University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar

Title VII, Civil Rights, discrimination against an employee: respondent filed suit, alleging two discrete Title VII violations. First, he alleged that Levine’s racially and religiously motivated harassment had resulted in his constructive discharge from the University, in violation of 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a), which prohibits an employer from discriminat­ing against an employee “because of such individual’s race, color, re­ligion, sex, and national origin” (referred to here as status-based dis­crimination). Second, he claimed that Fitz’s efforts to prevent the Hospital from hiring him were in retaliation for complaining about Levine’s harassment, in violation of §2000e–3(a), which prohibits employer retaliation “because an employee has opposed . . . an un­lawful employment practice . . . or . . . made a Title VII charge.” The jury found for respondent on both claims. The Fifth Circuit vacated as to the constructive-discharge claim, but affirmed as to the retaliation finding on the theory that retaliation claims brought un­der §2000e–3(a)—like §2000e–2(a) status-based claims—require only a showing that retaliation was a motivating factor for the adverse employment action, not its but-for cause, see §2000e–2(m). And it found that the evidence supported a finding that Fitz was motivated, at least in part, to retaliate against respondent for his complaints about Levine.

Held: Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to tradi­tional principles of but-for causation, not the lessened causation test stated in §2000e–2(m).

(a) In defining the proper causation standard for Title VII retalia­tion claims, it is presumed that Congress incorporated tort law’s cau­sation in fact standard—i.e., proof that the defendant’s conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff’s injury—absent an indication to the contrary in the statute itself. See Meyer v. Holley, 537 U. S. 280, 285. An em­ployee alleging status-based discrimination under §2000e–2 need not show “but-for” causation. It suffices instead to show that the motive to discriminate was one of the employer’s motives, even if the em­ployer also had other, lawful motives for the decision. This principle is the result of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228, and the ensuing Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act), which substituted a new burden-shifting framework for the one endorsed by Price Waterhouse. As relevant here, that Act added a new subsection to §2000e–2, providing that “an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice,” §2000e–2(m).

Also relevant here is this Court’s decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U. S. 167, 176, which interprets the Age Dis­crimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) phrase “because of . . . age,” 29 U. S. C. §623(a)(1). Gross holds two insights that inform the analysis of this case. The first is textual and concerns the proper interpretation of the term “because” as it relates to the principles of causation underlying both §623(a) and §2000e–3(a). The second is the significance of Congress’ structural choices in both Title VII itself and the 1991 Act.

(b) Title VII’s antiretaliation provision appears in a different sec­tion from its status-based discrimination ban. And, like §623(a)(1), the ADEA provision in Gross, §2000e–3(a) makes it unlawful for an employer to take adverse employment action against an employee “because” of certain criteria. Given the lack of any meaningful textu­al difference between §2000e–3(a) and §623(a)(1), the proper conclu­sion is that Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment ac­tion. Respondent and the United States maintain that §2000e–2(m)’s motivating-factor test applies, but that reading is flawed. First, it is inconsistent with the provision’s plain language, which addresses on­ly race, color, religion, sex, and national origin discrimination and says nothing about retaliation. Second, their reading is inconsistent with the statute’s design and structure. Congress inserted the moti­vating-factor provision as a subsection within §2000e–2, which deals only with status-based discrimination. The conclusion that Congress acted deliberately in omitting retaliation claims from §2000–2(m) is reinforced by the fact that another part of the 1991 Act, §109, ex­pressly refers to all unlawful employment actions. See EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 256. Third, the cases they rely on, which state the general proposition that Congress’ enactment of a broadly phrased antidiscrimination statute may signal a concomitant intent to ban retaliation against individuals who oppose that discrim­ination, see, e.g., CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U. S. 442, 452–453; Gómez-Pérez v. Potter, 553 U. S. 474, do not support the quite different rule that every reference to race, color, creed, sex, or nationality in an antidiscrimination statute is to be treated as a syn­onym for “retaliation,” especially in a precise, complex, and exhaus­tive statute like Title VII. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, which contains seven paragraphs of detailed description of the practices constituting prohibited discrimination, as well as an ex­press antiretaliation provision, and which was passed only a year be­fore §2000e–2(m)’s enactment, shows that when Congress elected to address retaliation as part of a detailed statutory scheme, it did so clearly.

