘some evidence’ to support its holding.”  (Id. at p. 1117.); several decisions interpreting section 781 have found proper venue in a county where “only preparatory acts have occurred” and where those preparatory acts were not themselves elements of the offense.  (People v. Simon, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1109.); [venue proper in Los Angeles County because defendant kidnapped the victims there before taking them to Kern County where he murdered one of them].)

In addition to preparatory acts, we have also held that venue can be based on the effects of preparatory acts (what we have called “preparatory effects”).  In People v. Posey, supra, 32 Cal.4th 193, a Marin County Sheriff’s detective paged the defendant in San Francisco to arrange a drug purchase.  The defendant telephoned the detective, who falsely said he was in Sonoma County when he actually was in Marin County.  The defendant agreed to sell the detective cocaine base and later completed the sale in San Francisco.  Some days later, the detective again paged the defendant, who telephoned the detective in Marin and agreed to another drug transaction in San Francisco.  We held that the defendant could be prosecuted in Marin County for the drug sales that took place in San Francisco, reasoning that just as committing “preparatory acts” in the charging county is sufficient to establish venue under section 781, “by the same token, the words ‘effects . . . requisite to the consummation’ of a crime establishing venue in a county should be liberally construed to embrace preparatory effects, such as the placement of a telephone call into a county leading to a crime” in another county.  (People v. Posey, supra, at p. 219.)

Other cases have held that a defendant who commits a crime in one county with effects in another county that are “requisite to . . . the achievement of the defendant’s unlawful purpose” may be tried in the latter county under section 781, even though the effects were not elements of the offense.  (People v. Megladdery (1940) 40 Cal.App.2d 748, 775 (Megladdery); in Megladdery, an attorney acting as an agent of the defendant repeated the solicitation of the bribe in Alameda County.  This fact, the court held, was sufficient to support the conclusion that “acts requisite to the achievement or end of the unlawful purpose occurred in Alameda County,” thereby establishing venue in Alameda County under section 781.  (Megladdery, at p. 780.)

The court in Megladdery relied upon People v. Graves (1934) 137 Cal.App.1, in which the court held that the defendant, a member of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, could be prosecuted in Los Angeles for receiving a bribe in San Francisco to influence his vote on a flood control issue.  The Megladdery court observed that “the dishonest vote was not an essential part of the crimes charged, and the crime was complete before the vote was given, but, nevertheless, it was held, and properly so, that Los Angeles had jurisdiction — the vote was a legal effect of the corrupt agreement, and that gave Los Angeles jurisdiction.”  (Megladdery, supra, 40 Cal.App.2d at p. 775.); permitting this case to be tried in Madera County satisfies the purposes of the venue requirement.  It “ ‘promotes the convenience of both parties in obtaining evidence and securing the presence of witnesses.’”  (People v. Simon, supra, 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1095); there was no danger that defendant would be “ ‘ “prosecuted in a remote place.” ’”  (Ibid.)  And trial in Madera protected “the interests of the community in which a crime or related activity occurs.”  (Ibid.)  The interests of the citizens in Madera County in punishing defendant for possessing cocaine to be sold in their community and for possessing a firearm to facilitate those drug sales are at least as strong as the interests of the citizens in Fresno County in punishing defendant for storing drugs and a firearm in their midst; section 781 is remedial and is thus construed liberally.  (People v. Posey, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 218; People v. Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1118.)  (Cal. S. Ct., 03.05.12, P. v. Thomas, S185305).

