South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., Docket No. 17-494

Sales of goods: Tax: Sales tax: Use tax: Commerce clause: Interstate commerce: E-commerce: Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement: Stare decisis: Fortas, J.: Gorsuch, J.:

When a consumer purchases goods or services, the consumer’s State often imposes a sales tax. This case requires the Court to determine when an out-of-state seller can be required to collect and remit that tax. All concede that taxing the sales in question here is lawful. The question is whether the out-of-state seller can be held responsible for its payment, and this turns on a proper interpretation of the Commerce Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3.

In two earlier cases the Court held that an out-of-state seller’s liability to collect and remit the tax to the consumer’s State depended on whether the seller had a physical presence in that State, but that mere shipment of goods into the consumer’s State, following an order from a catalog, did not satisfy the physical presence requirement. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U. S. 753 (1967); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298 (1992). The Court granted certiorari here to reconsider the scope and validity of the physical presence rule mandated by those cases.

Under this Court’s decisions in Bellas Hess and Quill, South Dakota may not require a business to collect its sales tax if the business lacks a physical presence in the State. Without that physical presence, South Dakota instead must rely on its residents to pay the use tax owed on their purchases from out-of-state sellers. “The impracticability of this collection from the multitude of individual purchasers is obvious.” National Geographic Soc. v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U. S. 551, 555 (1977). And consumer compliance rates are notoriously low.

(…) This Court’s doctrine has developed further with time. Modern precedents rest upon two primary principles that mark the boundaries of a State’s authority to regulate interstate commerce. First, state regulations may not discriminate against interstate commerce; and second, States may not impose undue burdens on interstate commerce. State laws that discriminate against interstate commerce face “a virtually per se rule of invalidity.” Granholm v. Heald, 544 U. S. 460, 476 (2005). State laws that “regulate even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest . . . will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970). Although subject to exceptions and variations, see, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794 (1976); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U. S. 573 (1986), these two principles guide the courts in adjudicating cases challenging state laws under the Commerce Clause.

These principles also animate the Court’s Commerce Clause precedents addressing the validity of state taxes. The Court explained the now-accepted framework for state taxation in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274 (1977). The Court held that a State “may tax exclusively interstate commerce so long as the tax does not create any effect forbidden by the Commerce Clause.” Id., at 285. After all, “interstate commerce may be required to pay its fair share of state taxes.” D. H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U. S. 24, 31 (1988). The Court will sustain a tax so long as it (1) applies to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the services the State provides. See Complete Auto, supra, at 279.

Before Complete Auto, the Court had addressed a challenge to an Illinois tax that required out-of-state retailers to collect and remit taxes on sales made to consumers who purchased goods for use within Illinois. Bellas Hess, 386 U. S., at 754–755. The Court held that a mail-order company “whose only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier or the United States mail” lacked the requisite minimum contacts with the State required by both the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause. Id., at 758. Unless the retailer maintained a physical presence such as “retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a State,” the State lacked the power to require that retailer to collect a local use tax. Ibid. The dissent disagreed: “There should be no doubt that this large-scale, systematic, continuous solicitation and exploitation of the Illinois consumer market is a sufficient ‘nexus’ to require Bellas Hess to collect from Illinois customers and to remit the use tax.” Id., at 761–762 (opinion of Fortas, J., joined by Black and Douglas, JJ.).

In 1992, the Court reexamined the physical presence rule in Quill. That case presented a challenge to North Dakota’s “attempt to require an out-of-state mail-order house that has neither outlets nor sales representatives in the State to collect and pay a use tax on goods purchased for use within the State.” 504 U. S., at 301. Despite the fact that Bellas Hess linked due process and the Commerce Clause together, the Court in Quill overruled the due process holding, but not the Commerce Clause holding; and it thus reaffirmed the physical presence rule. 504 U. S., at 307–308, 317–318.

The physical presence rule has “been the target of criticism over many years from many quarters.” Direct Mar­keting Assn. v. Brohl, 814 F. 3d 1129, 1148, 1150–1151 (CA10 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Quill, it has been said, was “premised on assumptions that are unfounded” and “riddled with internal inconsistencies.” Rothfeld, Quill: Confusing the Commerce Clause, 56 Tax Notes 487, 488 (1992). Quill created an inefficient “online sales tax loophole” that gives out-of-state businesses an advantage. A. Laffer & D. Arduin, Pro-Growth Tax Reform and E-Fairness 1, 4 (July 2013). And “while nexus rules are clearly necessary,” the Court “should focus on rules that are appropriate to the twenty-first century, not the nineteenth.” Hellerstein, Deconstructing the Debate Over State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 13 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 549, 553 (2000). Each year, the physical presence rule becomes further removed from economic reality and results in significant revenue losses to the States. These critiques underscore that the physical presence rule, both as first formulated and as applied today, is an incorrect interpretation of the Commerce Clause.

Quill is flawed on its own terms. First, the physical presence rule is not a necessary interpretation of the requirement that a state tax must be “applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State.” Com­plete Auto, 430 U. S., at 279. Second, Quill creates rather than resolves market distortions. And third, Quill imposes the sort of arbitrary, formalistic distinction that the Court’s modern Commerce Clause precedents disavow.

(…) For example, a company with a website accessible in South Dakota may be said to have a physical presence in the State via the customers’ computers. A website may leave cookies saved to the customers’ hard drives, or customers may download the company’s app onto their phones. Or a company may lease data storage that is permanently, or even occasionally, located in South Dakota. Cf. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 584 U. S. ___ (2018) (per curiam).

