Supreme Court of Texas, Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment Services of Nevada, Inc. v. Triex Texas Holdings, LLC, Docket No. 21-0913

Statute of Limitations

 

Accrual and Limitations

 

Tolling

 

Discovery Rule

 

Fraudulent Concealment Distinguished from the Discovery Rule

 

Fraud Distinguished from the Discovery Rule

 

Equitable Estoppel

 

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

 

Texas Law

 

 

 

 

A cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty generally accrues, and limitations begins to run, when the claimant knows or should know of the wrongful injury. See Berry v. Berry, 646 S.W.3d 516, 525-26 (Tex. 2022). The court of appeals held that the discovery rule delays accrual and limitations until the claimant also knows of the wrongful acts and actors, without requiring the plaintiff to exercise reasonable diligence. 2021 WL 4318406 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Sept. 23, 2021). Because that holding conflicts with the established rule, and because respondents’ actions for fraud and conspiracy are also barred by limitations, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the trial court’s summary judgment for respondents.

 

 

Taylor’s and Dorris’s deposition testimony caused Triex to suspect that Marcus & Millichap misrepresented the sale to Triex by omitting key details about the nature of the lease and overvaluing the property in order to raise its commission. As a result, Triex added Marcus & Millichap to the lawsuit in March 2017—more than four years after Taylor Petroleum breached the lease and more than eight years after Marcus & Millichap brokered the sale. In its amended petition, Triex asserted claims for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud by nondisclosure, and conspiracy.

 

 

Actions for breach of fiduciary duty are governed by a four-year statute of limitations.1 TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE § 16.004(a)(5). Generally, a claim accrues when the defendant’s wrongful conduct causes the claimant to suffer a legal injury. Am. Star Energy & Mins. Corp. v. Stowers, 457 S.W.3d 427, 430 (Tex. 2015). This is true “even if the fact of injury is not discovered until later, and even if all resulting damages have not yet occurred.” S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1996).

 

 

1 Triex’s claims for fraud and civil conspiracy also have a four-year limitations period. TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE § 16.004(a)(4); see Agar Corp. v. Electro Cirs. Int’l, LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136, 142 (Tex. 2019) (holding that “civil conspiracy . . . shares a limitations period with that of its underlying tort”). “Generally, in a case of fraud the statute of limitations does not commence to run until the fraud is discovered or until it might have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Little v. Smith, 943 S.W.2d 414, 420 (Tex. 1997). Like its breach of fiduciary duty claim, Triex based its fraud claim on allegations that Marcus & Millichap failed to disclose certain information despite its duty to do so. Accordingly, we apply the same analysis to all three claims.

 

 

The discovery rule is a “narrow exception” to the legal injury rule that “defers accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff knew or, exercising reasonable diligence, should have known of the facts giving rise to the cause of action.” Berry, 646 S.W.3d at 524 (quoting Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex. 1996)). It “applies when the injury is by its nature inherently undiscoverable.” Agar Corp., 580 S.W.3d at 139 (citing Childs v. Haussecker, 974 S.W.2d 31, 36-37 (Tex. 1998)). “An injury is inherently undiscoverable if it is by nature unlikely to be discovered within the prescribed limitations period despite due diligence.” Berry, 646 S.W.3d at 524 (quoting S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 25). “The determination of whether an injury is inherently undiscoverable is made on a categorical basis rather than on the facts of the individual case.” Archer v. Tregellas, 566 S.W.3d 281, 290 (Tex. 2018) (citing HECI Expl. Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 886 (Tex. 1998)). The question is whether the injury is “the type of injury that could be discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence.”BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Marshall, 342 S.W.3d 59, 66 (Tex. 2011) (citing Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Horwood, 58 S.W.3d 732, 734-35 (Tex. 2001)). We have held that “in the fiduciary context, . . . the nature of the injury is presumed to be inherently undiscoverable” because “fiduciaries are presumed to possess superior knowledge.” Comput. Assocs., 918 S.W.2d at 456. So “a person to whom a fiduciary duty is owed may be unable to inquire into the fiduciary’s actions or may be unaware of the need to do so.” Valdez v. Hollenbeck, 465 S.W.3d 217, 231 (Tex. 2015). Accordingly, “even if inquiry is made, ‘facts which might ordinarily require investigation likely may not excite suspicion where a fiduciary relationship is involved.’” Id. (quoting Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1988)). Here the discovery rule applies, but it does not save Triex’s claims. The rule applies because a fiduciary relationship existed, and before Taylor Petroleum’s breach, Triex was unaware of the need to inquire into its fiduciary’s actions. See S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 8 (explaining that the rationale for finding a fiduciary’s misconduct to be inherently undiscoverable is that “a person to whom a fiduciary duty is owed is either unable to inquire into the fiduciary’s actions or unaware of the need to do so”). When the discovery rule applies, the statute of limitations does not begin to run “until the plaintiff knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the wrongful act and resulting injury.” Id. at 4. We have stated this rule in slightly different ways. But last Term, we explained that this means the discovery rule defers accrual “until the claimant knew or should have known of facts that in the exercise of reasonable diligence would have led to the discovery of the wrongful act.” Berry, 646 S.W.3d at 524 (quoting Little, 943 S.W.2d at 420). Or, in other words, accrual is deferred “until the plaintiff knew, or exercising reasonable diligence, should have known of the facts giving rise to the cause of action.” Id. (quoting Comput. Assocs., 918 S.W.2d at 455). Consistent throughout our cases is the requirement of reasonable diligence. We have also explained that “the discovery rule does not linger until a claimant learns of actual causes and possible cures.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. JMB/Hous. Ctrs. Partners Ltd. P’ship, 146 S.W.3d 79, 93 (Tex. 2004); see also KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cnty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex. 1999). Nor does it defer accrual until the plaintiff knows “the specific nature of each wrongful act that may have caused the injury,”KPMG, 988 S.W.2d at 749, or “the exact identity of the wrongdoer.” Childs, 974 S.W.2d at 40; see also PPG Indus., 146 S.W.3d at 93.