(c) The proper interpretation and implementation of §2000e–3(a) and its causation standard are of central importance to the fair and responsible allocation of resources in the judicial and litigation sys­tems, particularly since retaliation claims are being made with ever ­increasing frequency. Lessening the causation standard could also contribute to the filing of frivolous claims, siphoning resources from efforts by employers, agencies, and courts to combat workplace har­assment.

(d) Respondent and the Government argue that their view would be consistent with longstanding agency views contained in an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidance manual, but the manual’s explanations for its views lack the persuasive force that is a necessary precondition to deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140. Respondent’s final argument—that if §2000e– 2(m) does not control, then the Price Waterhouse standard should—is foreclosed by the 1991 Act’s amendments to Title VII, which displaced the Price Waterhouse framework. 674 F. 3d 448, vacated and remanded. (U.S.S.Ct, 24.06.2013, University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, J. Kennedy).

Titre VII de la loi fédérale sur les droits civils : discrimination par l’employeur  à l’encontre d’un employé : dans cette affaire, le recourant formule deux plaintes contre son employeur. Selon la première, il aurait été victime de harcèlement et d’un licenciement en raison de sa race et de sa religion (en l’espèce c’est l’employé qui a donné sa démission, on parle alors de « constructive discharge »). Selon la seconde, il aurait été victime par l’employeur de mesures de représailles : l’employeur aurait agi pour éviter qu’il puisse continuer d’œuvrer au sein d’un hôpital (il existe un accord entre l’employeur, une université, et l’hôpital, selon lequel les universitaires du domaine médical sont en priorité engagés par l’hôpital). Pour juger du mérite de ces deux plaintes, la Cour décide, ou plutôt rappelle, que deux tests différents s’appliquent suivant que le comportement reproché à l’employeur est direct comme dans le premier cas, ou indirect comme dans le second. Dans le premier cas, même si le comportement répréhensible n’est pas uniquement motivé par des considérations liées à la race ou à la religion, il suffit que la race ou la religion ait joué un rôle dans le comportement critiqué pour que le Titre VII soit violé. Il en va différemment dans le second cas : pour que le comportement de l’employeur ne soit pas admissible sous l’angle du Titre VII, il faut que la partie du comportement motivée par des considérations de race, de religion, ait suffi à entraîner les représailles prohibées. Peu importe dans ce cas que le comportement de l’employeur soit en outre motivé par d’autres raisons. En effet, dans le premier cas, le Titre VII mentionne expressément la race, la couleur, la religion, le sexe, et l’origine, mais pas les représailles. (La loi peut prévoir des exceptions s’agissant du second cas et prévoir que la race, la couleur, la religion, ou l’origine, même si elle n’est pas l’unique cause du comportement dont la partie se plaint, permet de l’emporter dans le cadre d’une action pour représailles fondée sur le Titre VII).