Notion de « venue » en droit pénal californien : quel est le Tribunal localement compétent lorsqu’est donnée la compétence personnelle et matérielle du Tribunal pénal de l’état ? Autrement dit, quel Tribunal de comté est compétent ? De manière générale, la « venue » appropriée pour la poursuite et le jugement d’une infraction pénale est la cour supérieure du comté dans lequel l’infraction a été commise (cf. Code pénal de Californie, §777). La Section 781 du Code pénal dispose que lorsqu’un crime est commis en partie dans plus d’un comté, ou lorsque les actes ou les effets constituants le crime ou nécessaires à sa commission se produisent dans plus d’un comté, l’infraction peut-être poursuivie et jugée devant la cour supérieure de chacun de ces comtés. En l’espèce, le prévenu admet que la cour supérieure du comté de Madera a juridiction matérielle s’agissant des infractions en cause, mais conteste que le comté de Madera soit une « venue » adéquate. En général donc, la « venue » adéquate pour la poursuite d’une infraction pénale est la cour supérieure du comté où l’infraction a été commise. Le Code pénal définit la compétence territoriale de la cour supérieure : la cour est compétente pour le comté dans lequel elle siège. Dans le Code, les termes « venue » et « territorial jurisdiction » sont synonymes. La détermination de la « venue » appropriée est une question de droit régie par la législation au sens formel. La notion de « venue » est indépendante de la question de la compétence fondamentale de la cour sur la personne (personal jurisdiction), laquelle est l’autorité de la cour de poursuivre un prévenu déterminé. La notion de « venue » est également indépendante de la question de la compétence fondamentale de la cour au sens de sa compétence matérielle (subject matter jurisdiction), laquelle est l’autorité de la cour de juger l’infraction au fond si celle-ci a été commise en Californie. La notion de « venue » se limite à déterminer le lieu où le procès pénal de première instance aura lieu, sans affecter la compétence du Tribunal de se saisir d’un cas. Comme l’a établi la jurisprudence, les dispositions applicables à la « venue » en procédure pénale servent différents objectifs. Tout d’abord, « venue » au lieu où l’infraction a été commise est pratique pour les deux parties en ce sens qu’est facilitée l’obtention des preuves et la présence des témoins aux audiences. Ensuite, du point de vue du prévenu, une loi qui prévoit la tenue du procès pénal dans un comté raisonnablement lié à l’infraction alléguée restreint ce qui serait autrement la discrétion de l’accusation de poursuivre l’affaire devant n’importe quel Tribunal de l’état, option qui, si elle était disponible, permettrait au Procureur de choisir un lieu qu’il considère comme favorable à sa position ou comme hostile à la position du prévenu, ou impliquant des difficultés pour ledit prévenu d’assurer sa défense. Actuellement, la principale justification des exigences résultant de la notion de « venue », (l’exigence de proximité du lieu du procès avec le lieu de commission de l’infraction), est de prévenir l’iniquité et le fardeau qui résulterait de la poursuite pénale en un lieu éloigné du lieu de l’infraction. Enfin, la législation sur la « venue » sert à protéger les intérêts de la communauté dans laquelle l’infraction ou une activité liée à l’infraction s’est produite, de manière à ne pas priver dite communauté du droit de siéger dans une cour de justice jugeant les infractions commises dans les limites de son territoire. Il existe cependant des exceptions légales à la règle générale selon laquelle une infraction doit être poursuivie et jugée dans le comté où elle a été commise. L’une de ces exceptions est prévue à la Section 781, qui dispose que lorsqu’une infraction a été commise en partie dans un territoire juridictionnel et en partie dans un autre, ou que les actes ou les effets constitutifs de l’infraction ou préparant sa commission se sont produits dans deux ou plusieurs territoires juridictionnels, la compétence de juger de telles infractions est donnée à toute cour compétente à l’intérieur de chacun de ces territoires juridictionnels. Le but de la Section 781 est l’abrogation de la règle de la Common law qui disposait que lorsqu’une infraction était consommée par une série d’actes, une partie desquels s’étant produits dans un comté et une partie dans un autre comté, aucune poursuite pénale n’était possible, ni dans l’un ni dans l’autre de ces comtés, à moins que les actes commis dans l’un des comtés suffisent à constituer une infraction. La Section 781 a nature de remède, de sorte que la Cour Suprême de Californie l’interprète de manière libérale pour réaliser le but d’étendre la compétence