 

 

In 2012, Triex had actual knowledge of its injuries and became aware of the need to inquire into Marcus & Millichap’s actions. The court of appeals concluded that “the evidence conclusively established that appellants were aware that they had sustained an injury by December 1, 2012,” the date Taylor Petroleum defaulted. 2021 WL 4318406, at *4. But it determined that a fact issue existed as to whether Triex “knew or should have known on December 1, 2012, that the injury was the result of wrongful acts committed by Marcus & Millichap.” Id. The court of appeals came to this conclusion by “relieving Triex of the responsibility of diligent inquiry” because of its fiduciary relationship with Marcus & Millichap. Id. at *3. But as we reiterated last Term, “those owed a fiduciary duty are not altogether absolved of the usual obligation to use reasonable diligence to discover an injury.”Berry, 646 S.W.3d at 526 (citing Little, 943 S.W.2d at 420); see also Comput. Assocs., 918 S.W.2d at 456. Recognizing that “the presence of a fiduciary relationship can affect application of the discovery rule,” we explained that “it remains the case that ‘a person owed a fiduciary duty has some responsibility to ascertain when an injury occurs.’ ‘When the fact of misconduct becomes apparent it can no longer be ignored, regardless of the nature of the relationship.’” Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Comput. Assocs., 918 S.W.2d at 456, then quoting S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 8). Had Triex exercised reasonable diligence, it would have discovered Marcus & Millichap’s allegedly wrongful acts. See Little, 943 S.W.2d at 420. Part of Triex’s claim against Marcus & Millichap is that it misrepresented that “this was a sure-fire and financially sound investment,” and that “rent would be coming in every month without any issues or risk.” When Taylor Petroleum defaulted on the lease, Triex “knew or should have known that something was amiss.” See Berry, 646 S.W.3d at 525. Indeed, Weiner’s affidavit in response to the summary judgment motion admitted that at the time of the breach, he knew Marcus & Millichap did a “poor job” of representing him. His awareness of his injury and of Marcus & Millichap’s poor representation “obligated him to make further inquiry on his own if he wanted to preserve a timely claim.” Id. Instead, Triex waited three years to sue the initial defendants, and an additional year to take depositions (…)

 

 

(…) (Comput. Assocs., 918 S.W.2d at 455). But in that case, we explained that although fraudulent concealment is “similar in effect” to the discovery rule, it is a different doctrine that exists for different reasons: “Unlike the discovery rule exception, deferral in the context of fraud or concealment resembles equitable estoppel. ‘Fraudulent concealment estops the defendant from relying on the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense to the plaintiff’s claim.’” Comput. Assocs., 918 S.W.2d at 456 (alterations in original) (quoting Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex. 1983)); see also Wagner & Brown, 58 S.W.3d at 736 (distinguishing fraudulent concealment from the discovery rule); Draughon, 631 S.W.3d at 93 (collecting cases).

 

 

 

(Supreme Court of Texas, Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment Services of Nevada, Inc. v. Triex Texas Holdings, LLC, Jan. 13, 2023, Docket No. 21-0913, Per Curiam)

California Court of Appeal, Grosz v. California Dept. of Tax and Fee Administration, Docket No. B309418

 

Judicial Notice

 

California Law

 

 

 

Chacon v. Union Pacific Railroad (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 565, 573 [judicial notice may be taken of a document, but not the truth of its contents].

 

 

While courts take judicial notice of public records, they do not take notice of the truth of matters stated therein.” (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.)

 

 

“A court will not take judicial notice of a case that was not cited in the briefs.” Neither will appellate courts “take judicial notice of matters irrelevant to the dispositive point on appeal.” The interpretation of a sister state’s statute by that state’s courts that was not discussed in the briefs is not relevant to our consideration of the issues on this appeal. Indeed, the question at issue on that appeal—whether non-Pennsylvania businesses that sell merchandise through Amazon’s FBA Program must collect and remit Pennsylvania sales tax—has no bearing on whether the determination of who is a retailer under California’s Sales and Use Tax Law is a ministerial task or involves the exercise of DTFA discretion.