Vance v. Ball State Univ.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1). This provision obviously prohibits discrimination. Under Title VII, an employer’s liability for workplace harassment may depend on the status of the harasser. If the harassing employee is the victim’s co-worker, the employer is liable only if it was negligent in controlling working conditions. In cases in which the harasser is a “supervisor,” however, different rules apply. If the supervisor’s har­assment culminates in a tangible employment action (i.e., “a signifi­cant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits,” Burlington In­dustries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U. S. 742, 761), the employer is strictly liable. But if no tangible employment action is taken, the employer may escape liability by establishing, as an affirmative defense, that (1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior and (2) that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities that the employer provided. Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U. S. 775, 807; Ellerth, supra, at 765. Held: An employee is a “supervisor” for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII only if he or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim. The interpretation of the concept of a supervisor adopted today is one that can be readily applied. An alleged harasser’s supervisor sta­tus will often be capable of being discerned before (or soon after) liti­gation commences and is likely to be resolved as a matter of law be­fore trial. By contrast, the vagueness of the EEOC’s standard would impede the resolution of the issue before trial, possibly requiring the jury to be instructed on two very different paths of analysis, depend­ing on whether it finds the alleged harasser to be a supervisor or merely a co-worker. This approach will not leave employees unprotected against har­assment by co-workers who possess some authority to assign daily tasks. In such cases, a victim can prevail simply by showing that the employer was negligent in permitting the harassment to occur, and the jury should be instructed that the nature and degree of authority wielded by the harasser is an important factor in determining negli­gence. 646 F. 3d 461, affirmed.  (U.S.S.Ct., 24.06.2013, Vance v. Ball State Univ., J. Alito).

Titre VII de la loi fédérale de 1964 sur les droits civils : cette loi prohibe sur la place de travail les actes de discrimination ou de maltraitance basés sur la race, la couleur, la religion, le sexe ou l’origine nationale.  Selon cette loi, la responsabilité d’un employeur pour harassement sur la place de travail peut dépendre du statut de l’employé qui pratique les actes hostiles. Si cet employé est un collègue de la victime et non pas un supérieur hiérarchique, l’employeur ne sera responsable qu’en cas de négligence dans le contrôle des conditions de travail. Si cet employé est un supérieur hiérarchique, l’analyse est différente. Si les actes hostiles de l’employé superviseur conduisent à une action tangible (soit un changement significatif des conditions de travail, tel que le licenciement, une absence de promotion, etc.), l’employeur sera responsable de manière stricte. Mais si les actes hostiles n’ont pas conduit à une action tangible sur la place de travail, l’employeur peut échapper à sa responsabilité en établissant (1) qu’il a exercé une diligence raisonnable pour prévenir et corriger tout acte hostile, et (2) que sans bonne raison,  la victime n’a pas pris avantage des moyens mis à disposition par l’employeur pour prévenir ou corriger les actes hostiles. La présente affaire permet à la Cour de juger qu’un employé doit être considéré comme un supérieur hiérarchique entrainant la responsabilité solidaire de l’employeur au sens du Titre VII seulement si sa fonction telle qu’attribuée par l’employeur lui permet de prendre des actions tangibles affectant la victime. Le but de la simplicité de cette définition est de permettre que la qualité de supérieur hiérarchique soit décidée non pas en cours de procès par le jury qui pourrait être instruit de manière diverse sur ce qu’est au juste un supérieur hiérarchique (la personne malveillante est-elle un supérieur ou un collègue ?) mais dès le début du procès en tant que question juridique. Cette approche ne laisse pas sans protection les employés victimes de harcèlement par des collègues qui ne sont pas des supérieurs hiérarchiques mais qui possèdent certains attributs de ce statut dans l’assignation des tâches quotidiennes. Dans de tels cas, une victime peut l’emporter simplement en démontrant que l’employeur a été négligeant en permettant que la maltraitance se produise, et le jury doit être instruit dans le sens que la nature et le degré d’autorité dont bénéficie l’auteur constituent d’importants facteurs dans la détermination de la négligence.

Descamps v. U.S.