(…) The physical presence rule as defined and enforced in Bellas Hess and Quill is not just a technical legal problem—it is an extraordinary imposition by the Judiciary on States’ authority to collect taxes and perform critical public functions. Forty-one States, two Territories, and the District of Columbia now ask this Court to reject the test formulated in Quill.

(…) Yet the physical presence rule undermines that necessary confidence by giving some online retailers an arbitrary advantage over their competitors who collect state sales taxes.

(…) “Although we approach the reconsideration of our decisions with the utmost caution, stare decisis is not an inexorable command.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 233 (2009) (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U. S. 3, 20 (1997)). Here, stare decisis can no longer support the Court’s prohibition of a valid exercise of the States’ sovereign power.

(…) Further, the real world implementation of Commerce Clause doctrines now makes it manifest that the physical presence rule as defined by Quill must give way to the “far-reaching systemic and structural changes in the economy” and “many other societal dimensions” caused by the Cyber Age. Direct Marketing, 575 U. S., at ___ (KENNEDY, J., concurring) (slip op., at 3). Though Quill was wrong on its own terms when it was decided in 1992, since then the Internet revolution has made its earlier error all the more egregious and harmful.

(…) For these reasons, the Court concludes that the physical presence rule of Quill is unsound and incorrect. The Court’s decisions in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298 (1992), and National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U. S. 753 (1967), should be, and now are, overruled.

In the absence of Quill and Bellas Hess, the first prong of the Complete Auto test simply asks whether the tax applies to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State. 430 U. S., at 279. “Such a nexus is established when the taxpayer [or collector] ‘avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business’ in that jurisdiction.” Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U. S. 1, 11 (2009). Here, the nexus is clearly sufficient based on both the economic and virtual contacts respondents have with the State. The Act applies only to sellers that deliver more than $100,000 of goods or services into South Dakota or engage in 200 or more separate transactions for the delivery of goods and services into the State on an annual basis. S. B. 106, §1. This quantity of business could not have occurred unless the seller availed itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business in South Dakota. And respondents are large, national companies that undoubtedly maintain an extensive virtual presence. Thus, the substantial nexus requirement of Complete Auto is satisfied in this case.

The question remains whether some other principle in the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine might invalidate the Act. Because the Quill physical presence rule was an obvious barrier to the Act’s validity, these issues have not yet been litigated or briefed, and so the Court need not resolve them here. That said, South Dakota’s tax system includes several features that appear designed to prevent discrimination against or undue burdens upon interstate commerce. First, the Act applies a safe harbor to those who transact only limited business in South Dakota. Second, the Act ensures that no obligation to remit the sales tax may be applied retroactively. S. B. 106, §5. Third, South Dakota is one of more than 20 States that have adopted the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement. This system standardizes taxes to reduce administrative and compliance costs: It requires a single, state level tax administration, uniform definitions of products and services, simplified tax rate structures, and other uniform rules. It also provides sellers access to sales tax administration software paid for by the State. Sellers who choose to use such software are immune from audit liability. Any remaining claims regarding the application of the Commerce Clause in the absence of Quill and Bellas Hess may be addressed in the first instance on remand.

(U.S.S.C., June 21, 2018, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., Docket No. 17-494, J. Kennedy)

A la lumière de la « Commerce Clause », U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3, un état, domicile de l’acheteur, peut-il exiger d’un vendeur sis en un autre état de percevoir et de régler la taxe de vente ?

Dans deux décisions précédentes (Bellas Hess et Quill), la Cour a répondu par l’affirmative, mais à la condition que le vendeur dispose d’une présence physique dans l’état de l’acheteur. La simple expédition des biens, après un achat sur catalogue, ne satisfaisait pas à la condition de la présence physique.

Sans présence physique du vendeur sur son sol, l’état de l’acheteur devait récupérer la « sales tax » auprès de chaque acheteur individuel, un système qualifié d’impraticable.

Dans sa décision « Complete Auto » rendue en 1977, la Cour a jugé qu’un état était compétent pour taxer le commerce entre états (et lui seul), à condition de ne pas créer d’effets interdits par la « Commerce Clause ». De la sorte, une telle taxe doit s’appliquer à une activité en lien substantiel avec l’état de perception, doit être répartie équitablement entre les débiteurs, ne doit pas discriminer le commerce entre états à l’avantage du commerce local, et doit être équitablement liée aux services apportés par l’état de perception.

La jurisprudence Bellas Hess et Quill a fait l’objet de nombreuses critiques, auxquelles se sont joints les Juges Fortas et Gorsuch dans diverses opinions. Elle a été vue comme créant un avantage concurrentiel en faveur du commerce électronique provenant d’un autre état que celui de l’acheteur. Ces critiques soutiennent que la règle de la présence physique résulte d’une interprétation incorrecte de la Commerce Clause.

Par exemple, une entreprise qui maintient un site Internet peut être qualifiée d’entreprise avec présence physique dans un autre état que celui de son siège, par le biais des ordinateurs des clients.

En conséquence, Bellas Hess et Quill sont ici reconsidérés, et « overruled », ce que n’empêche pas le principe « stare decisis ». Reste donc essentiellement applicable le premier élément du test posé par la décision Complete Auto, à savoir la condition que la taxe soit imposée à une activité présentant un lien substantiel avec l’état qui taxe. Un tel lien est établi quand le débiteur de la taxe profite des conditions que l’état met à sa disposition pour permettre son activité commerciale. En l’espèce, ce lien est clairement suffisant considérant les contacts économiques et virtuels avec l’état de l’acheteur : la loi qui prévoit la taxe ne s’applique qu’aux vendeurs qui délivrent plus de 100'000 dollars dans l’état de l’acheteur, ou qui participent à plus de 200 transactions individuelles par année dans dit état.