 

 

 

(California Court of Appeal, Jan. 9, 2023, Grosz v. California Dept. of Tax and Fee Administration, Docket No. B309418, Certified for Publication)

 

California Court of Appeal, Grosz v. California Dept. of Tax and Fee Administration, Docket No. B309418

Sales and Use Taxes

 

Amazon

 

Taxpayer Action Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 526a

 

Tax Law

 

Standing

 

California Law

 

 

 

 

In addition to its own products, Amazon fulfills orders for products sold by third-party merchants through a program it calls “Fulfillment by Amazon” (FBA). The trial court in this action described the program as alleged in the First Amended Complaint (FAC): “To support this program, Amazon contracts with merchants (‘FBA Merchants’) who supply the products ordered by consumers through Amazon’s website. Amazon provides advertising, packaging, and delivery of the products supplied by the FBA Merchants. [Citation.] Amazon also processes payments for sales on behalf of the FBA Merchants.” According to the FAC, the state agency responsible for collecting sales and use tax (currently the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration (DTFA)) has historically not collected from Amazon sales and use taxes for products sold through the FBA program. Stanley Grosz filed a taxpayer actionunder Code of Civil Procedure section 526a (Section 526a) seeking a declaration that the DTFA “has a mandatory duty to assess and collect” sales and use tax specifically from Amazon for products sold through the FBA program, and an injunction requiring the DTFAto do so. The DTFA and its Director, Nicolas Maduro, and the Amazon entities that Grosz named in his FAC as Real Parties in Interest all demurred to the FAC. The trial court sustained the respondents’ demurrers without leave to amend. The trial court reasoned that the Revenue and Taxation Code vests the DTFA with discretion to determine whether the FBA Merchant or Amazon is the “retailer” in any given FBA transaction for purposes of collecting sales and use tax. Because the determination is discretionary and not ministerial, the trial court reasoned that Grosz had no standing to pursue his action. (See Silver v. Watson (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 905, 909 (Silver).) We agree with the trial court, and will affirm the trial court’s order sustaining the respondents’ demurrers without leave to amend.

 

 

(Before July 1, 2017, the agency responsible for collecting sales and use taxes was the State Board of Equalization. The Taxpayer Transparency and Fairness Act of 2017 created the DTFA and transferred the Board of Equalization’s authority and responsibility for sales and use taxes (among other things) to the DTFA. (Stats. 2017, ch. 16, §§ 5, 14, 15; Gov. Code, §§ 15570, 15570.20, 15570.22; Rev. & Tax. Code, § 20.) (Fn. 3).

 

 

In his opening brief, Stanley Grosz—the taxpayer who filed suit against the DTFA—explains that this appeal is limited to DTFA’s “failure to collect tax from Amazon on FBA sales transacted prior to October 1, 2019. . . .” In 2019, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed Assembly Bill No. 147, which the Legislature called the Marketplace Facilitator Act (MFA). (Stats. 2019, ch. 5, § 2.) The bill made the MFA operative on October 1, 2019. (Stats. 2019, ch. 5, § 2; Rev. & Tax. Code, § 6049.5, subd. (a).) The MFA appears on its face to relate to transactions like the FBA transactions alleged in the FAC. We do not construe any part of the MFA here, but note only that it appears that Grosz has attempted to expressly exclude from his lawsuit any transactions occurring after the MFA’s operative date. (Fn. 4).

 

 

(…) The trial court (…) explaining: “The determination of which party—FBA Merchants or Amazon—was the retailer necessarily entailed consideration of all sections of the vast statutory scheme and required discretion especially considering ‘the “highly technical,” “intensely detailed and fact-specific sales tax system governing an enormous universe of transactions.”’”

 

 

Code of Civil Procedure Section 526a: “The purpose of Section 526a, ‘which applies to citizen and corporate taxpayers alike, is to permit a large body of persons to challenge wasteful government action that otherwise would go unchallenged because of the standing requirement. [Citation.]  . . . Although by its terms the statute applies to local governments, it has been judicially extended to all state and local agencies and officials. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘ “The individual citizen must be able to take the initiative through taxpayers’ suits to keep government accountable on the state as well as on the local level.” ’ ” (Vasquez v. State of California (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 849, 854, fn. omitted.) “It is established that an action lies under Section 526a not only to enjoin wasteful expenditures, but also to enforce the government’s duty to collect funds due the State. ‘ “A taxpayer may sue a governmental body in a representative capacity in cases involving its . . . failure . . . to perform a duty specifically enjoined.” [Citation.] This well-established rule ensures that the California courts, by entertaining only those taxpayers’ suits that seek to measure governmental performance against a legal standard, do not trespass into the domain of legislative or executive discretion. [Citations.] This rule similarly serves to prevent the courts from hearing complaints which seek relief that the courts cannot effectively render; the courts cannot formulate decrees that involve the exercise of indefinable discretion; their decrees can only restrict conduct that can be tested against legal standards. [Citations.]’ ” (Vasquez v. State of California, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at pp. 854-855, italics added.) “The cases have . . . been careful to note that Section 526a has its limits. In particular, the courts have stressed that the statute should not be applied to principally ‘political’ issues or issues involving the exercise of the discretion of either the legislative or executive branches of government.” (Humane Society of the United States v. State Bd. of Equalization (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 349, 356, italics added; see Silver, supra, 26 Cal.App.3d at p. 909 [“if the governing body has discretion in the matter, the taxpayer may not interfere”].)