Sentences enhancements: the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) increases the sentences of cer­tain federal defendants who have three prior convictions “for a vio­lent felony,” including “burglary, arson, or extortion.” 18 U. S. C. §924(e). To determine whether a past conviction is for one of those crimes, courts use a “categorical approach”: they compare the statu­tory elements of a prior conviction with the elements of the “generic” crime―i.e., the offense as commonly understood. If the statute’s ele­ments are the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense, the prior conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate. When a prior conviction is for violating a “divisible statute”—one that sets out one or more of the elements in the alternative, e.g., burglary involving en­try into a building or an automobile—a “modified categorical ap­proach” is used. That approach permits sentencing courts to consult a limited class of documents, such as indictments and jury instruc­tions, to determine which alternative element formed the basis of the defendant’s prior conviction. Because a sentenc­ing court cannot tell, simply by looking at a divisible statute, which version of the offense a defendant was convicted of, the court is per­mitted to consult extra-statutory documents—but only to assess whether the defendant was convicted of the particular “statutory def­inition” that corresponds to the generic offense. Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U. S. 29, and Johnson v. United States, 559 U. S. 133, also em­phasized this elements-based rationale for the modified categorical approach; Taylor’s elements-centric categorical approach comports with ACCA’s text and history, avoids Sixth Amendment concerns that would arise from sentencing courts’ making factual findings that properly belong to juries, and averts “the practical difficulties and po­tential unfairness of a factual approach.” 495 U. S., at 601 (U.S.S.Ct., Descamps v. U.S., 20.06.2013, J. Kagan).

Une loi pénale fédérale aggrave une peine à laquelle certains prévenus de crimes fédéraux ont été condamnés, pour autant qu’ils aient par le passé été condamnés à trois reprises pour certains crimes graves et violents (violent felonies), tels que « burglary », «incendie volontaire », et extorsion. Pour déterminer si une condamnation antérieure entre dans la catégorie de ces crimes graves et violents, les Tribunaux utilisent le critère de l’approche catégorique, par laquelle les éléments statutaires de la précédente condamnation sont comparés aux éléments de l’infraction dite générique, soit selon les exemples ci-dessus, les infractions de « burgalry », incendie volontaire, et extorsion. Lorsqu’une des condamnations antérieures est fondée sur une règle alternative, soit qui reprend certains éléments de l’infraction grave et violente en question, l’autorité appelée à juger la dernière infraction et qui doit se prononcer sur l’aggravation de la peine est autorisée de manière très limitée à consulter certains documents, parfois très anciens, liés à la procédure antérieure (comme par exemple l’acte d’accusation ou les instructions données au jury). Mais guère davantage, car donner connaissance à l’autorité ultérieure des faits résultants de la procédure antérieure reviendrait à éventuellement violer le Sixième Amendement, permettant au Tribunal ultérieur d’évaluer des faits, tâche réservée au jury.

American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant

Arbitration : exclusion of class actions : an agreement between petitioners, American Express and a subsidiary, and respondents, merchants who accept American Express cards, re­quires all of their disputes to be resolved by arbitration and provides that there “shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbi­trated on a class action basis.” (…) Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. Animal Feeds International Corp., 559 U. S. 662, which held that a party may not be compelled to submit to class arbitration absent an agreement to do so.

The FAA does not permit courts to invalidate a contractual waiv­er of class arbitration on the ground that the plaintiff’s cost of indi­vidually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery. The FAA reflects the overarching principle that arbitration is a matter of contract. See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U. S. ___, ___. Courts must “rigorously enforce” arbitration agree­ments according to their terms, Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213, 221, even for claims alleging a violation of a federal statute, unless the FAA’s mandate has been “ ‘overridden by a contra­ry congressional command,’ ” CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U. S. ___, ___. (U.S.S.Ct., 20.06.2013, American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, J. Scalia).

                                                                                               

Arbitrage : exclusion par convention de toute action arbitrale de classe. Si les parties à un contrat prévoient de régler leurs éventuels litiges par arbitrage et non devant les tribunaux, en précisant que les arbitrages seront individuels et les actions arbitrales de classe exclues, une partie de pourra pas, en cas de litige, intenter une telle action de classe. Pas même si elle allègue qu’un arbitrage individuel n’a pas de sens du fait que la procédure coûterait beaucoup plus cher que le gain éventuel obtenu du procès (la présente espèce concernait une partie qui entendait intenter une action arbitrale de classe basée sur le §1 du Sherman Act et le §4 du Clayton Act). De manière générale, les tribunaux doivent rigoureusement donner effet aux conventions d’arbitrage conformément aux termes de ces conventions, même s’agissant des prétentions fondées sur la violation d’une loi fédérale, sauf intention contraire du Congrès fédéral.