(L’espèce mentionne encore le « Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement », adopté par plus de 20 états. Ce système standardise les taxes pour réduire les coûts administratifs. Il ne requiert au niveau de l’état qu’une seule administration fiscale, prévoit des définitions uniformes de produits et services, et prévoit d’autres règles de simplification).

L’affaire est renvoyée à l’autorité inférieure pour déterminer si d’autres principes découlant de la Commerce Clause sont susceptibles d’annuler la loi qui prévoit la taxe litigieuse.

Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, Docket 13-485

The Commerce Clause grants Congress power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. These “few simple words . . . reflected a central concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.” Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322, 325–326 (1979). Although the Clause is framed as a positive grant of power to Congress, “we have consistently held this language to contain a further, negative command, known as the dormant Commerce Clause, prohibiting certain state taxation even when Congress has failed to legislate on the subject.” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n  v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U. S. 175, 179 (1995).

This interpretation of the Commerce Clause has been disputed. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U. S. 564, 609–620 (1997) (THOMAS, J., dissenting); Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U. S. 232, 259–265 (1987) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); License Cases, 5 How. 504, 578–579 (1847) (Taney, C. J.). But it also has deep roots. See, e.g., Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232, 279–280 (1873); Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia ex rel. Soc. for Relief of Distressed Pilots, 12 How. 299, 318–319 (1852); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 209 (1824) (Marshall, C. J.). By prohibiting States from discriminating against or imposing excessive burdens on interstate commerce without congressional approval, it strikes at one of the chief evils that led to the adoption of the Constitution, namely, state tariffs and other laws that burdened interstate commerce. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U. S. 325, 330–331 (1996); Hughes, supra, at 325; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 280 (1876); see also The Federalist Nos. 7, 11 (A. Hamilton), and 42 (J. Madison).

Under our precedents, the dormant Commerce Clause precludes States from “discriminating between transactions on the basis of some interstate element.” Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U. S. 318, 332,

n. 12 (1977). This means, among other things, that a State “may not tax a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the State.” Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U. S. 638, 642 (1984). “Nor may a State impose a tax which discriminates against interstate commerce either by providing a direct commercial advantage to local business, or by subjecting interstate commerce to the burden of ‘multiple taxation.’” Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U. S. 450, 458 (1959).

The discarded distinction between taxes on gross receipts and net income was based on the notion, endorsed in some early cases, that a tax on gross receipts is an impermissible “direct and immediate burden” on interstate commerce, whereas a tax on net income is merely an “indirect and incidental” burden. United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321, 328–329 (1918); see also Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37, 57 (1920). This arid distinction between direct and indirect burdens allowed “very little coherent, trustworthy guidance as to tax validity.” 2 Trost §9:1, at 212. And so, beginning with Justice Stone’s seminal opinion in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250 (1938), and continuing through cases like J. D. Adams and Gwin, White, the direct-indirect burdens test was replaced with a more practical approach that looked to the economic impact of the tax. These cases worked “a substantial judicial reinterpretation of the power of the States to levy taxes on gross income from interstate commerce.” 1 Trost §2:20, at 175. After a temporary reversion to our earlier formalism, see Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U. S. 602 a wide arc, recently reaching the place where taxation of gross receipts from interstate commerce is placed on an equal footing with receipts from local business, in Com­plete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, 2 Trost §9:1, at 212. And we have now squarely rejected the argument that the Commerce Clause distinguishes between taxes on net and gross income. See Jefferson Lines, 514 U. S., at 190 (explaining that the Court in Central Greyhound “understood the gross receipts tax to be simply a variety of tax on income”); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S. 267, 280 (1978) (rejecting a suggestion that the Commerce Clause distinguishes between gross receipts taxes and net income taxes); id., at 281 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the Court that, for purposes of constitutional review, there is no distinction between a corporate income tax and a gross-receipts tax”); Complete Auto, supra, at 280 (upholding a gross receipts tax and rejecting the notion that the Commerce Clause places “a blanket prohibition against any state taxation imposed directly on an interstate transaction”). The principal dissent mischaracterizes the import of the Court’s statement in Moorman that a gross receipts tax is “ ‘more burdensome’ ” than a net income tax. Post, at 13. This was a statement about the relative economic impact of the taxes (a gross receipts tax applies regardless of whether the corporation makes a profit). It was not, as Justice Brennan confirmed in dissent, a suggestion that net income taxes are subject to lesser constitutional scrutiny than gross receipts taxes. Indeed, we noted in Moorman that “the actual burden on interstate commerce would have been the same had Iowa imposed a plainly valid gross-receipts tax instead of the challenged net income tax.” Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S. 267, 280–281 (1978).

For its part, petitioner distinguishes J. D. Adams, Gwin, White, and Central Greyhound on the ground that they concerned the taxation of corporations, not individuals. But it is hard to see why the dormant Commerce Clause should treat individuals less favorably than corporations. See Camps Newfound, 520 U. S., at 574 (“A tax on real estate, like any other tax, may impermissibly burden interstate commerce”). In addition, the distinction between individuals and corporations cannot stand because the taxes invalidated in J. D. Adams and Gwin, White applied to the income of both individuals and corporations. See Ind. Stat. Ann., ch. 26, §64–2602 (Burns 1933) (tax in J. D. Adams); 1935 Wash. Sess. Laws ch.180, Tit. II, §4(e), pp. 710–711 (tax in Gwin, White).