juridictionnelle pénale au-delà des limites rigides de la Common law. C’est pourquoi la Cour interprète la Section 781 d’une manière conforme au sens commun, en considérant les faits et les circonstances du cas plutôt que des considérations techniques difficiles à appréhender. L’accusation supporte le fardeau de prouver les faits qui satisfont aux critères de « venue ». Le test est celui de la prépondérance des preuves. En cas de recours à ce niveau, les déterminations de la cour de première instance portant sur la juridiction territoriale seront confirmées aussi longtemps qu’existent « certaines preuves » à l’appui de la décision de première instance. Plusieurs décisions interprétant la Section 781 ont jugé comme adéquate la « venue » dans un comté où seuls des actes préparatoires s’étaient produits, et où ces actes préparatoires n’étaient pas en eux-mêmes des éléments de l’infraction (par exemple dans un cas la « venue » dans le comté de Los Angeles était adéquate parce que le prévenu avait kidnappé ses victimes dans ce comté avant de les conduire dans le comté de Kern, où il tua l’une d’elles). Par ailleurs, la Cour Suprême de Californie a jugé qu’une « venue » adéquate pouvait être basée sur les effets des actes préparatoires (appelés les effets préparatoires). Dans la décision People v. Posey, un officier des forces de l’ordre de Marin County avait arrangé un rendez-vous à San Francisco avec le prévenu pour acheter de la drogue. Le prévenu téléphona à l’officier, qui répondit volontairement de manière erronée, indiquant qu’il se trouvait dans le comté de Sonoma alors qu’il se trouvait dans le comté de Marin. Le prévenu accepta de vendre à l’officier de la cocaïne base, et la vente eu lieu plus tard à San Francisco. Quelques jours plus tard, l’officier contacta à nouveau le prévenu, qui téléphona à l’officier, lequel se trouvait dans le comté de Marin, et il accepta de conclure une nouvelle vente de drogue à San Francisco. La Cour jugea que le prévenu pouvait être poursuivi et jugé dans le comté de Marin pour les ventes de drogue effectuées à San Francisco, exposant que la commission des actes préparatoires dans le comté de la poursuite pénale suffisait à établir « venue » sous l’angle de la section 781. Dans d’autres cas, des cours ont jugé que le prévenu qui commet une infraction dans un comté avec des effets dans un autre comté, qui complètent le but illicite poursuivi par le prévenu, peut être jugé dans ce dernier comté selon la Section 781, même si les effets ne sont pas des éléments constitutifs de l’infraction. Dans la décision Megladdery, datant de 1940, une cour d’appel jugea qu’un avocat, agissant comme agent du prévenu, répéta un acte de tentative de corruption dans le comté d’Alameda. La cour d’appel continua son raisonnement en exposant que ce fait était suffisant pour supporter la conclusion que les actes liés à la consommation du but contraire à la loi s’étaient produits dans le comté d’Alameda, établissant ainsi « venue » dans ledit  comté d’Alameda selon la section 781. Pour rendre sa décision dans l’affaire Megladdery, la cour d’appel s’était inspirée d’une autre affaire jugée par une autre cour d’appel en 1934 qui avait disposé que le prévenu, membre du Board of Supervisors du comté de Los Angeles, pouvait être poursuivi à Los Angeles pour avoir reçu à San Francisco un avantage provenant d’un acte de corruption en vue d’influencer son vote sur une question de contrôle des inondations. La cour Megladerry observa que ce vote malhonnête ne constituait pas une part essentielle de l’infraction poursuivie, et que l’infraction était consommée avant le vote. Nonobstant, la cour précisa que le Tribunal de première instance de Los Angeles était compétent, le vote constituant un effet juridique de l’accord de corruption, ce qui confère compétence à dite cour de Los Angeles. La Cour Suprême rappelle encore une fois que le but des conditions pour admettre une « venue » est de rendre pratique, pour les deux parties, l’obtention des moyens de preuve, d’assurer la présence des témoins, d’éviter que le prévenu ne soit poursuivi en un for éloigné, et de protéger les intérêts de la communauté dans laquelle une infraction ou des activités liées à l’infraction se sont produits. Par exemple, les intérêts des citoyens du comté de Madera à la punition du prévenu pour possession de cocaïne en vue de sa vente dans leur communauté et pour possession d’une arme à feu en vue de faciliter ces ventes de drogue sont au moins aussi forts que les intérêts des citoyens du comté de Fresno à la punition du prévenu pour possession de drogue et d’une arme à feu dans leur communauté. La Section 781 revêt nature de remède, et est ainsi interprétée de manière libérale.