 

 

Sales and Use Tax “Retailer”: “The California Sales and Use Tax Law (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 6001 et seq.) embodies a comprehensive tax system created to impose an excise tax, for the support of state and local government, on the sale, use, storage or consumption of tangible personal property within the state. [Citation.] The two taxes, sales and use, are mutually exclusive but complementary, and are designed to exact an equal tax based on a percentage of the purchase price of the property in question. In essence ‘ “a sales tax is a tax on the freedom of purchase. . . a use tax is a tax on the enjoyment of that which was purchased.’ ” Citations. The use tax supplements the sales tax by imposing on those subject to it the same tax burden as would otherwise be assessed under the sales tax.” (Wallace Berrie & Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1985) 40 Cal.3d 60, 66-67, fns. omitted.) Specifically, California law imposes a tax on “the gross receipts of any retailer from the sale of all tangible personal property sold at retail in this state. . . .” (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 6051.) The sales tax is imposed on and collected from “retailers.” (Ibid.) California law also imposes a tax on the “storage, use, or other consumption in this state of tangible personal property purchased from any retailer. . . .” (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 6201.) This tax is imposed on the retail purchaser, but is collected from the purchaser by the “retailer” and remitted to the state. (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 6202, 6203.) Pertinent to this appeal, the Sales and Use Tax Law states that “ ‘retailer’ includes,” among other things, “every seller who makes any retail sale or sales of tangible personal property . . .” and “every person engaged in the business of making sales for storage, use, or other consumption . . . .” (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 6015, subd. (a)(1) & (2).) A “ ‘seller’ includes every person engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property of a kind the gross receipts from the retail sale of which are required to be included in the measure of the sales tax.” (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 6014.) “A ‘retail sale’ . . . means a sale for a purpose other than resale in the regular course of business in the form of tangible personal property.” (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 6007.) And a “ ‘sale’ ” means, among other things, “any transfer of title or possession, exchange, or barter, conditional or otherwise, in any manner or by any means whatsoever, of tangible personal property for a consideration. ‘Transfer of possession’ includes only transactions found by the DTFA to be in lieu of a transfer of title, exchange, or barter.” (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 6006, subd. (a).)

 

 

(…) Pawnbrokers, storage men, mechanics, artisans, or others selling the property to enforce a lien thereon, are retailers with respect to sales of the property to consumers and tax applies to the receipts from such sales.

 

 

(…) Grosz concedes that a sales or use tax can only be applied once to a retail transaction—that Amazon and any particular FBA Merchant “cannot both be held liable for tax on the same . . . sale.” (Fn. 8).

 

 

(…) On the statutory interpretation question, we conclude, as did the trial court, that the determination of who is a “retailer” under the Sales and Use Tax Law and relevant regulations is one that invokes the discretion of the DTFA; making that designation is not a ministerial task (…) as opposed to a discretionary action.

 

 

(…) Here, by contrast, the question is not whether the law imposes a tax, but rather on whom, based on language in several interrelated statutes. The question here, as the trial court pointed out, is not whether the DTFA has discretion, but rather how it must exercise that discretion. That is the critical distinction between this case and Sonoma (195 Cal.App.3d 982).

 

 

(…) In addition to expressly giving the DTFA discretion to determine who “may be regarded . . . as retailers” for purposes of the Sales and Use Tax Law under the circumstances outlined in Revenue and Taxation Code section 6015, subdivision (b), we note the broad discretion the Legislature has given the DTFA generally. (Gov. Code, §§ 15570 et seq.).

 

 

The statutory framework of the Sales and Use Tax Law and the statutes vesting the DTFA with authority to administer that statutory framework also generally lead us to conclude that whether a taxpayer is a retailer for purposes of the Sales and Use Tax Law is a discretionary determination and not a ministerial task. Consistent with those conclusions, we agree with the trial court that Grosz’s lawsuit may not proceed under Section 526a.

 

 

We affirm the trial court’s order sustaining the DTFA’s and Amazon’s demurrers and dismissing the lawsuit.

 

 

 

 

(California Court of Appeal, Jan. 9, 2023, Grosz v. California Dept. of Tax and Fee Administration, Docket No. B309418, Certified for Publication)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Emilio Braun v. America-CV Station Group, Inc., et al., Docket No. 21-13774

Voluntary Petition for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy

 

Modification to a Chapter 11 Reorganization Plan

 

New Disclosure Statement and Another Opportunity to Vote Required

 

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3019(a)

 

 

 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-23120-DPG

 

 

 

Just before the Chapter 11 reorganization plans of Caribevision Holdings, Inc. and Caribevision TV Network, LLC were set to be confirmed, the debtors filed an emergency motion to modify the plans under 11 U.S.C. § 1127(a). The initial plans called for equity in the reorganized companies to be split between four shareholders: Ramon Diez-Barroso, Pegaso Television Corp., Emilio Braun, and Vasallo TV Group. The modification, after being approved by the bankruptcy court, stripped the first three of their equity and allocated full ownership to the fourth—a company controlled by the debtors’ Chief Executive Officer. Taken by surprise, the three ousted shareholders, who collectively call themselves the Pegaso Equity Holders, now challenge the bankruptcy court’s order granting the debtors’ emergency motion to modify the reorganization plans. They contend that they were entitled to a revised disclosure statement and a second opportunity to vote on the plans under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3019(a)—a procedural protection the bankruptcy court did not provide them. We agree. When a modification to a Chapter 11 reorganization plan materially and adversely affects the treatment of a class of claim or interest holders, those claim or interest holders are entitled to a new disclosure statement and another opportunity to vote. Because the modification materially and adversely affected the Pegaso Equity Holders, we reverse and remand to the bankruptcy court.

 

 

(…) In May 2019, the holding companies—along with two operating companies they own—filed voluntary petitions for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The Chapter 11 proceeding would restructure the companies’ debt obligations while maintaining ongoing operations. Each company authorized Carlos Vasallo, the networks’ President and Chief Executive Officer, to make all decisions regarding the Chapter 11 petitions.