(…) This argument confuses what a State may do without violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment with what it may do without violating the Commerce Clause. The Due Process Clause allows a State to tax “all the income of its residents, even income earned outside the taxing jurisdiction.” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U. S. 450, 462–463 (1995). But “while a State may, consistent with the Due Process Clause, have the authority to tax a particular taxpayer, imposition of the tax may nonetheless violate the Commerce Clause.” Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298, 305 (1992) (rejecting a due process challenge to a tax before sustaining a Commerce Clause challenge to that tax).

There is no merit to petitioner’s argument that Maryland is free to adopt any tax scheme that is not actually intended to discriminate against interstate commerce. Reply Brief 7. The Commerce Clause regulates effects, not motives, and it does not require courts to inquire into voters’ or legislators’ reasons for enacting a law that has a discriminatory effect. See, e.g., Associated Industries of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U. S. 641, 653 (1994); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617, 626– 627 (1978); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U. S. 333, 352–353 (1977).

Our cases have held that tax schemes may be invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause even absent a showing of actual double taxation. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vt., 445 U. S. 425, 444 (1980); Gwin, White, 305 U. S., at 439. We note, however, that petitioner does not dispute that respondents have been subject to actual multiple taxation in this case.

Books: 14 A W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations (rev. ed. 2008 and Cum. Supp. 2014–2015); The Federalist Nos. 7, 11 (A. Hamilton), and 42 (J. Madison); 2 C. Trost & P. Hartman, Federal Limitations on State and Local Taxation 2d (2003); 2 J. Hellerstein & W. Hellerstein, State Taxation (3d ed. 2003); Mason, Made in America for European Tax: The Internal Consistency Test, 49 Boston College L. Rev. 1277, 1310 (2008); R. Blakey, State Income Taxation 1 (1930).

(U.S.S.Ct., May 18, 2015, Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, Docket 13-485, J. Alito).

La Clause du Commerce de la Constitution fédérale attribue au Congrès la compétence de réglementer le commerce entre les différents états. Cette clause reflète une préoccupation centrale des rédacteurs de la Constitution, et elle constitue la raison directe de la convocation de la constituante. Elle résulte de la conviction que pour perdurer, la nouvelle Union devait se donner les moyens d’éviter tout dérapage en direction d’une balkanisation économique, laquelle avait déjà porté préjudice aux relations entre les Colonies et plus tard entre les états sous l’autorité des « Articles of Confederation ». Bien que la Clause soit formulée en termes d’attribution positive de compétence en faveur du Congrès, la présente Cour a jugé de manière constante que le langage de la Clause contient une directive négative, connue sous le nom de Clause du Commerce dormante, interdisant aux états de procéder à certains prélèvements fiscaux, même lorsque le Congrès n’a pas légiféré dans le domaine concerné par la taxation.

Il est vrai que cette interprétation de la Clause du Commerce a été disputée. Mais elle a aussi des racines profondes. En interdisant aux états d’établir des discriminations en matière de commerce entre états, ou en leur interdisant d’imposer des charges excessives à ce commerce, sans l’approbation du Congrès, la Clause du Commerce s’oppose à l’un des principaux préjudice qui avait conduit à l’adoption de la Constitution fédérale, à savoir l’imposition mise en place par des états et la promulgation d’autres lois par ces états ayant pour effet de freiner le commerce entre états.

Selon la jurisprudence de la Cour, la Clause du Commerce dormante interdit aux états la mise en place de mesures discriminatoires s’agissant de transactions qui présentent un caractère interétatique. Ce principe implique entre autres qu’un état ne peut pas taxer une transaction ou une autre occurrence plus lourdement en cas de composante interétatique qu’en l’absence d’une telle composante. Un état ne peut pas davantage imposer une taxe qui entraîne une discrimination dirigée contre le commerce entre états, soit en procurant un avantage commercial direct en faveur des commerçants locaux, soit en chargeant le commerce entre états de multiples taxes.

La distinction, qui n’est pas à considérer en l’espèce, entre la taxation « on gross receipts » (un impôt sur le revenu total brut d’une entreprise, quelque soit sa source. Des économistes auraient critiqué ce type d’imposition en ce qu’il favoriserait une intégration verticale des entreprises, et en ce qu’il discriminerait suivant le type d’activité commerciale) et la taxation du revenu net, était basée sur la notion, reconnue dans des jurisprudences anciennes mais rejetée depuis, qu’une taxe sur le revenu brut constitue une charge interdite, directe et immédiate, en défaveur du commerce entre états, alors qu’une taxe sur le revenu net ne constitue qu’une charge indirecte et incidente. Cette distinction, qualifiée d’aride par la Cour, entre des charges directes et indirectes, n’éclaire guère en matière de validité de l’imposition en général.

Ainsi, la jurisprudence a évolué. Le test de la charge directe respectivement indirecte a été remplacé par une approche plus pratique basée sur l’impact économique de l’impôt. La jurisprudence rendue au fil du temps a substantiellement réinterprété la notion de la compétence des états de prélever l’impôt sur le revenu brut dérivant du commerce entre états. La Cour a finalement clairement rejeté l’argument selon lequel la Clause du Commerce distinguerait entre les impôts sur le revenu brut et ceux sur le revenu net («gross receipts tax» s’analyse simplement en une variété d’impôt sur le revenu ; la Clause du Commerce ne distingue nullement entre la notion de « gross receipts tax » et la notion d’impôt sur le revenu net). Cette analyse s’applique aussi s’agissant de l’imposition des personnes morales. Dans cette affaire, la principale opinion dissidente se trompe dans sa compréhension d’un considérant tiré de la jurisprudence Moorman, qui exposait qu’un « gross receipts tax » serait plus contraignant qu’un impôt sur le revenu net. Moorman se limitait à considérer l’impact économique relatif de l’impôt (un « gross receipts tax » s’applique sans considérer si l’entreprise produit ou non un profit). La jurisprudence Moorman poursuit en soutenant que la charge effective sur le commerce interétatique aurait été la même si l’état de l’Iowa avait imposé un « gross receipts tax » (conforme au droit) au lieu d’un impôt sur le revenu net (objet d’une contestation). La Clause du Commerce dormante ne saurait traiter les personnes physiques moins favorablement que les personnes morales (un impôt foncier, comme tout autre impôt, est susceptible de contraindre illicitement le commerce entre états).