Agency for Int’l Development v. Alliance for Open Society Int’l, Inc.

First Amendment, freedom of speech: in the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (Leadership Act), 22 U. S. C. §7601 et seq., Con­gress has authorized the appropriation of billions of dollars to fund efforts by nongovernmental organizations to combat HIV/AIDS worldwide. The Act imposes two related conditions: (1) No funds “may be used to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution,” §7631(e); and (2) No funds may be used by an organiza­tion “that does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution,”§7631(f). To enforce the second condition, known as the Policy Re­quirement, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) require funding recipients to agree in their award docu­ments that they oppose prostitution;

Held: The Policy Requirement violates the First Amendment by com­pelling as a condition of federal funding the affirmation of a belief that by its nature cannot be confined within the scope of the Gov­ernment program.

The Policy Requirement mandates that recipients of federal funds explicitly agree with the Government’s policy to oppose prosti­tution. The First Amendment, however, “prohibits the government from telling people what they must say.” Rumsfeld v. Forum for Ac­ademic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U. S. 47, 61. As a direct regulation, the Policy Requirement would plainly violate the First Amendment. The question is whether the Government may nonethe­less impose that requirement as a condition of federal funding (…) Rust illustrates the distinction. In that case, the Court considered Title X of the Public Health Service Act, which authorized grants to health-care organizations offering family planning services, but pro­hibited federal funds from being “used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning.” 500 U. S., at 178. To enforce the pro­vision, HHS regulations barred Title X projects from advocating abor­tion and required grantees to keep their Title X projects separate from their other projects. The regulations were valid, the Court ex­plained, because they governed only the scope of the grantee’s Title X projects, leaving the grantee free to engage in abortion advocacy through programs that were independent from its Title X projects. Because the regulations did not prohibit speech “outside the scope of the federally funded program,” they did not run afoul of the First Amendment. Id., at 197 (…). By demanding that funding re­cipients adopt and espouse, as their own, the Government’s view on an issue of public concern, the Policy Requirement by its very nature affects “protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program.” Rust, supra, at 197 (…) It requires them to pledge al­legiance to the Government’s policy of eradicating prostitution. That condition on funding violates the First Amendment (U.S.S.Ct., 20.06.2013, Agency for Int’l Development v. Alliance for Open Society Int’l, Inc., CJ Roberts).

Premier Amendement : liberté d’expression : le Congrès fédéral a autorisé par une loi fédérale le prélèvement de plusieurs millions de dollars en faveur d’organisations non gouvernementales dédiées au combat contre le VIH/SIDA. Pour bénéficier de ces fonds, la loi impose deux conditions cumulatives : ces fonds ne peuvent pas être utilisés pour la promotion ou pour des efforts visant à la légalisation de la prostitution, et ces fonds ne peuvent pas être attribués à des organisations dépourvues d’une politique qui s’oppose explicitement à la prostitution. Les organisations candidates aux subventions doivent signer un document indiquant que l’organisation s’oppose à la prostitution. La Cour considère que la première condition résiste à une analyse sous l’angle du Premier Amendement, mais pas la seconde condition. En effet, selon le Premier Amendement, le gouvernement ne peut prescrire à la population ce qu’il peut exprimer. La violation de la seconde condition précitée est donc évidente, mais il reste à examiner si le gouvernement peut néanmoins imposer cette condition, comprise comme une condition pour recevoir une subvention fédérale, à laquelle l’organisation est libre de renoncer. La Cour indique qu’il est loisible au législateur de prévoir que les programmes subventionnés soient soumis à des conditions (comme ici ne pas promouvoir la prostitution, ou dans une autre affaire ne pas promouvoir l’avortement), ce qui laisse libre l’organisation, dans d’autres de ses programmes qui ne sont pas subventionnés, de prendre des options libres face par exemple comme ici à la question de la prostitution (ou de l’avortement comme dans l’autre exemple).