 

 

To finance the discharge of debt obligations and maintain operations, the proposed reorganization plans called for the post-petition holding companies’ equity holders to make a new $500,000 capital contribution and execute a $1.6 million line of credit. The new equity in the reorganized holding companies was to be allocated in proportion to the amount of capital each post-petition shareholder contributed. To achieve this, the plans “cancelled and extinguished” the equity interests in the pre-petition entities and “simultaneously” issued new equity interests in the reorganized holding companies. The three Pegaso Equity Holders were each to receive individual shares that collectively amount to 65.8% of the equity interests in each reorganized holding company—50.1% to Diez-Barroso, 11.9% to Pegaso Television Corp., and 3.8% to Braun. The remainder was to go to the Vasallo TV Group, LLC—a company owned by Carlos Vasallo. The plans classified all the equity interest holders together into the same class—Class 3.

 

 

At first this bankruptcy case was proceeding like any other. The debtors submitted the plans to the bankruptcy court along with a disclosure statement. Minor objections were made; an amended disclosure statement was filed. The bankruptcy court approved it, votes on the reorganization plans were solicited, and ballots were filed. A year into the bankruptcy, everything was going according to plan. Until it wasn’t. Two weeks before the confirmation hearing, the same day as the deadline to cast a ballot, the debtors informed the Pegaso Equity Holders that they needed the exit financing three days before the confirmation hearing. The debtors believed that this was necessary to comply with their view of the bankruptcy court’s requirement to certify that funding was available. But the Pegaso Equity Holders assert that this was unexpected. The reorganization plans, along with the disclosure statement, provided that the financial contributions were to be made “on the Effective Date”—a date that would not occur until after the Confirmation Order became a final order.

 

 

(…) The court immediately proceeded to consider confirmation. Confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan typically requires the impaired classes of creditors and equity interest holders to accept the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8). When it came time to count the votes, no one in Class 3—the equity interest holders of the pre-petition holding companies—had cast a ballot. But under the Code, if a plan provides that the interests of a class do not entitle the interest holders to “receive or retain any property under the plan on account of” their interests, then they are “deemed not to have accepted a plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 1126(g). The court read the initial reorganization plans to extinguish the pre-petition equity interests without giving those interest holders anything in return. So the court’s solution was to “deem” that Class 3 had rejected the plans. It then confirmed the modified plans via a “cramdown” over the deemed dissent of the Class 3 interest holders. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).

 

 

Modifying a Chapter 11 reorganization plan before confirmation is relatively easy: the “proponent of a plan may modify such plan at any time before confirmation.” 11 U.S.C. § 1127(a). This is by design. The Bankruptcy Code seeks to facilitate negotiation between the debtor and its creditors, equity holders, and other interested parties. Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1127.03[1] (16th ed. 2022). Easy modification allows negotiated outcomes to quickly become part of the plan. But there are a few constraints. The modified plan must still comply with the Code’s substantive requirements for any reorganization plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1127(a). This means that the modification must comply with § 1122’s restrictions on the classification of claims and interests and § 1123’s requirements for the contents of a reorganization plan. Id. An important substantive requirement for our purposes is found in § 1123(a)(4). Unless the disfavored class members consent, the modified plan must “provide the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class.” Id. § 1123(a)(4). There are also procedural constraints. A modification must comply with § 1125’s requirement that claim and interest holders be given “adequate information” about the contents of a plan. Id. § 1127(c). Before a modification is filed, this is accomplished in a disclosure statement, which must be approved by the bankruptcy court as containing adequate information. Id. § 1125(b); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3016(b). A sufficient statement ensures that investors can make an informed vote. See 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).

 

 

Under certain circumstances, when a modification is made after votes are cast based on an old disclosure statement, the debtor must provide a new disclosure statement and call for another round of voting. In re New Power Co., 438 F.3d 1113, 1117–18 (11th Cir. 2006). But not all modifications trigger this requirement. A claim or interest holder is entitled to this procedural protection only if, after a hearing, the bankruptcy court finds that the modification “materially and adversely changes the way that claim or interest holder is treated.” Id. Because these determinations are mixed questions of law and fact, we review them de novo. Id. at 1117.

 

 

The rule provides that if the court finds that “the proposed modification does not adversely change the treatment of the claim of any creditor or the interest of any equity security holder who has not accepted in writing the modification, it shall be deemed accepted by all creditors and equity security holders who have previously accepted the plan.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3019(a) (emphasis added). The key word here is “any.” “Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (citation omitted); accord Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997). The repeated use of the word “any” refers to creditors or equity security holders of whatever kind. The text does not permit any narrower interpretation. The rule therefore requires additional disclosure and voting if the modification materially and adversely affects any creditor or interest holder, not just those voting to accept the plan.

 

 

Our precedent likewise does not distinguish between classes. We have said that “the bankruptcy court may deem a claim or interest holder’s vote for or against a plan as a corresponding vote in relation to a modified plan unless the modification materially and adversely changes the way that claim or interest holder is treated.” New Power, 438 F.3d at 1117–18 (emphasis added). “If it does,” we continued, “the claim or interest holder is entitled to a new disclosure statement and another vote.” Id. at 1118. The text of the rule and our precedent thus both make clear that if a modification materially and adversely changes the treatment of any claim or interest holder who has not accepted the modification in writing, then that claim or interest holder is entitled to a new disclosure statement and resolicitation of votes. So too here.