La « Due Process Clause » du Quatorzième Amendement permet à un état d’imposer l’ensemble du revenu de ses résidents, y compris le revenu gagné à l’extérieur de la juridiction de l’autorité de taxation. Mais si un état peut, conformément à la Due Process Clause, disposer de la compétence d’imposer un contribuable particulier, la décision d’imposition est susceptible cependant de porter atteinte à la Clause du Commerce.

Est dépourvu de mérite l’argument selon lequel un état serait libre d’adopter n’importe quel système d’imposition qui ne viserait pas à discriminer à l’encontre du commerce interétatique. La Clause du Commerce réglemente les effets, et non les motifs, et elle n’impose pas aux Tribunaux de considérer les raisons qui ont motivé les votants ou le législateur à promulguer une loi pourvue d’effets discriminatoires.

La jurisprudence de la Cour a considéré que des systèmes d’imposition peuvent être invalides sous l’angle de la Clause du Commerce dormante, même en l’absence de l’établissement d’une double imposition effective. La présente espèce porte pour sa part sur une telle double imposition.

National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius

Health care: individual mandate and Medicaid expansion: in 2010, Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in order to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of health care. One key provision is the individual mandate, which requires most Americans to maintain “minimum essential” health insurance coverage. 26 U. S. C. §5000A. For individuals who are not exempt, and who do not receive health insurance through an employer or government program, the means of satisfying the requirement is to purchase insurance from a private company. Beginning in 2014, those who do not comply with the mandate must make a “shared responsibility payment” to the Fed­eral Government. §5000A(b)(1). The Act provides that this “penalty” will be paid to the Internal Revenue Service with an individual’s tax­es, and “shall be assessed and collected in the same manner” as tax penalties. §§5000A(c), (g)(1). Another key provision of the Act is the Medicaid expansion. The current Medicaid program offers federal funding to States to assist pregnant women, children, needy families, the blind, the elderly, and the disabled in obtaining medical care. 42 U. S. C. §1396d(a). The Affordable Care Act expands the scope of the Medicaid program and increases the number of individuals the States must cover. For ex­ample, the Act requires state programs to provide Medicaid coverage by 2014 to adults with incomes up to 133 percent of the federal pov­erty level, whereas many States now cover adults with children only if their income is considerably lower, and do not cover childless adults at all. §1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII). The Act increases federal funding to cover the States’ costs in expanding Medicaid coverage. §1396d(y)(1). But if a State does not comply with the Act’s new coverage require­ments, it may lose not only the federal funding for those require­ments, but all of its federal Medicaid funds. §1396c.

Twenty-six States, several individuals, and the National Federa­tion of Independent Business brought suit in Federal District Court, challenging the constitutionality of the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the Medicaid expansion as a valid exercise of Congress’s spending power, but concluded that Congress lacked authority to en­act the individual mandate. Finding the mandate severable from the Act’s other provisions, the Eleventh Circuit left the rest of the Act in­tact.

Held: The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. 648 F. 3d 1235, affirmed in part and reversed in part.

1. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Part II, concluding that the Anti-Injunction Act does not bar this suit; 2. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS concluded in Part III–A that the indi­vidual mandate is not a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.

(a) The Constitution grants Congress the power to “regulate Commerce.” Art. I, §8, cl. 3. The power to regulate commerce presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be reg­ulated. This Court’s precedent reflects this understanding: as ex­pansive as this Court’s cases construing the scope of the commerce power have been, they uniformly describe the power as reaching “ac­tivity.” E.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 560. The individ­ual mandate, however, does not regulate existing commercial activi­ty. It instead compels individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a product, on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate commerce.

Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially vast domain to congressional authority. Con­gress already possesses expansive power to regulate what people do. Upholding the Affordable Care Act under the Commerce Clause would give Congress the same license to regulate what people do not do. The Framers knew the difference between doing something and doing nothing. They gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to compel it. Ignoring that distinction would undermine the prin­ciple that the Federal Government is a government of limited and enumerated powers. The individual mandate thus cannot be sus­tained under Congress’s power to “regulate Commerce.”

(b) Nor can the individual mandate be sustained under the Nec­essary and Proper Clause as an integral part of the Affordable Care Act’s other reforms. Each of this Court’s prior cases upholding laws under that Clause involved exercises of authority derivative of, and in service to, a granted power. E.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U. S. ___. The individual mandate, by contrast, vests Congress with the extraordinary ability to create the necessary predicate to the ex­ercise of an enumerated power and draw within its regulatory scope those who would otherwise be outside of it. Even if the individual mandate is “necessary” to the Affordable Care Act’s other reforms, such an expansion of federal power is not a “proper” means for mak­ing those reforms effective. 

3. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS concluded in Part III–B that the individ­ual mandate must be construed as imposing a tax on those who do not have health insurance, if such a construction is reasonable.

The most straightforward reading of the individual mandate is that it commands individuals to purchase insurance. But, for the reasons explained, the Commerce Clause does not give Congress that power. It is therefore necessary to turn to the Government’s alternative ar­gument: that the mandate may be upheld as within Congress’s power to “lay and collect Taxes.” Art. I, §8, cl. 1. In pressing its taxing power argument, the Government asks the Court to view the man­date as imposing a tax on those who do not buy that product. Be­cause “every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality,” Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 657, the question is whether it is “fairly possible” to inter­pret the mandate as imposing such a tax, Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62. 

4. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Part III–C, concluding that the individual mandate may be upheld as within Congress’s power under the Taxing Clause. 

(a) The Affordable Care Act describes the “shared responsibility payment” as a “penalty,” not a “tax.” That label is fatal to the appli­cation of the Anti-Injunction Act. It does not, however, control whether an exaction is within Congress’s power to tax. In answering that constitutional question, this Court follows a functional approach, “disregarding the designation of the exaction, and viewing its sub­stance and application.” United States v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287, 294. 

(b) Such an analysis suggests that the shared responsibility payment may for constitutional purposes be considered a tax. The payment is not so high that there is really no choice but to buy health insurance; the payment is not limited to willful violations, as penal­ties for unlawful acts often are; and the payment is collected solely by the IRS through the normal means of taxation. Cf. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 36–37. None of this is to say that pay­ment is not intended to induce the purchase of health insurance. But the mandate need not be read to declare that failing to do so is un­lawful. Neither the Affordable Care Act nor any other law attaches negative legal consequences to not buying health insurance, beyond requiring a payment to the IRS. And Congress’s choice of language—stating that individuals “shall” obtain insurance or pay a “penalty”—does not require reading §5000A as punishing unlawful conduct. It may also be read as imposing a tax on those who go without insur­ance. See New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 169–174. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, joined by JUSTICE BREYER and JUSTICE KAGAN, concluded in Part IV that the Medicaid expansion violates the Constitution by threatening States with the loss of their existing Medicaid funding if they decline to comply with the expansion.  

(a) The Spending Clause grants Congress the power “to pay the Debts and provide for the . . . general Welfare of the United States.” Art. I, §8, cl. 1. Congress may use this power to establish cooperative state-federal Spending Clause programs. The legitimacy of Spending Clause legislation, however, depends on whether a State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of such programs. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17. “The Constitu­tion simply does not give Congress the authority to require the States to regulate.” New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 178. When Congress threatens to terminate other grants as a means of pressur­ing the States to accept a Spending Clause program, the legislation runs counter to this Nation’s system of federalism. Cf. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U. S. 203, 211. 

(b) Section 1396c gives the Secretary of Health and Human Ser­vices the authority to penalize States that choose not to participate in the Medicaid expansion by taking away their existing Medicaid fund­ing. 42 U. S. C. §1396c. The threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget is economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion. The Government claims that the expansion is properly viewed as only a modification of the existing program, and that this modification is permissible because Congress reserved the “right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision” of Medicaid. §1304. But the expansion accom­plishes a shift in kind, not merely degree. The original program was designed to cover medical services for particular categories of vulner­able individuals. Under the Affordable Care Act, Medicaid is trans­formed into a program to meet the health care needs of the entire nonelderly population with income below 133 percent of the poverty level. A State could hardly anticipate that Congress’s reservation of the right to “alter” or “amend” the Medicaid program included the power to transform it so dramatically. The Medicaid expansion thus violates the Constitution by threatening States with the loss of their existing Medicaid funding if they decline to comply with the expan­sion. 

(c) The constitutional violation is fully remedied by precluding the Secretary from applying §1396c to withdraw existing Medicaid funds for failure to comply with the requirements set out in the ex­pansion. See §1303. The other provisions of the Affordable Care Act are not affected. Congress would have wanted the rest of the Act to stand, had it known that States would have a genuine choice whether to participate in the Medicaid expansion. In our federal system, the National Government pos­sesses only limited powers; the States and the people retain the remainder. Nearly two centuries ago, Chief Justice Marshall observed that “the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted” to the Federal Government “is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, as long as our system shall exist.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405 (1819). In this case we must again determine whether the Constitution grants Congress powers it now asserts, but which many States and individuals believe it does not possess. Resolv­ing this controversy requires us to examine both the limits of the Government’s power, and our own limited role in policing those boundaries.

The Federal Government “is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers.” Ibid. That is, rather than granting general authority to perform all the conceiv­able functions of government, the Constitution lists, or enumerates, the Federal Government’s powers. Congress may, for example, “coin Money,” “establish Post Offices,” and “raise and support Armies.” Art. I, §8, cls. 5, 7, 12. The enumeration of powers is also a limitation of pow­ers, because “the enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 195 (1824). The Constitution’s express conferral of some powers makes clear that it does not grant others. And the Federal Government “can exercise only the powers granted to it.” McCulloch, supra, at 405.

Today, the restrictions on government power foremost in many Americans’ minds are likely to be affirmative pro­hibitions, such as contained in the Bill of Rights. These affirmative prohibitions come into play, however, only where the Government possesses authority to act in the first place. If no enumerated power authorizes Congress to pass a certain law, that law may not be enacted, even if it would not violate any of the express prohibitions in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere in the Constitution.

Indeed, the Constitution did not initially include a Bill of Rights at least partly because the Framers felt the enu­meration of powers sufficed to restrain the Government. As Alexander Hamilton put it, “the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS.” The Federalist No. 84, p. 515 (C. Ros­siter ed. 1961). And when the Bill of Rights was ratified, it made express what the enumeration of powers neces­sarily implied: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution . . . are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 10. The Federal Government has expanded dramatically over the past two centuries, but it still must show that a consti­tutional grant of power authorizes each of its actions. See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U. S. ___ (2010).

