Judicial Estoppel
Equitable Doctrine
Bankruptcy Proceedings
Judicial estoppel is an “equitable doctrine” intended “to protect the integrity of the judicial process,” both by “prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment,” and by preventing the “risk of inconsistent court determinations.” New Hampshire, 532 U. S., at 749–751.
Sometimes, as happened here, a debtor seeks to litigate a claim against a third party that he failed to disclose in his bankruptcy proceedings.
Some lower courts apply judicial estoppel to bar such lawsuits, reasoning that application of the doctrine “raises the cost of lying” and “induces debtors to be truthful in their bankruptcy filings.” Cannon-Stokes v. Potter, 453 F. 3d 446, 448 (CA7 2006).
The courts that apply judicial estoppel to claims in the bankruptcy context view the debtor’s failure to disclose a particular claim as an “implicit representation” that the claim does not exist. 18B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4477.9 (3d ed. 2019 and Supp. 2026) (collecting cases). On this view, when the debtor files a lawsuit based on that claim, he has taken inconsistent positions in the two judicial proceedings “by asserting in the civil lawsuit that he has a claim against the defendant while denying under oath in the bankruptcy proceeding that the claim exists.” Slater v. United States Steel Corp., 871 F. 3d 1174, 1176 (CA11 2017) (en banc).
Based on that understanding, those lower courts have developed a general rule for the application of judicial estoppel in the bankruptcy context: “If a plaintiff-debtor omits a pending (or soon-to-be-filed) lawsuit from the bankruptcy schedules and obtains a discharge (or plan confirmation), judicial estoppel bars the action.” Ah Quin v. County of Kauai Dept. of Transp., 733 F. 3d 267, 271 (CA9 2013).
While this Court has never applied judicial estoppel in the bankruptcy context, in a different context we left open whether it “may be appropriate to resist application of judicial estoppel” when the party’s prior inconsistent position was due to “inadvertence or mistake.” New Hampshire, 532 U. S., at 753. For purposes of this opinion, we assume without deciding that judicial estoppel can apply in the bankruptcy context and that “inadvertence or mistake” can function as an exception to that application. Operating under those assumptions, the Fifth Circuit’s understanding of “inadvertence or mistake” is simultaneously too rigid and too broad.
The rigidity comes from the Fifth Circuit’s failure to fully recognize that “judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine.” Id., at 750 (internal quotation marks omitted). As such, its “examination must be made in the light of the recognized principles of equity.” United States Nat. Bank v. Chase Nat. Bank, 331 U. S. 28, 36 (1947). Equity, we have said, “eschews mechanical rules; it depends on flexibility.” Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 396 (1946). Thus, when a court conducts an equitable inquiry, it must act “on a case-by-case basis,” considering all relevant facts and circumstances. Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631, 649–650 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, equitable doctrines require room to consider all of the particulars.
By contrast, the Fifth Circuit’s rule allows courts to consider only two circumstances when assessing inadvertence or mistake: whether the debtor knew of the underlying facts of the claim, and whether there was a potential motive to conceal the claim. See In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F. 3d 197, 210 (CA5 1999); Love, 677 F. 3d, at 262. And under
this rule, a court may not look at any other evidence tending to show that the omission was inadvertent. That rigidity is out of step with equity. To determine whether the omission was inadvertent or a mistake, the Fifth Circuit instead should have examined the totality of the circumstances surrounding Keathley’s failure to report his personal-injury claims earlier. See, e.g., Ah Quin, 733 F. 3d, at 276 (“Rather than applying a presumption of deceit, judicial estoppel requires an inquiry into whether the plaintiff ’s bankruptcy filing was, in fact, inadvertent or mistaken, as those terms are commonly understood” (emphasis added and deleted)).
The Fifth Circuit’s rule is not only overly rigid; it is also overly broad. In particular, the Fifth Circuit holds that an omission falls outside of the exception any time a debtor knows certain facts or could potentially benefit from non-disclosure of a claim. But it is rare for a debtor to be unaware of the underlying facts of his claim, and a debtor will almost always hypothetically benefit from not revealing such a claim to his creditors. In essence, then, the Fifth Circuit’s approach is a one-size-fits-all test that requires courts to view as purposeful nearly every bankruptcy omission. Indeed, the decision below acknowledged as much, noting that, under Fifth Circuit precedent, the potential-motive element “‘is almost always met if a debtor fails to disclose a claim or possible claim to the bankruptcy court.’” 2025 WL 673434, *5 (quoting Love, 677 F. 3d, at 262).
The overbreadth of the Fifth Circuit’s rule (the fact that it almost always is satisfied) makes it patently incompatible with an inadvertence-or-mistake standard, which suggests that circumstances—and outcomes—may vary. A near-dispositive criterion is a poor fit for a fair inquiry into whether an omission is actually the result of inadvertence or mistake.
Today’s decision is straightforward. The Fifth Circuit artificially narrowed its inquiry into whether Keathley’s bankruptcy-schedule omission was the result of inadvertence or mistake by assessing only whether he had knowledge of the underlying facts or a potential motive to conceal his personal-injury suit. That was error. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
(The parties also dispute at some length whether bad faith is required for judicial estoppel to apply (...) In light of our narrow holding - responding only to the analysis used by the Fifth Circuit - we need not resolve any further questions about the application of judicial estoppel in the bankruptcy context).
(U.S. Supreme Court, June 11, 2026, Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc., J. Jackson, Unanimous)