 

 

To be sure, for a creditor or equity interest holder that already voted to reject a plan, a second rejection vote in response to a modification that materially and adversely affects its interest will have little effect. On the other hand, a creditor or equity interest holder that previously voted to accept a plan benefits from the added disclosure and revoting because it can change its vote to reject the plan—recourse not available to a creditor or equity interest holder that voted to reject the initial plan. But a dissenting vote on a Chapter 11 plan does not give the debtor a free pass to modify the plan to the detriment of that dissenting claim or interest holder. This case shows exactly why a new disclosure statement can protect a claim or interest holder who previously voted to reject the plans. A new disclosure statement with additional time to vote would have given the Pegaso Equity Holders an opportunity to object to the modification on substantive grounds.

 

 

 

Secondary Sources: Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1127.03[1] (16th ed. 2022)

 

 

 

 

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Jan. 5, 2023, Emilio Braun v. America-CV Station Group, Inc., et al., Docket No. 21-13774, Published)

VAT (Swiss Law) - Group of Entities - Tax Evasion (Swiss Law)

VAT (Swiss Law)

 

Déduction de l'impôt préalable

 

Groupe de sociétés

 

Evasion fiscale

 

 

La règle selon laquelle une entité qui fournit ses prestations en son nom, en apparaissant comme prestataire vis-à-vis de l'extérieur, est considérée comme un assujetti distinct, vaut toutefois sous réserve de l'évasion fiscale. C'est donc seulement dans le cas d'évasion fiscale qu'il convient de privilégier l'approche économique et de s'écarter de la construction juridique mise en place

 

 

 

 

Tribunal fédéral suisse

 

2C_846/2022  

 

 

Arrêt du 15 décembre 2022  

 

IIe Cour de droit public  

 

Republication

 

 

Participants à la procédure 

A.________ SA, 

recourante, 

 

contre  

 

Administration fédérale des contributions, Division principale de la taxe sur la valeur ajoutée, Schwarztorstrasse 50, 3003 Berne. 

 

Objet 

TVA 2012 à 2015; déduction de l'impôt préalable, évasion fiscale, 

 

recours contre l'arrêt du Tribunal administratif fédéral, Cour I, du 6 septembre 2022 (A-1706/2021).

 

 

 

 

5.  

L'objet du litige peut être présenté comme suit. La recourante est assujettie à la TVA (art. 10 al. 1 de la loi fédérale du 12 juin 2009 régissant la taxe sur la valeur ajoutée [loi sur la TVA; LTVA; RS 641.20]). Elle a obtenu des prestations de travail à façon ou des prestations de montage fournies par C.________ Sàrl qui répondent à la définition légale de prestations de services imposables (art. 1 al. 2 let. a et 18 al. 1 et 23 a contrario LTVA). Elle a versé à C.________ Sàrl l'impôt facturé par cette dernière, ce qui lui a formellement ouvert le droit à la déduction de l'impôt préalable (art. 28 al. 1 let. a LTVA). Ni l'instance précédente ni l'AFC ne contestent que les conditions de la déduction de l'impôt préalable sont remplies. Elles soutiennent en revanche que les conditions pour admettre l'existence d'une évasion fiscale sont réalisées.

 

 

Est ainsi seule litigieuse la question de savoir si la constitution de C.________ Sàrl et ses relations avec la recourante constituent un cas d'évasion fiscale ayant permis à cette dernière d'économiser l'impôt par la déduction de l'impôt préalable prévue à l'art. 28 LTVA durant les années 2012 et 2013. La recourante s'en défend.

 

 

6.  

 

6.1. La LTVA ne définit pas ce qu'il faut entendre par activité "indépendante ". Elle se limite à préciser à son art. 10 al. 1, 2e phrase - abrogé au 31 décembre 2017 et depuis repris presque mot pour mot par le nouvel art. 10 al. 1bis LTVA (RO 2017 3575) - qu'une personne exploite une entreprise lorsqu'elle exerce à titre indépendant une activité professionnelle ou commerciale en vue de réaliser, à partir de prestations, des recettes ayant un caractère de permanence et lorsqu'elle agit en son propre nom vis-à-vis des tiers (RO 2009 5203). Il est toutefois admis que la question de savoir si une activité doit être qualifiée d'indépendante ou non au sens de la LTVA ne se pose qu'en lien avec des activités professionnelles ou commerciales exercées par des personnes physiques (ATF 138 II 251 consid. 2.4.2; arrêts 2C_387/2020 du 23 novembre 2020 consid. 5.2; 2C_711/2014 du 20 février 2015 consid. 2.2.2; 2C_814/2013 du 3 mars 2014 consid. 2.3.3 et 2C_399/2011 du 13 avril 2012 consid. 2.4.2). Le Tribunal fédéral a en effet posé le principe selon lequel il fallait considérer que les personnes morales exerçaient toujours une activité indépendante, même lorsqu'elles constituaient des filiales d'autres personnes morales et exploitaient une seule et même entreprise avec celles-ci d'un point de vue économique (ATF 142 II 113 consid. 7.3; 138 II 251 consid. 2.4.2).