The same does not apply to the States, because the Con­stitution is not the source of their power. The Consti­tution may restrict state governments—as it does, for example, by forbidding them to deny any person the equal protection of the laws. But where such prohibitions do not apply, state governments do not need constitutional au­thorization to act. The States thus can and do perform many of the vital functions of modern government—punishing street crime, running public schools, and zoning property for development, to name but a few—even though the Constitution’s text does not authorize any government to do so. Our cases refer to this general power of govern­ing, possessed by the States but not by the Federal Gov­ernment, as the “police power.” See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, 618–619 (2000).

“State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.” New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 181 (1992). Because the police power is controlled by 50 different States instead of one national sovereign, the facets of governing that touch on citizens’ daily lives are normally administered by smaller governments closer to the governed. The Framers thus ensured that powers which “in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people” were held by gov­ernments more local and more accountable than a distant federal bureaucracy. The Federalist No. 45, at 293 (J. Madison). The independent power of the States also serves as a check on the power of the Federal Government: “By denying any one government complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power.” Bond v. United States, 564 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 9–10).

Our permissive reading of these powers is explained in part by a general reticence to invalidate the acts of the Nation’s elected leaders. “Proper respect for a co-ordinate branch of the government” requires that we strike down an Act of Congress only if “the lack of constitutional authority to pass the act in question is clearly demon­strated.” United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 635 (1883). Members of this Court are vested with the authority to interpret the law; we possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make policy judgments. Those decisions are entrusted to our Nation’s elected leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the people disagree with them. It is not our job to protect the people from the consequences of their political choices.

Our deference in matters of policy cannot, however, become abdication in matters of law. “The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176 (1803). Our respect for Congress’s policy judgments thus can never extend so far as to disavow restraints on federal power that the Constitution carefully constructed. “The peculiar circumstances of the moment may render a measure more or less wise, but cannot render it more or less constitutional.” Chief Justice John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution No. V, Alexandria Gazette, July 5, 1819, in John Marshall’s Defense of McCulloch v. Mary­land 190–191 (G. Gunther ed. 1969). And there can be no question that it is the responsibility of this Court to en­force the limits on federal power by striking down acts of Congress that transgress those limits. Marbury v. Madi­son, supra, at 175–176 (U.S.S.Ct., 28.06.12, National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, C.J. Roberts).

Droit de la santé et assurance maladie : notion d’obligation individuelle : en 2010, le Congrès fédéral a promulgué une loi fédérale en vue d’augmenter le nombre d’Américains couverts par une assurance maladie et en vue de diminuer les coûts de la santé. Une des dispositions essentielles de la loi est dite « obligation individuelle », qui impose à la plupart des Américains de maintenir une couverture d’assurance minimum couvrant les soins essentiels. Pour les personnes qui ne sont pas exemptées et qui ne sont pas assurées par l’intermédiaire de leur employeur ou par l’intermédiaire du Gouvernement, le moyen de satisfaire à cette obligation est de souscrire une assurance maladie privée. Dès l’année 2014, ceux qui ne satisfont pas à cette obligation sont tenus de procéder à un « paiement de responsabilité partagée » à verser au Gouvernement fédéral, par l’IRS, en même temps que le règlement de la créance fiscale. Cette somme sera recouvrée de la même manière qu’une amende fiscale.

Une autre disposition essentielle de la nouvelle loi fédérale est l’expansion du régime Medicaid. Le programme Medicaid antérieur offre des subventions fédérales aux états pour aider à obtenir des soins médicaux les femmes enceintes, les enfants, les familles dans le besoin, les mal voyants, les personnes âgées, et les invalides. La nouvelle loi étend le cadre du programme Medicaid et augmente le nombre de personnes que l’état doit couvrir. Par exemple, la nouvelle loi impose aux programmes des états de couvrir par Medicaid, dès l’année 2014, les adultes disposant d’un revenu jusqu’à 133% du niveau fédéral de pauvreté. Sous l’ancien régime, de nombreux états ne couvrent que les adultes avec des enfants et que si leur revenu est considérablement plus bas. La loi nouvelle augmente les subventions fédérales en vue de couvrir les frais encourus par les états du fait de l’extension de la couverture offerte par Medicaid. Mais si un état ne se conforme pas aux nouvelles conditions de couverture prévues par la nouvelle loi fédérale, il pourra perdre non seulement les subventions fédérales liées à ces nouvelles conditions, mais aussi l’ensemble des subventions liées à Medicaid.

Sont contestées en l’espèce l’obligation individuelle et l’extension du régime Medicaid.

Dans son opinion, le Juge Roberts conclut que l’obligation individuelle telle que prévue dans la nouvelle loi ne peut pas être avalisée sous l’angle de la Clause de commerce de la Constitution fédérale, qui n’autorise pas le Congrès fédéral a prévoir une telle obligation individuelle. La Necessary and Proper clause ne saurait elle non plus autoriser la promulgation de l’obligation individuelle.

S’agissant de la clause de commerce, le Juge Roberts rappelle que la Constitution fédérale accorde au Congrès la compétence de réguler le commerce. La compétence de réguler le commerce présuppose l’existence d’une activité commerciale à réguler. La jurisprudence de la Cour est le reflet de ce principe. Même si dite jurisprudence a interprété la Clause de commerce de manière extensive, ces décisions décrivent la compétence du Congrès à ce niveau comme portant sur une « activité ». Or l’obligation individuelle objet du présent litige ne régule pas d’une activité commerciale existante. Au contraire, elle contraint les personnes à devenir commercialement actives en achetant un produit d’assurance, basée sur le fait que l’omission d’achat affecte le commerce entre états. Dès lors, interpréter la Clause de commerce comme attribuant au Congrès la compétence de réglementer la conduite des personnes précisément parce que ces personnes ne font rien est de nature à attribuer de nouvelles et potentiellement vastes compétences au Congrès. Le Congrès détient déjà de vastes compétences de régler ce que les personnes font. Confirmer la conformité à la Constitution de la loi fédérale en question sous l’angle de la Clause de commerce reviendrait à attribuer au Congrès la même liberté de réglementer ce que les personnes ne font pas. Les Fondateurs de la Constitution connaissaient la différence entre faire quelque chose et ne rien faire. Ils ont attribué au Congrès la compétence de régler le commerce, non de le contraindre. Ignorer cette distinction porterait préjudice au principe selon lequel le Gouvernement fédéral est un Gouvernement de compétences limitées et énumérées.

