Tuesday, February 21, 2012

Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown



Arbitration: state and federal courts must enforce the Federal Arbi­tration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq., with respect to all arbitration agreements covered by that statute. Here, the Supreme Court of Appeals of  West Virginia, by misreading and disregarding the precedents of this Court interpreting the FAA, did not follow controlling federal law implement­ing that basic principle. The state court held unenforceable all predispute arbitration agreements that apply to claims alleging personal injury or wrongful death against nursing homes. The statute’s text includes no exception for personal-injury or wrongful-death claims. It “requires courts to enforce the bargain of the parties to arbitrate.” Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213, 217 (1985). It “reflects an emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution.” KPMG LLP v. Coc­chi, 565 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (per curiam) (slip op., at 3) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 631 (1985); internal quota­tion marks omitted). As this Court reaffirmed last Term, “[w]hen state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: the conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep­cion, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 6–7). That rule resolves these cases. West Virginia’s prohibition against predispute agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or wrongful-death claims against nursing homes is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular type of claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA. See ibid. See also, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U. S. 346, 356 (2008) (FAA pre-empts state law granting state commissioner exclusive jurisdiction to decide issue the parties agreed to arbitrate); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U. S. 52, 56 (1995) (FAA pre­empts state law requiring judicial resolution of claims involving punitive damages); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U. S. 483, 491 (1987) (FAA pre-empts state-law requirement that litigants be provided a judicial forum for wage dis­putes); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 10 (1984) (FAA pre-empts state financial investment statute’s prohibition of arbitration of claims brought under that statute)  (U.S. S. Ct., 21.02.12,  Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, Per Curiam).

Arbitrage : les cours des Etats et les cours fédérales sont tenues d'appliquer le Federal Arbitration Act (Act) s'agissant de toutes conventions d'arbitrages relevant de cet Act. En l'espèce, c'est à tort qu'une cour étatique a déclaré inapplicable toutes clauses arbitrales s'appliquant à des prétentions fondées sur des dommages corporels ou sur des décès. Or ces deux domaines ne sont pas exclus de la procédure arbitrale par l'Act, qui, par conséquent, s'applique, de sorte que les parties peuvent convenir d'un arbitrage. Les parties peuvent également conclure une convention d'arbitrage s'agissant de prétentions en punitive damages, ces prétentions n'étant pas exclues par l'Act. Il en va de même des prétentions en paiement d'un salaire. Dans touts ces cas, le droit fédéral l’emporte sur le droit étatique contraire.

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