 

 

Dès lors que l'entreprise remplit les conditions énoncées ci-dessus, elle est en principe considérée comme un assujetti distinct et les prestations qu'elle fournit lui sont attribuées aux fins de l'assujettissement et de l'imposition. Le principe de l'unité de l'entreprise, qui sert à déterminer l'étendue de l'assujettissement d'un contribuable donné, ne joue pas de rôle s'agissant de savoir si l'on est en présence d'un ou de plusieurs contribuables. Il ne permet pas, en particulier, de faire abstraction de la forme juridique pour admettre l'existence d'un seul assujetti en présence de plusieurs entités juridiquement distinctes, mais qui exploitent une seule entreprise d'un point de vue économique. Selon la jurisprudence en matière de taxe sur la valeur ajoutée, la règle selon laquelle une entité qui fournit ses prestations en son nom, en apparaissant comme prestataire vis-à-vis de l'extérieur, est considérée comme un assujetti distinct, vaut toutefois sous réserve de l'évasion fiscale. C'est donc seulement dans le cas d'évasion fiscale qu'il convient de privilégier l'approche économique et de s'écarter de la construction juridique mise en place (arrêt 2C_742/2008 du 11 février 2009 consid. 5 et les nombreuses références citées, qui a reçu l'approbation de la doctrine, cf. Pierre-Marie Glauser, Evasion fiscale : une approche théorique et pratique de l'évasion fiscale, Genève 2010, p. 42).

 

 

6.2. En l'occurrence, la recourante et C.________ Sàrl sont des personnes morales. Elles doivent en principe être considérées comme assujetties distinctes, sous réserve toutefois, comme on vient de le voir, d'un cas d'évasion fiscale.  

 

 

7.  

 

7.1. Selon la jurisprudence, il y a évasion fiscale lorsque (a) la forme juridique choisie par le contribuable apparaît comme insolite, inappropriée ou étrange, en tout cas inadaptée à la situation économique, lorsque, en outre (élément dit objectif), (b) il y a lieu d'admettre que ce choix a été abusivement exercé uniquement dans le but d'économiser des impôts qui seraient dus si les rapports de droit étaient aménagés de façon appropriée (élément dit subjectif), et lorsque (c) le procédé choisi conduirait effectivement à une notable économie d'impôt (élément dit effectif; pour une application détaillée de ces critères, cf. ATF 138 II 239 consid. 4.1 avec renvois).

 

 

7.2. Il convient d'examiner si ces conditions sont remplies sur la base des circonstances concrètes du cas d'espèce. Si tel est le cas, l'imposition doit se fonder sur l'organisation juridique qui aurait été appropriée pour atteindre le but économique visé (cf. ATF 146 II 97 consid. 2.6.2; 142 II 399 consid. 4.2; 138 II 239 consid. 4.1; arrêts 2C_652/2018 du 14 mai 2020 consid. 4.1.1, in : StE 2020 B 27.1 no 61, SVR 2020 LPP no 34 p. 143; 2C_354/2018 du 20 avril 2020 consid. 4.2.1).

 

 

7.3. En l'occurrence, se référant à la décision sur réclamation de l'AFC dont elle fait sien le contenu (arrêt attaqué, consid. 5.1.1), ce qui est admissible et a pour effet d'introduire ces faits dans l'arrêt attaqué (G. Bovey, op. cit., n° 13 ad art. 97 al. 1 LTF et les références citées), l'instance précédente expose que le caractère insolite de la construction mise en place résulte, s'agissant de C.________ Sàrl, de plus d'une vingtaine de faits. Il s'agit de l'absence d' animus societatis, de l'absence de locaux, de l'absence d'actifs, de l'absence de réelle présence sur le marché, de la confusion entre l'assujettie et C.________ Sàrl vis-à-vis des tiers lors de l'établissement des quittances et factures, de l'absence de comptabilité, de charges constituées uniquement de salaires et de matériel de bureau, du fait que les autres charges de fonctionnement de C.________ Sàrl sont supportées uniquement par la recourante, de l'absence d'autorisation de placer du personnel, de l'accès, du droit de regard et des paiements effectués par B.________ sur le compte bancaire de C.________ Sàrl, de paiements effectués depuis le compte bancaire de C.________ Sàrl en faveur de la recourante par son administrateur B.________, du rôle de représentation de C.________ Sàrl exercé par ce dernier, de la confusion entre direction et gestion entre C.________ Sàrl et la recourante, de la dépendance économique importante de C.________ Sàrl par rapport à la recourante et de la sous-traitance alors que B.________ sait que C.________ Sàrl n'a aucun moyen financier.

 

L'arrêt attaqué constate également que B.________ avait prêté à D.________ les 20'000 fr. pour la fondation de C.________ Sàrl, comme cela ressortait du formulaire de demande d'ouverture d'un compte de consignation pour société en formation du 17 avril 2012, qui indiquait également B.________ comme fondateur et ayant-droit économique. Les mouvements d'argent sur le compte opérationnel montraient que le 1er mai 2012 déjà C.________ Sàrl ne disposait plus que de 650 fr. de liquidités et 2'350 fr. de capital social, ce qui était inférieur au minimum légal. Selon les documents bancaires, B.________ était une personne autorisée, ce qui signifiait qu'il avait un accès et un droit de regard sur le compte opérationnel de C.________ Sàrl; ce dernier avait d'ailleurs effectué des paiements au moyen de ce compte en faveur de tiers notamment d'employés, d'assurances, des impôts et de sponsoring. C.________ Sàrl ne disposait que de personnel, mais pas d'actifs immobilisés tels que machines ou mobiliers. Les employés de C.________ Sàrl et ceux engagés séparément par l'assujettie ne disposaient pas d'un savoir-faire distinct pour effectuer des travaux que l'assujettie n'aurait pas été en mesure de fournir. L'assujettie fournissait plus du 80% du chiffre d'affaires de C.________ Sàrl. Les dépenses de cette dernière se limitaient, au vu des documents bancaires à disposition et de l'absence de comptabilité, aux salaires et cotisations sociales. C.________ Sàrl avait en outre été déclarée en faillite à peine une année après avoir été reprise par E.________, qui était administrateur simultanément de plusieurs sociétés en liquidation.