L’obligation individuelle ne peut pas non plus être jugée conforme à la Constitution sous l’angle de la Necessary and Proper Clause. La jurisprudence de la Cour portant sur dite Clause a toujours précisé que pour être conforme à la Clause, l’action du Congrès devait dériver d’une compétence déjà attribuée, ce qui n’est pas le cas ici.

Le Juge Roberts conclut ensuite que l’obligation individuelle s’analyse en une taxe imposée à ceux qui sont dépourvus d’assurance-maladie. Le Congrès dispose en effet de la compétence de lever l’impôt, et l’argument du Gouvernement dans cette affaire était que le Congrès disposait de la compétence d’imposer l’achat d’une assurance maladie sous l’angle de la compétence de taxer attribuée au Congrès. Le Juge Roberts rappelle que la Cour doit recourir à toutes les interprétations raisonnables possibles  pour éviter de déclarer une loi comme étant contraire à la Constitution fédérale. La question est donc de savoir s’il est de bonne foi possible d’interpréter l’obligation individuelle comme imposant une taxe. La réponse est affirmative, et l’obligation individuelle prévue par la nouvelle loi fédérale est conforme à la Constitution fédérale. De même, le paiement d’une pénalité par ceux qui n’achèteraient pas d’assurance maladie s’analyse en une taxe, et non une peine d’une autre nature que fiscale, nonobstant l’usage du terme « pénalité », qui doit être analysé selon sa substance et selon son application, indépendamment de son libellé. A ce niveau, il convient de considérer que la « pénalité » n’est pas élevée au point de contraindre l’achat d’une assurance. La pénalité n’est en outre pas limitée aux cas de violations intentionnelles, comme les pénalités le sont usuellement. Et son paiement relève de la compétence de l’IRS par les voies habituelles de recouvrement de l’impôt.

Les Juges Roberts, Breyer et Kagan concluent que l’extension du régime Medicaid est contraire à la Constitution en ce qu’il menace les états de perdre leurs subventions liées à Medicaid en cas de refus de se conformer à l’extension du régime.

Quant à la Clause de la dépense (Spending Clause), elle attribue au Congrès la compétence de payer les dettes et d’accomplir le bien-être général des Etats-Unis. Le Congrès fédéral peut se fonder sur cette Clause pour accorder des subventions aux états coopérants avec le programme de subventions. Mais la Constitution n’accorde pas au Congrès l’autorité d’imposer aux états de légiférer. Lorsque le Congrès menace de mettre fin à d’autres subventions comme moyen d’imposer à l’état d’accepter un programme de subvention déterminé, le Congrès agit contrairement au système fédéral des Etats-Unis, donc contrairement à la Constitution. Le système d’expansion de Medicaid prévu par la loi nouvelle dispose précisément que les états qui n’accepteraient pas de se conformer au nouveau programme perdraient leurs subventions résultant de l’ancien programme. Une telle réglementation est comme indiqué précédemment contraire à la Constitution, de sorte que la partie de la loi nouvelle qui régit l’extension du régime Medicaid est annulée par la Cour.

La Cour rappelle que le Gouvernement fédéral dispose des compétences que la Constitution fédérale lui attribue. Les autres compétences restent aux états et au peuple. Les limites de compétences prévues par le Bill of Rights ne s’appliquent que lorsqu’elles se rapportent à une compétence déjà attribuée au Gouvernement fédéral. Le Bill of Rights limite cette compétence. Mais si aucune compétence n’est attribuée au Gouvernement fédéral, il ne peut pas légiférer. L’expansion du Gouvernement fédéral fut certes considérable pendant les 200 dernières années, mais il doit toujours démontrer qu’une attribution de compétence constitutionnelle autorise chacune de ses actions.

Sont ensuite rappelées les notions de fédéralisme à la base de la Constitution des Etats-Unis, qui sont les mêmes que les principes à la base de la Constitution suisse (fédéralisme, attributions de compétences au Gouvernement fédéral, compétences non attribuées qui restent en main des états et du peuple, les états et leur entités décentralisées  étant par ailleurs plus proches de la population, ce qui est vu comme un principe important).

S’agissant de ses propres compétences, la Cour Suprême fédérale rappelle sa réticence générale à invalider les actes du Congrès, composés des élus de la nation. La Cour n’annulera un acte du Congrès que si son inconstitutionnalité est clairement démontrée. Les Juges de la Cour sont investis de l’autorité d’interpréter la loi. Ils ne détiennent ni l’expertise ni la compétence de procéder à des jugements de nature politique. Ce dernier type de jugements compète aux membres du Congrès, qui peuvent ne pas être élus à nouveau si leurs actions déplaisent aux électeurs. Il n’appartient pas à la Cour de protéger la population des conséquences de leurs choix politiques. Le respect de la Cour pour les jugements politiques du Congrès ne saurait toutefois dépasser le cadre des compétences fédérales que la Constitution a déterminées avec soin.