 

 

7.4. Au vu des éléments de faits retenus par l'instance précédente, qui lient le Tribunal fédéral (art. 105 al. 1 LTF) - la recourante ayant échoué à démontrer la réalisation des conditions de l'art. 97 al. 1 LTF pour en modifier le contenu ou pour les supprimer (cf. consid. 3 ci-dessus), force est d'admettre que la constitution de C.________ Sàrl est étrange, en tout cas inadaptée à la situation économique. En effet, C.________ Sàrl n'a eu qu'une brève existence. Les fonds dont elle disposait ont été fournis par B.________. Ce dernier avait un accès et un droit de regard sur le seul compte opérationnel de C.________ Sàrl, ce qui démontre que D.________ n'était que formellement associé gérant inscrit au registre du commerce et que B.________ en était l'administrateur de fait. A cela s'ajoute que C.________ Sàrl avait un chiffre d'affaires dépendant de la recourante pour plus de 80%, avant d'être liquidée à brève échéance par un tiers administrateur habitué à effectuer ce genre de liquidations, une fois que la recourante a cessé de lui confier des travaux. C.________ Sàrl ne pouvait par conséquent pas justifier son existence en dehors des travaux sous-traités par la recourante, quand bien même elle aurait eu quelqu'autres clients. La première condition objective d'une évasion fiscale est par conséquent réalisée.

 

 

7.5. Il est également établi que la structure " recourante - C.________ Sàrl " ne peut pas se justifier pour des raisons commerciales ou personnelles, puisque les employés de C.________ Sàrl et ceux engagés séparément par la recourante ne disposaient pas d'un savoir-faire distinct pour effectuer des travaux que la recourante n'aurait pas été en mesure de fournir. Elle se justifie d'autant moins que C.________ Sàrl ne disposait pas de locaux ni d'actifs immobilisés. La deuxième condition subjective de l'évasion fiscale est ainsi également réalisée.

 

 

7.6. Enfin, comme l'a jugé à bon droit l'instance précédente, l'économie d'impôt que génère la structure insolite mise en place se mesure à l'aune de la situation qui aurait dû exister si elle était appropriée au but économique poursuivi par les parties. En l'occurrence, C.________ Sàrl et la recourante ont produit un chiffre d'affaires imposable qui ne l'aurait pas été ou que partiellement eu égard aux charges de personnel. La recourante n'aurait ainsi pas pu déduire l'impôt préalable d'un montant de 97'605 fr. si elle n'avait pas collaboré avec C.________ Sàrl. A cela s'ajoute que C.________ Sàrl, qui a certes facturé à la recourante l'impôt et en a reçu le paiement par cette dernière, ne s'est jamais acquittée de l'impôt elle-même, ce qui faisait aussi partie du but du montage insolite, géré par l'ayant droit économique de C.________ Sàrl, B.________, qui a fait en sorte, au vu de la brièveté de l'existence de C.________ Sàrl, de sa liquidation rapide et de l'absence de toute comptabilité, que l'impôt perçu par C.________ Sàrl ne soit jamais perçu par l'autorité intimée. La dernière condition de l'évasion fiscale est par conséquent aussi réalisée.

 

 

7.7. La recourante objecte que la confusion entre elle-même et C.________ Sàrl, alors qu'au regard de l'art. 10 LTVA (voir consid. 6.2 ci-dessus) elles sont en principe assujetties de manière distincte, revient à la rendre solidairement responsable de l'impôt dû par C.________ Sàrl. Elle soutient que cela serait contraire à l'art. 15 LTVA qui prévoit de manière exhaustive les cas de responsabilité solidaire, mais ne vise pas le présent cas de figure (cf. consid. 3.2 in fine ci-dessus).  

Cet argument tombe à faux. Il a été exposé ci-dessus (consid. 6.1) que la règle selon laquelle une entité qui fournit ses prestations en son nom, en apparaissant comme prestataire vis-à-vis de l'extérieur, est considérée comme un assujetti distinct, ne vaut que sous réserve de l'évasion fiscale. Celle-ci étant ici établie, il y a lieu de faire abstraction des deux entités distinctes que formaient la recourante et C.________ Sàrl, de sorte que la question de la responsabilité solidaire de l'une envers l'autre ne se pose pas. Elles doivent en effet être considérées comme une entreprise unique exerçant une même activité économique.

 

 

7.8. En jugeant que la recourante ne peut pas faire valoir la déduction de l'impôt préalable d'un montant de 97'605 fr. sur les factures établies par C.________ Sàrl, l'instance précédente n'a pas violé le droit fédéral.

 

 

8.  

Les considérants qui précèdent conduisent au rejet du recours. 

 

Succombant, la recourante doit supporter les frais judiciaires (cf. art. 66 al. 1 LTF). Il n'est pas alloué de dépens (cf. art. 68 al. 1 LTF).

 

 

 

Par ces motifs, le Tribunal fédéral prononce :  

 

 

1.  

Le recours est rejeté.

 

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